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QUESTION CXLI.

OF TEMPERANCE.

(*In Eight Articles.*)

In the next place we must consider temperance: (1) Temperance itself: (2) its parts: (3) its precepts. With regard to temperance we must consider (1) temperance itself: (2) the contrary vices.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether temperance is a virtue? (2) Whether it is a special virtue? (3) Whether it is only about desires and pleasures? (4) Whether it is only about pleasures of touch? (5) Whether it is about pleasures of taste, as such, or only as a kind of touch? (6) What is the rule of temperance? (7) Whether it is a cardinal, or principal, virtue? (8) Whether it is the greatest of virtues?

First Article.

WHETHER TEMPERANCE IS A VIRTUE?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that temperance is not a virtue. For no virtue goes against the inclination of nature, since there is in us a natural aptitude for virtue, as stated in *Ethic.* ii. 1. Now temperance withdraws us from pleasures to which nature inclines, according to *Ethic.* ii. 3, 8. Therefore temperance is not a virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, Virtues are connected with one another, as stated above (I.-II., Q. LXV., A. 1). But some people have temperance without having the other virtues: for we find many who are temperate, and yet covetous or timid. Therefore temperance is not a virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, To every virtue there is a corresponding gift, as appears from what we have said above (I.-II., Q. LXVIII.). But seemingly no gift corresponds to temperance, since all the gifts have been already ascribed to the other virtues, in the preceding Questions. Therefore temperance is not a virtue.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*Music.* vi. 15): *Temperance is the name of a virtue.*

I answer that, As stated above (I.-II., Q. LV., A. 3), it is essential to virtue to incline man to good. Now the good of man is to be in accordance with reason, as Dionysius states (*Div. Nom.* iv. 4). Hence human virtue is that which inclines man to something in accordance with reason. Now temperance evidently inclines man to this, since its very name implies moderation or temperateness, which reason causes. Therefore temperance is a virtue.

Reply Obj. 1. Nature inclines everything to whatever is becoming to it. Wherefore man naturally desires pleasures that are becoming to him. Since, however, man as such is a rational being, it follows that those pleasures are becoming to man which are in accordance with reason. From such pleasures temperance does not withdraw him, but from those which are contrary to reason. Wherefore it is clear that temperance is not contrary to the inclination of human nature, but is in accord with it. It is, however, contrary to the inclination of the animal nature that is not subject to reason.

Reply Obj. 2. The temperance which fulfils the conditions of perfect virtue is not without prudence, while this is lacking to all who are in sin. Hence those who lack other virtues, through being subject to the opposite vices, have not the temperance which is a virtue, though they do acts of temperance from a certain natural disposition, in so far as certain imperfect virtues are either natural to man, as

stated above (I.-II., Q. LXIII., A. 1), or acquired by habituation, which virtues, through lack of prudence, are not perfected by reason, as stated above (I.-II., Q. LXV., A. 1).

Reply Obj. 3. Temperance also has a corresponding gift, namely, fear, whereby man is withheld from the pleasures of the flesh, according to Ps. cxviii. 120: *Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear.* The gift of fear has for its principal object God, Whom it avoids offending, and in this respect it corresponds to the virtue of hope, as stated above (Q. XIX., A. 9, *ad* 1). But it may have for its secondary object whatever a man shuns in order to avoid offending God. Now man stands in the greatest need of the fear of God in order to shun those things which are most seductive, and these are the matter of temperance: wherefore the gift of fear corresponds to temperance also.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER TEMPERANCE IS A SPECIAL VIRTUE?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that temperance is not a special virtue. For Augustine says (*De Morib. Eccl.* xv., xix.) that *it belongs to temperance to preserve one's integrity and freedom from corruption for God's sake.* But this is common to every virtue. Therefore temperance is not a special virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, Ambrose says (*De Offic.* i.) that *what we observe and seek most in temperance is tranquillity of soul.* But this is common to every virtue. Therefore temperance is not a special virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, Tully says (*De Offic.* i.) that *we cannot separate the beautiful from the virtuous,* and that *whatever is just is beautiful.* Now the beautiful is considered as proper to temperance, according to the same authority (*ibid.*). Therefore temperance is not a special virtue.

On the contrary, The Philosopher (*Ethic.* ii. 7; iii. 10) reckons it a special virtue.

I answer that, It is customary in human speech to employ a common term in a restricted sense in order to designate

the principal things to which that common term is applicable: thus the word *city* is used antonomastically* to designate Rome. Accordingly the word *temperance* has a twofold acceptation. First, in accordance with its common signification: and thus temperance is not a special but a general virtue, because the word *temperance* signifies a certain temperateness or moderation, which reason appoints to human operations and passions: and this is common to every moral virtue. Yet there is a logical difference between temperance and fortitude, even if we take them both as general virtues: since temperance withdraws man from things which seduce the appetite from obeying reason, while fortitude incites him to endure or withstand those things on account of which he forsakes the good of reason.

On the other hand, if we take temperance antonomastically, as withholding the appetite from those things which are most seductive to man, it is a special virtue, for thus it has, like fortitude, a special matter.

Reply Obj. 1. Man's appetite is corrupted chiefly by those things which seduce him into forsaking the rule of reason and Divine law. Wherefore integrity, which Augustine ascribes to temperance, can, like the latter, be taken in two ways: first, in a general sense, and secondly in a sense of excellence.

Reply Obj. 2. The things about which temperance is concerned have a most disturbing effect on the soul, for the reason that they are natural to man, as we shall state further on (AA. 4, 5). Hence tranquillity of soul is ascribed to temperance by way of excellence, although it is a common property of all the virtues.

Reply Obj. 3. Although beauty is becoming to every virtue, it is ascribed to temperance, by way of excellence, for two reasons. First, in respect of the generic notion of temperance, which consists in a certain moderate and fitting proportion, and this is what we understand by beauty, as attested by Dionysius (*Div. Nom.* iv. 1). Secondly, because the things from which temperance withholds us, hold the

* Cf. Q. CXXV., A. 2, footnote.

lowest place in man, and are becoming to him by reason of his animal nature, as we shall state further on (AA. 4, 5: Q. CXLII., A. 4), wherefore it is natural that such things should defile him. In consequence beauty is a foremost attribute of temperance which above all hinders man from being defiled. In like manner honesty* is a special attribute of temperance: for Isidore says (*Etym.* x.): *An honest man is one who has no defilement, for honesty means an honourable state.* This is most applicable to temperance, which withstands the vices that bring most dishonour on man, as we shall state further on (Q. CXLII., A. 4).

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER TEMPERANCE IS ONLY ABOUT DESIRES AND PLEASURES?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that temperance is not only about desires and pleasures. For Tully says (*De Inv. Rhet.* ii.) that *temperance is reason's firm and moderate mastery of lust and other wanton emotions of the mind.* Now all the passions of the soul are called emotions of the mind. Therefore it seems that temperance is not only about desires and pleasures.

Obj. 2. Further, *Virtue is about the difficult and the good.* Now it seems more difficult to temper fear, especially with regard to dangers of death, than to moderate desires and pleasures, which are despised on account of deadly pains and dangers, according to Augustine (QQ. LXXXIII., qu. 36). Therefore it seems that the virtue of temperance is not chiefly about desires and pleasures.

Obj. 3. Further, According to Ambrose (*De Offic.* i.) *the grace of moderation belongs to temperance:* and Tully says (*De Offic.* ii.) that *it is the concern of temperance to calm all disturbances of the mind and to enforce moderation.* Now

* Honesty must be taken here in its broad sense as synonymous with moral goodness, from the point of view of decorum: cf. Q. CXLV., A. 1.

moderation is needed, not only in desires and pleasures, but also in external acts and whatever pertains to the exterior. Therefore temperance is not only about desires and pleasures.

On the contrary, Isidore says in his *Etymologies** that *it is temperance whereby lust and desire are kept under control.*

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CXXIII., A. 1: Q. CXXVI., A. 1), it belongs to moral virtue to safeguard the good of reason against the passions that rebel against reason. Now the movement of the soul's passions is twofold, as stated above (I.-II., Q. XXIII., A. 2), when we were treating of the passions: the one, whereby the sensitive appetite pursues sensible and bodily goods, the other whereby it flies from sensible and bodily evils.

The first of these movements of the sensitive appetite rebels against reason chiefly by lack of moderation. Because sensible and bodily goods, considered in their species, are not in opposition to reason, but are subject to it as instruments which reason employs in order to attain its proper end: and that they are opposed to reason is owing to the fact that the sensitive appetite fails to tend towards them in accord with the mode of reason. Hence it belongs properly to moral virtue to moderate those passions which denote a pursuit of the good.

On the other hand, the movement of the sensitive appetite in flying from sensible evil is mostly in opposition to reason, not through being immoderate, but chiefly in respect of its flight: because, when a man flies from sensible and bodily evils, which sometimes accompany the good of reason, the result is that he flies from the good of reason. Hence it belongs to moral virtue to make man while flying from evil to remain firm in the good of reason.

Accordingly, just as the virtue of fortitude, which by its very nature bestows firmness, is chiefly concerned with the passion, viz. fear, which regards flight from bodily evils, and consequently with daring, which attacks the objects of fear in the hope of attaining some good, so, too, temperance,

* The words quoted do not occur in the work referred to.

which denotes a kind of moderation, is chiefly concerned with those passions that tend towards sensible goods, viz. desire and pleasure, and consequently with the sorrows that arise from the absence of those pleasures. For just as daring presupposes objects of fear, so too suchlike sorrow arises from the absence of the aforesaid pleasures.

Reply Obj. 1. As stated above (I.-II., Q. XXIII., AA. 1, 2: Q. XXV., A. 1), when we were treating of the passions, those passions which pertain to avoidance of evil, presuppose the passions pertaining to the pursuit of good; and the passions of the irascible presuppose the passions of the concupiscible. Hence, while temperance directly moderates the passions of the concupiscible which tend towards good, as a consequence, it moderates all the other passions, inasmuch as moderation of the passions that precede results in moderation of the passions that follow: since he that is not immoderate in desire is moderate in hope, and grieves moderately for the absence of the things he desires.

Reply Obj. 2. Desire denotes an impulse of the appetite towards the object of pleasure, and this impulse needs control, which belongs to temperance. On the other hand fear denotes a withdrawal of the mind from certain evils, against which man needs firmness of mind, which fortitude bestows. Hence temperance is properly about desires, and fortitude about fears.

Reply Obj. 3. External acts proceed from the internal passions of the soul: wherefore their moderation depends on the moderation of the internal passions.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER TEMPERANCE IS ONLY ABOUT DESIRES AND PLEASURES OF TOUCH?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that temperance is not only about desires and pleasures of touch. For Augustine says (*De Morib. Eccl.* x.) that *the function of temperance is to control and quell the desires which draw us to the things which with-*

draw us from the laws of God and from the fruit of His goodness; and a little further on he adds that *it is the duty of temperance to spurn all bodily allurements and popular praise.* Now we are withdrawn from God's laws not only by the desire for pleasures of touch, but also by the desire for pleasures of the other senses, for these, too, belong to the bodily allurements, and again by the desire for riches or for worldly glory: wherefore it is written (1 Tim. vi. 10): *Desire* is the root of all evils.* Therefore temperance is not only about desires of pleasures of touch.

Obj. 2. Further, The Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iv. 3) that *one who is worthy of small things and deems himself worthy of them is temperate, but he is not magnificent.* Now honours, whether small or great, of which he is speaking there, are an object of pleasure, not of touch, but in the soul's apprehension. Therefore temperance is not only about desires for pleasures of touch.

Obj. 3. Further, Things that are of the same genus would seem to pertain to the matter of a particular virtue under one same aspect. Now all pleasures of sense are apparently of the same genus. Therefore they all equally belong to the matter of temperance.

Obj. 4. Further, Spiritual pleasures are greater than the pleasures of the body, as stated above (I.-II., Q. XXXI., A. 5) in the treatise on the passions. Now sometimes men forsake God's laws and the state of virtue through desire for spiritual pleasures, for instance, through curiosity in matters of knowledge: wherefore the devil promised man knowledge, saying (Gen. iii. 5): *Ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil.* Therefore temperance is not only about pleasures of touch.

Obj. 5. Further, If pleasures of touch were the proper matter of temperance, it would follow that temperance is about all pleasures of touch. But it is not about all, for instance, about those which occur in games. Therefore pleasures of touch are not the proper matter of temperance.

* *Cupiditas,* which the Douay version following the Greek φιλαργυρία renders *desire of money.*

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iii. 10) that *temperance is properly about desires of pleasures of touch.*

I answer that, As stated above (A. 3), temperance is about desires and pleasures in the same way as fortitude is about fear and daring. Now fortitude is about fear and daring with respect to the greatest evils whereby nature itself is dissolved; and such are dangers of death. Wherefore in like manner temperance must needs be about desires for the greatest pleasures. And since pleasure results from a natural operation, it is so much the greater according as it results from a more natural operation. Now to animals the most natural operations are those which preserve the nature of the individual by means of meat and drink, and the nature of the species by the union of the sexes. Hence temperance is properly about pleasures of meat and drink and sexual pleasures. Now these pleasures result from the sense of touch. Wherefore it follows that temperance is about pleasures of touch.

Reply Obj. 1. In the passage quoted Augustine apparently takes temperance, not as a special virtue having a determinate matter, but as concerned with the moderation of reason, in any matter whatever: and this is a general condition of every virtue. However, we may also reply that if a man can control the greatest pleasures, much more can he control lesser ones. Wherefore it belongs chiefly and properly to temperance to moderate desires and pleasures of touch, and secondarily other pleasures.

Reply Obj. 2. The Philosopher takes temperance as denoting moderation in external things, when, to wit, a man tends to that which is proportionate to him, but not as denoting moderation in the soul's emotions, which pertains to the virtue of temperance.

Reply Obj. 3. The pleasures of the other senses play a different part in man and in other animals. For in other animals pleasures do not result from the other senses save in relation to sensibles of touch: thus the lion is pleased to see the stag, or to hear its voice, in relation to his food. On the other hand, man derives pleasure from the other

senses, not only for this reason, but also on account of the becomingness of the sensible object. Wherefore temperance is about the pleasures of the other senses, in relation to pleasures of touch, not principally but consequently: while in so far as the sensible objects of the other senses are pleasant on account of their becomingness, as when a man is pleased at a well-harmonized sound, this pleasure has nothing to do with the preservation of nature. Hence these passions are not of such importance that temperance can be referred to them antonomastically.

Reply Obj. 4. Although spiritual pleasures are by their nature greater than bodily pleasures, they are not so perceptible to the senses, and consequently they do not so strongly affect the sensitive appetite, against whose impulse the good of reason is safeguarded by moral virtue. We may also reply that spiritual pleasures, strictly speaking, are in accordance with reason, wherefore they need no control, save accidentally, in so far as one spiritual pleasure is a hindrance to another greater and more binding.

Reply Obj. 5. Not all pleasures of touch regard the preservation of nature, and consequently it does not follow that temperance is about all pleasures of touch.

Fifth Article.

whether temperance is about the pleasures proper to the taste?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that temperance is about pleasures proper to the taste. For pleasures of the taste result from food and drink, which are more necessary to man's life than sexual pleasures, which regard the touch. But according to what has been said (A. 4), temperance is about pleasures in things that are necessary to human life. Therefore temperance is about pleasures proper to the taste rather than about those proper to the touch.

Obj. 2. Further, Temperance is about the passions rather than about things themselves. Now, according to *De*

Anima ii. text. 28, *the touch is the sense of food*, as regards the very substance of the food, whereas savour which is the proper object of the taste, is the pleasing quality of the food. Therefore temperance is about the taste rather than about the touch.

Obj. 3. Further, According to *Ethic.* vii. 4, 7: iii. 10, temperance and intemperance are about the same things, as continence and incontinence, perseverance, and effeminacy, to which delicacy pertains. Now delicacy seems to regard the delight taken in savours which are the object of the taste. Therefore temperance is about pleasures proper to the taste.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iii. 10) that *seemingly temperance and intemperance have little if anything to do with the taste.*

I answer that, As stated above (A. 4), temperance is about the greatest pleasures, which chiefly regard the preservation of human life either in the species or in the individual. In these matters certain things are to be considered as principal and others as secondary. The principal thing is the use itself of the necessary means, of the woman who is necessary for the preservation of the species, or of food and drink which are necessary for the preservation of the individual: while the very use of these necessary things has a certain essential pleasure annexed thereto.

In regard to either use we consider as secondary whatever makes the use more pleasurable, such as beauty and adornment in woman, and a pleasing savour and likewise odour in food. Hence temperance is chiefly about the pleasure of touch, that results essentially from the use of these necessary things, which use is in all cases attained by the touch. Secondarily, however, temperance and intemperance are about pleasures of the taste, smell, or sight, inasmuch as the sensible objects of these senses conduce to the pleasurable use of the necessary things that have relation to the touch. But since the taste is more akin to the touch than the other senses are, it follows that temperance is more about the taste than about the other senses.

Reply Obj. 1. The use of food and the pleasure that essentially results therefrom pertain to the touch. Hence the Philosopher says (*De Anima* ii. text. 28) that *touch is the sense of food*, for the food is hot or cold, wet or dry. To the taste belongs the discernment of savours, which make the food pleasant to eat, in so far as they are signs of its being suitable for nourishment.

Reply Obj. 2. The pleasure resulting from savour is additional, so to speak, whereas the pleasure of touch results essentially from the use of food and drink.

Reply Obj. 3. Delicacy regards principally the substance of the food, but secondarily it regards its delicious savour and the way in which it is served.

Sixth Article.

Whether the rule of temperance depends on the needs of the present life?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the rule of temperance does not depend on the needs of the present life. For higher things are not regulated according to lower. Now, as temperance is a virtue of the soul, it is above the needs of the body. Therefore the rule of temperance does not depend on the needs of the body.

Obj. 2. Further, Whoever exceeds a rule sins. Therefore if the needs of the body were the rule of temperance, it would be a sin against temperance to indulge in any other pleasure than those required by nature, which is content with very little. But this would seem unreasonable.

Obj. 3. Further, No one sins in observing a rule. Therefore if the need of the body were the rule of temperance, there would be no sin in using any pleasure for the needs of the body, for instance, for the sake of health. But this is apparently false. Therefore the need of the body is not the rule of temperance.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Morib. Eccl.* xxi.): *In both Testaments the temperate man finds confirmation of*

the rule forbidding him to love the things of this life, or to deem any of them desirable for its own sake, and commanding him to avail himself of those things with the moderation of a user, not the attachment of a lover, in so far as they are requisite for the needs of this life and of his station.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1: Q. CIX., A. 2: Q. CXXIII., A. 1), the good of moral virtue consists chiefly in the order of reason: because *man's good is to be in accord with reason,* as Dionysius asserts (*Div. Nom.* iv. 4). Now the principal order of reason is that by which it directs certain things towards their end, and the good of reason consists chiefly in this order; since good has the aspect of end, and the end is the rule of whatever is directed to the end. Now all the pleasurable objects that are at man's disposal, are directed to some necessity of this life as to their end. Wherefore temperance takes the need of this life, as the rule of the pleasurable objects of which it makes use, and uses them only for as much as the need of this life requires.

Reply Obj. 1. As stated in the body of the Article, the need of this life is regarded as a rule in so far as it is an end. Now it must be observed that sometimes the end of the worker differs from the end of the work, thus it is clear that the end of building is a house, whereas sometimes the end of the builder is profit. Accordingly the end and rule of temperance itself is happiness; while the end and rule of the thing it makes use of is the need of human life, to which whatever is useful for life is subordinate.

Reply Obj. 2. The need of human life may be taken in two ways. First, it may be taken in the sense in which we apply the term *necessary* to that without which a thing cannot be at all; thus food is necessary to an animal. Secondly, it may be taken for something without which a thing cannot be becomingly. Now temperance regards not only the former of these needs, but also the latter. Wherefore the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iii. 11) that *the temperate man desires pleasant things for the sake of health, or for the sake of a sound condition of body.* Other things that are not neces-

sary for this purpose may be divided into two classes. For some are a hindrance to health and a sound condition of body; and these temperance makes no use of whatever, for this would be a sin against temperance. But others are not a hindrance to those things, and these temperance uses moderately, according to the demands of place and time, and in keeping with those among whom one dwells. Hence the Philosopher (*ibid.*) says that the *temperate man also desires suchlike pleasant things*, those namely that are not necessary for health or a sound condition of body, *so long as they are not prejudicial to these things.*

Reply Obj. 3. As stated in the body of the Article, temperance regards need according to the requirements of life, and this depends not only on the requirements of the body, but also on the requirements of external things, such as riches and station, and more still on the requirements of good conduct. Hence the Philosopher adds (*loc. cit.*) that *the temperate man makes use of pleasant things provided that not only they be not prejudicial to health and a sound bodily condition, but also that they be not inconsistent with good*, i.e. good conduct, nor *extravagant beyond his substance*, i.e. his means. And Augustine says (*De Morib. Eccl.* xxi.) that the *temperate man considers the need* not only *of this life* but also *of his station.*

Seventh Article.

whether temperance is a cardinal virtue?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that temperance is not a cardinal virtue. For the good of moral virtue depends on reason. But temperance is about those things that are furthest removed from reason, namely about pleasures common to us and the lower animals, as stated in *Ethic.* iii. 10. Therefore temperance, seemingly, is not a principal virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, The greater the impetus the more difficult is it to control. Now anger, which is controlled by meekness, seems to be more impetuous than desire, which is controlled by temperance. For it is written (Prov. xxvii. 4): *Anger*

hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh forth; and who can bear the violence [*impetum*] *of one provoked?* Therefore meekness is a principal virtue rather than temperance.

Obj. 3. Further, Hope as a movement of the soul takes precedence of desire and concupiscence, as stated above (I.-II., Q. XXV., A. 4). But humility controls the presumption of immoderate hope. Therefore, seemingly, humility is a principal virtue rather than temperance which controls concupiscence.

On the contrary, Gregory reckons temperance among the principal virtues (*Moral.* ii.).

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CXXIII., A. 11: Q. LXI., A. 3), a principal or cardinal virtue is so called because it has a foremost claim to praise on account of one of those things that are requisite for the notion of virtue in general. Now moderation, which is requisite in every virtue, deserves praise principally in pleasures of touch, with which temperance is concerned, both because these pleasures are most natural to us, so that it is more difficult to abstain from them, and to control the desire for them, and because their objects are more necessary to the present life, as stated above (A. 4). For this reason temperance is reckoned a principal or cardinal virtue.

Reply Obj. 1. The longer the range of its operation, the greater is the agent's power (*virtus*) shown to be: wherefore the very fact that the reason is able to moderate desires and pleasures that are furthest removed from it, proves the greatness of reason's power. This is how temperance comes to be a principal virtue.

Reply Obj. 2. The impetuousness of anger is caused by an accident, for instance, a painful hurt; wherefore it soon passes, although its impetus be great. On the other hand, the impetuousness of the desire for pleasures of touch proceeds from a natural cause, wherefore it is more lasting and more general, and consequently its control regards a more principal virtue.

Reply Obj. 3. The object of hope is higher than the object of desire, wherefore hope is accounted the principal passion

in the irascible. But the objects of desires and pleasures of touch move the appetite with greater force, since they are more natural. Therefore temperance, which appoints the mean in such things, is a principal virtue.

Eighth Article.

Whether temperance is the greatest of the virtues?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that temperance is the greatest of the virtues. For Ambrose says (*De Offic.* i.) that *what we observe and seek most in temperance is the safeguarding of what is honourable, and the regard for what is beautiful.* Now virtue deserves praise for being honourable and beautiful. Therefore temperance is the greatest of the virtues.

Obj. 2. Further, The more difficult the deed the greater the virtue. Now it is more difficult to control desires and pleasures of touch than to regulate external actions, the former pertaining to temperance and the latter to justice. Therefore temperance is a greater virtue than justice.

Obj. 2. Further, Seemingly the more general a thing is, the more necessary and the better it is. Now fortitude is about dangers of death which occur less frequently than pleasures of touch, for these occur every day; so that temperance is in more general use than fortitude. Therefore temperance is a more excellent virtue than fortitude.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*Rhet.* i. 9) that the *greatest virtues are those which are most profitable to others, for which reason we give the greatest honour to the brave and the just.*

I answer that, As the Philosopher declares (*Ethic.* i. 2) *the good of the many is more godlike than the good of the individual,* wherefore the more a virtue regards the good of the many, the better it is. Now justice and fortitude regard the good of the many more than temperance does, since justice regards the relations between one man and another, while fortitude regards dangers of battle which are endured for the common

weal: whereas temperance moderates only the desires and pleasures which affect man himself. Hence it is evident that justice and fortitude are more excellent virtues than temperance: while prudence and the theological virtues are more excellent still.

Reply Obj. 1. Honour and beauty are especially ascribed to temperance, not on account of the excellence of the good proper to temperance, but on account of the disgrace of the contrary evil from which it withdraws us, by moderating the pleasures common to us and the lower animals.

Reply Obj. 2. Since virtue is about the difficult and the good, the excellence of a virtue is considered more under the aspect of good, wherein justice excels, than under the aspect of difficult, wherein temperance excels.

Reply Obj. 3. That which is general because it regards the many conduces more to the excellence of goodness, than that which is general because it occurs frequently: fortitude excels in the former way, temperance in the latter. Hence fortitude is greater simply, although in some respect temperance may be described as greater not only than fortitude but also than justice.

QUESTION CXLII.

OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO TEMPERANCE.

(*In Four Articles.*)

We must now consider the vices opposed to temperance. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether insensibility is a sin? (2) Whether intemperance is a childish sin? (3) Of the comparison between intemperance and timidity. (4) Whether intemperance is the most disgraceful of vices?

First Article.

WHETHER INSENSIBILITY IS A VICE?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that insensibility is not a vice. For those are called insensible who are deficient with regard to pleasures of touch. Now seemingly it is praiseworthy and virtuous to be altogether deficient in such matters: for it is written (Dan. x. 2, 3): *In those days I Daniel mourned the days of three weeks, I ate no desirable bread, and neither flesh nor wine entered my mouth, neither was I anointed with ointment.* Therefore insensibility is not a sin.

Obj. 2. Further, *Man's good is to be in accord with reason,* according to Dionysius (*Div. Nom.* iv. 4). Now abstinence from all pleasures of touch is most conducive to man's progress in the good of reason: for it is written (Dan. i. 17) that *to* the *children* who took pulse for their food (*verse* 12), *God gave knowledge, and understanding in every book, and wisdom.* Therefore insensibility, which rejects these pleasures altogether, is not sinful.

Obj. 3. Further, That which is a very effective means of

avoiding sin would seem not to be sinful. Now the most effective remedy in avoiding sin is to shun pleasures, and this pertains to insensibility. For the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* ii. 9) that *if we deny ourselves pleasures we are less liable to sin.* Therefore there is nothing vicious in insensibility.

On the contrary, Nothing save vice is opposed to virtue. Now insensibility is opposed to the virtue of temperance according to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* ii. 7; iii. 11). Therefore insensibility is a vice.

I answer that, Whatever is contrary to the natural order is vicious. Now nature has introduced pleasure into the operations that are necessary for man's life. Wherefore the natural order requires that man should make use of these pleasures, in so far as they are necessary for man's well-being, as regards the preservation either of the individual or of the species. Accordingly if anyone were to reject pleasure to the extent of omitting things that are necessary for nature's preservation, he would sin, as acting counter to the order of nature. And this pertains to the vice of insensibility.

It must, however, be observed that it is sometimes praiseworthy, and even necessary for the sake of an end, to abstain from such pleasures as result from these operations. Thus, for the sake of the body's health, certain persons refrain from pleasures of meat, drink, and sex; as also for the fulfilment of certain engagements: thus athletes and soldiers have to deny themselves many pleasures, in order to fulfil their respective duties. In like manner penitents, in order to recover health of soul, have recourse to abstinence from pleasures, as a kind of diet, and those who are desirous of giving themselves up to contemplation and Divine things need much to refrain from carnal desires. Nor do any of these things pertain to the vice of insensibility, because they are in accord with right reason.

Reply Obj. 1. Daniel abstained thus from pleasures, not through any horror of pleasure as though it were evil in itself, but for some praiseworthy end, in order, namely, to adapt himself to the heights of contemplation by abstaining

from pleasures of the body. Hence the text goes on to tell of the revelation that he received immediately afterwards.

Reply Obj. 2. Since man cannot use his reason without his sensitive powers, which need a bodily organ, as stated in the First Part (Q. XXXIV., AA. 7, 8), man needs to sustain his body in order that he may use his reason. Now the body is sustained by means of operations that afford pleasure: wherefore the good of reason cannot be in a man if he abstain from all pleasures. Yet this need for using pleasures of the body will be greater or less, according as man needs more or less the powers of his body in accomplishing the act of reason. Wherefore it is commendable for those who undertake the duty of giving themselves to contemplation, and of imparting to others a spiritual good, by a kind of spiritual procreation, as it were, to abstain from many pleasures, but not for those who are in duty bound to bodily occupations and carnal procreation.

Reply Obj. 3. In order to avoid sin, pleasure must be shunned, not altogether, but so that it is not sought more than necessity requires.

Second Article.

whether intemperance is a childish sin?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that intemperance is not a childish sin. For Jerome in commenting on Matth. xviii. 3, *Unless you be converted, and become as little children,* says that *a child persists not in anger, is unmindful of injuries, takes no pleasure in seeing a beautiful woman,* all of which is contrary to intemperance. Therefore intemperance is not a childish sin.

Obj. 2. Further, Children have none but natural desires. Now *in respect of natural desires few sin by intemperance,* according to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* iii. 11). Therefore intemperance is not a childish sin.

Obj. 3. Further, Children should be fostered and nourished: whereas concupiscence and pleasure, about which intemper-

ance is concerned, are always to be thwarted and uprooted, according to Coloss. iii. 5, *Mortify . . . your members upon the earth, which are . . . concupiscence,* etc.* Therefore intemperance is not a childish sin.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iii. 12) that *we apply the term intemperance† to childish sins.*

I answer that, A thing is said to be childish for two reasons. First, because it is becoming to children, and the Philosopher does not mean that the sin of intemperance is childish in this sense. Secondly, by way of likeness, and it is in this sense that sins of intemperance are said to be childish. For the sin of intemperance is one of unchecked concupiscence, which is likened to a child in three ways. First, as regards that which they both desire, for like a child concupiscence desires something disgraceful. This is because in human affairs a thing is beautiful according as it harmonizes with reason. Wherefore Tully says (*De Offic.* i.) under the heading *Comeliness is twofold,* that *the beautiful is that which is in keeping with man's excellence in so far as his nature differs from other animals.* Now a child does not attend to the order of reason; and in like manner concupiscence does not listen to reason, according to *Ethic.* vii. 6. Secondly, they are alike as to the result. For a child, if left to his own will, becomes more self-willed: hence it is written (*Ecclus.* xxx. 8): *A horse not broken becometh stubborn, and a child left to himself will become headstrong.* So, too, concupiscence, if indulged, gathers strength: wherefore Augustine says (*Conf.* viii. 5): *Lust served became a custom, and custom not resisted became necessity.* Thirdly, as to the remedy which is applied to both. For a child is corrected by being restrained; hence it is written (Prov. xxiii. 13, 14): *Withhold not correction from a child . . . Thou shalt beat him with a rod, and deliver his soul from Hell.* In like manner by resisting concupiscence we moderate it according to the demands

* Vulg.,—*your members which are upon the earth, fornication . . . concupiscence.*

† Ἀκολασία which Aristotle refers (*ibid.*) to κολάζω, to punish, so that its original sense would be *impunity.*

of virtue. Augustine indicates this when he says (*Music.* vi. 6) that if the mind be lifted up to spiritual things, and remain fixed *thereon, the impulse of custom,* i.e. carnal concupiscence, *is broken, and being suppressed is gradually weakened: for it was stronger when we followed it, and though not wholly destroyed, it is certainly less strong when we curb it.* Hence the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iii. 12) that *as a child ought to live according to the direction of his tutor, so ought the concupiscible to accord with reason.*

Reply Obj. 1. This argument takes the term *childish* as denoting what is observed in children. It is not in this sense that the sin of intemperance is said to be childish, but by way of likeness, as explained in the Article.

Reply Obj. 2. A desire may be said to be natural in two ways. First, with regard to its genus, and thus temperance and intemperance are about natural desires, since they are about desires of food and sex, which are directed to the preservation of nature. Secondly, a desire may be called natural with regard to the species of the thing that nature requires for its own preservation; and in this way it does not happen often that one sins in the matter of natural desires, for nature requires only that which supplies its need, and there is no sin in desiring this, save only where it is desired in excess as to quantity. This is the only way in which sin can occur with regard to natural desires, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* iii. 11).

There are other things in respect of which sins frequently occur, and these are certain incentives to desire devised by human curiosity,* such as the nice (*curiosa*) preparation of food, or the adornment of women. And though children do not affect these things much, yet intemperance is called a childish sin for the reason given above in the Article.

Reply Obj. 3. That which regards nature should be nourished and fostered in children, but that which pertains to the lack of reason in them should not be fostered, but corrected, as stated in the Article.

* Cf. Q. CLXVII.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER COWARDICE IS A GREATER VICE THAN INTEMPERANCE?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that cowardice is a greater vice than intemperance. For a vice deserves reproach through being opposed to the good of virtue. Now cowardice is opposed to fortitude, which is a more excellent virtue than temperance, as stated above (A. 2: Q. CXLI., A. 8). Therefore cowardice is a greater vice than intemperance.

Obj. 2. Further, The greater the difficulty to be surmounted, the less is a man to be reproached for failure, wherefore the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* vii. 7) that *it is no wonder, in fact it is pardonable, if a man is mastered by strong and overwhelming pleasures or pains.* Now seemingly it is more difficult to control pleasures than other passions; hence it is stated in *Ethic.* ii. 3, that *it is more difficult to contend against pleasure than against anger,* which would seem to be stronger than fear. Therefore intemperance, which is overcome by pleasure, is a less grievous sin than cowardice, which is overcome by fear.

Obj. 3. Further, It is essential to sin that it be voluntary. Now cowardice is more voluntary than intemperance, since no man desires to be intemperate, whereas some desire to avoid dangers of death, which pertains to cowardice. Therefore cowardice is a more grievous sin than intemperance.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iii. 12) that *intemperance seems more akin to voluntary action than cowardice.* Therefore it is more sinful.

I answer that, One vice may be compared with another in two ways. First, with regard to the matter or object; secondly, on the part of the man who sins: and in both ways intemperance is a more grievous sin than cowardice.

First, as regards the matter. For cowardice shuns dangers of death, to avoid which the principal motive is the necessity of preserving life. On the other hand, intemper-

ance is about pleasures, the desire of which is not so necessary for the preservation of life, because, as stated above (A. 2, *ad* 2), intemperance is more about certain annexed pleasures or desires than about natural desires or pleasures. Now the more necessary the motive of sin the less grievous the sin. Wherefore intemperance is a more grievous vice than cowardice, on the part of the object or motive matter.

In like manner again, on the part of the man who sins, and this for three reasons. First, because the more sound-minded a man is, the more grievous his sin, wherefore sins are not imputed to those who are demented. Now grave fear and sorrow, especially in dangers of death, stun the human mind; but not so pleasure which is the motive of intemperance. Secondly, because the more voluntary a sin the graver it is. Now intemperance has more of the voluntary in it than cowardice has, and this for two reasons. The first is because actions done through fear have their origin in the compulsion of an external agent, so that they are not simply voluntary but mixed, as stated in *Ethic.* iii. 1, whereas actions done for the sake of pleasure are simply voluntary. The second reason is because the actions of an intemperate man are more voluntary individually and less voluntary generically. For no one would wish to be intemperate, yet man is enticed by individual pleasures which make of him an intemperate man. Hence the most effective remedy against intemperance is not to dwell on the consideration of singulars. It is the other way about in matters relating to cowardice: because the particular action that imposes itself on a man is less voluntary, for instance to cast aside his shield, and the like, whereas the general purpose is more voluntary, for instance to save himself by flight. Now that is simply more voluntary which is more voluntary in the particular circumstances in which the act takes place. Wherefore intemperance, being simply more voluntary than cowardice, is a greater vice. Thirdly, because it is easier to find a remedy for intemperance than for cowardice, since pleasures of food and sex, which are the matter of intemperance, are of every-day occurrence, and it is possible for

man without danger by frequent practice in their regard to become temperate; whereas dangers of death are of rare occurrence, and it is more dangerous for man to encounter them frequently in order to cease being a coward.

Reply Obj. 1. The excellence of fortitude in comparison with temperance may be considered from two standpoints. First, with regard to the end, which has the aspect of good: because fortitude is directed to the common good more than temperance is. And from this point of view cowardice has a certain precedence over intemperance, since by cowardice some people forsake the defence of the common good. Secondly, with regard to the difficulty, because it is more difficult to endure dangers of death than to refrain from any pleasures whatever: and from this point of view there is no need for cowardice to take precedence of intemperance. For just as it is a greater strength that does not succumb to a stronger force, so on the other hand to be overcome by a stronger force is proof of a lesser vice, and to succumb to a weaker force, is the proof of a greater vice.

Reply Obj. 2. Love of self-preservation, for the sake of which one shuns perils of death, is much more connatural than any pleasures whatever of food and sex which are directed to the preservation of life. Hence it is more difficult to overcome the fear of dangers of death, than the desire of pleasure in matters of food and sex: although the latter is more difficult to resist than anger, sorrow, and fear, occasioned by certain other evils.

Reply Obj. 3. The voluntary, in cowardice, depends rather on a general than on a particular consideration: wherefore in such cases we have the voluntary not simply but in a restricted sense.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER INTEMPERANCE IS THE MOST DISGRACEFUL OF SINS?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that intemperance is not the most disgraceful of sins. For as honour is due to virtue so is

disgrace due to sin. Now some sins are more grievous than intemperance: for instance murder, blasphemy, and the like. Therefore intemperance is not the most disgraceful of sins.

Obj. 2. Further, Those sins which are the more common are seemingly less disgraceful, since men are less ashamed of them. Now sins of intemperance are most common, because they are about things connected with the common use of human life, and in which many happen to sin. Therefore sins of intemperance do not seem to be most disgraceful.

Obj. 3. Further, The Philosopher says (*Ethic.* vii. 4, *sqq.*) *temperance and intemperance are about human desires and pleasures.* Now certain desires and pleasures are more shameful than human desires and pleasures; such are brutal pleasures and those caused by disease as the Philosopher states (*ibid.* 5). Therefore intemperance is not the most disgraceful of sins.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iii. 12) that *intemperance is justly more deserving of reproach than other vices.*

I answer that, Disgrace is seemingly opposed to honour and glory. Now honour is due to excellence, as stated above (Q. CIII., AA. 1, 2), and glory denotes clarity. Accordingly intemperance is most disgraceful for two reasons. First, because it is most repugnant to human excellence, since it is about pleasures common to us and the lower animals, as stated above (Q. CXLI., AA. 2, 3). Wherefore it is written (Ps. xlviii. 21): *Man, when he was in honour, did not understand: he hath been compared to senseless beasts, and made like to them.* Secondly, because it is most repugnant to man's clarity or beauty; inasmuch as the pleasures which are the matter of intemperance dim the light of reason from which all the clarity and beauty of virtue arises: wherefore these pleasures are described as being most slavish.

Reply Obj. 1. As Gregory says (*Moral.* xxxiii.), *the sins of the flesh,* which are comprised under the head of intemperance, *although less culpable, are more disgraceful.* The reason is that culpability is measured by inordinateness in respect of the end, while disgrace regards shamefulness, which

depends chiefly on the unbecomingness of the sin in respect of the sinner.

Reply Obj. 2. The commonness of a sin diminishes the shamefulness and disgrace of a sin in the opinion of men, but not as regards the nature of the vices themselves.

Reply Obj. 3. When we say that intemperance is most disgraceful, we mean in comparison with human vices, those, namely, that are connected with human passions which to a certain extent are in conformity with human nature. But those vices which exceed the mode of human nature are still more disgraceful. Nevertheless such vices are apparently reducible to the genus of intemperance, by way of excess: for instance if a man delight in eating human flesh, or in committing the unnatural vice.

QUESTION CXLIII.

OF THE PARTS OF TEMPERANCE, IN GENERAL.

We must now consider the parts of temperance: we shall consider these same parts (1) in general; (2) each of them in particular.

Article.

WHETHER TULLY BECOMINGLY ASSIGNS THE PARTS OF TEMPERANCE AS CONTINENCE, MILDNESS, MODESTY?

We proceed thus to the Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that Tully (*De Inv. Rhet.* ii.) unbecomingly assigns the parts of temperance, when he asserts them to be *continence, mildness, and modesty.* For continence is condivided with virtue (*Ethic.* iv. 9; vii. 1): whereas temperance is comprised under virtue. Therefore continence is not a part of temperance.

Obj. 2. Further, Mildness seemingly softens hatred or anger. But temperance is not about these things, but about pleasures of touch, as stated above (Q. CXLI., A. 4). Therefore mildness is not a part of temperance.

Obj. 3. Further, Modesty concerns external action, wherefore the Apostle says (Philip. iv. 5): *Let your modesty be known to all men.* Now external actions are the matter of justice, as stated above (Q. LVIII., A. 8). Therefore modesty is a part of justice rather than of temperance.

Obj. 4. Further, Macrobius (*Super Somn. Scip.* i.) reckons many more parts of temperance: for he says that *temperance results in modesty, shamefacedness, abstinence, chastity, honesty, moderation, contentment, sobriety, purity.* Andronicus also says that *the companions of temperance are gravity,*

*continence, humility, simplicity, refinement, method, serenity.** Therefore it seems that Tully insufficiently reckoned the parts of temperance.

I answer that, As stated above (QQ. XLVIII., CXXVIII.), a cardinal virtue may have three kinds of parts, namely integral, subjective, and potential. The integral parts of a virtue are the conditions the concurrence of which are necessary for virtue: and in this respect there are two integral parts of temperance, *shamefacedness,* whereby one recoils from the disgrace that is contrary to temperance, and *honesty,* whereby one loves the beauty of temperance. For, as stated above (Q. CXLI., A. 2, *ad* 3), temperance more than any other virtue lays claim to a certain comeliness, and the vices of intemperance excel others in disgrace.

The subjective parts of a virtue are its species: and the species of a virtue have to be differentiated according to the difference of matter or object. Now temperance is about pleasures of touch, which are of two kinds. For some are directed to nourishment: and in these as regards meat, there is *abstinence,* and as regards drink properly there is *sobriety.* Other pleasures are directed to the power of procreation, and in these as regards the principal pleasure of the act itself of procreation, there is *chastity,* and as to the pleasures incidental to the act, resulting, for instance, from kissing, touching, or fondling, we have *purity.*

The potential parts of a principal virtue are called secondary virtues: for while the principal virtue observes the mode in some principal matter, these observe the mode in some other matter wherein moderation is not so difficult. Now it belongs to temperance to moderate pleasures of touch, which are most difficult to moderate. Wherefore any virtue that is effective of moderation in some matter or other, and restrains the appetite in its impulse towards something, may be reckoned a part of temperance, as a virtue annexed thereto.

This happens in three ways: first, in the inward move-

* *Per-se-sufficientiam* which could be rendered *self-sufficiency,* but for the fact that this is taken in a bad sense.

ments of the soul; secondly, in the outward movements and actions of the body; thirdly, in outward things. Now besides the movement of concupiscence, which temperance moderates and restrains, we find in the soul three movements towards a particular object. In the first place there is the movement of the will when stirred by the impulse of passion: and this movement is restrained by *continence*, the effect of which is that, although a man suffer immoderate concupiscences, his will does not succumb to them. Another inward movement towards something is the movement of hope, and of the resultant daring, and this is moderated or restrained by *humility*. The third movement is that of anger, which tends towards revenge, and this is restrained by *meekness* or *mildness*.

With regard to bodily movements and actions, moderation and restraint is the effect of *modesty*, which, according to Andronicus, has three parts. The first of these enables one to discern what to do and what not to do, and to observe the right order, and to persevere in what we do: this he assigns to *method*. The second is that a man observe decorum in what he does, and this he ascribes to *refinement*. The third has to do with the conversation or any other intercourse between a man and his friends, and this is called *gravity*.

With regard to external things, a twofold moderation has to be observed. First, we must not desire too many, and to this Macrobius assigns *contentment*, and Andronicus *serenity;* secondly, we must not be too nice in our requirements, and to this Macrobius ascribes *moderation*, Andronicus *simplicity*.

Reply Obj. 1. It is true that continence differs from virtue, just as imperfect differs from perfect, as we shall state further on (Q. CLXV., A. 1); and in this sense it is condivided with virtue. Yet it has something in common with temperance both as to matter, since it is about pleasures of touch, and as to mode, since it is a kind of restraint. Hence it is suitably assigned as a part of temperance.

Reply Obj. 2. Mildness or meekness is reckoned a part of

temperance not because of a likeness of matter, but because they agree as to the mode of restraint and moderation as stated in the Article.

Reply Obj. 3. In the matter of external action justice considers what is due to another. Modesty does not consider this, but only a certain moderation. Hence it is reckoned a part not of justice but of temperance.

Reply Obj. 4. Under modesty Tully includes whatever pertains to the moderation of bodily movements and external things, as well as the moderation of hope which, in the Article, we reckoned as pertaining to humility.

QUESTION CXLIV.

OF THE PARTS OF TEMPERANCE, IN PARTICULAR, AND, FIRST, OF SHAMEFACEDNESS.

(*In Four Articles.*)

We must now consider the parts of temperance in particular: and in the first place the integral parts, which are shamefacedness and honesty. With regard to shamefacedness there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether shamefacedness is a virtue? (2) What is its object? (3) Who are the cause of a man being ashamed? (4) What kind of people are ashamed?

First Article.

WHETHER SHAMEFACEDNESS IS A VIRTUE?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that shamefacedness is a virtue. For it is proper to a virtue to observe the mean as fixed by reason: this is clear from the definition of virtue given in *Ethic.* ii. 6. Now shamefacedness observes the mean in this way, as the Philosopher observes (*ibid.* 7). Therefore shamefacedness is not a virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, Whatever is praiseworthy is either a virtue or something connected with virtue. Now shamefacedness is praiseworthy. But it is not part of a virtue. For it is not a part of prudence, since it is not in the reason but in the appetite; nor is it a part of justice, since shamefacedness implies a certain passion, whereas justice is not about the passions; nor again is it a part of fortitude, because it belongs to fortitude to be persistent and aggressive, while it belongs to shamefacedness to recoil from some-

thing; nor lastly is it a part of temperance, since the latter is about desires, whereas shamefacedness is a kind of fear according as the Philosopher states (*Ethic.* iv.) and Damascene (*De Fide Orthod.* ii.). Hence it follows that shamefacedness is a virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, The honest and the virtuous are convertible according to Tully (*De Offic.* i.). Now shamefacedness is a part of honesty: for Ambrose says (*De Offic.* i.) that *shamefacedness is the companion and familiar of the restful mind, averse to wantonness, a stranger to any kind of excess, the friend of sobriety and the support of what is honest, a seeker after the beautiful.* Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue.

Obj. 4. Further, Every vice is opposed to a virtue. Now certain vices are opposed to shamefacedness, namely shamelessness and inordinate prudery. Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue.

Obj. 5. Further, *Like acts beget like habits*, according to *Ethic.* ii. 1, 2. Now shamefacedness implies a praiseworthy act; wherefore from many such acts a habit results. But a habit of praiseworthy deeds is a virtue, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* i. 7). Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*Ethic.* ii. 7; iv. 9) that shamefacedness is not a virtue.

I answer that, Virtue is taken in two ways, in a strict sense and in a broad sense. Taken strictly virtue is a perfection, as stated in *Phys.* vii. 17, 18. Wherefore anything that is inconsistent with perfection, though it be good, falls short of the notions of virtue. Now shamefacedness is inconsistent with perfection, because it is the fear of something base, namely of that which is disgraceful. Hence Damascene says (*loc .cit. Obj.* 2) that *shamefacedness is fear of a base action.* Now just as hope is about a possible and difficult good, so is fear about a possible and arduous evil, as stated above (I.-II., Q. XL., A. 1: Q. XLI., A. 2: Q. XLII., A. 3), when we were treating of the passions. But one who is perfect as to a virtuous habit, does not apprehend that which would be disgraceful and base to do, as being possible and arduous,

that is to say difficult for him to avoid; nor does he actually do anything base, so as to be in fear of disgrace. Therefore shamefacedness, properly speaking, is not a virtue, since it falls short of the perfection of virtue.

Taken, however, in a broad sense virtue denotes whatever is good and praiseworthy in human acts or passions; and in this way shamefacedness is sometimes called a virtue, since it is a praiseworthy passion.

Reply Obj. 1. Following the mean is not sufficient for the notion of virtue, although it is one of the conditions included in virtue's definition: but it is requisite, in addition to this, that it be an elective habit, that is to say, operating from choice. Now shamefacedness denotes, not a habit but a passion, nor does its movement result from choice, but from an impulse of passion. Hence it falls short of the notion of virtue.

Reply Obj. 2. As stated in the *Article*, shamefacedness is fear of baseness and disgrace. Now it has been stated above (Q. CXLII., A. 4) that the vice of intemperance is most base and disgraceful. Wherefore shamefacedness pertains more to temperance than to any other virtue, by reason of its motive cause, which is a base action, though not according to the species of the passion, namely fear. Nevertheless in so far as the vices opposed to other virtues are base and disgraceful, shamefacedness may also pertain to other virtues.

Reply Obj. 3. Shamefacedness fosters honesty, by removing that which is contrary thereto, but not so as to attain to the perfection of honesty.

Reply Obj. 4. Every defect causes a vice, but not every good is sufficient for the notion of virtue. Consequently it does not follow that whatever is directly opposed to vice is a virtue, although every vice is opposed to a virtue, as regards its origin. Hence shamelessness, in so far as it results from excessive love of disgraceful things, is opposed to temperance.

Reply Obj. 5. Being frequently ashamed causes the habit of an acquired virtue whereby one avoids disgraceful things

which are the object of shamefacedness, without continuing to be shamefaced in their regard: although as a consequence of this acquired virtue, a man would be more ashamed, if confronted with the matter of shamefacedness.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER SHAMEFACEDNESS IS ABOUT A DISGRACEFUL ACTION?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that shamefacedness is not about a disgraceful action. For the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iv. 9) that *shamefacedness is fear of ignominy.* Now sometimes those who do nothing disgraceful suffer ignominy, according to Ps. lxviii. 8, *For thy sake I have borne reproach, shame hath covered my face.* Therefore shamefacedness is not properly about a disgraceful action.

Obj. 2. Further, Nothing apparently is disgraceful but what is sinful. Yet man is ashamed of things that are not sins, for instance one who performs a menial occupation. Therefore it seems that shamefacedness is not properly about a disgraceful action.

Obj. 3. Further, Virtuous deeds are not disgraceful but most beautiful according to *Ethic.* i. 7, 8. Yet sometimes people are ashamed to do virtuous deeds, according to Luke ix. 26, *He that shall be ashamed of Me and My words, of him the Son of man shall be ashamed,* etc. Therefore shamefacedness is not about a disgraceful action.

Obj. 4. Further, If shamefacedness were properly about a disgraceful action, it would follow that the more disgraceful the action the more ashamed would one be. Yet sometimes a man is more ashamed of lesser sins, while he glories in those which are most grievous, according to Ps. li. 3, *Why dost thou glory in malice?* Therefore shamefacedness is not properly about a disgraceful action.

On the contrary, Damascene (*De Fide Orthod.* ii.) and Gregory of Nyssa* say that *shamefacedness is fear of doing a disgraceful deed or of a disgraceful deed done.*

* Nemesius (*De Nat. Hom.*, xx.).

I answer that, As stated above (I.-II., Q. XLI., A. 2: Q. XLII., A. 3), when we were treating of the passions, fear is properly about an arduous evil, one, namely, that is difficult to avoid. Now disgrace is twofold. There is the disgrace inherent to vice, which consists in the deformity of a voluntary act: and this, properly speaking, has not the character of an arduous evil. For that which depends on the will alone does not appear to be arduous and above man's ability: wherefore it is not apprehended as fearful, and for this reason the Philosopher says (*Rhet.* ii.) that such evils are not a matter of fear.

The other kind of disgrace is penal so to speak, and it consists in the reproach that attaches to a person, just as the clarity of glory consists in a person being honoured. And since this reproach has the character of an arduous evil, just as honour has the character of an arduous good, shamefacedness, which is fear of disgrace, regards first and foremost reproach or ignominy. And since reproach is properly due to vice, as honour is due to virtue, it follows that shamefacedness regards also the disgrace inherent to vice. Hence the Philosopher says (*Rhet.* ii. 5) that *a man is less ashamed of those defects which are not the result of any fault of his own.*

Now shamefacedness regards fault in two ways. In one way a man refrains from vicious acts through fear of reproach: in another way a man while doing a disgraceful deed avoids the public eye through fear of reproach. In the former case, according to Gregory of Nyssa (*loc. cit.*), we speak of a person blushing, in the latter we say that he is ashamed. Hence he says that *the man who is ashamed acts in secret, but he who blushes fears to be disgraced.*

Reply Obj. 1. Shamefacedness properly regards ignominy as due to sin which is a voluntary defect. Hence the Philosopher says (*Rhet.* ii. 6) that *a man is more ashamed of those things of which he is the cause.* Now the virtuous man despises the ignominy to which he is subject on account of virtue, because he does not deserve it; as the Philosopher says of the magnanimous (*Ethic.* iv. 3). Thus we find it said of the apostles (Act. v. 41) that *they* (the apostles) *went*

from the presence of the council, rejoicing that they were accounted worthy to suffer reproach for the name of Jesus. It is owing to imperfection of virtue that a man is sometimes ashamed of the reproaches which he suffers on account of virtue, since the more virtuous a man is, the more he despises external things, whether good or evil. Wherefore it is written (Isa. li. 7): *Fear ye not the reproach of men.*

Reply Obj. 2. As stated above (Q. LXI., A. 3), though honour is not really due save to virtue alone, yet it regards a certain excellence: and the same applies to reproach, for though it is properly due to sin alone, yet, at least in man's opinion, it regards any kind of defect. Hence a man is ashamed of poverty, disrepute, servitude, and the like.

Reply Obj. 3. Shamefacedness does not regard virtuous deeds as such. Yet it happens accidentally that a man is ashamed of them, either because he looks upon them as vicious according to human opinion, or because he is afraid of being marked as presumptuous or hypocritical for doing virtuous deeds.

Reply Obj. 4. Sometimes more grievous sins are less shameful, either because they are less disgraceful, as spiritual sins in comparison with sins of the flesh, or because they connote a certain abundance of some temporal good; thus a man is more ashamed of cowardice than of daring, of theft than of robbery, on account of a semblance of power. The same applies to other sins.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER MAN IS MORE SHAMEFACED OF THOSE WHO ARE MORE CLOSELY CONNECTED WITH HIM?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that man is not more shamefaced of those who are more closely connected with him. For it is stated in *Rhet.* ii. 6 that *men are more shamefaced of those from whom they desire approbation.* Now men desire this especially from people of the better sort who are sometimes not connected with them. Therefore man is not more

shamefaced of those who are more closely connected with him.

Obj. 2. Further, Seemingly those are more closely connected who perform like deeds. Now man is not made ashamed of his sin by those whom he knows to be guilty of the same sin, because according to *Rhet.* ii. 6, *a man does not forbid his neighbour what he does himself.* Therefore he is not more shamefaced of those who are most closely connected with him.

Obj. 3. Further, The Philosopher says (*ibid.*) that *men take more shame from those who retail their information to many, such as jokers and fable-tellers.* But those who are more closely connected with a man do not retail his vices. Therefore one should not take shame chiefly from them.

Obj. 4. Further, The Philosopher says (*ibid.*) that *men are most liable to be made ashamed by those among whom they have done nothing amiss; by those of whom they ask something for the first time; by those whose friends they wish to become.* Now these are less closely connected with us. Therefore man is not made most ashamed by those who are more closely united to him.

On the contrary, It is stated in *Rhet.* ii. (*loc. cit.*) that *man is made most ashamed by those who are to be continually with him.*

I answer that, Since reproach is opposed to honour, just as honour denotes attestation to someone's excellence, especially the excellence which is according to virtue, so too reproach, the fear of which is shamefacedness, denotes attestation to a person's defect, especially that which results from sin. Hence the more weighty a person's attestation is considered to be, the more does he make another person ashamed. Now a person's attestation may be considered as being more weighty, either because he is certain of the truth or because of its effect. Certitude of the truth attaches to a person's attestations for two reasons. First, on account of the rectitude of his judgment, as in the case of wise and virtuous men, by whom man is more desirous of being honoured, and by whom he is brought to a greater sense of

shame. Hence children and the lower animals inspire no one with shame, by reason of their lack of judgment. Secondly, on account of his knowledge of the matter attested, because everyone judges well of what is known to him. In this way we are more liable to be made ashamed by persons connected with us, since they are better acquainted with our deeds: whereas strangers and persons entirely unknown to us, who are ignorant of what we do, inspire us with no shame at all.

An attestation receives weight from its effect by reason of some advantage or harm resulting therefrom; wherefore men are more desirous of being honoured by those who can be of use to them, and are more liable to be made ashamed by those who are able to do them some harm. And for this reason again, in a certain respect, persons connected with us make us more ashamed, since we are to be continually in their society, as though this entailed a continual harm to us: whereas the harm that comes from strangers and passers-by ceases almost at once.

Reply Obj. 1. People of the better sort make us ashamed for the same reason as those who are more closely connected with us; because just as the attestation of the better men carries more weight since they have a more universal knowledge of things, and in their judgments hold fast to the truth: so too, the attestation of those among whom we live is more cogent since they know more about our concerns in detail.

Reply Obj. 2. We fear not the attestation of those who are connected with us in the likeness of sin, because we do not think that they look upon our defect as disgraceful.

Reply Obj. 3. Tale-bearers make us ashamed on account of the harm they do by making many think ill of us.

Reply Obj. 4. Even those among whom we have done no wrong, make us more ashamed, on account of the harm that would follow, because, to wit, we should forfeit the good opinion they had of us: and again because when contraries are put in juxtaposition their opposition seems greater, so that when a man notices something disgraceful in one whom

he esteemed good, he apprehends it as being the more disgraceful. The reason why we are made more ashamed by those of whom we ask something for the first time, or whose friends we wish to be, is that we fear to suffer some injury, by being disappointed in our request, or by failing to become their friends.

Fourth Article.

whether even virtuous men can be ashamed?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that even virtuous men can be ashamed. For contraries have contrary effects. Now those who excel in wickedness are not ashamed, according to Jerem. iii. 3, *Thou hadst a harlot's forehead, thou wouldst not blush.* Therefore those who are virtuous are more inclined to be ashamed.

Obj. 2. Further, The Philosopher says (*Rhet.* ii.) that *men are ashamed not only of vice, but also of the signs of evil:* and this happens also in the virtuous. Therefore virtuous men can be ashamed.

Obj. 3. Further, Shamefacedness is fear of ignominy. Now virtuous people may happen to be ignominious, for instance if they are slandered, or if they suffer reproach undeservedly. Therefore a virtuous man can be ashamed.

Obj. 4. Further, Shamefacedness is a part of temperance, as stated above (Q. XLIII). Now a part is not separated from its whole. Since then temperance is in a virtuous man, it means that shamefacedness is also.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iv. 9) that a *virtuous man is not shamefaced.*

I answer that, As stated above (AA. 1, 2) shamefacedness is fear of some disgrace. Now it may happen in two ways that an evil is not feared: first, because it is not reckoned an evil; secondly because one reckons it impossible with regard to oneself, or as not difficult to avoid.

Accordingly shame may be lacking in a person in two ways. First, because the things that should make him ashamed are not deemed by him to be disgraceful; and in

this way those who are steeped in sin are without shame, for instead of disapproving of their sins, they boast of them. Secondly, because they apprehend disgrace as impossible to themselves, or as easy to avoid. In this way the old and the virtuous are not shamefaced. Yet they are so disposed, that if there were anything disgraceful in them they would be ashamed of it. Wherefore the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iv. 9) that *shame is in the virtuous hypothetically.*

Reply Obj. 1. Lack of shame occurs in the best and in the worst men through different causes, as stated in the Article. In the average men it is found, in so far as they have a certain love of good, and yet are not altogether free from evil.

Reply Obj. 2. It belongs to the virtuous man to avoid not only vice, but also whatever has the semblance of vice, according to 1 Thess. v. 22, *From all appearance of evil refrain yourselves.* The Philosopher, too, says (*Ethic.* iv. 9) that the virtuous man should avoid *not only what is really evil, but also those that are regarded as evil.*

Reply Obj. 3. As stated above (A. 1, *ad* 1) the virtuous man despises ignominy and reproach, as being things he does not deserve, wherefore he is not much ashamed of them. Nevertheless, to a certain extent, shame, like the other passions, may forestall reason.

Reply Obj. 4. Shamefacedness is a part of temperance, not as though it entered into its essence, but as a disposition to it: wherefore Ambrose says (*De Offic.* i.) that shamefacedness lays the first foundations of temperance, by inspiring man with the horror of whatever is disgraceful.

QUESTION CXLV.

OF HONESTY.*

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE must now consider honesty, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) The relation between the honest and the virtuous: (2) Its relation with the beautiful:† (3) Its relation with the useful and the pleasant: (4) Whether honesty is a part of temperance?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER HONESTY IS THE SAME AS VIRTUE?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that honesty is not the same as virtue. For Tully says (*De Inv. Rhet.* ii.) that *the honest is what is desired for its own sake.* Now virtue is desired, not for its own sake, but for the sake of happiness, for the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* i.) that *happiness is the reward and the end of virtue.* Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, According to Isidore (*Etym.* x.) *honesty means an honourable state.* Now honour is due to many things besides virtue, since *it is praise that is the proper due of virtue,* according to *Ethic.* i. Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, The principal condition of virtue is the interior choice, as the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* viii. 13). But honesty seems to pertain rather to exterior conduct,

* Cf. Q. CXLI., A. 3., footnote.

† As honesty here denotes moral goodness, so beauty stands for moral beauty.

according to 1 Cor. xiv. 40, *Let all things be done decently* (*honeste*) *and according to order* among you. Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue.

Obj. 4. Further, Honesty apparently consists in external wealth. According to Ecclus. xi. 14, *good things and evil, life and death, poverty and riches* (honestas) *are from God.* But virtue does not consist in external wealth. Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue.

On the contrary, Tully (*De Offic.* i. § *De Quatuor Virtutibus: Rhet.* ii., *loc. cit.*) divides honesty into the four principal virtues, into which virtue is also divided. Therefore honesty is the same as virtue.

I answer that, As Isidore says (*loc. cit.*) *honesty means an honourable state,* wherefore a thing may be said to be honest through being worthy of honour. Now honour, as stated above (Q. CXLIV., A. 2, *ad* 2), is due to excellence: and the excellence of a man is gauged chiefly according to his virtue, as stated in *Phys.* vii. 17, 18. Therefore, properly speaking, honesty refers to the same thing as virtue.

Reply Obj. 1. According to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* i. 7), of those things that are desired for their own sake, some are desired for their own sake alone, and never for the sake of something else, such as happiness which is the last end; while some are desired, not only for their own sake, inasmuch as they have an aspect of goodness in themselves, even if no further good accrued to us through them, but also for the sake of something else, inasmuch as they are conducive to some more perfect good. It is thus that the virtues are desirable for their own sake: wherefore Tully says (*De Inv. Rhet.* ii.) that *some things allure us by their own force, and attract us by their own worth such as virtue, truth, knowledge.* And this suffices to give a thing the character of honest.

Reply Obj. 2. Some of the things which are honoured besides virtue are more excellent than virtue, namely God and happiness, and suchlike things are not so well known to us by experience as virtue which we practise day by day. Hence virtue has a greater claim to the name of honesty. Other things which are beneath virtue are honoured, in

so far as they are a help to the practice of virtue, such as rank, power, and riches. For as the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iv.) that *these things are honoured by some people, but in truth it is only the good man who is worthy of honour.* Now a man is good in respect of virtue. Wherefore praise is due to virtue in so far as the latter is desirable for the sake of something else, while honour is due to virtue for its own sake: and it is thus that virtue has the character of honesty.

Reply Obj. 3. As stated in the *Article,* honest denotes that to which honour is due. Now honour is an attestation to someone's excellence, as stated above (Q. CIII., AA. 1, 2). But one attests only to what one knows; and the internal choice is not made known save by external actions. Wherefore external conduct has the character of honesty, in so far as it reflects internal rectitude. For this reason honesty consists radically in the internal choice, but its expression lies in the external conduct.

Reply Obj. 4. It is because the excellence of wealth is commonly regarded as making a man deserving of honour, that sometimes the name of honesty is given to external prosperity.

Second Article.

whether the honest is the same as the beautiful?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the honest is not the same as the beautiful. For the aspect of honest is derived from the appetite, since the honest is what is desirable for its own sake. But the beautiful regards rather the faculty of vision to which it is pleasing. Therefore the beautiful is not the same as the honest.

Obj. 2. Further, Beauty requires a certain clarity, which is characteristic of glory: whereas the honest regards honour. Since then honour and glory differ, as stated above (Q. CIII., A. 1, *ad* 3), it seems also that the honest and the beautiful differ.

Obj. 3. Further, Honesty is the same as virtue, as stated

above (A. 1). But a certain beauty is contrary to virtue, wherefore it is written (Ezech. xvi. 15): *Trusting in thy beauty thou playest the harlot because of thy renown.* Therefore the honest is not the same as the beautiful.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. xii. 23, 24): *Those that are our uncomely* (*inhonesta*) *parts, have more abundant comeliness* (*honestatem*), *but our comely* (*honesta*) *parts have no need.* Now by uncomely parts he means the baser members, and by comely parts the beautiful members. Therefore the honest and the beautiful are apparently the same.

I answer that, As may be gathered from the words of Dionysius (*Div. Nom.* iv. 1), beauty or comeliness results from the concurrence of clarity and due proportion. For he states that God is said to be beautiful, as being *the cause of the harmony and clarity of the universe.* Hence the beauty of the body consists in a man having his bodily limbs well proportioned, together with a certain clarity of colour. In like manner spiritual beauty consists in a man's conduct or actions being well proportioned in respect of the spiritual clarity of reason. Now this is what is meant by honesty, which we have stated (A. 1) to be the same as virtue; and it is virtue that moderates according to reason all that is connected with man. Wherefore *honesty is the same as spiritual beauty.* Hence Augustine says (*QQ.* LXXXIII., 30): *By honesty I mean intelligible beauty, which we properly designate as spiritual,* and further on he adds that *many things are beautiful to the eye, which it would be hardly proper to call honest.*

Reply Obj. 1. The object that moves the appetite is an apprehended good. Now if a thing is perceived to be beautiful as soon as it is apprehended, it is taken to be something becoming and good. Hence Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* iv. 1) that *the beautiful and the good are beloved by all.* Wherefore the honest, inasmuch as it implies spiritual beauty, is an object of desire, and for this reason Tully says (*De Offic.* i.): *Thou perceivest the form and the features, so to speak, of honesty; and were it to be seen with the*

eye, would, as Plato declares, arouse a wondrous love of wisdom.

Reply Obj. 2. As stated above (Q. CIII., A. 1, *ad* 3), glory is the effect of honour: because through being honoured or praised, a person acquires clarity in the eyes of others. Wherefore, just as the same thing makes a man honourable and glorious, so is the same thing honest and beautiful.

Reply Obj. 3. This argument applies to the beauty of the body: although it might be replied that to be proud of one's honesty is to play the harlot because of one's spiritual beauty, according to Ezech. xxviii. 17, *Thy heart was lifted up with thy beauty, thou hast lost thy wisdom in thy beauty.*

Third Article.

Whether the honest differs from the useful and the pleasant?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the honest does not differ from the useful and the pleasant. For the honest is what is desirable for its own sake. Now pleasure is desired for its own sake, for *it seems ridiculous to ask a man why he wishes to be pleased,* as the Philosopher remarks (*Ethic.* x. 2). Therefore the honest does not differ from the pleasant.

Obj. 2. Further, Riches are comprised under the head of useful good: for Tully says (*De Inv. Rhet.* ii.): *There is a thing* that *attracts the desire not by any force of its own, nor by its very nature, but on account of its fruitfulness and utility:* and *that is money.* Now riches come under the head of honesty, for it is written (Ecclus. xi. 14): *Poverty and riches* (*honestas*) are from God, and (xiii. 2): *He shall take a burden upon him that hath fellowship with one more honourable,* i.e. richer, *than himself.* Therefore the honest differs not from the useful.

Obj. 3. Further, Tully proves (*De Offic.* ii. § 2, *De Utilit.*) that *nothing can be useful unless it be honest:* and Ambrose makes the same statement (*De Offic.* ii.). Therefore the useful differs not from the honest.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Q. LXXXIII., 30): *The honest is that which is desirable for its own sake: the useful implies reference to something else.*

I answer that, The honest concurs in the same subject with the useful and the pleasant, but it differs from them in aspect. For, as stated above (A. 2), a thing is said to be honest, in so far as it has a certain beauty through being regulated by reason. Now whatever is regulated in accordance with reason is naturally becoming to man. Again, it is natural for a thing to take pleasure in that which is becoming to it. Wherefore an honest thing is naturally pleasing to man: and the Philosopher proves this with regard to acts of virtue (*Ethic.* i.). Yet not all that is pleasing is honest, since a thing may be becoming according to the senses, but not according to reason. A pleasing thing of this kind is beside man's reason which perfects his nature. Even virtue itself, which is essentially honest, is referred to something else as its end, namely happiness. Accordingly the honest, the useful, and the pleasant concur in the one subject.

Nevertheless they differ in aspect. For a thing is said to be honest as having a certain excellence deserving of honour on account of its spiritual beauty: while it is said to be pleasing, as bringing rest to desire, and useful, as referred to something else. The pleasant, however, extends to more things than the useful and the honest: since whatever is useful and honest is pleasing in some respect, whereas the converse does not hold, as stated in *Ethic.* ii. 3.

Reply Obj. 1. A thing is said to be honest, if it is desired for its own sake by the rational appetite, which tends to that which is in accordance with reason: while a thing is said to be pleasant if it is desired for its own sake by the sensitive appetite.

Reply Obj. 2. Riches are denominated honesty according to the opinion of the many who honour wealth; or because they are intended to be the instruments of virtuous deeds, as stated above (A. 1, *ad* 2).

Reply Obj. 3. Tully and Ambrose mean to say that

nothing incompatible with honesty can be simply and truly useful, since it follows that it is contrary to man's last end, which is a good in accordance with reason; although it may perhaps be useful in some respect, with regard to a particular end. But they do not mean to say that every useful thing as such may be classed among those that are honest.

Fourth Article.

whether honesty should be reckoned a part of temperance?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that honesty should not be reckoned a part of temperance. For it is not possible for a thing to be part and whole in respect of one same thing. Now *temperance is a part of honesty,* according to Tully (*De Inv. Rhet.* ii.). Therefore honesty is not a part of temperance.

Obj. 2. Further, It is stated (3 Esdr. iii. 21) that *wine . . . makes all thoughts honest.* But the use of wine, especially in excess, in which sense the passage quoted should seemingly be taken, pertains to intemperance rather than to temperance. Therefore honesty is not a part of temperance.

Obj. 3. Further, The honest is that which is deserving of honour. Now *it is the just and the brave who receive most honour,* according to the Philosopher (*Rhet.* i.). Therefore honesty pertains, not to temperance, but rather to justice and fortitude: wherefore Eleazar said as related in 2 Machab. vi. 28: *I suffer an honourable* (*honesta*) *death, for the most venerable and most holy laws.*

On the contrary, Macrobius (*De Somn. Scip.* i.) reckons honesty a part of temperance, and Ambrose (*De Offic.* i.) ascribes honesty as pertaining especially to temperance.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 2), honesty is a kind of spiritual beauty. Now the disgraceful is opposed to the beautiful: and opposites are most manifestive of one another. Wherefore seemingly honesty belongs especially to temperance, since the latter repels that which is most disgraceful and unbecoming to man, namely animal lusts. Hence by

its very name temperance is most significative of the good of reason to which it belongs to moderate and temper evil desires. Accordingly honesty, as being ascribed for a special reason to temperance, is reckoned as a part thereof, not as a subjective part, nor as an annexed virtue, but as an integral part or condition attaching thereto.

Reply Obj. 1. Temperance is accounted a subjective part of honesty taken in a wide sense: it is not thus that the latter is reckoned a part of temperance.

Reply Obj. 2. When a man is intoxicated, the wine makes his thoughts honest according to his own reckoning, because they deem themselves great and deserving of honour.

Reply Obj. 3. Greater honour is due to justice and fortitude than to temperance, because they excel in the point of a greater good: yet, greater honour is due to temperance, because the vices which it holds in check are the most deserving of reproach, as stated above in the Article. Thus honesty is more to be ascribed to temperance according to the rule given by the Apostle (1 Cor. xii. 23) when he says that *our uncomely parts have more abundant comeliness,* which, namely, destroys whatever is uncomely.

QUESTION CXLVI.

OF ABSTINENCE.

(*In Two Articles.*)

We must now consider the subjective parts of temperance: first, those which are about pleasures of food; secondly, those which are about pleasures of sex. The first consideration will include abstinence, which is about meat and drink, and sobriety, which is specifically about drink.

With regard to abstinence three points have to be considered: (1) Abstinence itself; (2) its act which is fasting; (3) its opposite vice which is gluttony. Under the first head there are two points of enquiry: (1) Whether abstinence is a virtue? (2) Whether it is a special virtue?

First Article.

Whether abstinence is a virtue?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that abstinence is not a virtue. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. iv. 20): *The kingdom of God is not in speech but in power* (*virtute*). Now the kingdom of God does not consist in abstinence, for the Apostle says (Rom. xiv. 17): *The kingdom of God is not meat and drink*, where a gloss* observes that *justice consists neither in abstaining nor in eating*. Therefore abstinence is not a virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (*Conf.* x.) addressing himself to God: *This hast Thou taught me, that I should set myself to take food as physic.* Now it belongs not to virtue, but to the medical art to regulate medicine. Therefore, in

* Cf. S. Augustine, *QQ. Evang.* ii., *qu.* 11.

like manner, to regulate one's food, which belongs to abstinence, is an act not of virtue but of art.

Obj. 3. Further, Every virtue observes the mean, as stated in *Ethic.* ii. 6, 7. But abstinence seemingly inclines not to the mean but to deficiency, since it denotes retrenchment. Therefore abstinence is not a virtue.

Obj. 4. Further, No virtue excludes another virtue. But abstinence excludes patience: for Gregory says (*Pastor.* iii.) that *impatience not unfrequently dislodges the abstainer's mind from its peaceful seclusion.* Likewise he says (*ibid.*) that *sometimes the sin of pride pierces the thoughts of the abstainer,* so that abstinence excludes humility. Therefore abstinence is not a virtue.

On the contrary, It is written (2 Pet. i. 5, 6): *Join with your faith virtue, and with virtue knowledge, and with knowledge abstinence;* where abstinence is numbered among other virtues. Therefore abstinence is a virtue.

I answer that, Abstinence by its very name denotes retrenchment of food. Hence the term abstinence may be taken in two ways. First, as denoting retrenchment of food absolutely, and in this way it signifies neither a virtue nor a virtuous act, but something indifferent. Secondly, it may be taken as regulated by reason, and then it signifies either a virtuous habit or a virtuous act. This is the meaning of Peter's words quoted above, where he says that we ought *to join abstinence with knowledge,* namely that in abstaining from food a man should act with due regard for those among whom he lives, for his own person, and for the requirements of health.

Reply Obj. 1. The use and abstinence from food, considered in themselves, do not pertain to the kingdom of God, since the Apostle says (1 Cor. viii. 8): *Meat doth not commend us to God. For neither, if we eat not* shall we have the less, nor if we eat, shall we have the more,* i.e. spiritually. Nevertheless they both belong to the kingdom of God, in so far as they are done reasonably through faith and love of God.

Reply Obj. 2. The regulation of food, in the point of

* Vulg.,—*Neither if we eat . . . nor if we eat not.*

quantity and quality, belongs to the art of medicine as regards the health of the body; but in the point of internal affections with regard to the good of reason, it belongs to abstinence. Hence Augustine says (*QQ. Evang.* ii. 11): *It makes no difference whatever to virtue what or how much food a man takes, so long as he does it with due regard for the people among whom he lives, for his own person, and for the requirements of his health: but it matters how readily and uncomplainingly he does without food when bound by duty or necessity to abstain.*

Reply Obj. 3. It belongs to temperance to bridle the pleasures which are too alluring to the soul, just as it belongs to fortitude to strengthen the soul against fears that deter it from the good of reason. Wherefore, just as fortitude is commended on account of a certain excess, from which all the parts of fortitude take their name, so temperance is commended for a kind of deficiency, from which both it and its parts are denominated. Hence abstinence, since it is a part of temperance, is named from deficiency, and yet it observes the mean, in so far as it is in accord with right reason.

Reply Obj. 4. Those vices result from abstinence in so far as it is not in accord with right reason. For right reason makes one abstain as one ought, i.e. with gladness of heart, and for the due end, i.e. for God's glory and not one's own.

Second Article.

whether abstinence is a special virtue.

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that abstinence is not a special virtue. For every virtue is praiseworthy by itself. But abstinence is not praiseworthy by itself; for Gregory says (*Pastor.* iii.) that *the virtue of abstinence is praised only on account of the other virtues.* Therefore abstinence is not a special virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine (Fulgentius) says (*De Fide ad Pet.* xliii.) that *the saints abstain from meat and drink, not that any creature of God is evil, but merely in order to chastise*

the body. Now this belongs to chastity, as its very name denotes. Therefore abstinence is not a special virtue distinct from chastity.

Obj. 3. Further, As man should be content with moderate meat, so should he be satisfied with moderate clothes, according to 1 Tim. vi. 8, *Having food, and wherewith to be covered, with these we should be* [Vulg.,—*are*] *content*. Now there is no special virtue in being content with moderate clothes. Neither, therefore, is there in abstinence which moderates food.

On the contrary, Macrobius (*De Somn. Scip*. i.) reckons abstinence as a special part of temperance.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CXXVI., A. 1; Q. CXLI., A. 3) moral virtue maintains the good of reason against the onslaught of the passions: hence whenever we find a special motive why a passion departs from the good of reason, there is need of a special virtue. Now pleasures of the table are of a nature to withdraw man from the good of reason, both because they are so great, and because food is necessary to man who needs it for the maintenance of life, which he desires above all other things. Therefore abstinence is a special virtue.

Reply Obj. 1. Virtues are of necessity connected together, as stated above (I.-II., Q. LXII., A. 1). Wherefore one virtue receives help and commendation from another, as justice from fortitude. Accordingly in this way the virtue of abstinence receives commendation on account of the other virtues.

Reply Obj. 2. The body is chastised by means of abstinence, not only against the allurements of lust, but also against those of gluttony: since by abstaining a man gains strength for overcoming the onslaughts of gluttony, which increase in force the more he yields to them. Yet abstinence is not prevented from being a special virtue through being a help to chastity, since one virtue helps another.

Reply Obj. 3. The use of clothing was devised by art, whereas the use of food is from nature. Hence it is more necessary to have a special virtue for the moderation of food than for the moderation of clothing.

QUESTION CXLVII.

OF FASTING.

(*In Eight Articles.*)

We must now consider fasting: under which head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether fasting is an act of virtue? (2) Of what virtue is it the act? (3) Whether it is a matter of precept? (4) Whether anyone is excused from fulfilling this precept? (5) The time of fasting: (6) Whether it is requisite for fasting to eat but once? (7) The hour of eating for those who fast: (8) The meats from which it is necessary to abstain.

First Article.

WHETHER FASTING IS AN ACT OF VIRTUE?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that fasting is not an act of virtue. For every act of virtue is acceptable to God. But fasting is not always acceptable to God, according to Isa. lviii. 3, *Why have we fasted and Thou hast not regarded?* Therefore fasting is not an act of virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, No act of virtue forsakes the mean of virtue. Now fasting forsakes the mean of virtue, which in the virtue of abstinence takes account of the necessity of supplying the needs of nature, whereas by fasting something is retrenched therefrom: else those who do not fast would not have the virtue of abstinence. Therefore fasting is not an act of virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, That which is competent to all, both good and evil, is not an act of virtue. Now such is fasting,

since every one is fasting before eating. Therefore fasting is not an act of virtue.

On the contrary, It is reckoned together with other virtuous acts (2 Cor. vi. 5, 6) where the Apostle says: *In fasting, in knowledge, in chastity,* etc. (Vulg.,—*in chastity, in knowledge*).

I answer that, An act is virtuous through being directed by reason to some virtuous (*honestum*)* good. Now this is consistent with fasting, because fasting is practised for a threefold purpose. First, in order to bridle the lusts of the flesh, wherefore the Apostle says (*loc. cit.*): *In fasting, in chastity,* since fasting is the guardian of chastity. For, according to Jerome (*Contra Jov.* ii.) *Venus is cold when Ceres and Bacchus are not there,* that is to say, lust is cooled by abstinence in meat and drink. Secondly, we have recourse to fasting in order that the mind may arise more freely to the contemplation of heavenly things: hence it is related (Dan. x.) of Daniel that he received a revelation from God after fasting for three weeks. Thirdly, in order to satisfy for sins: wherefore it is written (Joel ii. 12): *Be converted to Me with all your heart, in fasting, and in weeping and in mourning.* The same is declared by Augustine in a sermon on prayer and fasting (ccxx. *De Tempore*): *Fasting cleanses the soul, raises the mind, subjects one's flesh to the spirit, renders the heart contrite and humble, scatters the clouds of concupiscence, quenches the fire of lust, kindles the true ligh of chastity.*

Reply Obj. 1. An act that is virtuous generically may be rendered vicious by its connexion with certain circumstances. Hence the text goes on to say: *Behold in the day of your fast your own will is founded,* and a little further on (*verse* 4): *You fast for debates and strife and strike with the fist wickedly.* These words are expounded by Gregory (*Pastor.* iii.) as follows: *The will indicates joy and the fist anger. In vain then is the flesh restrained if the mind allowed to drift to inordinate movements be wrecked by vice.* And Augustine says (*loc. cit.*) that *fasting loves not many words,*

* Cf. Q. CXLV., A. 1.

deems wealth superfluous, scorns pride, commends humility, helps man to perceive what is frail and paltry.

Reply Obj. 2. The mean of virtue is measured not according to quantity but according to right reason, as stated in *Ethic.* ii. 6. Now reason judges it expedient, on account of some special motive, for a man to take less food than would be becoming to him under ordinary circumstances, for instance in order to avoid sickness, or in order to perform certain bodily works with greater ease: and much more does reason direct this to the avoidance of spiritual evils and the pursuit of spiritual goods. Yet reason does not retrench so much from one's food as to refuse nature its necessary support: thus Jerome says:* *It matters not whether thou art a longer or a short time in destroying thyself, since to afflict the body immoderately, whether by excessive lack of nourishment, or by eating or sleeping too little, is to offer a sacrifice of stolen goods.* In like manner right reason does not retrench so much from a man's food as to render him incapable of fulfilling his duty. Hence Jerome says (*loc. cit.*) *Rational man forfeits his dignity, if he sets fasting before chastity, or night-watchings before the well-being of his senses.*

Reply Obj. 3. The fasting of nature, in respect of which a man is said to be fasting until he partakes of food, consists in a pure negation, wherefore it cannot be reckoned a virtuous act. Such is only the fasting of one who abstains in some measure from food for a reasonable purpose. Hence the former is called natural fasting (*jejunium jejunii*)†: while the latter is called the faster's fast, because he fasts for a purpose.

Second Article.

whether fasting is an act of abstinence?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that fasting is not an act of abstinence. For a gloss on Matth. xvii. 20, *This kind* of devil,

* The quotation is from the Corpus of Canon Law (Cap. *Non immediocriter*, De Consecrationibus, dist. 5).

† Literally the *fast of fasting*.

says: *To fast is to abstain not only from food but also from all manner of lusts.* Now this belongs to every virtue. Therefore fasting is not exclusively an act of abstinence.

Obj. 2. Further, Gregory says in a Lenten Homily (xvi. *in Ev.*) that *the Lenten fast is a tithe of the whole year.* Now paying tithes is an act of religion, as stated above (Q. LXXXVII., A. 1). Therefore fasting is an act of religion and not of abstinence.

Obj. 3. Further, Abstinence is a part of temperance, as stated above (QQ. CXLIII. CXLVI.,). Now temperance is condivided with fortitude, to which it belongs to endure hardships, and this seems very applicable to fasting. Therefore fasting is not an act of abstinence.

On the contrary, Isidore says (*Etym.* vi.) that *fasting is frugality of fare and abstinence from food.*

I answer that, Habit and act have the same matter. Wherefore every virtuous act about some particular matter belongs to the virtue that appoints the mean in that matter. Now fasting is concerned with food, wherein the mean is appointed by abstinence. Wherefore it is evident that fasting is an act of abstinence.

Reply Obj. 1. Properly speaking fasting consists in abstaining from food, but speaking metaphorically it denotes abstinence from anything harmful, and such especially is sin.

We may also reply that even properly speaking fasting is abstinence from all manner of lust, since, as stated above (A. 1, *ad* 1), an act ceases to be virtuous by the conjunction of any vice.

Reply Obj. 2. Nothing prevents the act of one virtue belonging to another virtue, in so far as it is directed to the end of that virtue, as explained above (Q. CXLVI., A. 2, *ad* 2: I.-II., Q. XXIII., A. 7). Accordingly there is no reason why fasting should not be an act of religion, or of chastity, or of any other virtue.

Reply Obj. 3. It belongs to fortitude as a special virtue, to endure, not any kind of hardship, but only those connected with the danger of death. To endure hardships

resulting from privation of pleasure of touch, belongs to temperance and its parts: and such are the hardships of fasting.

Third Article.

whether fasting is a matter of precept?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that fasting is not a matter of precept. For precepts are not given about works of supererogation which are a matter of counsel. Now fasting is a work of supererogation: else it would have to be equally observed at all places and times. Therefore fasting is not a matter of precept.

Obj. 2. Further, Whoever infringes a precept commits a mortal sin. Therefore if fasting were a matter of precept, all who do not fast would sin mortally, and a widespreading snare would be laid for men.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (*De Vera Relig.* 17) that *the Wisdom of God having taken human nature, and called us to a state of freedom, instituted a few most salutary sacraments whereby the community of the Christian people, that is, of the free multitude, should be bound together in subjection to one God.* Now the liberty of the Christian people seems to be hindered by a great number of observances no less than by a great number of sacraments. For Augustine says in answering the questions of Januarius (*Ep.* lv.) that *whereas God in His mercy wished our religion to be distinguished by its freedom and the evidence and small number of its solemn sacraments, some people render it oppressive with slavish burdens.* Therefore it seems that the Church should not have made fasting a matter of precept.

On the contrary, Jerome writing to Lucinus and speaking of fasting says (*Ep.* xxviii.): *Let each province keep to its own practice, and look upon the commands of the elders as though they were laws of the apostles.* Therefore fasting is a matter of precept.

I answer that, Just as it belongs to the secular authority to make legal precepts which apply the natural law to

matters of common weal in temporal affairs, so it belongs to ecclesiastical superiors to prescribe by statute those things that concern the common weal of the faithful in spiritual goods.

Now it has been stated above (A. 1) that fasting is useful for the deletion and prevention of sin, and for raising the mind to spiritual things. And everyone is bound by the natural dictate of reason to practise fasting as far as it is necessary for these purposes. Wherefore fasting in general is a matter of precept of the natural law, while the fixing of the time and manner of fasting as becoming and profitable to the Christian people, is a matter of precept of positive law established by ecclesiastical authority: the latter is the Church fast, the former is the fast prescribed by nature.

Reply Obj. 1. Fasting considered in itself denotes something not eligible but penal: yet it becomes eligible in so far as it is useful to some end. Wherefore considered absolutely it is not binding under precept, but it is binding under precept to each one that stands in need of such a remedy. And since men, for the most part, need this remedy, both because *in many things we all offend* (James iii. 2), and because *the flesh lusteth against the spirit* (Gal. v. 17), it was fitting that the Church should appoint certain fasts to be kept by all in common. In doing this the Church does not make a precept of a matter of supererogation, but particularizes in detail that which is of general obligation.

Reply Obj. 2. Those commandments which are given under the form of a general precept, do not bind all persons in the same way, but subject to the requirements of the end intended by the lawgiver. It will be a mortal sin to disobey a commandment through contempt of the lawgiver's authority, or to disobey it in such a way as to frustrate the end intended by him: but it is not a mortal sin if one fails to keep a commandment, when there is a reasonable motive, and especially if the lawgiver would not insist on its observance if he were present. Hence it is that not all, who do not keep the fasts of the Church, sin mortally.

Reply Obj. 3. Augustine is speaking there of those things

that are neither contained in the authorities of Holy Scripture, nor found among the ordinances of bishops in council, nor sanctioned by the custom of the universal Church. On the other hand, the fasts that are of obligation are appointed by the councils of bishops and are sanctioned by the custom of the universal Church. Nor are they opposed to the freedom of the faithful, rather are they of use in hindering the slavery of sin, which is opposed to spiritual freedom, of which it is written (Gal. v. 13): *You brethren have been called unto liberty; only make not liberty an occasion to the flesh.*

Fourth Article.

whether all are bound to keep the fasts of the church?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that all are bound to keep the fasts of the Church. For the commandments of the Church are binding even as the commandments of God, according to Luke x. 16, *He that heareth you heareth Me.* Now all are bound to keep the commandments of God. Therefore in like manner all are bound to keep the fasts appointed by the Church.

Obj. 2. Further, Children especially are seemingly not exempt from fasting, on account of their age: for it is written (Joel ii. 15): *Sanctify a fast*, and further on (*verse* 16): *Gather together the little ones, and them that suck the breasts.* Much more therefore are all others bound to keep the fasts.

Obj. 3. Further, Spiritual things should be preferred to temporal, and necessary things to those that are not necessary. Now bodily works are directed to temporal gain; and pilgrimages, though directed to spiritual things, are not a matter of necessity. Therefore, since fasting is directed to a spiritual gain, and is made a necessary thing by the commandment of the Church, it seems that the fasts of the Church ought not to be omitted on account of a pilgrimage, or bodily works.

Obj. 4. Further, It is better to do a thing willingly than

through necessity, as stated in 2 Cor. ix. 7. Now the poor are wont to fast through necessity, owing to lack of food. Much more therefore ought they to fast willingly.

On the contrary, It seems that no righteous man is bound to fast. For the commandments of the Church are not binding in opposition to Christ's teaching. But our Lord said (Luke v. 34) that *the children of the bridegroom cannot fast whilst the bridegroom is with them.** Now He is with all the righteous by dwelling in them in a special manner,† wherefore our Lord said (Matth. xxviii. 20): Behold I am with you . . . *even to the consummation of the world.* Therefore the righteous are not bound by the commandment of the Church to fast.

I answer that, As stated above (I.-II., Q. XC., A. 2; Q. XCVIII., AA. 2, 6), general precepts are framed according to the requirements of the many. Wherefore in making such precepts the lawgiver considers what happens generally and for the most part, and he does not intend the precept to be binding on a person in whom for some special reason there is something incompatible with observance of the precept. Yet discretion must be brought to bear on the point. For if the reason be evident, it is lawful for a man to use his own judgment in omitting to fulfil the precept, especially if custom be in his favour, or if it be difficult for him to have recourse to superior authority. On the other hand, if the reason be doubtful, one should have recourse to the superior who has power to grant a dispensation in such cases. And this must be done in the fasts appointed by the Church, to which all are bound in general, unless there be some special obstacle to this observance.

Reply Obj. 1. The commandments of God are precepts of the natural law, which are, of themselves, necessary for salvation. But the commandments of the Church are about matters which are necessary for salvation, not of themselves, but only through the ordinance of the Church. Hence

* Vulg.,—*Can you make the children of the bridegroom fast, whilst the bridegroom is with them?*

† Cf. P. I., Q. VIII., A. 3.

there may be certain obstacles on account of which certain persons are not bound to keep the fasts in question.

Reply Obj. 2. In children there is a most evident reason for not fasting, both on account of their natural weakness, owing to which they need to take food frequently, and not much at a time, and because they need much nourishment owing to the demands of growth, which results from the residuum of nourishment. Wherefore as long as the stage of growth lasts, which as a rule lasts until they have completed the third period of seven years, they are not bound to keep the Church fasts: and yet it is fitting that even during that time they should exercise themselves in fasting, more or less, in accordance with their age. Nevertheless when some great calamity threatens, even children are commanded to fast, in sign of more severe penance, according to Jonas iii. 7, *Let neither men nor beasts . . . taste anything . . . nor drink water.*

Reply Obj. 3. Apparently a distinction should be made with regard to pilgrims and working people. For if the pilgrimage or laborious work can be conveniently deferred or lessened without detriment to the bodily health and such external conditions as are necessary for the upkeep of bodily or spiritual life, there is no reason for omitting the fasts of the Church. But if one be under the necessity of starting on the pilgrimage at once, and of making long stages, or of doing much work, either for one's bodily livelihood, or for some need of the spiritual life, and it be impossible at the same time to keep the fasts of the Church, one is not bound to fast: because in ordering fasts the Church would not seem to have intended to prevent other pious and more necessary undertakings. Nevertheless, in such cases one ought, seemingly, to seek the superior's dispensation; except perhaps when the above course is recognized by custom, since when superiors are silent they would seem to consent.

Reply Obj. 4. Those poor who can provide themselves with sufficient for one meal are not excused, on account of poverty, from keeping the fasts of the Church. On the

other hand, those would seem to be exempt who beg their food piecemeal, since they are unable at any one time to have a sufficiency of food.

Reply Obj. 5. This saying of our Lord may be expounded in three ways. First, according to Chrysostom (*Hom.* xxxi. *in Matth.*), who says that *the disciples, who are called children of the bridegroom, were as yet of a weakly disposition, wherefore they are compared to an old garment. Hence while Christ was with them in body they were to be fostered with kindness rather than drilled with the harshness of fasting.* According to this interpretation, it is fitting that dispensations should be granted to the imperfect and to beginners, rather than to the elders and the perfect, according to a gloss on Ps. cxxx. 2, *As a child that is weaned is towards his mother.* Secondly, we may say with Jerome* that our Lord is speaking here of the fasts of the observances of the Old Law. Wherefore our Lord means to say that the apostles were not to be held back by the old observances, since they were to be filled with the newness of grace. Thirdly, according to Augustine (*De Consensu Evang.* ii.), who states that fasting is of two kinds. One pertains to those who are humbled by disquietude, and this is not befitting perfect men, for they are called *children of the bridegroom;* hence when we read in Luke: *The children of the bridegroom cannot fast,*† we read in Matth. (ix. 15): *The children of the bridegroom cannot mourn.*‡ The other pertains to the mind that rejoices in adhering to spiritual things: and this fasting is befitting the perfect.

Fifth Article.

WHETHER THE TIMES FOR THE CHURCH FAST ARE FITTINGLY APPOINTED?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the times for the Church fast are unfittingly appointed. For we read (Matth. iv.) that

* Ven. Bede (*Comment.* on Luke v.). † Cf. footnote p. 61.

‡ Vulg.,—*Can the children of the bridegroom mourn ?*

Christ began to fast immediately after being baptized. Now we ought to imitate Christ, according to 1 Cor. iv. 16, *Be ye followers of me, as I also am of Christ.* Therefore we ought to fast immediately after the Epiphany when Christ's baptism is celebrated.

Obj. 3. Further, It is unlawful in the New Law to observe the ceremonies of the Old Law. Now it belongs to the solemnities of the Old Law to fast in certain particular months: for it is written (Zach. viii. 19): *The fast of the fourth month and the fast of the fifth, and the fast of the seventh, and the fast of the tenth shall be to the house of Juda, joy and gladness and great solemnities.* Therefore the fast of certain months, which are called Ember days, are unfittingly kept in the Church.

Obj. 3. Further, According to Augustine (*De Consensu Ev.* ii.), *just as there is a fast of sorrow, so is there a fast of joy.* Now it is most becoming that the faithful should rejoice spiritually in Christ's Resurrection. Therefore during the five weeks which the Church solemnizes on account of Christ's Resurrection, and on Sundays which commemorate the Resurrection, fasts ought to be appointed.

On the contrary stands the general custom of the Church.

I answer that, As stated above (AA. 1, 3), fasting is directed to two things, the deletion of sin, and the raising of the mind to heavenly things. Wherefore fasting ought to be appointed specially for those times, when it behoves man to be cleansed from sin, and the minds of the faithful to be raised to God by devotion: and these things are particularly requisite before the feast of Easter, when sins are loosed by baptism, which is solemnly conferred on Easter-eve, on which day our Lord's burial is commemorated, because *we are buried together with Christ by baptism unto death* (Rom. vi. 4). Moreover at the Easter festival the mind of man ought to be devoutly raised to the glory of eternity, which Christ restored by rising from the dead, and so the Church ordered a fast to be observed immediately before the Paschal feast; and for the same reason, on the eve of the chief festivals, because it is then that one ought to make ready

to keep the coming feast devoutly. Again it is the custom in the Church for Holy Orders to be conferred every quarter of the year: and then both the ordainer, and the candidates for ordination, and even the whole people, for whose good they are ordained, need to fast in order to make themselves ready for the ordination. Hence it is related (Luke vi. 12) that before choosing His disciples our Lord *went out into a mountain to pray*: and Ambrose commenting on these words says: *What shouldst thou do, when thou desirest to undertake some pious work, since Christ prayed before sending His apostles?*

With regard to the forty days' fast, according to Gregory (*Hom.* xvi. *in Ev.*) there are three reasons for the number. First, *because the power of the Decalogue is accomplished in the four books of the Holy Gospels: since forty is the product of ten multiplied by four.* Or *because we are composed of four elements in this mortal body through whose lusts we transgress the Lord's commandments which are delivered to us in the Decalogue. Wherefore it is fitting we should punish that same body forty times.* Or, *because, just as under the Law it was commanded that tithes should be paid of things, so we strive to pay God a tithe of days, for since a year is composed of three hundred and sixty-six days, by punishing ourselves for thirty-six days (namely the fasting days during the six weeks of Lent) we pay God a tithe of our year.* According to Augustine (*De Doctr. Christ.* ii.) a fourth reason may be added. For the Creator is the Trinity, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. Again, the number three refers to the invisible creature, since we are commanded to love God, with our whole heart, with our whole soul, and with our whole mind: while the number four refers to the visible creature, by reason of heat, cold, wet and dry. Thus the number ten signifies all things, and if this be multiplied by four which refers to the body whereby we make use of things, we have the number forty.

Each fast of the Ember days is composed of three days, on account of the number of months in each season: or on account of the number of Holy Orders which are conferred at these times.

Reply Obj. 1. Christ needed not baptism for His own sake, but in order to commend baptism to us. Wherefore it was competent for Him to fast, not before, but after His baptism, in order to invite us to fast before our baptism.

Reply Obj. 2. The Church keeps the Ember fasts, neither at the very same time as the Jews, nor for the same reasons. For they fasted in July, which is the fourth month from April (which they count as the first), because it was then that Moses coming down from Mount Sina broke the tables of the Law (Exod. xxxii.), and that, according to Jeremias (xxxix. 2), the walls of the city were first broken through. In the fifth month, which we call August, they fasted because they were commanded not to go up on to the mountain, when the people had rebelled on account of the spies (Num. xiv.): also in this month the temple of Jerusalem was burnt down by Nabuchodonosor (Jerem. lii.) and afterwards by Titus. In the seventh month which we call October, Godolias was slain, and the remnants of the people were dispersed (Jerem. li.). In the tenth month, which we call January, the people who were with Ezekiel in captivity heard of the destruction of the temple (Ezech. iv.).

Reply Obj. 3. The *fasting of joy* proceeds from the instigation of the Holy Ghost Who is the Spirit of liberty, wherefore this fasting should not be a matter of precept. Accordingly the fasts appointed by the commandment of the Church are rather *fasts of sorrow* which are inconsistent with days of joy. For this reason fasting is not ordered by the Church during the whole of the Paschal season, nor on Sundays: and if anyone were to fast at these times in contradiction to the custom of Christian people, which as Augustine declares (*Ep.* xxxvi.) is to be considered as law, or even through some erroneous opinion (thus the Manichees fast, because they deem such fasting to be of obligation),—he would not be free from sin. Nevertheless fasting considered in itself is commendable at all times, according to the saying of Jerome to Lucinius (*Ep.* xxviii.): *Would that we might fast always.*

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT IS REQUISITE FOR FASTING THAT ONE EAT BUT ONCE?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that it is not requisite for fasting that one eat but once. For, as stated above (A. 2), fasting is an act of the virtue of abstinence, which observes due quantity of food not less than the number of meals. Now the quantity of food is not limited for those who fast. Therefore neither should the number of meals be limited.

Obj. 2. Further, Just as man is nourished by meat, so is he by drink: wherefore drink breaks the fast, and for this reason we cannot receive the Eucharist after drinking. Now we are not forbidden to drink at various hours of the day. Therefore those who fast should not be forbidden to eat several times.

Obj. 3. Further, Digestives are a kind of food: and yet many take them on fasting days after eating. Therefore it is not essential to fasting to take only one meal.

On the contrary stands the common custom of the Christian people.

I answer that, Fasting is instituted by the Church in order to bridle concupiscence, yet so as to safeguard nature. Now only one meal is seemingly sufficient for this purpose, since thereby man is able to satisfy nature; and yet he withdraws something from concupiscence by minimizing the number of meals. Therefore it is appointed by the Church, in her moderation, that those who fast should take one meal in the day.

Reply Obj. 1. It was not possible to fix the same quantity of food for all, on account of the various bodily temperaments, the result being that one person needs more, and another less food: whereas, for the most part, all are able to satisfy nature by only one meal.

Reply Obj. 2. Fasting is of two kinds. One is the natural fast, which is requisite for receiving the Eucharist. This is broken by any kind of drink even of water, after which it is

not lawful to receive the Eucharist. The fast of the Church is another kind and is called the *fasting of the faster*, and this is not broken save by such things as the Church intended to forbid in instituting the fast. Now the Church does not intend to command abstinence from drink, for this is taken more for bodily refreshment, and digestion of the food consumed, although it nourishes somewhat. It is, however, possible to sin and lose the merit of fasting, by partaking of too much drink: as also by eating immoderately at one meal.

Reply Obj. 3. Although digestives nourish somewhat they are not taken chiefly for nourishment, but for digestion. Hence one does not break one's fast by taking them or any other medicines, unless one were to take digestives, with a fraudulent intention, in great quantity and by way of food.

Seventh Article.

Whether the ninth hour is suitably fixed for the faster's meal?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the ninth hour is not suitably fixed for the faster's meal. For the state of the New Law is more perfect than the state of the Old Law. Now in the Old Testament they fasted until evening, for it is written (Lev. xxiii. 32): *It is a sabbath . . you shall afflict your souls*, and then the text continues: *From evening until evening you shall celebrate your sabbaths.* Much more therefore under the New Testament should the fast be ordered until the evening.

Obj. 2. Further, The fast ordered by the Church is binding on all. But all are not able to know exactly the ninth hour. Therefore it seems that the fixing of the ninth hour should not form part of the commandment to fast.

Obj. 3. Further, Fasting is an act of the virtue of abstinence, as stated above (A. 2). Now the mean of moral virtue does not apply in the same way to all, since what is much for one is little for another, as stated in *Ethic.* ii. 6.

Therefore the ninth hour should not be fixed for those who fast.

On the contrary, The Council of Chalcedon* says: *During Lent those are by no means to be credited with fasting who eat before the celebration of the office of Vespers,* which in the Lenten season is said after the ninth hour. Therefore we ought to fast until the ninth hour.

I answer that, As stated above (AA. 1, 3, 5), fasting is directed to the deletion and prevention of sin. Hence it ought to add something to the common custom, yet so as not to be a heavy burden to nature. Now the right and common custom is for men to eat about the sixth hour: both because digestion is seemingly finished (the natural heat being withdrawn inwardly at night-time on account of the surrounding cold of the night), and the humour spread about through the limbs (to which result the heat of the day conduces until the sun has reached its zenith), and again because it is then chiefly that the nature of the human body needs assistance against the external heat that is in the air, lest the humours be parched within. Hence, in order that those who fast may feel some pain in satisfaction for their sins, the ninth hour is suitably fixed for their meal. Moreover, this hour agrees with the mystery of Christ's Passion, which was brought to a close at the ninth hour, when *bowing His head, He gave up the ghost* (Jo. xix. 30): because, those who fast by punishing their flesh, are conformed to the Passion of Christ, according to Gal. v. 24, *They that are Christ's, have crucified their flesh with the vices and concupiscences.*

Reply Obj. 1. The state of the Old Testament is compared to the night, while the state of the New Testament is compared to the day, according to Rom. xiii. 12, *The night is passed and the day is at hand.* Therefore in the Old Testament they fasted until night, but not in the New Testament.

Reply Obj. 2. Fasting requires a fixed hour based, not on a strict calculation, but on a rough estimate: for it suffices

* The quotation is from an unknown provincial council, and is to be found in the Corpus Juris, Cap. *Solent,* De Consecratione, dist. 1.

that it be about the ninth hour, and this is easy for anyone to ascertain.

Reply Obj. 3. A little more or a little less cannot do much harm. Now it is not a long space of time from the sixth hour at which men for the most part are wont to eat, until the ninth hour which is fixed for those who fast. Wherefore the fixing of such a time cannot do much harm to anyone, whatever his circumstances may be. If however this were to prove a heavy burden to a man on account of sickness, age, or some similar reason, he should be dispensed from fasting, or be allowed to forestall the hour by a little.

Eighth Article.

whether it is fitting that those who fast should be bidden to abstain from flesh meat, eggs, and milk foods?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems unfitting that those who fast should be bidden to abstain from flesh meat, eggs, and milk foods. For it has been stated above (A. 6) that fasting was instituted as a curb on the concupiscence of the flesh. Now concupiscence is kindled by drinking wine more than by eating flesh; according to Prov. xx. 1, *Wine is a luxurious thing*, and Eph. v. 18, *Be not drunk with wine, wherein is luxury*. Since then those who fast are not forbidden to drink wine, it seems that they should not be forbidden to eat flesh meat.

Obj. 2. Further, Some fish are as delectable to eat as the flesh of certain animals. Now concupiscence is desire of the delectable, as stated above (I.-II., Q. XXX., A. 1). Therefore since fasting which was instituted in order to bridle concupiscence does not exclude the eating of fish, neither should it exclude the eating of flesh meat.

Obj. 3. Further, On certain fasting days people make use of eggs and cheese. Therefore one can likewise make use of them during the Lenten fast.

On the contrary stands the common custom of the faithful.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 6), fasting was instituted

by the Church in order to bridle the concupiscences of the flesh, which regard pleasures of touch in connexion with food and sex. Wherefore the Church forbade those who fast to partake of those foods which both afford most pleasure to the palate, and besides are a very great incentive to lust. Such are the flesh of animals that take their rest on the earth, and of those that breathe the air and their products, such as milk from those that walk on the earth, and eggs from birds. For, since suchlike animals are more like man in body, they afford greater pleasure as food, and greater nourishment to the human body, so that from their consumption there results a greater surplus available for seminal matter, which when abundant becomes a great incentive to lust. Hence the Church has bidden those who fast to abstain especially from these foods.

Reply Obj. 1. Three things concur in the act of procreation, namely heat, spirit,* and humour. Wine and other things that heat the body conduce especially to heat: flatulent foods seemingly co-operate in the production of the vital spirit: but it is chiefly the use of flesh meat which is most productive of nourishment, that conduces to the production of humour. Now the alteration occasioned by heat, and the increase in vital spirits are of short duration, whereas the substance of the humour remains a long time. Hence those who fast are forbidden the use of flesh meat rather than of wine or vegetables which are flatulent foods.

Reply Obj. 2. In the institution of fasting, the Church takes account of the more common occurrences. Now, generally speaking, eating flesh meat affords more pleasure than eating fish, although this is not always the case. Hence the Church forbade those who fast to eat flesh meat, rather than to eat fish.

Reply Obj. 3. Eggs and milk foods are forbidden to those who fast, for as much as they originate from animals that provide us with flesh: wherefore the prohibition of flesh meat takes precedence of the prohibition of eggs and milk foods. Again the Lenten fast is the most solemn of all, both

* Cf. P. I., Q. CXVIII., A. 1, *ad* 3.

because it is kept in imitation of Christ, and because it disposes us to celebrate devoutly the mysteries of our redemption. For this reason the eating of flesh meat is forbidden in every fast, while the Lenten fast lays a general prohibition even on eggs and milk foods. As to the use of the latter things in other fasts the custom varies among different people, and each person is bound to conform to that custom which is in vogue with those among whom he is dwelling. Hence Jerome says to Lucinius (*Ep.* xxviii.): *Let each province keep to its own practice, and look upon the commands of the elders as though they were the laws of the apostles.*

QUESTION CXLVIII.

OF GLUTTONY.

(In Six Articles.)

We must now consider gluttony. Under this head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether gluttony is a sin? (2) Whether it is a mortal sin? (3) Whether it is the greatest of sins? (4) Its species: (5) Whether it is a capital sin? (6) Its daughters.

First Article.

WHETHER GLUTTONY IS A SIN?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that gluttony is not a sin. For our Lord said (Matth. xv. 11): *Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a man.* Now gluttony regards food which goes into a man. Therefore, since every sin defiles a man, it seems that gluttony is not a sin.

Obj. 2. Further, No man sins in what he cannot avoid, as Augustine says (*De Nat. et Grat.* lxvii.). Now gluttony is immoderation in food; and man cannot avoid this, for Gregory says (*Moral.* xxx.): *Since in eating pleasure and necessity go together, we fail to discern between the call of necessity and the seduction of pleasure,* and Augustine says (*Conf.* x.): *Who is it, Lord, that does not eat a little more than necessary?* Therefore gluttony is not a sin.

Obj. 3. Further, In every kind of sin the first movement is a sin. But the first movement in taking food is not a sin, else hunger and thirst would be sinful. Therefore gluttony is not a sin.

On the contrary, Gregory says (*Moral.* xxx.) that *unless we first tame the enemy dwelling within us, namely our gluttonous appetite, we have not even stood up to engage in the spiritual combat.* But man's inward enemy is sin. Therefore gluttony is a sin.

I answer that, Gluttony denotes, not any desire of eating and drinking, but an inordinate desire. Now desire is said to be inordinate through leaving the order of reason, wherein the good of moral virtue consists: and a thing is said to be a sin through being contrary to virtue. Wherefore it is evident that gluttony is a sin.

Reply Obj. 1. That which goes into man by way of food, by reason of its substance and nature, does not defile a man spiritually. But the Jews, against whom our Lord is speaking, and the Manichees deemed certain foods to make a man unclean, not on account of their signification, but by reason of their nature.* It is the inordinate desire of food that defiles a man spiritually.

Reply Obj. 2. As stated in the Article, the vice of gluttony does not regard the substance of food, but in the desire thereof not being regulated by reason. Wherefore if a man exceed in quantity of food, not from desire of food, but through deeming it necessary to him, this pertains, not to gluttony, but to some kind of inexperience. It is a case of gluttony only when a man knowingly exceeds the measure in eating, from a desire for the pleasures of the palate.

Reply Obj. 3. The appetite is twofold. There is the natural appetite, which belongs to the powers of the vegetal soul. In these powers virtue and vice are impossible, since they cannot be subject to reason; wherefore the appetitive power is condivided with the powers of secretion, digestion, and excretion, and to it hunger and thirst are to be referred. Besides this there is another, the sensitive appetite, and it is in the concupiscence of this appetite that the vice of gluttony consists. Hence the first movement of gluttony denotes inordinateness in the sensitive appetite, and this is not without sin.

* Cf. I.-II., Q. CII., A. 6, *ad* 1.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER GLUTTONY IS A MORTAL SIN?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that gluttony is not a mortal sin. For every mortal sin is contrary to a precept of the Decalogue: and this, apparently, does not apply to gluttony. Therefore gluttony is not a mortal sin.

Obj. 2. Further, Every mortal sin is contrary to charity, as stated above (Q. CXXXII., A. 3). But gluttony is not opposed to charity, neither as regards the love of God, nor as regards the love of one's neighbour. Therefore gluttony is never a mortal sin.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says in a sermon on Purgatory:* *Whenever a man takes more meat and drink than is necessary, he should know that this is one of the lesser sins.* But this pertains to gluttony. Therefore gluttony is accounted among the lesser, that is to say venial, sins.

Obj. 4. *On the contrary,* Gregory says (*Moral.* xxx.): *As long as the vice of gluttony has a hold on a man, all that he has done valiantly is forfeited by him: and as long as the belly is unrestrained, all virtue comes to naught.* But virtue is not done away save by mortal sin. Therefore gluttony is a mortal sin.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), the vice of gluttony properly consists in inordinate concupiscence. Now the order of reason in regulating the concupiscence may be considered from two points of view. First, with regard to things directed to the end, inasmuch as they may be incommensurate and consequently improportionate to the end; secondly, with regard to the end itself, inasmuch as concupiscence turns man away from his due end. Accordingly, if the inordinate concupiscence in gluttony be found to turn man away from the last end, gluttony will be a mortal sin. This is the case when he adheres to the pleasure of gluttony as his end, for the sake of which he contemns God, being

* Cf. Append. to S. Augustine's works: *Serm.* civ. *de sanctis.*

ready to disobey God's commandments, in order to obtain those pleasures. On the other hand, if the inordinate concupiscence in the vice of gluttony be found to affect only such things as are directed to the end, for instance when a man has too great a desire for the pleasures of the palate, yet would not for their sake do anything contrary to God's law, it is a venial sin.

Reply Obj. 1. The vice of gluttony becomes a mortal sin by turning man away from his last end: and accordingly, by a kind of reduction, it is opposed to the precept of hallowing the sabbath, which commands us to rest in our last end. For mortal sins are not all directly opposed to the precepts of the Decalogue, but only those which contain injustice: because the precepts of the Decalogue pertain specially to justice and its parts, as stated above (Q. CXXII., A. 1).

Reply Obj. 2. In so far as it turns man away from his last end, gluttony is opposed to the love of God, who is to be loved, as our last end, above all things: and only in this respect is gluttony a mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 3. This saying of Augustine refers to gluttony as denoting inordinate concupiscence merely in regard of things directed to the end.

Reply Obj. 4. Gluttony is said to bring virtue to naught, not so much on its own account, as on account of the vices which arise from it. For Gregory says (*Pastor.* iii.): *When the belly is distended by gluttony, the virtues of the soul are destroyed by lust.*

Third Article.

whether gluttony is the greatest of sins?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that gluttony is the greatest of sins. For the grievousness of a sin is measured by the grievousness of the punishment. Now the sin of gluttony is most grievously punished, for Chrysostom says (*Hom.* xiii. *in Matth.*): *Gluttony turned Adam out of Paradise, gluttony it was that drew down the deluge at the time of Noe, and brought punish-*

ment on the people of Sodom, according to Ezech. xvi. 49, *This was the iniquity of Sodom, thy sister, . . . fulness of bread*, etc. Therefore the sin of gluttony is the greatest of all.

Obj. 2. Further, In every genus the cause is the most powerful. Now gluttony is apparently the cause of other sins, for a gloss on Ps. cxxxv. 10, *Who smote Egypt with their first-born*, says: *Lust, concupiscence, pride are the first-born of gluttony*. Therefore gluttony is the greatest of sins.

Obj. 3. Further, Man should love himself in the first place after God, as stated above (Q. XXV., A. 4). Now man, by the vice of gluttony, inflicts an injury on himself: for it is written (Ecclus. xxxvii. 34): *By surfeiting many have perished*. Therefore gluttony is the greatest of sins, at least excepting those that are against God.

On the contrary, The sins of the flesh, among which gluttony is reckoned, are less culpable according to Gregory (*Moral.* xxxiii.).

I answer that, The gravity of a sin may be measured in three ways. First and foremost it depends on the matter in which the sin is committed: and in this way sins committed in connexion with Divine things are the greatest. From this point of view gluttony is not the greatest sin, for it is about matters connected with the nourishment of the body. Secondly, the gravity of a sin depends on the person who sins, and from this point of view the sin of gluttony is diminished rather than aggravated, both on account of the necessity of taking food, and on account of the difficulty of proper discretion and moderation in such matters. Thirdly, from the point of view of the result that follows, and in this way gluttony has a certain gravity, inasmuch as certain sins are occasioned thereby.

Reply Obj. 1. These punishments are to be referred to the vices that resulted from gluttony, or to the root from which gluttony sprang, rather than to gluttony itself. For the first man was expelled from Paradise on account of pride, from which he went on to an act of gluttony: while the deluge and

the punishment of the people of Sodom were inflicted for sins occasioned by gluttony.

Reply Obj. 2. This objection argues from the standpoint of the sins that result from gluttony. Nor is a cause necessarily more powerful, unless it be a direct cause: and gluttony is not the direct cause but the accidental cause, as it were, and the occasion of other vices.

Reply Obj. 3. The glutton intends, not the harm to his body, but the pleasure of eating: and if injury results to his body, this is accidental. Hence this does not directly affect the gravity of gluttony, the guilt of which is nevertheless aggravated, if a man incur some bodily injury through taking too much food.

Fourth Article.

WHETHER THE SPECIES OF GLUTTONY ARE FITTINGLY DISTINGUISHED ACCORDING TO THESE FIVE CIRCUMSTANCES: HASTILY, SUMPTUOUSLY, TOO MUCH, GREEDILY, DAINTILY?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the species of gluttony are unfittingly distinguished by Gregory who says (*Moral.* xxx.): *The vice of gluttony tempts us in five ways. Sometimes it forestalls the hour of need; sometimes it seeks costly meats; sometimes it requires the food to be daintily cooked; sometimes it exceeds the measure of refreshment by taking too much; sometimes we sin by the very heat of an immoderate appetite:*— which are contained in the following verse:

Hastily, sumptuously, too much, greedily, daintily.

For the above are distinguished according to diversity of circumstance. Now circumstances, being the accidents of an act, do not differentiate its species. Therefore the species of gluttony are not distinguished according to the aforesaid.

Obj. 2. Further, As time is a circumstance, so is place. If then gluttony admits of one species in respect of time, it

seems that there should likewise be others in respect of place and other circumstances.

Obj. 3. Further, Just as temperance observes due circumstances, so do the other moral virtues. Now the species of the vices opposed to the other moral virtues are not distinguished according to various circumstances. Neither, therefore, are the species of gluttony distinguished thus.

On the contrary stands the authority of Gregory quoted above.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), gluttony denotes inordinate concupiscence in eating. Now two things are to be considered in eating, namely the food we eat, and the eating thereof. Accordingly, the inordinate concupiscence may be considered in two ways. First, with regard to the food consumed: and thus, as regards the substance or species of food a man seeks *sumptuous*—i.e., costly food; as regards its quality, he seeks food prepared too nicely—i.e., *daintily*; and as regards quantity, he exceeds by eating *too much*.

Secondly, the inordinate concupiscence is considered as to the consumption of food: either because one forestalls the proper time for eating, which is to eat *hastily*, or one fails to observe the due manner of eating, by eating *greedily*.

Isidore (*De Summo Bon.* ii.) comprises the first and second under one heading, when he says that the glutton exceeds in *what* he eats, or in *how much*, *how* or *when* he eats.

Reply Obj. 1. The corruption of various circumstances causes the various species of gluttony, on account of the various motives, by reason of which the species of moral things are differentiated. For in him that seeks sumptuous food, concupiscence is aroused by the very species of the food; in him that forestalls the time concupiscence is disordered through impatience of delay, and so forth.

Reply Obj. 2. Place and other circumstances include no special motive connected with eating, that can cause a different species of gluttony.

Reply Obj. 3. In all other vices, whenever different circumstances correspond to different motives, the difference

of circumstances argues a specific difference of vice: but this does not apply to all circumstances, as stated above (I.-II., Q. LXXII., A. 9).

Fifth Article.

whether gluttony is a capital vice?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that gluttony is not a capital vice. For capital vices denote those whence, under the aspect of final cause, other vices originate. Now food, which is the matter of gluttony, has not the aspect of end, since it is sought, not for its own sake, but for the body's nourishment. Therefore gluttony is not a capital vice.

Obj. 2. Further, A capital vice would seem to have a certain pre-eminence in sinfulness. But this does not apply to gluttony, which, in respect of its genus, is apparently the least of sins, seeing that it is most akin to what is in accord with nature. Therefore it seems that gluttony is not a capital vice.

Obj. 3. Further, Sin results from a man forsaking the food of virtue on account of something useful to the present life, or pleasing to the senses. Now as regards goods having the aspect of utility, there is but one capital vice, namely covetousness. Therefore, seemingly, there would be but one capital vice in respect of pleasures: and this is lust, which is a greater vice than gluttony, and is about greater pleasures. Therefore gluttony is not a capital vice.

On the contrary, Gregory (*Moral.* xxxi.) reckons gluttony among the capital vices.

I answer that, As stated above (I.-II., Q. LXXXIV., A. 3), a capital vice denotes one from which, considered as final cause, i.e. as having a most desirable end, other vices originate: wherefore through desiring that end men are incited to sin in many ways. Now an end is rendered most desirable through having one of the conditions of happiness which is desirable by its very nature: and pleasure is essential to happiness, according to *Ethic.* i. 8; x. 3, 7, 8. There-

fore the vice of gluttony, being about pleasures of touch which stand foremost among other pleasures, is fittingly reckoned among the capital vices.

Reply Obj. 1. It is true that food itself is directed to something as its end: but since that end, namely the sustaining of life, is most desirable, and whereas life cannot be sustained without food, it follows that food too is most desirable: indeed, nearly all the toil of man's life is directed thereto, according to Eccles. vi. 7, *All the labour of man is for his mouth.* Yet gluttony seems to be about pleasures of food rather than about food itself; wherefore, as Augustine says (*De Vera Relig.* liii.), *with such food as is good for the worthless body, men desire to be fed,* wherein namely the pleasure consists, *rather than to be filled: since the whole end of that desire is this,—not to thirst and not to hunger.*

Reply Obj. 2. In sin the end is ascertained with respect to the conversion, while the gravity of sin is determined with regard to the aversion. Wherefore it does not follow that the capital sin which has the most desirable end surpasses the others in gravity.

Reply Obj. 3. That which gives pleasure is desirable in itself: and consequently corresponding to its diversity there are two capital vices, namely gluttony and lust. On the other hand, that which is useful is desirable, not in itself, but as directed to something else: wherefore seemingly in all useful things there is one aspect of desirability. Hence there is but one capital vice, in respect of such things.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER SIX DAUGHTERS ARE FITTINGLY ASSIGNED TO GLUTTONY, TO WIT, UNSEEMLY JOY, SCURRILITY, UNCLEANNESS, LOQUACIOUSNESS, AND DULNESS OF MIND IN THE UNDERSTANDING?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that six daughters are unfittingly assigned to gluttony, to wit, *unseemly joy, scurrility, uncleanness, loquaciousness, and dulness of mind as regards the*

understanding. For unseemly joy results from every sin, according to Prov. ii. 14, *Who are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things*. Likewise dulness of mind is associated with every sin, according to Prov. xiv. 22, *They err that work evil*. Therefore they are unfittingly reckoned to be daughters of gluttony.

Obj. 2. Further, The uncleanness which is particularly the result of gluttony would seem to be connected with vomiting, according to Isa. xxviii. 8, *All tables were full of vomit and filth*. But this seems to be not a sin but a punishment of sin, or even a useful thing that is a matter of council, according to Eccles. xxxi. 25, *If thou hast been forced to eat much, arise, go out, and vomit; and it shall refresh thee*. Therefore it should not be reckoned among the daughters of gluttony.

Obj. 3. Further, Isidore (Bk. II. *De Sum. Bono*, cap. 42; Bk. X. *Etym.*, litt. S) puts scurrility as a daughter of lust. Therefore it should be reckoned among the daughters of gluttony.

On the contrary, Gregory (*Moral.* xxxi.) assigns these daughters to gluttony.

I answer that, As stated above (AA. 1, 2, 3), gluttony consists properly in an immoderate pleasure in eating and drinking. Wherefore those vices are reckoned among the daughters of gluttony, which are the results of eating and drinking immoderately. These may be accounted for either on the part of the soul or on the part of the body. On the part of the soul these results are of four kinds. First, as regards the reason, whose keenness is dulled by immoderate meat and drink, and in this respect we reckon as a daughter of gluttony, *dulness of sense in the understanding*, on account of the fumes of food disturbing the brain. Even so, on the other hand, abstinence conduces to the penetrating power of wisdom, according to Eccles. ii. 3, *I thought in my heart to withdraw my flesh from wine, that I might turn my mind* in *wisdom*. Secondly, as regards the appetite, which is disordered in many ways by immoderation in eating and drinking, as though reason were fast asleep at the helm, and in this respect *unseemly joy* is reckoned, because all the other inordinate passions are directed to joy or sorrow, as stated *to*

Ethic. ii. 5. To this we must refer the saying of 3 Esdr. iii. 20, that *wine . . . gives every one a confident and joyful mind.* Thirdly, as regards inordinate words, and thus we have *loquaciousness*, because as Gregory says (*Pastor.* iii.), *unless gluttons were carried away by immoderate speech, that rich man who is stated to have feasted sumptuously every day would not have been so tortured in his tongue.* Fourthly, as regards inordinate action, and in this way we have *scurrility*, i.e. a kind of levity resulting from lack of reason, which is unable not only to bridle the speech, but also to restrain outward behaviour. Hence a gloss on Eph. v. 4, *Or foolish talking or scurrility*, says that *fools call this geniality*—i.e. *jocularity, because it is wont to raise a laugh.* Both of these, however, may be referred to the words which may happen to be sinful, either by reason of excess which belongs to *loquaciousness*, or by reason of unbecomingness, which belongs to *scurrility*.

On the part of the body, mention is made of *uncleanness*, which may refer either to the inordinate emission of any kind of superfluities, or especially to the emission of the semen. Hence a gloss on Eph. v. 3, *But fornication and all uncleanness*, says: *That is, any kind of incontinence that has reference to lust.*

Reply Obj. 1. Joy in the act or end of sin results from every sin, especially the sin that proceeds from habit, but the random riotous joy which is described as *unseemly* arises chiefly from immoderate partaking of meat or drink. In like manner, we reply that dulness of sense as regards matters of choice is common to all sin, whereas dulness of sense in speculative matters arises chiefly from gluttony, for the reason given in the *Article*.

Reply Obj. 2. Although it does one good to vomit after eating too much, yet it is sinful to expose oneself to its necessity by immoderate meat or drink. However, it is no sin to procure vomiting as a remedy for sickness if the physician prescribes it.

Reply Obj. 3. Scurrility proceeds from the act of gluttony, and not from the lustful act, but from the lustful will: wherefore it may be referred to either vice.

QUESTION CXLIX.

OF SOBRIETY.

(In Four Articles.)

WE must now consider sobriety and the contrary vice, namely drunkenness. As regards sobriety there are four points of inquiry: (1) What is the matter of sobriety? (2) Whether it is a special virtue? (3) Whether the use of wine is lawful? (4) To whom especially is sobriety becoming?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER DRINK IS THE MATTER OF SOBRIETY?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that drink is not the matter proper to sobriety. For it is written (Rom. xii. 3): *Not to be more wise than it behoveth to be wise, but to be wise unto sobriety.* Therefore sobriety is also about wisdom, and not only about drink.

Obj. 2. Further, Concerning the wisdom of God it is written (Wis. viii. 7) that *she teacheth sobriety* (Douay, *temperance*), *and prudence, and justice, and fortitude,* where sobriety stands for temperance. Now temperance is not only about drink, but also about meat and sexual matters. Therefore sobriety is not only about drink.

Obj. 3. Further, Sobriety would seem to take its name from *measure.** Now we ought to be guided by the measure in all things appertaining to us: for it is written (Tit. ii. 12): *We should live soberly and justly and godly in this world,* where

* *Bria,* a measure, a cup. Cf. Facciolati and Forcellini's *Lexicon.*

a gloss remarks: *Soberly, in ourselves;* and (1 Tim. ii. 9): *Women . . . in decent apparel, adorning themselves with modesty and sobriety.* Consequently it would seem that sobriety regards not only the interior man, but also things appertaining to external apparel. Therefore drink is not the matter proper to sobriety.

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. xxxi. 32): *Wine taken with sobriety is equal life to men; if thou drink it moderately, thou shalt be sober.*

I answer that, When a virtue is denominated from some condition common to the virtues, the matter specially belonging to it is that in which it is most difficult and most commendable to satisfy that condition of virtue: thus fortitude is about dangers of death, and temperance about pleasures of touch. Now sobriety takes its name from *measure,* for a man is said to be sober because he observes the *bria,* i.e. the measure. Wherefore sobriety lays a special claim to that matter wherein the observance of the measure is most deserving of praise. Such matter is the drinking of intoxicants, because the measured use thereof is most profitable, while immoderate excess therein is most harmful, since it hinders the use of reason even more than excessive eating. Hence it is written (Ecclus. xxxi. 37, 38): *Sober drinking is health to soul and body; wine drunken with excess raiseth quarrels, and wrath and many ruins.* For this reason sobriety is especially concerned with drink, not any kind of drink, but that which by reason of its volatility is liable to disturb the brain, such as wine and all intoxicants. Nevertheless, sobriety may be employed in a general sense so as to apply to any matter, as stated above (Q. CXXIII., A. 2; Q. CXLI., A. 2) with regard to fortitude and temperance.

Reply Obj. 1. Just as the material wine intoxicates a man as to his body, so too, speaking figuratively, the consideration of wisdom is said to be an inebriating draught, because it allures the mind by its delight, according to Ps. xxii. 5, *My chalice which inebriateth me, how goodly is it!* Hence sobriety is applied by a kind of metaphor in speaking of the contemplation of wisdom.

Reply Obj. 2. All the things that belong properly to temperance are necessary to the present life, and their excess is harmful. Wherefore it behoves one to apply a measure in all such things. This is the business of sobriety: and for this reason sobriety is used to designate temperance. Yet slight excess is more harmful in drink than in other things, wherefore sobriety is especially concerned with drink.

Reply Obj. 3. Although a measure is needful in all things, sobriety is not properly employed in connexion with all things, but only in those wherein there is most need for a measure.

Second Article.

whether sobriety is by itself a special virtue?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that sobriety is not by itself a special virtue. For abstinence is concerned with both meat and drink. Now there is no special virtue about meat. Therefore neither is sobriety, which is about drink, a special virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, Abstinence and gluttony are about pleasures of touch as sensitive to food. Now meat and drink combine together to make food, since an animal needs a combination of wet and dry nourishment. Therefore sobriety, which is about drink, is not a special virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, Just as in things pertaining to nourishment, meat is distinguished from drink, so are there various kinds of meats and of drinks. Therefore if sobriety is by itself a special virtue, seemingly there will be a special virtue corresponding to each different kind of meat or drink, which is unreasonable. Therefore it would seem that sobriety is not a special virtue.

On the contrary, Macrobius (*De Somno Scip.* i.) reckons sobriety to be a special part of temperance.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CXLVI., A. 2), it belongs to moral virtue to safeguard the good of reason against those things which may hinder it. Hence wherever we find a special hindrance to reason, there must needs be a

special virtue to remove it. Now intoxicating drink is a special kind of hindrance to the use of reason, inasmuch as it disturbs the brain by its fumes. Wherefore in order to remove this hindrance to reason a special virtue, which is sobriety, is requisite.

Reply Obj. 1. Meat and drink are alike capable of hindering the good of reason, by embroiling the reason with immoderate pleasure: and in this respect abstinence is about both meat and drink alike. But intoxicating drink is a special kind of hindrance, as stated above, wherefore it requires a special virtue.

Reply Obj. 2. The virtue of abstinence is about meat and drink, considered, not as food but as a hindrance to reason. Hence it does not follow that special kinds of virtue correspond to different kinds of food.

Reply Obj. 3. In all intoxicating drinks there is one kind of hindrance to the use of reason: so that the difference of drinks bears an accidental relation to virtue. Hence this difference does not call for a difference of virtue. The same applies to the difference of meats.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE USE OF WINE IS ALTOGETHER UNLAWFUL?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the use of wine is altogether unlawful. For without wisdom, a man cannot be in the state of salvation: since it is written (Wis. vii. 28): *God loveth none but him that dwelleth with wisdom,* and further on (ix. 19): *By wisdom they were healed, whosoever have pleased Thee, O Lord, from the beginning.* Now the use of wine is a hindrance to wisdom, for it is written (Eccles. ii. 3): *I thought in my heart to withdraw my flesh from wine, that I might turn my mind to wisdom.* Therefore wine-drinking is altogether unlawful.

Obj. 2. Further, The Apostle says (Rom. xiv. 21): *It is good not to eat flesh, and not to drink wine, nor anything whereby thy brother is offended or scandalized, or made weak.*

Now it is sinful to forsake the good of virtue, as likewise to scandalize one's brethren. Therefore it is unlawful to make use of wine.

Obj. 3. Further, Jerome says (*Contra Jovin.* i.) that *after the deluge wine and flesh were sanctioned : but Christ came in the last of the ages and brought back the end into line with the beginning.* Therefore it seems unlawful to use wine under the Christian law.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. v. 23): *Do not still drink water, but use a little wine for thy stomach's sake, and thy frequent infirmities ;* and it is written (Ecclus. xxxi. 36): *Wine drunken with moderation is the joy of the soul and the heart.*

I answer that, No meat or drink, considered in itself, is unlawful, according to Matth. xv. 11, *Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a man.* Wherefore it is not unlawful to drink wine as such. Yet it may become unlawful accidentally. This is sometimes owing to a circumstance on the part of the drinker, either because he is easily the worse for taking wine, or because he is bound by a vow not to drink wine: sometimes it results from the mode of drinking, because to wit he exceeds the measure in drinking: and sometimes it is on account of others who are scandalized thereby.

Reply Obj. 1. A man may have wisdom in two ways. First, in a general way, according as it is sufficient for salvation: and in this way it is required, in order to have wisdom, not that a man abstain altogether from wine, but that he abstain from its immoderate use. Secondly, a man may have wisdom in some degree of perfection: and in this way, in order to receive wisdom perfectly, it is requisite for certain persons that they abstain altogether from wine, and this depends on circumstances of certain persons and places.

Reply Obj. 2. The Apostle does not declare simply that it is good to abstain from wine, but that it is good in the case where this would give scandal to certain people.

Reply Obj. 3. Christ withdraws us from some things as being altogether unlawful, and from others as being obstacles

to perfection. It is in the latter way that he withdraws some from the use of wine, on account of their aiming at perfection, even as from riches and the like.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER SOBRIETY IS MORE REQUISITE IN PERSONS OF GREATER STANDING?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that sobriety is more requisite in persons of greater standing. For old age gives a man a certain standing; wherefore honour and reverence are due to the old, according to Levit. xix. 32, *Rise up before the hoary head, and honour the person of the aged man.* Now the Apostle declares that old men especially should be exhorted to sobriety, according to Tit. ii. 2, *That the aged man be sober.* Therefore sobriety is most requisite in persons of standing.

Obj. 2. Further, A bishop has the highest degree in the Church: and the Apostle commands him to be sober, according to 1 Tim. iii. 2, *It behoveth . . . a bishop to be blameless, the husband of one wife, sober, prudent, etc.* Therefore sobriety is chiefly required in persons of higher standing.

Obj. 3. Further, Sobriety denotes abstinence from wine. Now wine is forbidden to kings, who hold the highest place in human affairs: while it is allowed to those who are in a state of affliction, according to Prov. xxxi. 4, *Give not wine to kings,* and further on (*verse* 6), *Give strong drink to them that are sad, and wine to them that are grieved in mind.* Therefore sobriety is more requisite in persons of standing.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. iii. 11): *The women in like manner, chaste . . . sober,* etc., and (Tit. ii. 6) *Young men in like manner exhort that they be sober.*

I answer that, Virtue includes relationship to two things, to the contrary vices which it removes, and to the end to which it leads. Accordingly a particular virtue is more requisite in certain persons for two reasons. First, because they are more prone to the concupiscences which need to be

restrained by virtue, and to the vices which are removed by virtue. In this respect, sobriety is most requisite in the young and in women, because concupiscence of pleasure thrives in the young on account of the heat of youth, while in women there is not sufficient strength of mind to resist concupiscence. Hence, according to Valerius Maximus (ii. 1, n. 3), among the ancient Romans women drank no wine. Secondly, sobriety is more requisite in certain persons, as being more necessary for the operations proper to them. Now immoderate use of wine is a notable obstacle to the use of reason: wherefore sobriety is specially prescribed to the old, in whom reason should be vigorous in instructing others: to bishops and all ministers of the Church, who should fulfil their spiritual duties with a devout mind; and to kings, who should rule their subjects with wisdom.

This suffices for the *Replies* to the *Objections*.

QUESTION CL.

OF DRUNKENNESS.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE must next consider drunkenness. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether drunkenness is a sin? (2) Whether it is a mortal sin? (3) Whether it is the most grievous sin? (4) Whether it excuses from sin?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER DRUNKENNESS IS A SIN?

Objection 1. It seems that drunkenness is not a sin. For every sin has a corresponding contrary sin, thus timidity is opposed to daring, and presumption to pusillanimity. But no sin is opposed to drunkenness. Therefore drunkenness is not a sin.

Obj. 2. Further, Every sin is voluntary according to Augustine (*De Vera Relig.* xiv.). But no man wishes to be drunk, since no man wishes to be deprived of the use of reason. Therefore drunkenness is not a sin.

Obj. 3. Further, Whoever causes another to sin, sins himself. Therefore, if drunkenness were a sin, it would follow that it is a sin to ask a man to drink that which makes him drunk, which would seem very hard.

Obj. 4. Further, Every sin calls for correction. But correction is not applied to drunkards: for Gregory says that *we must forbear with their ways, lest they become worse if they be compelled to give up the habit.** Therefore drunkenness is not a sin.

* Cf. Canon *Denique*, dist. 4.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. xiii. 13): *Not in rioting and drunkenness.*

I answer that, Drunkenness may be understood in two ways. First, it may signify the defect itself of a man resulting from his drinking much wine, the consequence being that he loses the use of reason. In this sense drunkenness denotes not a sin, but a penal defect resulting from a fault. Secondly, drunkenness may denote the act by which a man incurs this defect. This act may cause drunkenness in two ways. In one way, through the wine being too strong, without the drinker being cognizant of this: and in this way too, drunkenness may occur without sin, especially if it is not through his negligence, and thus we believe that Noe was made drunk as related in Gen. ix. In another way drunkenness may result from inordinate concupiscence and use of wine: in this way it is accounted a sin, and is comprised under gluttony as a species under its genus. For gluttony is divided into *surfeiting* (Douay, *rioting*) *and drunkenness*, which are forbidden by the Apostle (*loc. cit.*).

Reply Obj. 1. As the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iii. 11), insensibility which is opposed to temperance is not very common, so that like its species which are opposed to the species of temperance it has no name. Hence the vice opposed to drunkenness is unnamed; and yet if a man were knowingly to abstain from wine to the extent of molesting nature grievously, he would not be free from sin.

Reply Obj. 2. This objection regards the resulting defect which is involuntary: whereas immoderate use of wine is voluntary, and it is in this that the sin consists.

Reply Obj. 3. Even as he that is drunk is excused if he knows not the strength of the wine, so too is he that invites another to drink excused from sin, if he be unaware that the drinker is the kind of person to be made drunk by the drink offered. But if ignorance be lacking neither is excused from sin.

Reply Obj. 4. Sometimes the correction of a sinner is to be foregone, as stated above (Q. XXXIII., A. 6). Hence

Augustine says in a letter to Aurelius (*Ep.* xxii.), *Meseems, such things are cured not by bitterness, severity, harshness, but by teaching rather than commanding, by advice rather than threats. Such is the course to be followed with the majority of sinners: few are they whose sins should be treated with severity.*

Second Article.

whether drunkenness is a mortal sin?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that drunkenness is not a mortal sin. For Augustine says in a sermon on Purgatory* that *drunkenness, if indulged in assiduously, is a mortal sin.* Now assiduity denotes a circumstance which does not change the species of a sin; so that it cannot aggravate a sin infinitely, and make a mortal sin of a venial sin, as shown above (I.-II., Q. LXXXVIII., A. 5). Therefore if drunkenness is not a mortal sin for some other reason, neither is it for this.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (*ibid.*): *Whenever a man takes more meat and drink than is necessary, he should know that this is one of the lesser sins.* Now the lesser sins are called venial. Therefore drunkenness, which is caused by immoderate drink, is a venial sin.

Obj. 3. Further, No mortal sin should be committed on the score of medicine. Now some drink too much at the advice of the physician, that they may be purged by vomiting; and from this excessive drink drunkenness ensues. Therefore drunkenness is not a mortal sin.

On the contrary, We read in the Canons of the apostles (*Can.* xli., xlii.; *Tom.* i. *Concil.*): *A bishop, priest or deacon who is given to drunkenness or gambling, or incites others thereto, must either cease or be deposed; a subdeacon, reader or precentor who does these things must either give them up or be excommunicated; the same applies to the laity.* Now such punishments are not inflicted save for mortal sins. Therefore drunkenness is a mortal sin.

* *Serm.* civ. in the Appendix to S. Augustine's works.

I answer that, The sin of drunkenness, as stated in the foregoing *Article,* consists in the immoderate use and concupiscence of wine. Now this may happen to a man in three ways. First, so that he knows not the drink to be immoderate and intoxicating: and then drunkenness may be without sin, as stated above (A. 1). Secondly, so that he perceives the drink to be immoderate, but without knowing it to be intoxicating, and then drunkenness may involve a venial sin. Thirdly, it may happen that a man is well aware that the drink is immoderate and intoxicating, and yet he would rather be drunk than abstain from drink. Such a man is a drunkard properly speaking, because morals take their species not from things that occur accidentally and beside the intention, but from that which is directly intended. In this way drunkenness is a mortal sin, because then a man willingly and knowingly deprives himself of the use of reason, whereby he performs virtuous deeds and avoids sin, and thus he sins mortally by running the risk of falling into sin. For Ambrose says in his book on the Patriarchs (*De Abraham* i.): *We learn that we should shun drunkenness, which prevents us from avoiding grievous sins. For the things we avoid when sober, we unknowingly commit through drunkenness.* Therefore drunkenness, properly speaking, is a mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 1. Assiduity makes drunkenness a mortal sin, not on account of the mere repetition of the act, but because it is impossible for a man to become drunk assiduously, without exposing himself to drunkenness knowingly and willingly, since he has many times experienced the strength of wine and his own liability to drunkenness.

Reply Obj. 2. To take more meat or drink than is necessary belongs to the vice of gluttony, which is not always a mortal sin: but knowingly to take too much drink to the point of being drunk, is a mortal sin. Hence Augustine says (*Conf.* x. 3): *Drunkenness is far from me: Thou wilt have mercy, that it come not near me. But full feeding sometimes hath crept upon Thy servant.*

Reply Obj. 3. As stated above (Q. CXLI., A. 6), meat and

drink should be moderate in accordance with the demands of the body's health. Wherefore, just as it happens sometimes that the meat and drink which are moderate for a healthy man are immoderate for a sick man, so too it may happen conversely, that what is excessive for a healthy man is moderate for one that is ailing. In this way when a man eats or drinks much at the physician's advice in order to provoke vomiting, he is not to be deemed to have taken excessive meat or drink. There is, however, no need for intoxicating drink in order to procure vomiting, since this is caused by drinking lukewarm water: wherefore this is no sufficient cause for excusing a man from drunkenness.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER DRUNKENNESS IS THE GRAVEST OF SINS?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that drunkenness is the gravest of sins. For Chrysostom says (*Hom.* lviii. *in Matth.*) that *nothing gains the devil's favour so much as drunkenness and lust, the mother of all the vices.* And it is written in the Decretals (Dist. xxxv., Cap. 9): *Drunkenness, more than anything else, is to be avoided by the clergy, for it foments and fosters all the vices.*

Obj. 2. Further, From the very fact that a thing excludes the good of reason, it is a sin. Now this is especially the effect of drunkenness. Therefore drunkenness is the greatest of sins.

Obj. 3. Further, The gravity of a sin is shown by the gravity of its punishment. Now seemingly drunkenness is punished most severely; for Ambrose says (*De Elia et de Jejunio* v.) that *there would be no slavery, were there no drunkards.* Therefore drunkenness is the greatest of sins.

On the contrary, According to Gregory (*Moral.* xxxiii.), spiritual vices are greater than carnal vices. Now drunkenness is one of the carnal vices. Therefore it is not the greatest of sins.

I answer that, A thing is said to be evil because it removes

a good. Wherefore the greater the good removed by an evil, the graver the evil. Now it is evident that a Divine good is greater than a human good. Wherefore the sins that are directly against God are graver than the sin of drunkenness, which is directly opposed to the good of human reason.

Reply Obj. 1. Man is most prone to sins of intemperance, because suchlike concupiscences and pleasures are connatural to us, and for this reason these sins are said to find greatest favour with the devil, not for being graver than other sins, but because they occur more frequently among men.

Reply Obj. 2. The good of reason is hindered in two ways: in one way by that which is contrary to reason, in another by that which takes away the use of reason. Now that which is contrary to reason has more the character of an evil, than that which takes away the use of reason for a time, since the use of reason, which is taken away by drunkenness, may be either good or evil, whereas the goods of virtue, which are taken away by things that are contrary to reason, are always good.

Reply Obj. 3. Drunkenness was the occasional cause of slavery, in so far as Cham brought the curse of slavery on to his descendants, for having laughed at his father when the latter was made drunk. But slavery was not the direct punishment of drunkenness.

Fourth Article.

whether drunkenness excuses from sin?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that drunkenness does not excuse from sin. For the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iii. 5) that *the drunkard deserves double punishment.* Therefore drunkenness aggravates a sin instead of excusing from it.

Obj. 2. Further, One sin does not excuse another, but increases it. Now drunkenness is a sin. Therefore it is not an excuse for sin.

Obj. 3. Further, The Philosopher says (*Ethic.* vi. 5) that just as man's reason is tied by drunkenness, so is it by concupiscence. But concupiscence is not an excuse for sin: neither therefore is drunkenness.

On the contrary, According to Augustine (*Contra Faust.* xxii.), Lot was to be excused from incest on account of drunkenness.

I answer that, Two things are to be observed in drunkenness, as stated above (A. 1), namely the resulting defect and the preceding act. On the part of the resulting defect whereby the use of reason is fettered, drunkenness may be an excuse for sin, in so far as it causes an act to be involuntary through ignorance. But on the part of the preceding act, a distinction would seem necessary; because, if the drunkenness that results from that act be without sin, the subsequent sin is entirely excused from fault, as perhaps in the case of Lot. If, however, the preceding act was sinful, the person is not altogether excused from the subsequent sin, because the latter is rendered voluntary through the voluntariness of the preceding act, inasmuch as it was through doing something unlawful that he fell into the subsequent sin. Nevertheless, the resulting sin is diminished, even as the character of voluntariness is diminished. Wherefore Augustine says (*Contra Faust., loc. cit.*) that *Lot's guilt is to be measured, not by the incest, but by his drunkenness.*

Reply Obj. 1. The Philosopher does not say that the drunkard deserves more severe punishment, but that he deserves double punishment for his twofold sin. Or we may reply that he is speaking in view of the law of a certain Pittacus, who, as stated in *Polit.* ii., ordered those guilty of assault while drunk to be more severely punished than if they had been sober, because they do wrong in more ways than one. In this, as Aristotle observes (*ibid.*), he seems to have considered the advantage, namely of the prevention of wrong, rather than the leniency which one should have for drunkards, seeing that they are not in possession of their faculties.

Reply Obj. 2. Drunkenness may be an excuse for sin, not

in the point of its being itself a sin, but in the point of the defect that results from it, as stated in the *Article*.

Reply Obj. 3. Concupiscence does not altogether fetter the reason, as drunkenness does, unless perchance it be so vehement as to make a man insane. Yet the passion of concupiscence diminishes sin, because it is less grievous to sin through weakness than through malice.

QUESTION CLI.

OF CHASTITY.

(*In Four Articles.*)

We must next consider chastity: (1) The virtue itself of chastity: (2) virginity, which is a part of chastity: (3) lust, which is the contrary vice. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether chastity is a virtue? (2) Whether it is a general virtue? (3) Whether it is a virtue distinct from abstinence? (4) Of its relation to purity.

First Article.

WHETHER CHASTITY IS A VIRTUE?

We proceed to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that chastity is not a virtue. For here we are treating of virtues of the soul. But chastity, seemingly, belongs to the body: for a person is said to be chaste because he behaves in a certain way as regards the use of certain parts of the body. Therefore chastity is not a virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, Virtue is a voluntary habit, as stated in *Ethic.* ii. 4, 6. But chastity, apparently, is not voluntary, since it can be taken away by force from a woman to whom violence is done. Therefore it seems that chastity is not a virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, There is no virtue in unbelievers. Yet some unbelievers are chaste. Therefore chastity is not a virtue.

Obj. 4. Further, The fruits are distinct from the virtues.

But chastity is reckoned among the fruits (Gal. v. 23). Therefore chastity is not a virtue.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De decem chord.*): *Whereas thou shouldest excel thy wife in virtue, since chastity is a virtue, thou yieldest to the first onslaught of lust, while thou wishest thy wife to be victorious.*

I answer that, Chastity takes its name from the fact that reason chastises concupiscence, which, like a child, needs curbing, as the Philosopher states (*Ethic.* iii. 12). Now the essence of human virtue consists in being something moderated by reason, as shown above (I.-II., Q. LXIV., A. 1). Therefore it is evident that chastity is a virtue.

Reply Obj. 1. Chastity does indeed reside in the soul as its subject, though its matter is in the body. For it belongs to chastity that a man make moderate use of bodily members in accordance with the judgment of his reason and the choice of his will.

Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* i.), *so long as her mind holds to its purpose, whereby she has merited to be holy even in body, not even the violence of another's lust can deprive her body of its holiness, which is safeguarded by her persevering continency.* He also says (*ibid.*) that *in the mind there is a virtue which is the companion of fortitude, whereby it is resolved to suffer any evil whatsoever rather than consent to evil.*

Reply Obj. 3. As Augustine says (*Contra Julian.* iv.), *it is impossible to have any true virtue unless one be truly just; nor is it possible to be just unless one live by faith.* Whence he argues that in unbelievers there is neither true chastity, nor any other virtue, because, to wit, they are not referred to the due end, and as he adds (*ibid.*) *virtues are distinguished from vices not by their functions,* i.e. their acts, *but by their ends.*

Reply Obj. 4. Chastity is a virtue in so far as it works in accordance with reason, but in so far as it delights in its act, it is reckoned among the fruits.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER CHASTITY IS A GENERAL VIRTUE?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that chastity is a general virtue. For Augustine says (*De Mendacio* xx.) that *chastity of the mind is the well-ordered movement of the mind that does not prefer the lesser to the greater things.* But this belongs to every virtue. Therefore chastity is a general virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, Chastity takes its name from chastisement. Now every moment of the appetitive part should be chastised by reason. Since, then, every moral virtue curbs some movement of the appetite, it seems that every moral virtue is chastity.

Obj. 3. Further, Chastity is opposed to fornication. But fornication seems to belong to every kind of sin: for it is written (Ps.l xxii. 27): *Thou shalt destroy* [Vulg.,—*hast destroyed*] *all them that go awhoring from* [Douay,—*are disloyal to*] *Thee.* Therefore chastity is a general virtue.

On the contrary, Macrobius (*De Somn. Scip.* i.) reckons it to be a part of temperance.

I answer that, The word *chastity* is employed in two ways. First, properly; and thus it is a special virtue having a special matter, namely the concupiscences relating to venereal pleasures. Secondly, the word *chastity* is employed metaphorically: for just as a mingling of bodies conduces to venereal pleasure which is the proper matter of chastity and of lust its contrary vice, so too the spiritual union of the mind with certain things conduces to a pleasure which is the matter of a spiritual chastity metaphorically speaking, as well as of a spiritual fornication likewise metaphorically so called. For if the human mind delight in the spiritual union with that to which it behoves it to be united, namely God, and refrains from delighting in union with other things against the requirements of the order established by God, this may be called a spiritual chastity, according to Cor. xi. 2, *I have espoused you to one husband, that I may present you as a chaste virgin to Christ.* If, on the other hand, the

mind be united to any other things whatsoever, against the prescription of the Divine order, it will be called spiritual fornication, according to Jerem. iii. 1, *But thou hast prostituted thyself to many lovers.* Taking chastity in this sense, it is a general virtue, because every virtue withdraws the human mind from delighting in a union with unlawful things. Nevertheless, the essence of this chastity consists principally in charity and the other theological virtues, whereby the human mind is united to God.

Reply Obj. 1. This argument takes chastity in the metaphorical sense.

Reply Obj. 2. As stated above (A. 1; Q. CXLII., A. 2), the concupiscence of that which gives pleasure is especially likened to a child, because the desire of pleasure is connatural to us, especially of pleasures of touch which are directed to the maintenance of nature. Hence it is that if the concupiscence of such pleasures be fostered by consenting to it, it will wax very strong, as in the case of a child left to his own will. Wherefore the concupiscence of these pleasures stands in very great need of being chastised: and consequently chastity is applied antonomastically to such-like concupiscences, even as fortitude is about those matters wherein we stand in the greatest need of strength of mind.

Reply Obj. 3. This argument considers spiritual fornication metaphorically so called, which is opposed to spiritual chastity, as stated in the *Article.*

Third Article.

whether chastity is a distinct virtue from abstinence?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that chastity is not a distinct virtue from abstinence. Because where the matter is generically the same, one virtue suffices. Now it would seem that things pertaining to the same sense are of one genus. Therefore, since pleasures of the palate which are the matter of abstinence, and venereal pleasures which are the matter of

chastity, pertain to the touch, it seems that chastity is not a distinct virtue from abstinence.

Obj. 2. Further, The Philosopher (*Ethic.* iii. 12) likens all vices of intemperance to childish sins, which need chastising. Now chastity takes its name from chastisement of the contrary vices. Since then certain vices are bridled by abstinence, it seems that abstinence is chastity.

Obj. 3. Further, The pleasures of the other senses are the concern of temperance, in so far as they refer to pleasures of touch, which are the matter of temperance. Now pleasures of the palate, which are the matter of abstinence, are directed to venereal pleasures, which are the matter of chastity: wherefore Jerome says (*Ep.* cxlvii. *ad Amand.*), commenting on Tit. i. 7, *Not given to wine, no striker*, etc.: *The belly and the organs of generation are neighbours, that the neighbourhood of the organs may indicate their complicity in vice.* Therefore abstinence and chastity are not distinct virtues.

On the contrary, The Apostle (2 Cor. vi. 5, 6) reckons *chastity* together with *fastings* which pertain to abstinence.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CXLI., A. 4), temperance is properly about the concupiscences of the pleasures of touch: so that where there are different kinds of pleasure, there are different virtues comprised under temperance. Now pleasures are proportionate to the actions whose perfections they are, as stated in *Ethic.* ix. 7: and it is evident that actions connected with the use of food whereby the nature of the individual is maintained differ generically from actions connected with the use of matters venereal, whereby the nature of the species is preserved. Therefore chastity, which is about venereal pleasures, is a distinct virtue from abstinence, which is about pleasures of the palate.

Reply Obj. 1. Temperance is chiefly about pleasures of touch, not as regards the sense's judgment concerning the objects of touch, which judgment is of uniform character concerning all such objects, but as regards the use itself of those objects, as stated in *Ethic.* iii. 10. Now the uses of meats, drinks, and venereal matters differ in character.

Wherefore there must needs be different virtues, though they regard the one sense.

Reply Obj. 2. Venereal pleasures are more impetuous, and are more oppressive on the reason than the pleasures of the palate: and therefore they are in greater need of chastisement and restraint, since if one consent to them this increases the force of concupiscence and weakens the strength of the mind. Hence Augustine says (*Soliloq.* i. 10): *I consider that nothing so casts down the manly mind from its heights as the fondling of women, and those bodily contacts which belong to the married state.*

Reply Obj. 3. The pleasures of the other senses do not pertain to the maintenance of man's nature, except in so far as they are directed to pleasures of touch. Wherefore in the matter of such pleasures there is no other virtue comprised under temperance. But the pleasures of the palate, though directed somewhat to venereal pleasures, are essentially directed to the preservation of man's life: wherefore by their very nature they have a special virtue, although this virtue which is called abstinence directs its act to chastity as its end.

Fourth Article.

Whether purity belongs especially to chastity?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that purity does not belong especially to chastity. For Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* i.) that *purity is a virtue of the soul.* Therefore it is not something belonging to chastity, but is of itself a virtue distinct from chastity.

Obj. 2. Further, *Pudicitia* (purity) is derived from *pudor*, which is equivalent to shame. Now shame, according to Damascene (*De Fide Orthod.* ii.), is about a disgraceful act, and this is common to all sinful acts. Therefore purity belongs no more to chastity than to the other virtues.

Obj. 3. Further, The Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iii. 12) that *every kind of intemperance is most deserving of reproach.*

Now it would seem to belong to purity to avoid all that is deserving of reproach. Therefore purity belongs to all the parts of temperance, and not especially to chastity.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Perseverantia* xx.): *We must give praise to purity, that he who has ears to hear, may put to none but a lawful use the organs intended for procreation.* Now the use of these organs is the proper matter of chastity. Therefore purity belongs properly to chastity.

I answer that, As stated above (*Obj.* 2), *pudicitia* (purity) takes its name from *pudor,* which signifies shame. Hence purity must needs be properly about the things of which man is most ashamed. Now men are most ashamed of venereal acts, as Augustine remarks (*De Civ. Dei* xiv.), so much so that even the conjugal act, which is adorned by the honesty* of marriage, is not devoid of shame: and this because the movement of the organs of generation is not subject to the command of reason, as are the movements of the other external members. Now man is ashamed not only of this sexual union but also of all the signs thereof, as the Philosopher observes (*Rhet.* ii.). Consequently purity regards venereal matters properly, and especially the signs thereof, such as impure looks, kisses, and touches. And since the latter are more wont to be observed, purity regards rather these external signs, while chastity regards rather sexual union. Therefore purity is directed to chastity, not as a virtue distinct therefrom, but as expressing a circumstance of chastity. Nevertheless the one is sometimes used to designate the other.

Reply Obj. 1. Augustine is here speaking of purity as designating chastity.

Reply Obj. 2. Although every vice has a certain disgrace, the vices of intemperance are especially disgraceful, as stated above (Q. CXLII., A. 4).

Reply Obj. 3. Among the vices of intemperance, venereal sins are most deserving of reproach, both on account of the insubordination of the genital organs, and because by these sins especially, the reason is absorbed.

* Cf. Q. CXLV.

QUESTION CLII.

OF VIRGINITY.

(In Five Articles).

WE must now consider virginity: and under this head there are five points of inquiry: (1) In what does virginity consist? (2) Whether it is lawful? (3) Whether it is a virtue? (4) Of its excellence in comparison with marriage. (5) Of its excellence in comparison with the other virtues.

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER VIRGINITY CONSISTS IN INTEGRITY OF THE FLESH?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that virginity does not consist in integrity of the flesh. For Augustine says (*De Nup. et Concup.*)* that *virginity is the continual meditation on incorruption in a corruptible flesh.* But meditation does not concern the flesh. Therefore virginity is not situated in the flesh.

Obj. 2. Further, Virginity denotes a kind of purity. Now Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* i.) that *purity dwells in the soul.* Therefore virginity is not incorruption of the flesh.

Obj. 3. Further, The integrity of the flesh would seem to consist in the seal of virginal purity. Yet sometimes the seal is broken without loss of virginity. For Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* i.) that *those organs may be injured through being wounded by mischance. Physicians, too, sometimes do for the sake of health that which makes one shudder to see: and a midwife has been known to destroy by touch the*

* The quotation is from *De Sancta Virgin.* xiii.

proof of virginity that she sought. And he adds: *Nobody, I think, would be so foolish as to deem this maiden to have forfeited even bodily sanctity, though she lost the integrity of that organ.* Therefore virginity does not consist in incorruption of the flesh.

Obj. 4. Further, Corruption of the flesh consists chiefly in resolution of the semen: and this may take place without copulation, whether one be asleep or awake. Yet seemingly virginity is not lost without copulation: for Augustine says (*De Virgin.* xiii.) that *virginal integrity and holy continency that refrains from all sexual intercourse is the portion of angels.* Therefore virginity does not consist in incorruption of the flesh.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*ibid.* viii.) that *virginity is continence whereby integrity of the flesh is vowed, consecrated and observed in honour of the Creator of both soul and flesh.*

I answer that, Virginity takes its name apparently from *viror* (freshness), and just as a thing is described as fresh and retaining its freshness, so long as it is not parched by excessive heat, so too, virginity denotes that the person possessed thereof is unseared by the heat of concupiscence which is experienced in achieving the greatest bodily pleasure which is that of sexual intercourse. Hence Ambrose says (*De Virgin.* i.) that *virginal chastity is integrity free of pollution.*

Now venereal pleasures offer three points for consideration. The first is on the part of the body, viz. the violation of the seal of virginity. The second is the link between that which concerns the soul and that which concerns the body, and this is the resolution of the semen, causing sensible pleasure. The third is entirely on the part of the soul, namely the purpose of attaining this pleasure. Of these three the first is accidental to the moral act, which as such must be considered in reference to the soul. The second stands in the relation of matter to the moral act, since the sensible passions are the matters of moral acts. But the third stands in the position of form and complement, because the essence of morality is perfected in that which concerns the reason.

Since then virginity consists in freedom from the aforesaid corruption, it follows that the integrity of the bodily organ is accidental to virginity; while freedom from pleasure in resolution of the semen is related thereto materially; and the purpose of perpetually abstaining from this pleasure is the formal and completive element in virginity.

Reply Obj. 1. This definition of Augustine's expresses directly that which is formal in virginity. For *meditation* denotes reason's purpose; and the addition *perpetual* does not imply that a virgin must always retain this meditation actually, but that she should bear in mind the purpose of always persevering therein. The material element is expressed indirectly by the words *on incorruption in a corruptible body*. This is added to show the difficulty of virginity: for if the flesh were incorruptible, it would not be difficult to maintain a perpetual meditation on incorruption.

Reply Obj. 2. It is true that purity, as to its essence, is in the soul; but as to its matter, it is in the body: and it is the same with virginity. Wherefore Augustine says (*De Virgin.* viii.) that *although virginity resides in the flesh*, and for this reason is a bodily quality, *yet it is a spiritual thing, which a holy continency fosters and preserves.*

Reply Obj. 3. As stated in the *Article*, the integrity of a bodily organ is accidental to virginity, in so far as a person, through purposely abstaining from venereal pleasure, retains the integrity of a bodily organ. Hence if the organ lose its integrity by chance in some other way, this is no more prejudicial to virginity than being deprived of a hand or foot.

Reply Obj. 4. Pleasure resulting from resolution of semen may arise in two ways. If this be the result of the mind's purpose, it destroys virginity, whether copulation takes place or not. Augustine, however, mentions copulation, because suchlike resolution is the ordinary and natural result thereof. In another way this may happen beside the purpose of the mind, either during sleep, or through violence and without the mind's consent, although the flesh derives pleasure from it, or again through weakness of nature, as in the case of those who are subject to a flow of semen.

In such cases virginity is not forfeit, because suchlike pollution is not the result of impurity which excludes virginity.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER VIRGINITY IS UNLAWFUL?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that virginity is unlawful. For whatever is contrary to a precept of the natural law is unlawful. Now just as the words of Gen. ii. 16, *Of every tree* that is in *paradise, thou shalt eat,* indicate a precept of the natural law, in reference to the preservation of the individual, so also the words of Gen. i. 28, *Increase and multiply, and fill the earth,* express a precept of the natural law, in reference to the preservation of the species. Therefore just as it would be a sin to abstain from all food, as this would be to act counter to the good of the individual, so too it is a sin to abstain altogether from the act of procreation, for this is to act against the good of the species.

Obj. 2. Further, Whatever declines from the mean of virtue is apparently sinful. Now virginity declines from the mean of virtue, since it abstains from all venereal pleasures: for the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* ii. 2; iii. 11) that *he who revels in every pleasure, and abstains from not even one, is intemperate: and he who refrains from all is insensible as a lout.* Therefore virginity is something sinful.

Obj. 3. Further, Punishment is not due save for a vice. Now in olden times those were punished who led a celibate life, as Maximus Valerius asserts (ii. 4). Hence according to Augustine (*De Vera Relig.* iii.) Plato *is said to have sacrificed to nature, in order that he might atone for his perpetual continency as though it were a sin.* Therefore virginity is a sin.

On the contrary, No sin is a matter of direct counsel. But virginity is a matter of direct counsel: for it is written (1 Cor. vii. 25): *Concerning virgins I have no commandment of the Lord: but I give counsel.* Therefore virginity is not an unlawful thing.

I answer that, In human acts, those are sinful which

are against right reason. Now right reason requires that things directed to an end should be used in a measure proportionate to that end. Again, man's good is threefold as stated in *Ethic.* i. 8; one consisting in external things, for instance riches; another, consisting in bodily goods; the third, consisting in the goods of the soul among which the goods of the contemplative life take precedence of the goods of the active life, as the Philosopher shows (*Ethic.* x. 7), and as our Lord declared (Luke x. 43), *Mary hath chosen the better part.* Of these goods those that are external are directed to those which belong to the body, and those which belong to the body are directed to those which belong to the soul; and furthermore those which belong to the active life are directed to those which belong to the life of contemplation. Accordingly, right reason dictates that one use external goods in a measure proportionate to the body, and in like manner as regards the rest. Wherefore if a man refrain from possessing certain things (which otherwise it were good for him to possess), for the sake of his body's good, or of the contemplation of truth, this is not sinful, but in accord with right reason. In like manner if a man abstain from bodily pleasures, in order more freely to give himself to the contemplation of truth, this is in accordance with the rectitude of reason. Now holy virginity refrains from all venereal pleasure in order more freely to have leisure for Divine contemplation: for the Apostle says (1 Cor. vii. 34): *The unmarried woman and the virgin thinketh on the things of the Lord : that she may be holy in both body and in spirit. But she that is married thinketh on the things of the world, how she may please her husband.* Therefore it follows that virginity instead of being sinful is worthy of praise.

Reply Obj. 1. A precept implies a duty, as stated above (Q. CXXII., A. 1). Now there are two kinds of duty. There is the duty that has to be fulfilled by one person; and a duty of this kind cannot be set aside without sin. The other duty has to be fulfilled by the multitude, and the fulfilment of this kind of duty is not binding on each one of the multi-

tude. For the multitude has many obligations which cannot be discharged by the individual; but are fulfilled by one person doing this, and another doing that. Accordingly the precept of natural law which binds man to eat must needs be fulfilled by each individual, otherwise the individual cannot be sustained. On the other hand, the precept of procreation regards the whole multitude of men, which needs not only to multiply in body, but also to advance spiritually. Wherefore sufficient provision is made for the human multitude, if some betake themselves to carnal procreation, while others abstaining from this betake themselves to the contemplation of Divine things, for the beauty and welfare of the whole human race. Thus too in an army, some take sentry duty, others are standard-bearers, and others fight with the sword: yet all these things are necessary for the multitude, although they cannot be done by one person.

Reply Obj. 2. The person who, beside the dictate of right reason, abstains from all pleasures through aversion, as it were, of pleasure as such, is insensible as a country lout. But a virgin does not refrain from every pleasure, but only from that which is venereal; and abstains therefrom according to right reason, as stated in the *Article.* Now the mean of virtue is fixed with reference, not to quantity but to right reason, as stated in *Ethic.* ii. 6: wherefore it is said of the magnanimous (*Ethic.* iv. 3) that *in point of quantity he goes to extremes, but in the matter of becomingness he follows the mean.*

Reply Obj. 3. Laws are framed according to what occurs more frequently. Now it seldom happened in olden times that anyone refrained from all venereal pleasure through love of the contemplation of truth: as Plato alone is related to have done. Hence it was not through thinking this a sin, that he offered sacrifice, but because he yielded to the false opinion of his fellow countrymen, as Augustine remarks (*loc. cit.*).

Third Article.

whether virginity is a virtue?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that virginity is not a virtue. For no virtue is in us by nature, as the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* ii. 1). Now virginity is in us by nature, since all are virgins when born. Therefore virginity is not a virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, Whoever has one virtue has all virtues, as stated above (I.-II., Q. LXI., A. 1). Yet some have other virtues without having virginity: else, since none can go to the heavenly kingdom without virtue, no one could go there without virginity, which would involve the condemnation of marriage. Therefore virginity is not a virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, Every virtue is recovered by penance. But virginity is not recovered by penance: wherefore Jerome says in his letter to Eustochium (*Ep.* xxii.) on the safeguarding of virginity: *Other things God can do, but He cannot restore the virgin after her downfall.* Therefore seemingly virginity is not a virtue.

Obj. 4. Further, No virtue is lost without sin. Yet virginity is lost without sin, namely by marriage. Therefore virginity is not a virtue.

Obj. 5. Further, Virginity is condivided with widowhood and conjugal purity. But neither of these is a virtue. Therefore virginity is not a virtue.

On the contrary, Ambrose says (*De Virgin.* i.): *Love of virginity moves us to say something about virginity, lest by passing it over we should seem to cast a slight on what is a virtue of high degree.*

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), the formal and completive element in virginity is the purpose of abstaining from venereal pleasure, which purpose is rendered praiseworthy by its end, in so far, to wit, as this is done in order to have leisure for Divine things: while the material element in virginity is integrity of the flesh free of all experience of venereal pleasure. Now it is manifest that where a good action has a special matter through having a special excel-

lence, there is a special kind of virtue: for example, magnificence which is about great expenditure is for this reason a special virtue distinct from liberality, which is about all uses of money in general. Now to keep oneself free from the experience of venereal pleasure has an excellence of its own deserving of greater praise than keeping oneself free from inordinate venereal pleasure. Wherefore virginity is a special virtue being related to chastity as magnificence to liberality.

Reply Obj. 1. Men have from their birth that which is material in virginity, namely integrity of the flesh and freedom from venereal experience. But they have not that which is formal in virginity, namely the purpose of safeguarding this integrity for God's sake, which purpose gives virginity its character of virtue. Hence Augustine says (*De Virgin.* xi.): *Nor do we praise virgins for being virgins, but because their virginity is consecrated to God by holy continency.*

Reply Obj. 2. Virtues are connected together by reason of that which is formal in them, namely charity, or by reason of prudence, as stated above (Q. CXXIX., A. 3, *ad* 2), but not by reason of that which is material in them. For nothing hinders a virtuous man from providing the matter of one virtue, and not the matter of another virtue: thus a poor man has the matter of temperance, but not that of magnificence. It is in this way that one who has the other virtues lacks the matter of virginity, namely the aforesaid integrity of the flesh: nevertheless he can have that which is formal in virginity, his mind being so prepared that he has the purpose of safeguarding this same integrity of the flesh, should it be fitting for him to do so: even as a poor man may be so prepared in mind as to have the purpose of being magnificent in his expenditure, were he in a position to do so; or again as a prosperous man is so prepared in mind as to purpose bearing misfortune with equanimity: without which preparedness of the mind no man can be virtuous.

Reply Obj. 3. Virtue can be recovered by penance as regards that which is formal in virtue, but not as to that which is material therein. For if a magnificent man has

squandered all his wealth he does not recover his riches by repenting of his sin. In like manner a person who has lost virginity by sin, recovers by repenting, not the matter of virginity but the purpose of virginity.

As regards the matter of virginity there is that which can be miraculously restored by God, namely the integrity of the organ, which we hold to be accidental to virginity: while there is something else which cannot be restored even by miracle, to wit, that one who has experienced venereal lust should cease to have had that experience. For God cannot make that which is done not to have been done, as stated in the First Part (Q. XXV., A. 4).

Reply Obj. 4. Virginity as a virtue denotes the purpose, confirmed by vow, of observing perpetual integrity. For Augustine says (*De Virgin.* viii.) that *by virginity, integrity of the flesh is vowed, consecrated and observed in honour of the Creator of both soul and flesh.* Hence virginity, as a virtue, is never lost without sin.

Reply Obj. 5. Conjugal chastity is deserving of praise merely because it abstains from unlawful pleasures: hence no excellence attaches to it above that of chastity in general. Widowhood, however, adds something to chastity in general; but it does not attain to that which is perfect in this matter, namely to entire freedom from venereal pleasure; virginity alone achieves this. Wherefore virginity alone is accounted a virtue above chastity, even as magnificence is reckoned above liberality.

Fourth Article.

Whether virginity is more excellent than marriage?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that virginity is not more excellent than marriage. For Augustine says (*De Bono Conjug.* xxi.): *Continence was equally meritorious in John who remained unmarried and Abraham who begot children.* Now a greater virtue has greater merit. Therefore virginity is not a greater virtue than conjugal chastity.

Obj. 2. Further, The praise accorded a virtuous man depends on his virtue. If, then, virginity were preferable to conjugal continence, it would seem to follow that every virgin is to be praised more than any married woman. But this is untrue. Therefore virginity is not preferable to marriage.

Obj. 3. Further, The common good takes precedence of the private good, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* i. 2). Now marriage is directed to the common good: for Augustine says (*De Bono Conjug.* xvi.): *What food is to a man's well-being, such is sexual intercourse to the welfare of the human race.* On the other hand, virginity is ordered to the individual good, namely in order to avoid the *tribulation of the flesh,* to use the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. vii. 28). Therefore virginity is not greater than conjugal continence.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Virgin.* x.): *Both solid reason and the authority of Holy Writ show that neither is marriage sinful, nor is it to be equalled to the good of virginal continence or even to that of widowhood.*

I answer that, According to Jerome (*Contra Jovin.* i.) the error of Jovinian consisted in holding virginity not to be preferable to marriage. This error is refuted above all by the example of Christ Who both chose a virgin for His mother, and remained Himself a virgin, and by the teaching of the Apostle who (1 Cor. vii.) counsels virginity as the greater good. It is also refuted by reason, both because a Divine good takes precedence of a human good, and because the good of the soul is preferable to the good of the body, and again because the good of the contemplative life is better than that of the active life. Now virginity is directed to the good of the soul in respect of the contemplative life, which consists in thinking *on the things of God* (Vulg.,—*the Lord*), whereas marriage is directed to the good of the body, namely the bodily increase of the human race, and belongs to the active life, since the man and woman who embrace the married life have to think *on the things of the world,* as the Apostle says (1 Cor. vii. 34). Without doubt therefore virginity is preferable to conjugal continence.

Reply Obj. 1. Merit is measured not only by the kind of action, but still more by the mind of the agent. Now Abraham had a mind so disposed, that he was prepared to observe virginity, if it were in keeping with the times* for him to do so. Wherefore in him conjugal continence was equally meritorious with the virginal continence of John, as regards the essential reward, but not as regards the accidental reward. Hence Augustine says (*De Bono Conjug.* xxi.) that both *the celibacy of John and the marriage of Abraham fought Christ's battle in keeping with the difference of the times:* but John was continent even in deed, whereas Abraham was continent only in habit.*

Reply Obj. 2. Though virginity is better than conjugal continence, a married person may be better than a virgin for two reasons. First, on the part of chastity itself; if, to wit, the married person is more prepared in mind to observe virginity, if it should be expedient, than the one who is actually a virgin. Hence Augustine (*De Bono Conjug.* xxviii.) charges the virgin to say: *I am no better than Abraham, although the chastity of celibacy is better than the chastity of marriage.* Further on he gives the reason for this: *For what I do now, he would have done better, if it were fitting for him to do it then; and what they did I would even do now, if it behoved me now to do it.* Secondly, because perhaps the person who is not a virgin has some more excellent virtue. Wherefore Augustine says (*De Virgin.* xliv.): *Whence does a virgin know the things that belong to the Lord, however solicitous she be about them, if perchance on account of some mental fault she be not yet ripe for martyrdom, whereas this woman to whom she delighted in preferring herself is already able to drink the chalice of the Lord?*

Reply Obj. 3. The common good takes precedence of the private good, if it be of the same genus: but it may be that the private good is better generically. It is thus that the virginity that is consecrated to God is preferable to carnal

* *He who has done whatever He willed, not only with power but also with wisdom . . . is wont to observe in all His works a certain fitness of things and times.* (S. Bernard, Hom. ii. super *Missus est.*)

fruitfulness. Hence Augustine says (*De Virgin.* ix.): *It must be confessed that the fruitfulness of the flesh, even of those women who in these times seek naught else from marriage but children in order to make them servants of Christ, cannot compensate for lost virginity.*

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER VIRGINITY IS THE GREATEST OF VIRTUES?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that virginity is the greatest of virtues. For Cyprian says (*De Virgin.*)*: *We address ourselves now to the virgins. Sublime is their glory, but no less exalted is their vocation. They are a flower of the Church's sowing, the pride and ornament of spiritual grace, the most honoured portion of Christ's flock.*

Obj. 2. Further, A greater reward is due to the greater virtue. Now the greatest reward is due to virginity, namely the sevenfold fruit, according to a gloss on Matth. xiii. 23. Therefore virginity is the greatest of the virtues.

Obj. 3. Further, The more a virtue conforms us to Christ, the greater it is. Now virginity above all conforms us to Christ; for it is declared in the Apocalypse (xiv. 4) that virgins *follow the Lamb withersoever He goeth*, and (*verse* 3) that they sing *a new canticle*, which *no* other *man could say*. Therefore virginity is the greatest of the virtues.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Virgin.* xlvi.): *No one, methinks, would dare prefer virginity to martyrdom*, and (*ibid.* xlv.): *The authority of the Church informs the faithful in no uncertain manner, so that they know in what place the martyrs and the holy virgins who have departed this life are commemorated in the Sacrament of the Altar.* By this we are given to understand that martyrdom, and also the monastic state, are preferable to virginity.

I answer that, A thing may excel all others in two ways. First, in some particular genus: and thus virginity is most

* *De Habitu Virg.*

excellent, namely in the genus of chastity, since it surpasses the chastity both of widowhood and of marriage. And because comeliness is ascribed to chastity antonomastically, it follows that surpassing beauty is ascribed to chastity. Wherefore Ambrose says (*De Virgin.*): *Can anyone esteem any beauty greater than a virgin's, since she is beloved of her King, approved by her Judge, dedicated to her Lord, consecrated to her God?* Secondly, a thing may be most excellent simply, and in this way virginity is not the most excellent of the virtues. Because the end always excels that which is directed to the end; and the more effectively a thing is directed to the end, the better it is. Now the end which renders virginity praiseworthy is that one may have leisure for Divine things, as stated above (A. 4). Wherefore the theological virtues as well as the virtue of religion, the acts of which consist in being occupied about Divine things, are preferable to virginity. Moreover, martyrs work more mightily in order to cleave to God,—since for this end they hold their own life in contempt;—and those who dwell in monasteries,—since for this end they give up their own will and all that they may possess,—than virgins who renounce venereal pleasure for that same purpose. Therefore virginity is not simply the greatest of virtues.

Reply Obj. 1. Virgins are *the more honoured portion of Christ's flock*, and *their glory more sublime* in comparison with widows and married women.

Reply Obj. 2. The hundredfold fruit is ascribed to virginity, according to Jerome, on account of its superiority to widowhood, to which the sixtyfold fruit is ascribed, and to marriage, to which is ascribed the thirtyfold fruit. But according to Augustine (*De QQ. Evang.* i. 9), *the hundredfold fruit is given to martyrs, the sixtyfold to virgins, and the thirtyfold to married persons.* Wherefore it does not follow that virginity is simply the greatest of virtues, but only in comparison with other degrees of chastity.

Reply Obj. 3. Virgins *follow the Lamb whithersoever He goeth*, because they imitate Christ, by integrity not only of the mind but also of the flesh, as Augustine says (*De Virgin.*

xxvii.). Wherefore they follow the Lamb in more ways, but this does not imply that they follow more closely, because other virtues make us cleave to God more closely by imitation of the mind. The *new hymn* which virgins alone sing, is their joy at having preserved integrity of the flesh.

QUESTION CLIII.

OF LUST.

(*In Five Articles.*)

We must next consider the vice of lust which is opposed to chastity: (1) Lust in general; (2) its species. Under the first head there are five points of inquiry: (1) What is the matter of lust? (2) Whether all copulation is unlawful? (3) Whether lust is a mortal sin? (4) Whether lust is a capital vice? (5) Concerning its daughters.

First Article.

WHETHER THE MATTER OF LUST IS ONLY VENEREAL DESIRES AND PLEASURES?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the matter of lust is not only venereal desires and pleasures. For Augustine says (*Conf.* ii.) that *lust affects to be called surfeit and abundance.* But surfeit regards meat and drink, while abundance refers to riches. Therefore lust is not properly about venereal desires and pleasures.

Obj. 2. Further, It is written (Prov. xxi. 1): *Wine is a lustful* (Douay,—*luxurious*) *thing.* Now wine is connected with pleasure of meat and drink. Therefore these would seem to be the matter of lust.

Obj. 3. Further, Lust is defined as the desire of wanton pleasure. But wanton pleasure regards not only venereal matters but also many others. Therefore lust is not only about venereal desires and pleasures.

On the contrary, It is said of the lustful (*De Vera Relig.* iii.): *He that soweth in the flesh, of the flesh shall reap corruption.*

Now the sowing of the flesh refers to venereal pleasures. Therefore these belong to lust.

I answer that, As Isidore says (*Etym.* x.), *a lustful man is one who is debauched with pleasures.* Now venereal pleasures above all debauch a man's mind. Therefore lust is especially concerned with suchlike pleasures.

Reply Obj. 1. Even as temperance chiefly and properly applies to pleasures of touch, yet consequently and by a kind of likeness is referred to other matters, so too, lust applies chiefly to venereal pleasures, which more than anything else work the greatest havoc in a man's mind, yet secondarily it applies to any other matters pertaining to excess. Hence a gloss on Gal. v. 19 says *lust is any kind of surfeit.*

Reply Obj. 2. Wine is said to be a lustful thing, either in the sense in which surfeit in any matter is ascribed to lust, or because the use of too much wine affords an incentive to venereal pleasure.

Reply Obj. 3. Although wanton pleasure applies to other matters, the name of lust has a special application to venereal pleasures, to which also wantonness is specially applicable, as Augustine remarks (*De Civ. Dei* xiv.).

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER NO VENEREAL ACT CAN BE WITHOUT SIN?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that no venereal act can be without sin. For nothing but sin would seem to hinder virtue. Now every venereal act is a great hindrance to virtue. For Augustine says (*Soliloq.* i. 10): *I consider that nothing so casts down the manly mind from its height as the fondling of a woman, and those bodily contacts.* Therefore, seemingly, no venereal act is without sin.

Obj. 2. Further, Any excess that makes one forsake the good of reason is sinful, because virtue is corrupted by excess and deficiency as stated in *Ethic.* ii. 2, 6. Now in every venereal act there is excess of pleasure, since it so absorbs

the mind, that it is incompatible with the act of understanding, as the Philosopher observes (*Ethic.* vii. 11); and as Jerome states (*Ep.* xi. ad Ageruch. *de Monogam.*), rendered the hearts of the prophets, for the moment, insensible to the spirit of prophecy. Therefore no venereal act can be without sin.

Obj. 3. Further, The cause is more powerful than its effect. Now original sin is transmitted to children by concupiscence, without which no venereal act is possible, as Augustine declares (*De Nup. et Concup.* i.). Therefore no venereal act can be without sin.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Bono Conjug.* xxv.): *This is a sufficient answer to heretics, if only they will understand no sin is committed in that which is against neither nature, nor morals, nor a commandment:* and he refers to the act of sexual intercourse between the patriarchs of old and their several wives. Therefore not every venereal act is a sin.

I answer that, A sin, in human acts, is that which is against the order of reason. Now the order of reason consists in its ordering everything to its end in a fitting manner. Wherefore it is no sin if one, by the dictate of reason, makes use of certain things in a fitting manner and order for the end to which they are adapted, provided this end be something truly good. Now just as the preservation of the bodily nature of one individual is a true good, so, too, is the preservation of the nature of the human species a very great good. And just as the use of food is directed to the preservation of life in the individual, so is the use of venereal acts directed to the preservation of the whole human race. Hence Augustine says (*De Bono Conjug.* xvi.): *What food is to a man's well being, such is sexual intercourse to the welfare of the whole human race.* Wherefore just as the use of food can be without sin, if it be taken in due manner and order, as required for the welfare of the body, so also the use of venereal acts can be without sin, provided they be performed in due manner and order, in keeping with the end of human procreation.

Reply Obj. 1 A thing may be a hindrance to virtue in two

ways. First, as regards the ordinary degree of virtue, and as to this nothing but sin is an obstacle to virtue. Secondly, as regards the perfect degree of virtue, and as to this virtue may be hindered by that which is not a sin, but a lesser good. In this way sexual intercourse casts down the mind not from virtue, but from the height, i.e. the perfection of virtue. Hence Augustine says (*De Bono Conjug.* viii.): *Just as that was good which Martha did when busy about serving holy men, yet better still that which Mary did in hearing the word of God: so, too, we praise the good of Susanna's conjugal chastity, yet we prefer the good of the widow Anna, and much more that of the Virgin Mary.*

Reply Obj. 2. As stated above (Q. CLII., A. 2, *ad* 2; I.-II., Q. LXIV., A. 2), the mean of virtue depends not on quantity but on conformity with right reason: and consequently the exceeding pleasure attaching to a venereal act directed according to reason, is not opposed to the mean of virtue. Moreover, virtue is not concerned with the amount of pleasure experienced by the external sense, as this depends on the disposition of the body; what matters is how much the interior appetite is affected by that pleasure. Nor does it follow that the act in question is contrary to virtue, from the fact that the free act of reason in considering spiritual things is incompatible with the aforesaid pleasure. For it is not contrary to virtue, if the act of reason be sometimes interrupted for something that is done in accordance with reason, else it would be against virtue for a person to set himself to sleep. That venereal concupiscence and pleasure are not subject to the command and moderation of reason, is due to the punishment of the first sin, inasmuch as the reason, for rebelling against God, deserved that its body should rebel against it, as Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xiii.).

Reply Obj. 3. As Augustine says in the passage quoted in the objection, *the child, shackled with original sin, is born of fleshly concupiscence* (*which is not imputed as sin to the regenerate*) *as of a daughter of sin.* Hence it does not follow that the act in question is a sin, but that it contains something penal resulting from the first sin.

Third Article.

whether the lust that is about venereal acts can be a sin?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that lust about venereal acts cannot be a sin. For the venereal act consists in the emission of semen which is the surplus from food, according to the Philosopher (*De Gener. Anim.* i. 18, 19). But there is no sin attaching to the emission of other superfluities. Therefore neither can there be any sin in venereal acts.

Obj. 2. Further, Everyone can lawfully make what use he pleases of what is his. But in the venereal act a man uses only what is his own, except perhaps in adultery or rape. Therefore there can be no sin in venereal acts, and consequently lust is no sin.

Obj. 3. Further, Every sin has an opposite vice. But, seemingly, no vice is opposed to lust. Therefore lust is not a sin.

On the contrary, The cause is more powerful than its effect. Now wine is forbidden on account of lust, according to the saying of the Apostle (*Eph.* v. 18), *Be not drunk with wine wherein is lust* (Douay,—*luxury*). Therefore lust is forbidden.

Further, It is numbered among the works of the flesh: Gal. v. 19 (Douay,—*luxury*).

I answer that, The more necessary a thing is, the more it behoves one to observe the order of reason in its regard; wherefore the more sinful it becomes if the order of reason be forsaken. Now the use of venereal acts, as stated in the foregoing *Article*, is most necessary for the common good, namely the preservation of the human race. Wherefore there is the greatest necessity for observing the order of reason in this matter: so that if anything be done in this connexion against the dictate of reason's ordering, it will be a sin. Now lust consists essentially in exceeding the order and mode of reason in the matter of venereal acts. Wherefore without any doubt lust is a sin.

Reply Obj. 1. As the Philosopher says in the same book (*loc. cit.*), *the semen is a surplus that is needed.* For it is said to be superfluous, because it is the residue from the action of the nutritive power, yet it is needed for the work of the generative power. But the other superfluities of the human body are such as not to be needed, so that it matters not how they are emitted, provided one observe the decencies of social life. It is different with the emission of semen, which should be accomplished in a manner befitting the end for which it is needed.

Reply Obj. 2. As the Apostle says (1 Cor. vi. 20) in speaking against lust, *You are bought with a great price: glorify and bear God in your body.* Wherefore by inordinately using the body through lust a man wrongs God Who is the Supreme Lord of our body. Hence Augustine says (*De decem. chord.* x.): *God who thus governs His servants for their good, not for His, made this order and commandment, lest wanton and unlawful pleasures should destroy His temple which thou hast begun to be.*

Reply Obj. 3. The opposite of lust is not found in many, since men are more inclined to pleasure. Yet the contrary vice is comprised under insensibility, and occurs in one who has such a dislike for sexual intercourse as not to pay the marriage debt.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER LUST IS A CAPITAL VICE?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that lust is not a capital vice. For lust is apparently the same as uncleanness, according to a gloss on *Eph.* v. 3. But uncleanness is a daughter of gluttony, according to Gregory (*Moral.* xxxi.). Therefore lust is not a capital vice.

Obj. 2. Further, Isidore says (*De Summo Bono* ii.) that *as pride of mind leads to the depravity of lust, so does humility of mind safeguard the chastity of the flesh.* Now it is seemingly contrary to the nature of a capital vice to arise from another vice. Therefore lust is not a capital vice.

Obj. 3. Further, Lust is caused by despair, according to Eph. iv. 19, *Who despairing, have given themselves up to lasciviousness.* But despair is not a capital vice; indeed, it is accounted a daughter of sloth, as stated above (Q. XXXV., A. 4, *ad* 2). Much less, therefore, is lust a capital vice.

On the contrary, Gregory (*Moral.* xxi.) places lust among the capital vices.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CXLVIII., A. 5; I.-II., Q. LXXXIV., AA. 3, 4), a capital vice is one that has a very desirable end, so that through desire for that end, a man proceeds to commit many sins, all of which are said to arise from that vice as from a principal vice. Now the end of lust is venereal pleasure, which is very great. Wherefore this pleasure is very desirable as regards the *sensitive* appetite, both on account of the intensity of the pleasure, and because suchlike concupiscence is connatural to man. Therefore it is evident that lust is a capital vice.

Reply Obj. 1. As stated above (Q. CXLVIII., A. 6), according to some, the uncleanness which is reckoned a daughter of gluttony is a certain uncleanness of the body, and thus the objection is not to the point. If, however, it denote the uncleanness of lust, we must reply that it is caused by gluttony materially,—in so far as gluttony provides the bodily matter of lust,—and not under the aspect of final cause, in which respect chiefly the capital vices are said to be the cause of others.

Reply Obj. 2. As stated above (Q. CXXXII., A. 4), when we were treating of vainglory, pride is accounted the common mother of all sins, so that even the capital vices originate therefrom.

Reply Obj. 3. Certain persons refrain from lustful pleasures chiefly through hope of the glory to come, which hope is removed by despair, so that the latter is a cause of lust, as removing an obstacle thereto, not as its direct cause; whereas this is seemingly necessary for a capital vice.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE DAUGHTERS OF LUST ARE FITTINGLY RECKONED TO BE BLINDNESS OF MIND, THOUGHTLESSNESS, RASHNESS, INCONSTANCY, SELF-LOVE, HATRED OF GOD, LOVE OF THIS WORLD AND ABHORRENCE OF A FUTURE WORLD ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the daughters of lust are unfittingly reckoned to be *blindness of mind, thoughtlessness, rashness, inconstancy, self-love, hatred of God, love of this world and abhorrence or despair of a future world.* For mental blindness, thoughtlessness and rashness pertain to imprudence, which is to be found in every sin, even as prudence is in every virtue. Therefore they should not be reckoned especially as daughters of lust.

Obj. 2. Further, Constancy is reckoned a part of fortitude, as stated above (Q. CXXVIII.; Q. CXXXVII., A. 3). But lust is contrary, not to fortitude but to temperance. Therefore inconstancy is not a daughter of lust.

Obj. 3. Further, *Self-love extending to the contempt of God is the origin of every sin,* as Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xiv.). Therefore it should not be accounted a daughter of lust.

Obj. 4. Further, Isidore (*Commem. in Deut.* xvi.) mentions four, namely, *obscene, scurrilous, wanton* and *foolish talking.* There the aforesaid enumeration would seem to be superfluous.

On the contrary stands the authority of Gregory (*Moral.* xxxi.).

I answer that, When the lower powers are strongly moved towards their objects, the result is that the higher powers are hindered and disordered in their acts. Now the effect of the vice of lust is that the lower appetite, namely the concupiscible, is most vehemently intent on its object, to wit, the object of pleasure, on account of the vehemence of the passion and pleasure. Consequently the higher powers, namely the reason and the will, are most grievously disordered by lust.

Now the reason has four acts in matters of action. First there is simple understanding, which apprehends some end as good, and this act is hindered by lust, according to Dan. xiii. 56, *Beauty hath deceived thee, and lust hath perverted thy heart.* In this respect we have *blindness of mind.* The second act is counsel about what is to be done for the sake of the end: and this is also hindered by the concupiscence of lust. Hence Terence says (*Eunuch.*, act 1, sc. 1), speaking of lecherous love: *This thing admits of neither counsel nor moderation, thou canst not control it by counselling.* In this respect there is *rashness*, which denotes absence of counsel, as stated above (Q. LIII., A. 3). The third act is judgment about the things to be done, and this again is hindered by lust. For it is said of the lustful old men (Dan. xiii. 9): *They turned away their own mind . . . that they might not . . . remember just judgments.* In this respect there is *thoughtlessness.* The fourth act is the reason's command about the thing to be done, and this also is impeded by lust, in so far as through being carried away by concupiscence, a man is hindered from doing what his reason ordered to be done. To this *inconstancy* must be referred. Hence Terence says (*Eunuch., loc. cit.*) of a man who declared that he would leave his mistress: *One little false tear will undo those words.*

On the part of the will there results a twofold inordinate act. One is the desire for the end, to which we refer *self-love*, which regards the pleasure which a man desires inordinately, while on the other hand there is *hatred of God*, by reason of His forbidding the desired pleasure. The other act is the desire for the things directed to the end. With regard to this there is *love of this world*, whose pleasures a man desires to enjoy, while on the other hand there is *despair of a future world*, because through being held back by carnal pleasures he cares not to obtain spiritual pleasures, since they are distasteful to him.

Reply Obj. 1. According to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* vi. 5), *intemperance is the chief corruptive of prudence:* wherefore the vices opposed to prudence arise chiefly from lust, which is the principal species of intemperance.

Reply Obj. 2. The constancy which is a part of fortitude regards hardships and objects of fear; but constancy in refraining from pleasures pertains to continence which is a part of temperance, as stated above (Q. CXLIII.). Hence the inconstancy which is opposed thereto is to be reckoned a daughter of lust. Nevertheless even the first named inconstancy arises from lust, inasmuch as the latter enfeebles a man's heart and renders it effeminate, according to Osee iv. 11, *Fornication and wine and drunkenness take away the heart* (Douay,—*understanding*). Vegetius, too, says (*De Re Milit.* i.) that *the less a man knows of the pleasures of life, the less he fears death.* Nor is there any need, as we have repeatedly stated, for the daughters of a capital vice to agree with it in matter (*cf.* Q. XXXV., A. 4, *ad* 2; Q. CXVIII., A. 8, *ad* 1; Q. CXLVIII., A. 6).

Reply Obj. 3. Self-love in respect of any goods that a man desires for himself is the common origin of all sins; but in the special point of desiring carnal pleasures for oneself, it is reckoned a daughter of lust.

Reply Obj. 4. The sins mentioned by Isidore are inordinate external acts, pertaining in the main to speech; wherein there is a fourfold inordinateness. First, on account of the matter, and to this we refer *obscene words:* for, since *out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh* (Matth. xii. 34), the lustful man, whose heart is full of lewd concupiscences, readily breaks out into lewd words. Secondly, on account of the cause: for, since lust causes thoughtlessness and rashness, the result is that it makes a man speak without weighing or giving a thought to his words: this is called *scurrility.* Thirdly, on account of the end: for since the lustful man seeks pleasure, he directs his speech thereto, and so gives utterance to wanton words. Fourthly, on account of the sentiments expressed by his words, for through causing blindness of mind, lust perverts a man's sentiments, and so he gives way to foolish talking, for instance, by expressing a preference for the pleasures he desires to anything else.

DOMINICAN COLLEGE
SAN RAFAEL
MARIN COUNTY
CALIFORNIA

QUESTION CLIV.

OF THE PARTS OF LUST.

(*In Twelve Articles.*)

WE must now consider the parts of lust, under which head there are twelve points of inquiry: (1) Into what parts is lust divided? (2) Whether simple fornication is a mortal sin? (3) Whether it is the greatest of sins? (4) Whether there is mortal sin in touches, kisses and suchlike seduction? (5) Whether nocturnal pollution is a mortal sin? (6) Of seduction. (7) Of rape. (8) Of adultery. (9) Of incest. (10) Of sacrilege. (11) Of the sin against nature. (12) Of the order of gravity in the aforesaid sins.

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER SIX SPECIES ARE FITTINGLY ASSIGNED TO LUST, NAMELY, SIMPLE FORNICATION, ADULTERY, INCEST, SEDUCTION, RAPE, AND THE UNNATURAL VICE?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that six species are unfittingly assigned to lust, namely, simple fornication, adultery, incest, seduction, rape, and the unnatural vice. For diversity of matter does not diversify the species. Now the aforesaid division is made with regard to diversity of matter, according as the woman with whom a man has intercourse is married, or a virgin or of some other condition. Therefore it seems that the species of lust are diversified in this way.

Obj. 2. Further, Seemingly the species of one vice are not differentiated by things that belong to another vice. Now adultery does not differ from simple fornication, save in the

point of a man having intercourse with one who is another's, so that he commits an injustice. Therefore it seems that adultery should not be reckoned a species of lust.

Obj. 3. Further, Just as a man may happen to have intercourse with a woman who is bound to another man by marriage, so may it happen that a man has intercourse with a woman who is bound to God by vow. Therefore sacrilege should be reckoned a species of lust, even as adultery is.

Obj. 4. Further, A married man sins not only if he be with another woman, but also if he use his own wife inordinately. But the latter sin is comprised under lust. Therefore it should be reckoned among the species thereof.

Obj. 5. Further, The Apostle says (2 Cor. xii. 21): *Lest again, when I come, God humble me among you, and I mourn many of them that sinned before, and have not done penance for the uncleanness and fornication and lasciviousness that they have committed.* Therefore it seems that also uncleanness and lasciviousness should be reckoned species of lust, as well as fornication.

Obj. 6. Further, The thing divided is not to be reckoned among its parts. But lust is reckoned together with the aforesaid: for it is written (Gal. v. 19): *The works of the flesh are manifest, which are fornication, uncleanness, immodesty, lust* (Douay,—*luxury*). Therefore it seems that fornication is unfittingly reckoned a species of lust.

On the contrary, The aforesaid division is given in the Decretals (XXXVI., Q. I., *Append. Grat.* ad cap. *Lex illa*).

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CLIII., AA. 2, 3), the sin of lust consists in seeking venereal pleasure not in accordance with right reason. This may happen in two ways. First, in respect of the matter wherein this pleasure is sought; secondly, when, whereas there is due matter, other due circumstances are not observed. And since a circumstance, as such, does not specify a moral act, whose species is derived from its object which is also its matter, it follows that the species of lust must be assigned with respect to its matter or object.

Now this same matter may be discordant with right reason

in two ways. First, because it is inconsistent with the end of the venereal act. In this way, as hindering the begetting of children, there is the *vice against nature*, which attaches to every venereal act from which generation cannot follow; and, as hindering the due upbringing and advancement of the child when born, there is *simple fornication*, which is the union of an unmarried man with an unmarried woman. Secondly, the matter wherein the venereal act is consummated may be discordant with right reason in relation to other persons; and this in two ways. First, with regard to the woman, with whom a man has connection, by reason of due honour not being paid to her; and thus there is *incest*, which consists in the misuse of a woman who is related by consanguinity or affinity. Secondly, with regard to the person under whose authority the woman is placed: and if she be under the authority of a husband, it is *adultery*, if under the authority of her father, it is *seduction*, in the absence of violence, and *rape* if violence be employed.

These species are differentiated on the part of the woman rather than of the man, because in the venereal act the woman is passive and is by way of matter, whereas the man is by way of agent; and it has been stated above (*Obj.* 1) that the aforesaid species are assigned with regard to a difference of matter.

Reply Obj. 1. The aforesaid diversity of matter is connected with a formal difference of object, which difference results from different modes of opposition to right reason, as stated in the *Article*.

Reply Obj. 2. As stated above (I.-II., Q. XVIII., A. 7), nothing hinders the deformities of different vices concurring in the one act, and in this way adultery is comprised under lust and injustice. Nor is this deformity of injustice altogether accidental to lust: since the lust that obeys concupiscence so far as to lead to injustice, is thereby shown to be more grievous.

Reply Obj. 3. Since a woman, by vowing continence, contracts a spiritual marriage with God, the sacrilege that is committed in the violation of such a woman is a spiritual

adultery. In like manner, the other kinds of sacrilege pertaining to lustful matter are reduced to other species of lust.

Reply Obj. 4. The sin of a husband with his wife is not connected with undue matter, but with other circumstances, which do not constitute the species of a moral act, as stated in the *Article* and I.-II., Q. XVIII., A. 2.

Reply Obj. 5. As a gloss says on this passage, *uncleanness* stands for lust against nature, while *lasciviousness* is a man's abuse of boys, wherefore it would appear to pertain to seduction. We may also reply that *lasciviousness* relates to certain acts circumstantial to the venereal act, for instance kisses, touches, and so forth.

Reply Obj. 6. According to a gloss on this passage *lust* there signifies any kind of excess.

Second Article.

whether simple fornication is a mortal sin?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that simple fornication is not a mortal sin. For things that come under the same head would seem to be on a par with one another. Now fornication comes under the same head as things that are not mortal sins: for it is written (Acts xv. 29): *That you abstain from things sacrificed to idols, and from blood, and from things strangled, and from fornication.* But there is not mortal sin in these observances, according to 1 Tim. iv. 4, *Nothing* is *rejected that is received with thanksgiving.* Therefore fornication is not a mortal sin.

Obj. 2. Further, No mortal sin is the matter of a Divine precept. But the Lord commanded (Osee i. 2): *Go take thee a wife of fornications, and have of her children of fornications.* Therefore fornication is not a mortal sin.

Obj. 3. Further, No mortal sin is mentioned in Holy Writ without disapprobation. Yet simple fornication is mentioned without disapprobation by Holy Writ in connexion with the patriarchs. Thus we read (Gen. xvi. 4) that Abraham went in to his handmaid Agar; and further on (xxx. 5, 9)

that Jacob went in to Bala and Zelpha the handmaids of his wives; and again (xxxviii. 18) that Juda was with Thamar whom he thought to be a harlot. Therefore simple fornication is not a mortal sin.

Obj. 4. Further, Every mortal sin is contrary to charity. But simple fornication is not contrary to charity, neither as regards the love of God, since it is not a sin directly against God, nor as regards the love of our neighbour, since thereby no one is injured. Therefore simple fornication is not a mortal sin.

Obj. 5. Further, Every mortal sin leads to eternal perdition. But simple fornication has not this result: because a gloss of Ambrose on 1 Tim. iv. 8, *Godliness is profitable to all things*, says: *The whole of Christian teaching is summed up in mercy and godliness: if a man conforms to this, even though he gives way to the inconstancy of the flesh, doubtless he will be punished, but he will not perish.* Therefore simple fornication is not a mortal sin.

Obj. 6. Further, Augustine says (*De Bono Conjug.* xvi.) that *what food is to the well-being of the body, such is sexual intercourse to the welfare of the human race.* But inordinate use of food is not always a mortal sin. Therefore neither is all inordinate sexual intercourse; and this would seem to apply especially to simple fornication, which is the least grievous of the aforesaid species.

On the contrary, It is written (Tob. iv. 13): *Take heed to keep thyself . . . from all fornication, and beside thy wife never endure to know a crime.* Now crime denotes a mortal sin. Therefore fornication and all intercourse with other than one's wife is a mortal sin.

Further, Nothing but mortal sin debars a man from God's kingdom. But fornication debars him, as shown by the words of the Apostle (Gal. v. 21), who after mentioning fornication and certain other vices, adds: *They who do such things shall not obtain the kingdom of God.* Therefore simple fornication is a mortal sin.

Further, It is written in the Decretals (XXII., Q. I., Cap. *Prædicandum*): *They should know that the same penance is*

to be enjoined for perjury as for adultery, fornication, and wilful murder and other criminal offences. Therefore simple fornication is a criminal or mortal sin.

I answer that, Without any doubt we must hold simple fornication to be a mortal sin, notwithstanding that a gloss* on Deut. xxiii. 17, says: *This is a prohibition against going with whores, whose vileness is venial.* For instead of *venial* it should be *venal,* since such is the wanton's trade. In order to make this evident, we must take note that every sin committed directly against human life is a mortal sin. Now simple fornication implies an inordinateness that tends to injure the life of the offspring to be born of this union. For we find in all animals where the upbringing of the offspring needs care of both male and female, that these come together not indeterminately, but the male with a certain female, whether one or several; such is the case with all birds: while, on the other hand, among those animals, where the female alone suffices for the offspring's upbringing, the union is indeterminate, as in the case of dogs and like animals. Now it is evident that the upbringing of a human child requires not only the mother's care for his nourishment, but much more the care of his father as guide and guardian, and under whom he progresses in goods both internal and external. Hence human nature rebels against an indeterminate union of the sexes and demands that a man should be united to a determinate woman and should abide with her a long time or even for a whole lifetime. Hence it is that in the human race the male has a natural solicitude for the certainty of offspring, because on him devolves the upbringing of the child: and this certainly would cease if the union of sexes were indeterminate.

This union with a certain definite woman is called matrimony; which for the above reason is said to belong to the natural law. Since, however, the union of the sexes is directed to the common good of the whole human race, and common goods depend on the law for their determination, as stated above (I.-II., Q. XC., A. 2), it follows that this

* S. Augustine, *De QQ. in Deut.,* Q. 37.

union of man and woman, which is called matrimony, is determined by some law. What this determination is for us will be stated in the Third Part of this work (Suppl., Q. XXIX. *seqq.*), where we shall treat of the sacrament of matrimony. Wherefore, since fornication is an indeterminate union of the sexes, as something incompatible with matrimony, it is opposed to the good of the child's upbringing, and consequently it is a mortal sin. Nor does it matter if a man having knowledge of a woman by fornication, make sufficient provision for the upbringing of the child: because a matter that comes under the determination of the law is judged according to what happens in general, and not according to what may happen in a particular case.

Reply Obj. 1. Fornication is reckoned in conjunction with these things, not as being on a par with them in sinfulness, but because the matters mentioned there were equally liable to cause dispute between Jews and Gentiles, and thus prevent them from agreeing unanimously. For among the Gentiles, fornication was not deemed unlawful, on account of the corruption of natural reason: whereas the Jews, taught by the Divine law, considered it to be unlawful. The other things mentioned were loathsome to the Jews through custom introduced by the law into their daily life. Hence the Apostles forbade these things to the Gentiles, not as though they were unlawful in themselves, but because they were loathsome to the Jews, as stated above (I.-II., Q. CIII., A. 4, *ad* 3).

Reply Obj. 2. Fornication is said to be a sin, because it is contrary to right reason. Now man's reason is right, in so far as it is ruled by the Divine Will, the first and supreme rule. Wherefore that which a man does by God's will and in obedience to His command, is not contrary to right reason, though it may seem contrary to the general order of reason: even so, that which is done miraculously by the Divine power is not contrary to nature, though it be contrary to the usual course of nature. Therefore just as Abraham did not sin in being willing to slay his innocent son, because he

obeyed God, although considered in itself it was contrary to right human reason in general, so, too, Osee sinned not in committing fornication by God's command. Nor should such a copulation be strictly called fornication, though it be so called in reference to the general course of things. Hence Augustine says (*Conf.* iii. 8): *When God commands a thing to be done against the customs or agreement of any people, though it were never done by them heretofore, it is to be done;* and afterwards he adds: *For as among the powers of human society, the greater authority is obeyed in preference to the lesser, so must God in preference to all.*

Reply Obj. 3. Abraham and Jacob went in to their handmaidens with no purpose of fornication, as we shall show further on when we treat of matrimony.* As to Juda there is no need to excuse him, for he also caused Joseph to be sold.

Reply Obj. 4. Simple fornication is contrary to the love of our neighbour, because it is opposed to the good of the child to be born, as shown in the *Article*, since it is an act of generation accomplished in a manner disadvantageous to the future child.

Reply Obj. 5. A person who, while given to works of piety, yields to the inconstancy of the flesh, is freed from eternal loss, in so far as these works dispose him to receive the grace to repent, and because by such works he makes satisfaction for his past inconstancy; but not so as to be freed by pious works, if he persist in carnal inconstancy impenitent until death.

Reply Obj. 6. One copulation may result in the begetting of a man, wherefore inordinate copulation, which hinders the good of the future child, is a mortal sin as to the very genus of the act, and not only as to the inordinateness of concupiscence. On the other hand, one meal does not hinder the good of a man's whole life, wherefore the act of gluttony is not a mortal sin by reason of its genus. It would, however, be a mortal sin, if a man were knowingly to par-

* S. Thomas did not live to complete this treatise.

take of a food which would alter the whole condition of his life, as was the case with Adam.

Nor is it true that fornication is the least of the sins comprised under lust, for the marriage act that is done out of sensuous pleasure is a lesser sin.

Third Article.

whether fornication is the most grievous of sins?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that fornication is the most grievous of sins. For seemingly a sin is the more grievous according as it proceeds from a greater sensuous pleasure. Now the greatest sensuous pleasure is in fornication, for a gloss on 1 Cor. vii. 9 says that the *flame of sensuous pleasure is most fierce in lust.* Therefore it seems that fornication is the gravest of sins.

Obj. 2. Further, A sin is the more grievous that is committed against a person more closely united to the sinner: thus he sins more grievously who strikes his father than one who strikes a stranger. Now according to 1 Cor. vi. 18, *He that committeth fornication sinneth against his own body,* which is most intimately connected with a man. Therefore it seems that fornication is the most grievous of sins.

Obj. 3. Further, The greater a good is, the graver would seem to be the sin committed against it. Now the sin of fornication is seemingly opposed to the good of the whole human race, as appears from what was said in the foregoing *Article.* It is also against Christ, according to 1 Cor. vi. 15, *Shall I . . . take the members of Christ, and make them the members of a harlot?* Therefore fornication is the most grievous of sins.

On the contrary, Gregory says (*Moral.* xxxiii.) that the sins of the flesh are less grievous than spiritual sins.

I answer that, The gravity of a sin may be measured in two ways, first with regard to the sin in itself, secondly with regard to some accident. The gravity of a sin is measured with regard to the sin itself, by reason of its species,

which is determined according to the good to which that sin is opposed. Now fornication is contrary to the good of the child to be born. Wherefore it is a graver sin, as to its species, than those sins which are contrary to external goods, such as theft and the like; while it is less grievous than those which are directly against God, and sins that are injurious to the life of one already born, such as murder.

Reply Obj. 1. The sensual pleasure that aggravates a sin is that which is in the inclination of the will. But the sensual pleasure that is in the sensitive appetite, lessens sin, because a sin is the less grievous according as it is committed under the impulse of a greater passion. It is in this way that the greatest sensual pleasure is in fornication. Hence Augustine says (*De Agone Christiano*)* that of all a Christian's conflicts, the most difficult combats are those of chastity; wherein the fight is a daily one, but victory rare: and Isidore declares (*De Sum. Bono* xxxix.) that *mankind is subjected to the devil by carnal lust more than by anything else*, because, to wit, the vehemence of this passion is more difficult to overcome.

Reply Obj. 2. The fornicator is said to sin against his own body, not merely because the pleasure of fornication is consummated in the flesh, which is also the case in gluttony, but also because he acts against the good of his own body by an undue resolution and defilement thereof, and an undue association with another. Nor does it follow from this that fornication is the most grievous sin, because in man reason is of greater value than the body, wherefore if there be a sin more opposed to reason, it will be more grievous.

Reply Obj. 3. The sin of fornication is contrary to the good of the human race, in so far as it is prejudicial to the individual begetting of the one man that may be born. Now one who is already an actual member of the human species attains to the perfection of the species more than one who is a man potentially, and from this point of view murder is a more grievous sin than fornication and every kind of lust, through being more opposed to the good of the human

* The quotation is from *Serm.* ccl. *de Temp.*

species. Again, a Divine good is greater than the good of the human race: and therefore those sins also that are against God are more grievous. Moreover, fornication is a sin against God, not directly as though the fornicator intended to offend God, but consequently, in the same way as all mortal sins. And just as the members of our body are Christ's members, so too, our spirit is one with Christ, according to 1 Cor. vi. 17, *He who is joined to the Lord is one spirit.* Wherefore also spiritual sins are more against Christ than fornication is.

Fourth Article.

Whether there can be mortal sin in touches and kisses?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that there is no mortal sin in touches and kisses. For the Apostle says (Eph. v. 3): *Fornication and all uncleanness, or covetousness, let it not so much as be named among you, as becometh saints,* then he adds: *Or obscenity* (which a gloss* refers to kissing and fondling), *or foolish talking* (as soft speeches), *or scurrility* (which fools call geniality—i.e. jocularity), and afterwards he continues (*verse* 5): *For know ye this and understand that no fornicator, or unclean, or covetous person* (*which is the serving of idols*), *hath inheritance in the kingdom of Christ and of God,* thus making no further mention of obscenity, as neither of foolish talking or scurrility. Therefore these are not mortal sins.

Obj. 2. Further, Fornication is stated to be a mortal sin as being prejudicial to the good of the future child's begetting and upbringing. But these are not affected by kisses and touches or blandishments. Therefore there is no mortal sin in these.

Obj. 3. Further, Things that are mortal sins in themselves can never be good actions. Yet kisses, touches, and the like can be done sometimes without sin. Therefore they are not mortal sins in themselves.

On the contrary, A lustful look is less than a touch, a caress

* See above, Q. CXLVIII., A. 6.

or a kiss. But according to Matth. v. 28, *Whosoever shall look on a woman to lust after her hath already committed adultery with her in his heart.* Much more therefore are lustful kisses and other like things mortal sins.

Further, Cyprian says (*Ad Pompon., de Virgin.* i., Ep. 11), *By their very intercourse, their blandishments, their converse, their embraces, those who are associated in a sleep that knows neither honour nor shame, acknowledge their disgrace and crime.* Therefore by doing these things a man is guilty of a crime, that is of mortal sin.

I answer that, A thing is said to be a mortal sin in two ways. First, by reason of its species, and in this way a kiss, caress, or touch does not, of its very nature, imply a mortal sin, for it is possible to do such things without lustful pleasure, either as being the custom of one's country, or on account of some obligation or reasonable cause. Secondly, a thing is said to be a mortal sin by reason of its cause: thus he who gives an alms, in order to lead someone into heresy, sins mortally on account of his corrupt intention. Now it has been stated above (I.-II., Q. LXXIV., AA. 7, 8), that it is a mortal sin not only to consent to the act, but also to the delectation of a mortal sin. Wherefore since fornication is a mortal sin, and much more so the other kinds of lust, it follows that in such-like sins not only consent to the act but also consent to the pleasure is a mortal sin. Consequently, when these kisses and caresses are done for this delectation, it follows that they are mortal sins, and only in this way are they said to be lustful. Therefore in so far as they are lustful, they are mortal sins.

Reply Obj. 1. The Apostle makes no further mention of these three because they are not sinful except as directed to those that he had mentioned before.

Reply Obj. 2. Although kisses and touches do not by their very nature hinder the good of the human offspring, they proceed from lust, which is the source of this hindrance: and on this account they are mortally sinful.

Reply Obj. 3. This argument proves that such things are not mortal sins in their species.

Fifth Article.

whether nocturnal pollution is a mortal sin?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that nocturnal pollution is a sin. For the same things are the matter of merit and demerit. Now a man may merit while he sleeps, as was the case with Solomon, who while asleep obtained the gift of wisdom from the Lord (3 Kings iii., 2 Par. 1). Therefore a man may demerit while asleep; and thus nocturnal pollution would seem to be a sin.

Obj. 2. Further, Whoever has the use of reason can sin. Now a man has the use of reason while asleep, since in our sleep we frequently discuss matters, choose this rather than that, consenting to one thing, or dissenting to another. Therefore one may sin while asleep, so that nocturnal pollution is not prevented by sleep from being a sin, seeing that it is a sin according to its genus.

Obj. 3. Further, It is useless to reprove and instruct one who cannot act according to or against reason. Now man, while asleep, is instructed and reproved by God, according to Job xxxiii. 15, 16, *By a dream in a vision by night, when deep sleep is wont to lay hold of men.** . . . *Then He openeth the ears of men, and teaching instructeth them in what they are to learn.* Therefore a man, while asleep, can act according to or against his reason, and this is to do good or sinful actions, and thus it seems that nocturnal pollution is a sin.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit.* xii.): *When the same image that comes into the mind of a speaker presents itself to the mind of the sleeper, so that the latter is unable to distinguish the imaginary from the real union of bodies, the flesh is at once moved, with the result that usually follows such motions; and yet there is as little sin in this as there is in speaking and therefore thinking about such things while one is awake.*

* Vulg.,—*When deep sleep falleth upon men.* S. Thomas is apparently quoting from memory, as the passage is given correctly above, Q. XCV., A. 6, *Obj.* 1.

I *answer that,* Nocturnal pollution may be considered in two ways. First, in itself; and thus it has not the character of a sin. For every sin depends on the judgment of reason, since even the first movement of the sensuality has nothing sinful in it, except in so far as it can be suppressed by reason; wherefore in the absence of reason's judgment, there is no sin in it. Now during sleep reason has not a free judgment. For there is no one who while sleeping does not regard some of the images formed by his imagination as though they were real, as stated above in the First Part (Q. LXXXIV., A. 8). Wherefore what a man does while he sleeps and is deprived of reason's judgment, is not imputed to him as a sin, as neither are the actions of a maniac or an imbecile.

Secondly, nocturnal pollution may be considered with reference to its cause. This may be threefold. One is a bodily cause. For when there is excess of seminal humour in the body, or when the humour is disintegrated either through overheating of the body or some other disturbance, the sleeper dreams things that are connected with the discharge of this excessive or disintegrated humour: the same thing happens when nature is cumbered with other superfluities, so that phantasms relating to the discharge of those superfluities are formed in the imagination. Accordingly if this excess of humour be due to a sinful cause (for instance excessive eating or drinking), nocturnal pollution has the character of sin from its cause: whereas if the excess or disintegration of these superfluities be not due to a sinful cause, nocturnal pollution is not sinful, neither in itself nor in its cause.

A second cause of nocturnal pollution is on the part of the soul and the inner man: for instance when it happens to the sleeper on account of some previous thought. For the thought which preceded while he was awake, is sometimes purely speculative, for instance when one thinks about the sins of the flesh for the purpose of discussion; while sometimes it is accompanied by a certain emotion either of concupiscence or of abhorrence. Now nocturnal pollution is more apt to arise from thinking about carnal sins with

concupiscence for such pleasures, because this leaves its trace and inclination in the soul, so that the sleeper is more easily led in his imagination to consent to acts productive of pollution. In this sense the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* i. 13) that *in so far as certain movements gradually pass from the waking state to the state of sleep, the phantasms of good men are better than those of any other people:* and Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit.* xii.) that *even during sleep, the soul may have conspicuous merit on account of its good disposition.* Thus it is evident that nocturnal pollution may be sinful on the part of its cause. On the other hand, it may happen that nocturnal pollution ensues after thoughts about carnal acts though they were speculative, or accompanied by abhorrence, and then it is not sinful, neither in itself nor in its cause.

The third cause is spiritual and external; for instance when by the work of a devil the sleeper's phantasms are disturbed so as to induce the aforesaid result. Sometimes this is associated with a previous sin, namely the neglect to guard against the wiles of the devil Hence the words of the hymn at even:

> Our enemy repress, that so
> Our bodies no uncleanness know.*

On the other hand, this may occur without any fault on man's part, and through the wickedness of the devil alone Thus we read in the *Collationes Patrum* (*Coll.* xxii.) of a man who was ever wont to suffer from nocturnal pollution on festivals, and that the devil brought this about in order to prevent him from receiving Holy Communion. Hence it is manifest that nocturnal pollution is never a sin, but is sometimes the result of a previous sin.

Reply Obj. 1. Solomon did not merit to receive wisdom from God while he was asleep. He received it in token of his previous desire. It is for this reason that his petition is stated to have been pleasing to God (3 Kings iii. 10), as Augustine observes (*Gen. ad lit.* xii.).

Reply Obj. 2. The use of reason is more or less hindered

* Transl. W. K. Blount.

in sleep, according as the inner sensitive powers are more or less overcome by sleep, on account of the violence or attenuation of the evaporations. Nevertheless it is always hindered somewhat, so as to be unable to elicit a judgment altogether free, as stated in the First Part (Q. LXXXIV., A. 8, *ad* 2). Therefore what it does then is not imputed to it as a sin.

Reply Obj. 3. Reason's apprehension is not hindered during sleep to the same extent as its judgment, for this is accomplished by reason turning to sensible objects, which are the first principles of human thought. Hence nothing hinders man's reason during sleep from apprehending anew something arising out of the traces left by his previous thoughts and phantasms presented to him, or again through Divine revelation, or the interference of a good or bad angel.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER SEDUCTION SHOULD BE RECKONED A SPECIES OF LUST?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that seduction should not be reckoned a species of lust. For seduction denotes the unlawful violation of a virgin, according to the Decretals (XXXVI., qu. 1: Append. Grat. ad cap. *Lex illa*). But this may occur between an unmarried man and an unmarried woman, which pertains to fornication. Therefore seduction should not be reckoned a species of lust, distinct from fornication.

Obj. 2. Further, Ambrose says in his book on the Patriarchs (*De Abraham* i. 4): *Let no man be deluded by human laws: all seduction is adultery.* Now a species is not contained under another that is differentiated in opposition to it. Therefore since adultery is a species of lust, it seems that seduction should not be reckoned a species of lust.

Obj. 3. Further, To do a person an injury would seem to pertain to injustice rather than to lust. Now the seducer does an injury to another, namely the violated maiden's father, who can take the injury as personal to himself, and

sue the seducer for damages. Therefore seduction should not be reckoned a species of lust.

On the contrary, Seduction consists properly in the venereal act whereby a virgin is violated. Therefore, since lust is properly about venereal actions, it would seem that seduction is a species of lust.

I answer that, When the matter of a vice has a special deformity, we must reckon it to be a determinate species of that vice. Now lust is a sin concerned with venereal matter, as stated above (Q. CLIII., AA. 1, 4). And a special deformity attaches to the violation of a virgin who is under her father's care: both on the part of the maid, who through being violated without any previous compact of marriage is both hindered from contracting a lawful marriage and is put on the road to a wanton life from which she was withheld lest she should lose the seal of virginity: and on the part of the father, who is her guardian, according to Ecclus. xlii. 2, *Keep a sure watch over a shameless daughter, lest at any time she make thee become a laughing-stock to thy enemies.* Therefore it is evident that seduction which denotes the unlawful violation of a virgin, while still under the guardianship of her parents, is a determinate species of lust.

Reply Obj. 1. Although a virgin is free from the bond of marriage, she is not free from her father's power. Moreover, the seal of virginity is a special obstacle to the intercourse of fornication, in that it should be removed by marriage only. Hence seduction is not simple fornication, since the latter is intercourse with harlots, women, namely, who are no longer virgins, as a gloss observes on 2 Cor. xii., *And have not done penance for the uncleanness and fornication,* etc.

Reply Obj. 2. Ambrose here takes seduction in another sense, as applicable in a general way to any sin of lust. Wherefore seduction, in the words quoted, signifies the intercourse between a married man with any woman other than his wife. This is clear from his adding: *Nor is it lawful for the husband to do what the wife may not.* In this sense, too, we are to understand the words of Num. v. 13: *If* (Vulg.,—

But) the adultery is secret, and cannot be provided by witnesses, because she was not found in adultery (stupro).

Reply Obj. 3. Nothing prevents a sin from having a greater deformity through being united to another sin. Now the sin of lust obtains a greater deformity from the sin of injustice, because the concupiscence would seem to be more inordinate, seeing that it refrains not from the pleasurable object so that it may avoid an injustice. In fact a twofold injustice attaches to it. One is on the part of the virgin, who, though not violated by force, is nevertheless seduced, and thus the seducer is bound to compensation. Hence it is written (Exod. xxii. 16, 17): *If a man seduce a virgin not yet espoused, and lie with her, he shall endow her and have her to wife. If the maid's father will not give her to him, he shall give money according to the dowry, which virgins are wont to receive.* The other injury is done to the maid's father: wherefore the seducer is bound by the Law to a penalty in his regard. For it is written (Deut. xxii. 28, 29): *If a man find a damsel that is a virgin, who is not espoused, and taking her, lie with her, and the matter come to judgment: he that lay with her shall give to the father of the maid fifty sicles of silver, and shall have her to wife, and because he hath humbled her, he may not put her away all the days of his life:* and this, lest he should prove to have married her in mockery, as Augustine observes (QQ. *in Deut.*, qu. 34).

Seventh Article.

WHETHER RAPE IS A SPECIES OF LUST, DISTINCT FROM SEDUCTION?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that rape is not a species of lust, distinct from seduction. For Isidore says (*Etym.* v.) that *seduction (stuprum), or rape, properly speaking, is unlawful intercourse, and takes its name from its causing corruption: wherefore he that is guilty of rape is a seducer.* Therefore it seems that rape should not be reckoned a species of lust distinct from seduction.

Obj. 2. Further, Rape, apparently, implies violence. For it is stated in the Decretals (XXXVI., qu. 1: Append. Grat. ad cap. *Lex illa*) that *rape is committed when a maid is taken away by force from her father's house that after being violated she may be taken to wife.* But the employment of force is accidental to lust, for this essentially regards the pleasure of intercourse. Therefore it seems that rape should not be reckoned a determinate species of lust.

Obj. 3. Further, The sin of lust is curbed by marriage: for it is written (1 Cor. vii. 2): *For fear of fornication, let every man have his own wife.* Now rape is an obstacle to subsequent marriage, for it was enacted in the council of Meaux: *We decree that those who are guilty of rape, or of abducting or seducing women, should not have those women in marriage, although they should have subsequently married them with the consent of their parents.* Therefore rape is not a determinate species of lust.

Obj. 4. Further, A man may have knowledge of his newly married wife without committing a sin of lust. Yet he may commit rape if he take her away by force from her parents' house, and have carnal knowledge of her. Therefore rape should not be reckoned a determinate species of lust.

On the contrary, Rape is unlawful sexual intercourse, as Isidore states (*Etym.* v.). But this pertains to the sin of lust. Therefore rape is a species of lust.

I answer that, Rape, in the sense in which we speak of it now, is a species of lust: and sometimes it coincides with seduction; sometimes there is rape without seduction, and sometimes seduction without rape.

They coincide when a man employs force in order unlawfully to violate a virgin. This force is employed sometimes both towards the virgin and towards her father; and sometimes towards the father and not to the virgin, for instance if she allows herself to be taken away by force from her father's house. Again, force and rape differ in another way, because sometimes a maid is taken away by force from her parents' house, and is forcibly violated: while sometimes, though taken away by force, she is not forcibly violated, but of her

own consent, whether by act of fornication or by the act of marriage: for the conditions of rape remain no matter how force is employed.

There is rape without seduction if a man abduct a widow or one who is not a virgin. Hence Pope Symmachus says (*Ep.* v. *ad Cæsarium* Tom. 4 Concil.): *We abhor abductors whether of widows or of virgins on account of the heinousness of their crime.*

There is seduction without rape when a man, without employing force, violates a virgin unlawfully.

Reply Obj. 1. Since rape frequently coincides with seduction, the one is sometimes used to signify the other.

Reply Obj. 2. The employment of force would seem to arise from the greatness of concupiscence, the result being that a man does not fear to endanger himself by offering violence.

Reply Obj. 3. The rape of a maiden who is promised in marriage is to be judged differently from that of one who is not so promised. For one who is promised in marriage must be restored to her betrothed, who has a right to her in virtue of their betrothal: whereas one that is not promised to another must first of all be restored to her father's care, and then the abductor may lawfully marry her with her parents' consent. Otherwise the marriage is unlawful, since no matter what a man steals, he is bound to restore it. Nevertheless rape does not dissolve a marriage already contracted, although it is an impediment to its being contracted. As to the decree of the council in question, it was made in abhorrence of this crime, and has been abrogated. Wherefore Jerome* declares the contrary: *Three kinds of lawful marriage,* says he, *are mentioned in Holy Writ. The first is that of a chaste maiden given away lawfully in her maidenhood to a man. The second is when a man finds a maiden in the city, and by force has carnal knowledge of her. If the father be willing, the man shall endow her according to the father's estimate, and shall pay the price of her purity.*†

* The quotation is from Cap. *Tria,* caus. 36, qu. ii.

† Cf. Deut. xxii. 23-29.

The third is, when the maiden is taken away from such a man, and is given to another at the father's will.

We may also take this decree to refer to those who are promised to others in marriage, especially if the betrothal be expressed by words in the present tense.

Reply Obj. 4. The man who is just married has, in virtue of the betrothal, a certain right in her: wherefore, although he sins by using violence, he is not guilty of the crime of rape. Hence Pope Gelasius says*: *This law of bygone rulers stated that rape was committed when a maiden, with regard to whose marriage nothing had so far been decided, was taken away by force.*

Eighth Article.

Whether adultery is a determinate species of lust, distinct from the other species?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that adultery is not a determinate species of lust, distinct from the other species. For adultery takes its name from a man having intercourse with a woman who is not his own (*ad alteram*), according to a gloss† on Exod. xx. 14. Now a woman who is not one's own may be of various conditions, namely either a virgin, or under her father's care, or a harlot, or of any other description. Therefore it seems that adultery is not a species of lust distinct from the others.

Obj. 2. Further, Jerome says (*Contra Jovin.* i.): *It matters not for what reason a man behaves as one demented. Hence Sixtus the Pythagorean says in his Maxims: He that is insatiable of his wife is an adulterer,* and in like manner one who is over enamoured of any woman. Now every kind of lust includes a too ardent love. Therefore adultery is in every kind of lust: and consequently it should not be reckoned a species of lust.

Obj. 3. Further, Where there is the same kind of deformity, there would seem to be the same species of sin. Now,

* Cap. *Lex.* 36, qu. i.

† S. Augustine (*QQ. Super Exod., qu.* 71).

apparently, there is the same kind of deformity in seduction and adultery: since in either case a woman is violated who is under another person's authority. Therefore adultery is not a determinate species of lust, distinct from the others.

On the contrary, Pope Leo* says that *adultery is sexual intercourse with another man or woman in contravention of the marriage compact, whether through the impulse of one's own lust, or with the consent of the other party.* Now this implies a special deformity of lust. Therefore adultery is a determinate species of lust.

I answer that, Adultery, as its name implies, is access to another's marriage-bed (*ad alienum torum*). By so doing a man is guilty of a twofold offence against chastity and the good of human procreation. First, by accession to a woman who is not joined to him in marriage, which is contrary to the good of the upbringing of his own children. Secondly, by accession to a woman who is united to another in marriage, and thus he hinders the good of another's children. The same applies to the married woman who is corrupted by adultery. Wherefore it is written (Ecclus. xxiii. 32, 33): *Every woman . . . that leaveth her husband . . . shall be guilty of sin. For first she hath been unfaithful to the law of the Most High* (since there it is commanded: *Thou shalt not commit adultery*); *and secondly, she hath offended against her husband,* by making it uncertain that the children are his: *thirdly, she hath fornicated in adultery, and hath gotten children of another man,* which is contrary to the good of her offspring. The first of these, however, is common to all mortal sins, while the two others belong especially to the deformity of adultery. Hence it is manifest that adultery is a determinate species of lust, through having a special deformity in venereal acts.

Reply Obj. 1. If a married man has intercourse with another woman, his sin may be denominated either with regard to him, and thus, it is always adultery, since his action is contrary to the fidelity of marriage, or with regard to the

* S. Augustine (*De Bono Conjug.* iv. Cf. Append. Grat. ad cap. *Ille autem,* 32, qu. v.).

woman with whom he has intercourse; and thus sometimes it is adultery, as when a married man has intercourse with another's wife; and sometimes it has the character of seduction, or of some other sin, according to various conditions affecting the woman with whom he has intercourse: and it has been stated above (A. 1) that the species of lust correspond to the various conditions of women.

Reply Obj. 2. Matrimony is specially ordained for the good of human offspring, as stated above (A. 2). But adultery is specially opposed to matrimony, in the point of breaking the marriage faith which is due between husband and wife. And since the man who is too ardent a lover of his wife acts counter to the good of marriage if he use her indecently, although he be not unfaithful, he may in a sense be called an adulterer; and even more so than he that is too ardent a lover of another woman.

Reply Obj. 3. The wife is under her husband's authority, as united to him in marriage: whereas the maid is under her father's authority, as one who is to be married by that authority. Hence the sin of adultery is contrary to the good of marriage in one way, and the sin of seduction in another; wherefore they are reckoned to differ specifically. Of other matters concerning adultery we shall speak in the Third Part,* when we treat of matrimony.

Ninth Article.

whether incest is a determinate species of lust?

We proceed thus to the Ninth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that incest is not a determinate species of lust. For incest† takes its name from being a privation of chastity. But all kinds of lust are opposed to chastity. Therefore it seems that incest is not a species of lust, but is lust itself in general.

Obj. 2. Further, It is stated in the Decretals (XXXVI.,

* S. Thomas did not live to keep his promise: nor did the Compiler of the Supplement mention this subject. Cf. iv. Sent. D. 41.

† *Incestus* is equivalent to *in-castus* = *unchaste.*

qu. 1, Append. Grat. ad cap. *Lex illa*) that *incest is intercourse between a man and a woman related by consanguinity or affinity*. Now affinity differs from consanguinity. Therefore it is not one but several species of lust.

Obj. 3. Further, That which does not, of itself, imply a deformity, does not constitute a determinate species of vice. But intercourse between those who are related by consanguinity or affinity does not, of itself, contain any deformity, else it would never have been lawful. Therefore incest is not a determinate species of lust.

On the contrary, The species of lust are distinguished according to the various conditions of women with whom a man has unlawful intercourse. Now incest implies a special condition on the part of the woman, because it is unlawful intercourse with a woman related by consanguinity or affinity, as stated (*Obj.* 2 and A. 1). Therefore incest is a determinate species of lust.

I answer that, As stated above (AA. 1, 6) wherever we find something incompatible with the right use of venereal actions, there must needs be a determinate species of lust. Now sexual intercourse with women related by consanguinity or affinity is unbecoming to venereal union on three counts. First, because man naturally owes a certain respect to his parents and therefore to his other blood relations, who are descended in near degree from the same parents: so much so indeed that among the ancients, as Maximus Valerius relates (II. cap. 1), it was not deemed right for a son to bathe with his father, lest they should see one another naked. Now from what has been said (Q. CXLII., A. 4: Q. CLI., A. 4), it is evident that in venereal acts there is a certain shamefulness inconsistent with respect, wherefore men are ashamed of them. Wherefore it is unseemly that such persons should be united in venereal intercourse. This reason seems to be indicated (Levit. xviii. 7) where we read: *She is thy mother, thou shalt not uncover her nakedness,* and the same is expressed further on with regard to others.

The second reason is because blood relations must needs live in close touch with one another. Wherefore if they

were not debarred from venereal union, opportunities of venereal intercourse would be very frequent and thus men's minds would be enervated by lust. Hence in the Old Law the prohibition was apparently directed specially to those persons who must needs live together.

The third reason is, because this would hinder a man from having many friends: since through a man taking a stranger to wife, all his wife's relations are united to him by a special kind of friendship, as though they were of the same blood as himself. Wherefore Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xv. 16): *The demands of charity are most perfectly satisfied by men uniting together in the bonds that the various ties of friendship require, so that they may live together in a useful and becoming amity; nor should one man have many relationships in one, but each should have one.*

Aristotle adds another reason (2 *Polit.* ii.): for since it is natural that a man should have a liking for a woman of his kindred, if to this be added the love that has its origin in venereal intercourse, his love would be too ardent and would become a very great incentive to lust: and this is contrary to chastity. Hence it is evident that incest is a determinate species of lust.

Reply Obj. 1. Unlawful intercourse between persons related to one another would be most prejudicial to chastity, both on account of the opportunities it affords, and because of the excessive ardour of love, as stated in the *Article.* Wherefore the unlawful intercourse between such persons is called *incest* antonomastically.

Reply Obj. 2. Persons are related by affinity through one who is related by consanguinity: and therefore since the one depends on the other, consanguinity and affinity entail the same kind of unbecomingness.

Reply Obj. 3. There is something essentially unbecoming and contrary to natural reason in sexual intercourse between persons related by blood, for instance between parents and children who are directly and immediately related to one another, since children naturally owe their parents honour. Hence the Philosopher instances a horse (*De animal.* ix. 47)

which covered its own mother by mistake and threw itself over a precipice as though horrified at what it had done, because some animals even have a natural respect for those that have begotten them. There is not the same essential unbecomingness attaching to other persons who are related to one another not directly but through their parents: and, as to this, becomingness or unbecomingness varies according to custom, and human or Divine law: because, as stated above (A. 2), sexual intercourse, being directed to the common good, is subject to law. Wherefore, as Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xv. 16), *whereas the union of brothers and sisters goes back to olden times, it became all the more worthy of condemnation when religion forbade it.*

TENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER SACRILEGE CAN BE A SPECIES OF LUST?

We proceed thus to the Tenth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that sacrilege cannot be a species of lust. For the same species is not contained under different genera that are not subalternated to one another. Now sacrilege is a species of irreligion, as stated above (Q. XCIX., A. 1). Therefore sacrilege cannot be reckoned a species of lust.

Obj. 2. Further, The Decretals (XXXVI., qu. 1, Append. Grat. ad cap. *Lex illa*) do not place sacrilege among other sins which are reckoned species of lust. Therefore it would seem not to be a species of lust.

Obj. 3. Further, Something derogatory to a sacred thing may be done by the other kinds of vice, as well as by lust. But sacrilege is not reckoned a species of gluttony, or of any other similar vice. Therefore neither should it be reckoned a species of lust.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xv. 16) that *if it is wicked, through covetousness, to go beyond one's earthly bounds, how much more wicked is it through venereal lust to transgress the bounds of morals!* Now to go beyond one's earthly bounds in sacred matters is a sin of sacrilege. There-

fore it is likewise a sin of sacrilege to overthrow the bounds of morals through venereal desire in sacred matters. But venereal desire pertains to lust. Therefore sacrilege is a species of lust.

I answer that, As stated above (I.-II., Q. XVIII., A. 7), the act of a virtue or vice, that is directed to the end of another virtue or vice, assumes the latter's species: thus, theft committed for the sake of adultery, passes into the species of adultery. Now it is evident that as Augustine states (*De Virgin.* 8), the observance of chastity, by being directed to the worship of God, becomes an act of religion, as in the case of those who vow and keep chastity. Wherefore it is manifest that lust also, by violating something pertaining to the worship of God, belongs to the species of sacrilege: and in this way sacrilege may be accounted a species of lust.

Reply Obj. 1. Lust, by being directed to another vice as its end, becomes a species of that vice: and so a species of lust may be also a species of irreligion, as of a higher genus.

Reply Obj. 2. The enumeration referred to includes those sins which are species of lust by their very nature: whereas sacrilege is a species of lust in so far as it is directed to another vice as its end, and may coincide with the various species of lust. For unlawful intercourse between persons mutually united by spiritual relationship, is a sacrilege after the manner of incest. Intercourse with a virgin consecrated to God, inasmuch as she is the spouse of Christ, is sacrilege resembling adultery. If the maiden be under her father's authority, it will be spiritual seduction; and if force be employed it will be spiritual rape, which kind of rape even the civil law punishes more severely than others. Thus the Emperor Justinian says (Cod. i., iii., *de episc. et cler.* 5): *If any man dare, I will not say to rape, but even to tempt a consecrated virgin with a view to marriage, he shall be liable to capital punishment.*

Reply Obj. 3. Sacrilege is committed on a consecrated thing. Now a consecrated thing is either a consecrated person, who is desired for sexual intercourse, and thus it is

a kind of lust, or it is desired for possession, and thus it is a kind of injustice. Sacrilege may also come under the head of anger, for instance if through anger an injury be done to a consecrated person. Again, one may commit a sacrilege by partaking gluttonously of sacred food. Nevertheless, sacrilege is ascribed more specially to lust which is opposed to chastity for the observance of which certain persons are specially consecrated.

Eleventh Article.

Whether the unnatural vice is a species of lust?

We proceed thus to the Eleventh Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the unnatural vice is not a species of lust. For no mention of the vice against nature is made in the enumeration given above (A. 1). Therefore it is not a species of lust.

Obj. 2. Further, Lust is contrary to virtue; and so it is comprised under vice. But the unnatural vice is comprised not under vice, but under bestiality, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* vii.). Therefore the unnatural vice is not a species of lust.

Obj. 3. Further, Lust regards acts directed to human generation, as stated above (Q. CLIII., A. 1): Whereas the unnatural vice concerns acts from which generation cannot follow. Therefore the unnatural vice is not a species of lust.

On the contrary, It is reckoned together with the other species of lust (2 Cor. xii. 21) where we read: *And have not done penance for the uncleanness, and fornication, and lasciviousness,* where a gloss says: *Lasciviousness, i.e., unnatural lust.*

I answer that, As stated above (AA. 1, 6) wherever there occurs a special kind of deformity whereby the venereal act is rendered unbecoming, there is a determinate species of lust. This may occur in two ways: First, through being contrary to right reason, and this is common to all lustful vices; secondly, because, in addition, it is contrary to the natural order of the venereal act as becoming to the human

race: and this is called *the unnatural vice*. This may happen in several ways. First, by procuring pollution, without any copulation, for the sake of venereal pleasure: this pertains to the sin of *uncleanness* which some call *effeminacy*. Secondly, by copulation with a thing of undue species, and this is called *bestiality*. Thirdly, by copulation with an undue sex, male with male, or female with female, as the Apostle states (Rom. i. 27): and this is called the *vice of sodomy*. Fourthly, by not observing the natural manner of copulation, either as to undue means, or as to other monstrous and bestial manners of copulation.

Reply Obj. 1. There we enumerated the species of lust that are not contrary to human nature: wherefore the unnatural vice was omitted.

Reply Obj. 2. Bestiality differs from vice, for the latter is opposed to human virtue by a certain excess in the same matter as the virtue, and therefore is reducible to the same genus.

Reply Obj. 3. The lustful man intends not human generation but venereal pleasures. It is possible to have this without those acts from which human generation follows: and it is that which is sought in the unnatural vice.

Twelfth Article.

Whether the unnatural vice is the greatest sin among the species of lust?

We proceed thus to the Twelfth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the unnatural vice is not the greatest sin among the species of lust. For the more a sin is contrary to charity the graver it is. Now adultery, seduction and rape which are injurious to our neighbour are seemingly more contrary to the love of our neighbour, than unnatural sins, by which no other person is injured. Therefore the unnatural sin is not the greatest among the species of lust.

Obj. 2. Further, Sins committed against God would seem to be the most grievous. Now sacrilege is committed

directly against God, since it is injurious to the Divine worship. Therefore sacrilege is a graver sin than the unnatural vice.

Obj. 3. Further, Seemingly, a sin is all the more grievous according as we owe a greater love to the person against whom that sin is committed. Now the order of charity requires that a man love more those persons who are united to him,—and such are those whom he defiles by incest,—than persons who are not connected with him, and whom in certain cases he defiles by the unnatural vice. Therefore incest is a graver sin than the unnatural vice.

Obj. 4. Further, If the unnatural vice is most grievous, the more it is against nature the graver it would seem to be. Now the sin of uncleanness or effeminacy would seem to be most contrary to nature, since it would seem especially in accord with nature that agent and patient should be distinct from one another. Hence it would follow that uncleanness is the gravest of unnatural vices. But this is not true. Therefore unnatural vices are not the most grievous among sins of lust.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De adult. conjug.*)* that *of all these vices* (belonging, namely, to lust) *that which is against nature is the worst.*

I answer that, In every genus, worst of all is the corruption of the principle on which the rest depend. Now the principles of reason are those things that are according to nature because reason presupposes things as determined by nature, before disposing of other things according as it is fitting. This may be observed both in speculative and in practical matters. Wherefore just as in speculative matters the most grievous and shameful error is that which is about things the knowledge of which is naturally bestowed on man, so in matters of action it is most grave and shameful to act against things as determined by nature. Therefore, since by the unnatural vices man transgresses that which has been determined by nature with regard to the use of venereal actions, it follows that in this matter this sin is gravest of

* The quotation is from *De Bono Conjugali*, 9 and 11.

all. After it comes incest, which, as stated above (A. 9), is contrary to the natural respect which we owe persons related to us. With regard to the other species of lust they imply a transgression merely of that which is determined by right reason, on the presupposition, however, of natural principles. Now it is more against reason to make use of the venereal act not only with prejudice to the future offspring, but also so as to injure another person besides. Wherefore simple fornication, which is committed without injustice to another person, is the least grave among the species of lust. Then, it is a greater injustice to have intercourse with a woman who is subject to another's authority as regards the act of generation, than as regards merely her guardianship. Wherefore adultery is more grievous than seduction, and both of these are aggravated by the use of violence. Hence rape of a virgin is graver than seduction, and rape of a wife than adultery. And all these are aggravated by coming under the head of sacrilege, as stated above (A. 10).

Reply Obj. 1. Just as the ordering of right reason proceeds from man, so the order of nature is from God Himself: wherefore in sins contrary to nature, whereby the very order of nature is violated, an injury is done to God, the Author of nature. Hence Augustine says (*Conf.* iii. 8): *Those foul offences that are against nature should be everywhere and at all times detested and punished, such as were those of the people of Sodom, which should all nations commit, they should all stand guilty of the same crime, by the law of God, which hath not so made men that they should so abuse one another. For even that very intercourse which should be between God and us is violated, when that same nature, of which He is the Author, is polluted by the perversity of lust.*

Reply Obj. 2. Vices against nature are also against God, as stated above (*ad* 1), and are so much more grievous than the depravity of sacrilege, as the order impressed on human nature is prior to and more firm than any subsequently established order.

Reply Obj. 3. The nature of the species is more intimately

united to each individual, than any other individual is. Wherefore sins against the specific nature are more grievous.

Reply Obj. 4. Gravity of a sin depends more on the abuse of a thing than on the omission of the right use. Wherefore among sins against nature, the lowest place belongs to the sin of uncleanness, which consists in the mere omission of copulation with another. While the most grievous is the sin of bestiality, because use of the due species is not observed. Hence a gloss on Gen. xxxvii. 2, *He accused his brethren of a most wicked crime*, says that *they copulated with cattle*. After this comes the sin of sodomy, because use of the right sex is not observed. Lastly comes the sin of not observing the right manner of copulation, which is more grievous if the abuse regards the *vas* than if it affects the manner of copulation in respect of other circumstances.

QUESTION CLV.

OF THE POTENTIAL PARTS OF TEMPERANCE, AND IN THE FIRST PLACE, OF CONTINENCE.

(*In Four Articles.*)

We must next consider the potential parts of temperance. (1) continence; (2) clemency; (3) modesty. Under the first head we must consider continence and incontinence. With regard to continence there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether continence is a virtue? (2) What is its matter? (3) What is its subject? (4) Of its comparison with temperance.

First Article.

WHETHER CONTINENCE IS A VIRTUE?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that continence is not a virtue. For species and genus are not co-ordinate members of the same division. But continence is co-ordinated with virtue, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* vii. 7, 9). Therefore continence is not a virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, No one sins by using a virtue, since, according to Augustine (*De Lib. Arb.* iii. 18, 19), *a virtue is a thing that no one makes ill use of.* Yet one may sin by containing oneself: for instance, if one desire to do a good, and contain oneself from doing it. Therefore continence is not a virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, No virtue withdraws man from that which is lawful, but only from unlawful things: for a gloss on Gal. v. 23, *Faith, modesty*, etc., says that by continence

a man refrains even from things that are lawful. Therefore continence is not a virtue.

On the contrary, Every praiseworthy habit would seem to be a virtue. Now such is continence, for Andronicus says that *continence is a habit unconquered by pleasure.* Therefore continence is a virtue.

I answer that, The word *continence* is taken by various people in two ways. For some understand continence to denote abstention from all venereal pleasure: thus the Apostle joins continence to chastity (Gal. v. 23). In this sense perfect continence is virginity in the first place, and widowhood in the second. Wherefore the same applies to continence understood thus, as to virginity which we have stated above (Q. CLII., A. 3) to be a virtue. Others, however, understand continence as signifying that whereby a man resists evil desires, which in him are vehement. In this sense the Philosopher takes continence (*Ethic.* vii.), and thus also it is used in the *Conferences of the Fathers* (*Collat.* xii. 10, 11). In this way continence has something of the nature of a virtue, in so far, to wit, as the reason stands firm in opposition to the passions, lest it be led astray by them: yet it does not attain to the perfect nature of a moral virtue, by which even the sensitive appetite is subject to reason so that vehement passions contrary to reason do not arise in the sensitive appetite. Hence the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iv. 9) that *continence is not a virtue but a mixture,* inasmuch as it has something of virtue, and somewhat falls short of virtue.

If, however, we take virtue in a broad sense, for any principle of commendable actions, we may say that continence is a virtue.

Reply Obj. 1. The Philosopher includes continence in the same division with virtue in so far as the former falls short of virtue.

Reply Obj. 2. Properly speaking, man is that which is according to reason. Wherefore from the very fact that a man holds (*tenet se*) to that which is in accord with reason, he is said to contain himself. Now whatever pertains to

perversion of reason is not according to reason. Hence he alone is truly said to be continent who stands to that which is in accord with right reason, and not to that which is in accord with perverse reason. Now evil desires are opposed to right reason, even as good desires are opposed to perverse reason. Wherefore he is properly and truly continent who holds to right reason, by abstaining from evil desires, and not he who holds to perverse reason, by abstaining from good desires: indeed, the latter should rather be said to be obstinate in evil.

Reply Obj. 3. The gloss quoted takes continence in the first sense, as denoting a perfect virtue, which refrains not merely from unlawful goods, but also from certain lawful things that are lesser goods, in order to give its whole attention to the more perfect goods.

Second Article.

whether desires for pleasures of touch are the matter of continence?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that desires for pleasures of touch are not the matter of continence. For Ambrose says (*De Offic.* i. 46): *General decorum by its consistent form and the perfection of what is virtuous is restrained* in its every action.*

Obj. 2. Further, Continence takes its name from a man standing to the good of right reason, as stated above (A. 1). Now other passions lead man astray from right reason with greater vehemence than the desire for pleasures of touch: for instance, the fear of mortal dangers, which stupefies a man, and anger which makes him behave like a madman, as Seneca remarks (*De Ira* i. 11). Therefore continence does not properly regard the desires for pleasures of touch.

Obj. 3. Further, Tully says (*Rhet.* ii.): *It is continence that restrains cupidity with the guiding hand of counsel.* Now cupidity is generally used to denote the desire for riches

* *Continentem* according to S. Thomas's reading. St. Ambrose wrote *concinentem* = *harmonious.*

rather than the desire for pleasures of touch, according to 1 Tim. vi. 10, *Cupidity* (Douay,—*The desire of money*) *is the root of all evils*. Therefore continence is not properly about the desires for pleasures of touch.

Obj. 4. Further, There are pleasures of touch not only in venereal matters but also in the use of food. But continence is wont to be applied only to the use of venereal matters. Therefore the desire for pleasures of touch is not its proper matter.

Obj. 5. Further, Among pleasures of touch some are not human but bestial, both as regards food,—for instance, the pleasure of eating human flesh; and as regards venereal matters,—for instance the abuse of animals or boys. But continence is not about suchlike things, as stated in *Ethic.* vii. 5. Therefore desires for pleasures of touch are not the proper matter of continence.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*Ethic.* vii. 5) that *continence and incontinence are about the same things as temperance and intemperance.* Now temperance and intemperance are about the desires for pleasures of touch, as stated above (Q. CXLI., A. 4). Therefore continence and incontinence are also about that same matter.

I answer that, Continence denotes, by its very name, a certain curbing, in so far as a man contains himself from following his passions. Hence continence is properly said in reference to those passions which urge a man towards the pursuit of something, wherein it is praiseworthy that reason should withhold man from pursuing: whereas it is not properly about those passions, such as fear and the like, which denote some kind of withdrawal: since in these it is praiseworthy to remain firm in pursuing what reason dictates, as stated above (Q. CXXIII., AA. 3, 4). Now it is to be observed that natural inclinations are the principles of all supervening inclinations, as stated above (Q. XXVI., AA. 3, 7, 8). Wherefore the more they follow the inclination of nature, the more strongly do the passions urge to the pursuance of an object. Now nature inclines chiefly to those things that are necessary to it, whether for the main-

tenance of the individual, such as food, or for the maintenance of the species, such as venereal acts, the pleasures of which pertain to the touch. Therefore continence and incontinence refer properly to desires for pleasures of touch.

Reply Obj. 1. Just as temperance may be used in a general sense in connection with any matter; but is properly applied to that matter wherein it is best for man to be curbed: so, too, continence properly speaking regards that matter wherein it is best and most difficult to contain oneself, namely desires for pleasures of touch, and yet in a general sense and relatively may be applied to any other matter: and in this sense Ambrose speaks of continence.

Reply Obj. 2. Properly speaking we do not speak of continence in relation to fear, but rather of firmness of mind which fortitude implies. As to anger, it is true that it begets an impulse to the pursuit of something, but this impulse follows an apprehension of the soul—in so far as a man apprehends that someone has injured him—rather than an inclination of nature. Wherefore a man may be said to be continent of anger, relatively but not simply.

Reply Obj. 3. External goods, such as honours, riches and the like, as the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* vii. 4), seem to be objects of choice in themselves indeed, but not as being necessary for the maintenance of nature. Wherefore in reference to such things we speak of a person as being continent or incontinent, not simply, but relatively, by adding that they are continent or incontinent in regard to wealth, or honour and so forth. Hence Tully either understood continence in a general sense, as including relative continence, or understood cupidity in a restricted sense as denoting desire for pleasures of touch.

Reply Obj. 4. Venereal pleasures are more vehement than pleasures of the palate: wherefore we are wont to speak of continence and incontinence in reference to venereal matters rather than in reference to food; although according to the Philosopher they are applicable to both.

Reply Obj. 5. Continence is a good of the human reason:

wherefore it regards those passions which can be connatural to man. Hence the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* viii. 5) that if a man were to lay hold of a child with desire of eating him or of satisfying an unnatural passion, whether he follow up his desire or not, he is said to be continent,* not absolutely, but in a restricted sense.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SUBJECT OF CONTINENCE IS THE CONCUPISCIBLE POWER?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the subject of continence is the concupiscible power. For the subject of a virtue should be proportionate to the virtue's matter. Now the matter of continence, as stated (A. 2), is desires for the pleasures of touch, which pertain to the concupiscible power. Therefore continence is in the concupiscible power.

Obj. 2. Further, Opposites are referred to one same thing. But incontinence is in the concupiscible, whose passions overcome reason. For Andronicus says that *incontinence is the evil inclination of the concupiscible, by following which it chooses wicked pleasures in disobedience to reason.* Therefore continence is likewise in the concupiscible.

Obj. 3. Further, The subject of a human virtue is either the reason, or the appetitive power, which is divided into the will, the concupiscible and the irascible. Now continence is not in the reason, for then it would be an intellectual virtue; nor is it in the will, since continence is about the passions which are not in the will; nor again is it in the irascible, because it is not properly about the passions of the irascible, as stated above (A. 2, *ad* 2). Therefore it follows that it is in the concupiscible.

On the contrary, Every virtue residing in a certain power removes the evil act of that power. But continence does not remove the evil act of the concupiscible: since the continent man has evil desires, according to the Philosopher

* The text is evidently faulty; but the sense is clear.

(*Ethic.* vii. 9). Therefore continence is not in the concupiscible power.

I answer that, Every virtue while residing in a subject, makes that subject have a different disposition from that which it has while subjected to the opposite vice. Now the concupiscible has the same disposition in one who is continent and in one who is incontinent, since in both of them it breaks out into vehement evil desires. Wherefore it is manifest that continence is not in the concupiscible as its subject.—Again the reason has the same disposition in both, since both the continent and the incontinent have right reason, and each of them, while undisturbed by passion, purposes not to follow his unlawful desires. Now the primary difference between them is to be found in their choice: since the continent man, though subject to vehement desires, chooses not to follow them, because of his reason; whereas the incontinent man chooses to follow them, although his reason forbids. Hence continence must needs reside in that power of the soul, whose act it is to choose; and that is the will, as stated above (I.-II., Q. XIII., A. 1).

Reply Obj. 1. Continence has for its matter the desires for pleasures of touch, not as moderating them (this belongs to temperance which is in the concupiscible), but its business with them is to resist them. For this reason it must be in another power, since resistance is of one thing against another.

Reply Obj. 2. The will stands between reason and the concupiscible, and may be moved by either. In the continent man it is moved by the reason, in the incontinent man it is moved by the concupiscible. Hence continence may be ascribed to the reason as to its first mover, and incontinence to the concupiscible power: though both belong immediately to the will as their proper subject.

Reply Obj. 3. Although the passions are not in the will as their subject, yet it is in the power of the will to resist them: thus it is that the will of the continent man resists desires.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER CONTINENCE IS BETTER THAN TEMPERANCE?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that continence is better than temperance. For it is written (Ecclus. xxvi. 20): *No price is worthy of a continent soul.* Therefore no virtue can be equalled to continence.

Obj. 2. Further, The greater the reward a virtue merits, the greater the virtue. Now continence apparently merits the greater reward; for it is written (2 Tim. ii. 5): *He . . . is not crowned, except he strive lawfully,* and the continent man, since he is subject to vehement passions and evil desires, strives more than the temperate man, in whom these things are not vehement. Therefore continence is a greater virtue than temperance.

Obj. 3. Further, The will is a more excellent power than the concupiscible. But continence is in the will, whereas temperance is in the concupiscible, as stated above (A. 3). Therefore continence is a greater virtue than temperance.

On the contrary, Tully (*De Inv. Rhet.* ii.) and Andronicus reckon continence to be annexed to temperance, as to a principal virtue.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), continence has a twofold signification. In one way, it denotes cessation from all venereal pleasures; and if continence be taken in this sense, it is greater than temperance considered absolutely, as may be gathered from what we said above (Q. CLII., A. 5) concerning the pre-eminence of virginity over chastity considered absolutely. In another way continence may be taken as denoting the resistance of the reason to evil desires when they are vehement in a man: and in this sense temperance is far greater than continence, because the good of a virtue derives its praise from that which is in accord with reason. Now the good of reason flourishes more in the temperate man than in the continent man, because in the former even the sensitive appetite is obedient to reason,

being tamed by reason so to speak, whereas in the continent man the sensitive appetite strongly resists reason by its evil desires. Hence continence is compared to temperance, as the imperfect to the perfect.

Reply Obj. 1. The passage quoted may be understood in two ways. First, in reference to the sense in which continence denotes abstinence from all things venereal: and thus it means that *no price is worthy of a continent soul*, in the genus of chastity; since not even the fruitfulness of the flesh which is the purpose of marriage is equalled to the continence of virginity or of widowhood, as stated above (Q. CLII., AA. 4, 5). Secondly, it may be understood in reference to the general sense in which continence denotes any abstinence from things unlawful: and thus it means that *no price is worthy of a continent soul*, because its value is not measured with gold or silver, which are appreciable according to weight.

Reply Obj. 2. The strength or weakness of concupiscence may proceed from two causes. For sometimes it is owing to a bodily cause: because some people by their natural temperament are more prone to concupiscence than others; and again opportunities for pleasure which inflame the concupiscence are nearer to hand for some people than for others. Suchlike weakness of concupiscence diminishes merit, whereas strength of concupiscence increases it. On the other hand, weakness or strength of concupiscence arises from a praiseworthy spiritual cause, for instance the vehemence of charity, or the strength of reason, as in the case of a temperate man. In this way weakness of concupiscence, by reason of its cause, increases merit, whereas strength of concupiscence diminishes it.

Reply Obj. 3. The will is more akin to the reason than the concupiscible power is. Wherefore the good of reason, —on account of which virtue is praised by the very fact that it reaches not only to the will but also to the concupiscible power, as happens in the temperate man,—is shown to be greater than if it reach only to the will, as in the case of one who is continent.

QUESTION CLVI.

OF INCONTINENCE

(*In Four Articles.*)

We must next consider incontinence: and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether incontinence pertains to the soul or to the body? (2) Whether incontinence is a sin? (3) The comparison between incontinence and intemperance: (4) Which is the worse, incontinence in anger, or incontinence in desire?

First Article.

WHETHER INCONTINENCE PERTAINS TO THE SOUL OR TO THE BODY?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that incontinence pertains not to the soul but to the body. For sexual diversity comes not from the soul but from the body. Now sexual diversity causes diversity of incontinence: for the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* vii. 5) that *women are not described either as continent or as incontinent.* Therefore incontinence pertains not to the soul but to the body.

Obj. 2. Further, That which pertains to the soul does not result from the temperament of the body. But incontinence results from the bodily temperament: for the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* vii. 7) that *it is especially people of a quick or choleric and atrabilious temper whose incontinence is one of unbridled desire.* Therefore incontinence regards the body.

Obj. 3. Further, Victory concerns the victor rather than

the vanquished. Now a man is said to be incontinent, because *the flesh lusteth against the spirit*, and overcomes it. Therefore incontinence pertains to the flesh rather than to the soul.

On the contrary, Man differs from beast chiefly as regards the soul. Now they differ in respect of continence and incontinence, for we ascribe neither continence nor incontinence to the beasts, as the Philosopher states (*Ethic.* vii. 3, 6). Therefore incontinence is chiefly on the part of the soul.

I answer that, Things are ascribed to their direct causes rather than to those which merely occasion them. Now that which is on the part of the body is merely an occasional cause of incontinence; since it is owing to a bodily disposition that vehement passions can arise in the sensitive appetite, which is a power of the organic body. Yet these passions, however vehement they be, are not the sufficient cause of incontinence, but are merely the occasion thereof, since, so long as the use of reason remains, man is always able to resist his passions. If, however, the passions gain such strength as to take away the use of reason altogether—as in the case of those who become insane through the vehemence of their passions—the essential conditions of continence or incontinence cease, because such people do not retain the judgment of reason, which the continent man follows and the incontinent forsakes. From this it follows that the direct cause of incontinence is on the part of the soul, which fails to resist the passions by the reason. This happens in two ways, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* vii. 7): first, when the soul yields to the passions, before the reason has given its counsel; and this is called *unbridled incontinence* or *impetuosity*: secondly, when a man does not stand to what has been counselled, through holding weakly to reason's judgment; wherefore this kind of incontinence is called *weakness*. Hence it is manifest that incontinence pertains chiefly to the soul.

Reply Obj. 1. The human soul is the form of the body, and has certain powers which make use of bodily organs.

The operations of these organs conduce somewhat to those operations of the soul which are accomplished without bodily instruments, namely to the acts of the intellect and of the will, in so far as the intellect receives from the senses, and the will is urged by passions of the sensitive appetite. Accordingly, since woman, as regards the body, has a weak temperament, the result is that for the most part, whatever she holds to, she holds to it weakly; although in rare cases the opposite occurs, according to Prov. xxxi. 10, *Who shall find a valiant woman?* And since small and weak things are accounted as though they were not, the Philosopher speaks of women as though they had not the firm judgment of reason, although the contrary happens in some women. Hence he states that we do not describe women as being continent, because they are reckoned to be unstable of reason, and to follow their passions readily.

Reply Obj. 2. It is owing to the impulse of passion that a man at once follows his passion before his reason counsels him. Now the impulse of passion usually arises either from its quickness, as in bilious persons,* or from its vehemence, as in the melancholic, who on account of their earthy temperament are most vehemently aroused. Even so, on the other hand, a man fails to stand to that which is counselled, because he holds to it in weakly fashion by reason of the softness of his temperament, as we have stated with regard to women (*ad* 1). This is also the case with phlegmatic temperaments, for the same reason as in women. And these results are due to the fact that the bodily temperament is an occasional but not a sufficient cause of incontinence, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 3. In the incontinent man concupiscence of the flesh overcomes the spirit, not necessarily, but through a certain negligence of the spirit in not resisting strongly.

* Cf. I.-II., Q. XLVI., A. 5.

Second Article.

whether incontinence is a sin?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that incontinence is not a sin. For as Augustine says (*De Lib. Arb.* iii. 18): *No man sins in what he cannot avoid.* Now no man can by himself avoid incontinence, according to Wis. viii. 21, *I know* [Vulg.,—*knew*] *that I could not . . . be continent, except God gave it.* Therefore incontinence is not a sin.

Obj. 2. Further, Apparently every sin originates in the reason. But the judgment of reason is overcome in the incontinent man. Therefore incontinence is not a sin.

Obj. 3. Further, No one sins in loving God vehemently. Now a man becomes incontinent through the vehemence of divine love: for Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* iii., p. 1, lect. 10) that *Paul, through incontinence of divine love, exclaimed: I live, now not I* (Gal. ii. 20). Therefore incontinence is not a sin.

On the contrary, It is numbered together with other sins (2 Tim. iii. 3) where it is written: *Slanderers, incontinent, unmerciful,* etc. Therefore incontinence is a sin.

I answer that, Incontinence about a matter may be considered in two ways. First it may be considered properly and simply: and thus incontinence is about concupiscences of pleasures of touch, even as intemperance is, as we have said in reference to continence (Q. CLV., A. 2). In this way incontinence is a sin for two reasons: first, because the incontinent man goes astray from that which is in accord with reason; secondly, because he plunges into shameful pleasures. Hence the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* vii. 8) that *incontinence is censurable not only because it is wrong*—that is, by straying from reason—*but also because it is wicked*—that is, by following evil desires. Secondly, incontinence about a matter is considered, properly,—inasmuch as it is a straying from reason,—but not simply; for instance when a man does not observe the mode of reason in his desire for

honour, riches, and so forth, which seem to be good in themselves. About such things there is incontinence, not simply but relatively, even as we have said above in reference to continence (Q. CLV., A. 2, *ad* 3). In this way incontinence is a sin, not from the fact that one gives way to wicked desires, but because one fails to observe the mode of reason even in the desire for things that are of themselves desirable.

Thirdly, incontinence is said to be about a matter, not properly, but metaphorically; for instance about the desires for things of which one cannot make an evil use, such as the desire for virtue. A man may be said to be incontinent in these matters metaphorically, because just as the incontinent man is entirely led by his evil desire, even so is a man entirely led by his good desire which is in accord with reason. Suchlike incontinence is no sin, but pertains to the perfection of virtue.

Reply Obj. 1. Man can avoid sin and do good, yet not without God's help, according to Jo. xv. 5: *Without Me you can do nothing.* Wherefore the fact that man needs God's help in order to be continent, does not show incontinence to be no sin, for, as stated in *Ethic.* iii. 3, *what we can do by means of a friend we do, in a way, ourselves.*

Reply Obj. 2. The judgment of reason is overcome in the incontinent man, not necessarily, for then he would commit no sin, but through a certain negligence on account of his not standing firm in resisting the passion by holding to the judgment formed by his reason.

Reply Obj. 3. This argument takes incontinence metaphorically and not properly.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE CONTINENT MAN SINS MORE GRAVELY THAN THE INTEMPERATE?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate. For, seemingly, the more a man acts against his conscience, the more gravely he sins,

according to Luke xii. 47, *That servant who knew the will of his lord, . . . and did not . . . shall be beaten with many stripes.* Now the incontinent man would seem to act against his conscience more than the intemperate because, according to *Ethic.* vii. 3, the incontinent man, though knowing how wicked are the things he desires, nevertheless acts through passion, whereas the intemperate man judges what he desires to be good. Therefore the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate.

Obj. 2. Further, apparently, the graver a sin is, the more incurable it is: wherefore the sins against the Holy Ghost, being most grave, are declared to be unpardonable. Now the sin of incontinence would appear to be more incurable than the sin of intemperance. For a person's sin is cured by admonishment and correction, which seemingly are no good to the incontinent man, since he knows he is doing wrong, and does wrong notwithstanding: whereas it seems to the intemperate man that he is doing well, so that it were good for him to be admonished. Therefore it would appear that the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate.

Obj. 3. Further, The more eagerly man sins, the more grievous his sin. Now the incontinent sins more eagerly than the intemperate, since the incontinent man has vehement passions and desires, which the intemperate man does not always have. Therefore the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate.

On the contrary, Impenitence aggravates every sin: wherefore Augustine says (*De Verb. Dom.* xi. 12, 13) that *impenitence is a sin against the Holy Ghost.* Now according to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* vii. 7, 8) *the intemperate man is not inclined to be penitent, for he holds on to his choice: but every incontinent man is inclined to repentance.* Therefore the intemperate man sins more gravely than the incontinent.

I answer that, According to Augustine (*De duab. anim.* 10, 11) sin is chiefly an act of the will, because *by the will we sin and live aright.* Consequently where there is a greater inclination of the will to sin, there is a graver sin. Now in the intemperate man, the will is inclined to sin in virtue

of its own choice, which proceeds from a habit acquired through custom: whereas in the incontinent man, the will is inclined to sin through a passion. And since passion soon passes, whereas a habit is a disposition difficult to remove, the result is that the incontinent man repents at once, as soon as the passion has passed; but not so the intemperate man; in fact he rejoices in having sinned, because the sinful act has become connatural to him by reason of his habit. Wherefore in reference to such persons it is written (Prov. ii. 14) that *they are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things*. Hence it follows that the intemperate man is much worse than the incontinent, as also the Philosopher declares (*Ethic.* vii. 7).

Reply Obj. 1. Ignorance in the intellect sometimes precedes the inclination of the appetite and causes it, and then the greater the ignorance, the more does it diminish or entirely excuse the sin, in so far as it renders it involuntary. On the other hand, ignorance in the reason sometimes follows the inclination of the appetite, and then suchlike ignorance, the greater it is, the graver the sin, because the inclination of the appetite is shown thereby to be greater. Now in both the incontinent and the intemperate man, ignorance arises from the appetite being inclined to something, either by passion, as in the incontinent, or by habit, as in the intemperate. Nevertheless greater ignorance results thus in the intemperate than in the incontinent.—In one respect as regards duration, since in the incontinent man this ignorance lasts only while the passion endures, just as an attack of intermittent fever lasts as long as the humour is disturbed: whereas the ignorance of the intemperate man endures without ceasing, on account of the endurance of the habit, wherefore it is likened to phthisis or any chronic disease, as the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* viii. 8).—In another respect the ignorance of the intemperate man is greater as regards the thing ignored. For the ignorance of the incontinent man regards some particular detail of choice (in so far as he deems that he must choose this particular thing now): whereas the intemperate man's ignor-

ance is about the end itself inasmuch as he judges this thing good, in order that he may follow his desires without being curbed. Hence the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* vii. 7, 8) that the incontinent man is better than the intemperate, because he retains the best principle,* to wit, the right estimate of the end.

Reply Obj. 2. Mere knowledge does not suffice to cure the incontinent man, for he needs the inward assistance of grace which quenches concupiscence, besides the application of the external remedy of admonishment and correction, which induce him to begin to resist his desires, so that concupiscence is weakened, as stated above (Q. CXLII., A. 2). By these same means the intemperate man can be cured. But his curing is more difficult, for two reasons. The first is on the part of reason, which is corrupt as regards the estimate of the last end, which holds the same position as the principle in demonstrations. Now it is more difficult to bring back to the truth one who errs as to the principle; and it is the same in practical matters with one who errs in regard to the end. The other reason is on the part of the inclination of the appetite: for in the intemperate man this proceeds from a habit, which is difficult to remove, whereas the inclination of the incontinent man proceeds from a passion, which is more easily suppressed.

Reply Obj. 3. The eagerness of the will, which increases a sin, is greater in the intemperate man than in the incontinent, as explained in the *Article*. But the eagerness of concupiscence in the sensitive appetite is sometimes greater in the incontinent man, because he does not sin except through vehement concupiscence, whereas the intemperate man sins even through slight concupiscence and sometimes forestalls it. Hence the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* vii. 7, 8) that *we blame more the intemperate man, because he pursues pleasure without desiring it or with calm,* i.e. slight, *desire. For what would he do if he desired it ardently?*

* Τὸ βέλτιστον, ἡ ἀρχη, *the highest good, i.e. the first principle.*

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE INCONTINENT IN ANGER IS WORSE THAN THE INCONTINENT IN DESIRE?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the incontinent in anger is worse than the incontinent in desire. For the more difficult it is to resist the passion, the less grievous, apparently, is incontinence: wherefore the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* vii. 7): *It is not wonderful, indeed it is pardonable if a person is overcome by strong and overwhelming pleasures or pains.* Now according to Heraclitus it is more difficult to resist concupiscence than anger. Therefore incontinence of desire is less grievous than incontinence of anger.

Obj. 2. Further, One is altogether excused from sin if the passion be so vehement as to deprive one of the judgment of reason, as in the case of one who becomes demented through passion. Now he that is incontinent in anger retains more of the judgment of reason, than one who is incontinent in desire: since the angry man *listens to reason somewhat,* but not he that is carried away by desire, as the Philosopher states (*Ethic.* vii. 6). Therefore the incontinent in anger is worse than the incontinent in desire.

Obj. 3. Further, The more dangerous a sin the more grievous it is. Now incontinence of anger would seem to be more dangerous, since it leads a man to a greater sin, namely murder, for this is a more grievous sin than adultery, to which incontinence of desire leads. Therefore incontinence of anger is graver than incontinence of desire.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*Ethic.* vii. 6) that incontinence of anger is less disgraceful than incontinence of desire.

I answer that, The sin of incontinence may be considered in two ways. First, on the part of the passion which occasions the downfall of reason. In this way incontinence of desire is worse than incontinence of anger, because the movement of desire is more inordinate than the movement of anger. There are four reasons for this, and the Philosopher

indicates them, *Ethic.* vii. (*l.c.*): First, because the movement of anger partakes somewhat of reason, since the angry man tends to avenge the injury done to him and reason dictates this in a certain degree. Yet he does not tend thereto perfectly, because he does not intend the due mode of vengeance. On the other hand, the movement of desire is altogether in accord with sense and nowise in accord with reason.—Secondly, because the movement of anger results more from the bodily temperament owing to the quickness of the movement of the bile which tends to anger. Hence one who by bodily temperament is disposed to anger is more readily angry than one who is disposed to concupiscence is liable to be concupiscent: wherefore also it happens more often that the children of those who are disposed to anger are themselves disposed to anger, than that the children of those who are disposed to concupiscence are also disposed to concupiscence. Now that which results from the natural disposition of the body is deemed more deserving of pardon.—Thirdly, because anger seeks to work openly, whereas concupiscence is fain to disguise itself and creeps in by stealth.—Fourthly, because he who is subject to concupiscence works with pleasure, whereas the angry man works as though forced by a certain previous displeasure.

Secondly, the sin of incontinence may be considered with regard to the evil into which one falls through forsaking reason; and thus incontinence of anger is, for the most part, more grievous, because it leads to things that are harmful to one's neighbour.

Reply Obj. 1. It is more difficult to resist pleasure perseveringly than anger, because concupiscence is enduring. But for the moment it is more difficult to resist anger, on account of its impetuousness.

Reply Obj. 2. Concupiscence is stated to be without reason, not as though it destroyed altogether the judgment of reason, but because nowise does it follow the judgment of reason: and for this reason it is more disgraceful.

Reply Obj. 3. This argument considers incontinence with regard to its result.

QUESTION CLVII.

OF CLEMENCY AND MEEKNESS.

(*In Four Articles.*)

We must next consider clemency and meekness, and the contrary vices. Concerning the virtues themselves there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether clemency and meekness are altogether identical? (2) Whether each of them is a virtue? (3) Whether each is a part of temperance? (4) Of their comparison with the other virtues.

First Article.

WHETHER CLEMENCY AND MEEKNESS ARE ABSOLUTELY THE SAME?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that clemency and meekness are absolutely the same. For meekness moderates anger, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* iv. 5). Now anger is desire of vengeance. Since, then, clemency *is leniency of a superior in inflicting punishment on an inferior*, as Seneca states (*De Clementia* ii. 3), and vengeance is taken by means of punishment, it would seem that clemency and meekness are the same.

Obj. 2. Further, Tully says (*De Inv. Rhet.* ii.) that *clemency is a virtue whereby the mind is restrained by kindness when unreasonably provoked to hatred of a person*, so that apparently clemency moderates hatred. Now, according to Augustine (*Ep.* ccxi.), hatred is caused by anger; and this is the matter of meekness and clemency. Therefore seemingly clemency and meekness are absolutely the same.

Obj. 3. Further, The same vice is not opposed to different virtues. But the same vice, namely cruelty, is opposed to meekness and clemency. Therefore it seems that meekness and clemency are absolutely the same.

On the contrary, According to the aforesaid definitions of Seneca's, *clemency is leniency of a superior towards an inferior:* whereas meekness is not merely of superior to inferior, but of each to everyone. Therefore meekness and clemency are not absolutely the same.

I answer that, As stated in *Ethic.* ii. 3, a moral virtue is about passions and actions. Now internal passions are principles of external actions, and are likewise obstacles thereto. Wherefore virtues that moderate passions, to a certain extent, concur towards the same effect as virtues that moderate actions, although they differ specifically. Thus it belongs properly to justice to restrain man from theft, whereunto he is inclined by immoderate love or desire of money, which is restrained by liberality; so that liberality concurs with justice towards the effect, which is abstention from theft. This applies to the case in point; because through the passion of anger a man is provoked to inflict a too severe punishment, while it belongs directly to clemency to mitigate punishment, and this might be prevented by excessive anger.

Consequently meekness, in so far as it restrains the onslaught of anger, concurs with clemency towards the same effect; yet they differ from one another, inasmuch as clemency moderates external punishment, while meekness properly mitigates the passion of anger.

Reply Obj. 1. Meekness regards properly the desire itself of vengeance; whereas clemency regards the punishment itself which is applied externally for the purpose of vengeance.

Reply Obj. 2. Man's affections incline to the moderation of things that are unpleasant to him in themselves. Now it results from one man loving another that he takes no pleasure in the latter's punishment in itself, but only as directed to something else, for instance justice, or the

correction of the person punished. Hence love makes one quick to mitigate punishment,—and this pertains to clemency,—while hatred is an obstacle to such mitigation. For this reason Tully says that *the mind provoked to hatred* that is to punish too severely, *is restrained by clemency*, from inflicting too severe a punishment, so that clemency directly moderates not hatred but punishment.

Reply Obj. 3. The vice of anger, which denotes excess in the passion of anger, is properly opposed to meekness, which is directly concerned with the passion of anger; while cruelty denotes excess in punishing. Wherefore Seneca says (*De Clementia* ii. 4) that *those are called cruel who have reason for punishing, but lack moderation in punishing*. Those who delight in a man's punishment for its own sake may be called savage or brutal, as though lacking the human feeling that leads one man to love another.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER BOTH CLEMENCY AND MEEKNESS ARE VIRTUES?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that neither clemency nor meekness is a virtue. For no virtue is opposed to another virtue. Yet both of these are apparently opposed to severity, which is a virtue. Therefore neither clemency nor meekness is a virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, Virtue is destroyed by excess and decrease. But both clemency and meekness consist in a certain decrease; for clemency decreases punishment, and meekness decreases anger. Therefore neither clemency nor meekness is a virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, Meekness or mildness is included (Matth. v. 4) among the beatitudes, and (Gal. v. 23) among the fruits. Now the virtues differ from the beatitudes and fruits. Therefore they are not comprised under virtue.

On the contrary, Seneca says (*De Clementia* ii. 5): *Every good man is conspicuous for his clemency and meekness.*

Now it is virtue properly that belongs to a good man, since *virtue it is that makes its subject good, and renders his work good* (*Ethic.* ii. 6). Therefore clemency and meekness are virtues.

I answer that, The nature of moral virtue consists in the subjection of appetite to reason, as the Philosopher declares (*Ethic.* i. 13). Now this is verified both in clemency and in meekness. For clemency, in mitigating punishment, is guided by reason, according to Seneca (*De Clementia* ii. 5); and meekness, likewise, moderates anger according to right reason, as stated in *Ethic.* iv. 5. Wherefore it is manifest that both clemency and meekness are virtues.

Reply Obj. 1. Meekness is not directly opposed to severity; for meekness is about anger. On the other hand, severity regards the external infliction of punishment, so that accordingly it would seem rather to be opposed to clemency, which also regards external punishing, as stated above (A. 1). Yet they are not really opposed to one another, since they are both according to right reason. For severity is inflexible in the infliction of punishment, when right reason requires it; while clemency mitigates punishment also according to right reason, when and where this is requisite. Wherefore they are not opposed to one another as they are not about the same thing.

Reply Obj. 2. According to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* iv. 5), the habit that observes the mean in anger is unnamed; so that the virtue is denominated from the diminution of anger, and is designated by the name of meekness. For the virtue is more akin to diminution than to excess, because it is more natural to man to desire vengeance for injuries done to him, than to be lacking in that desire, since scarcely anyone belittles an injury done to himself, as Sallust observes (*Catilin.*). As to clemency, it mitigates punishment, not in respect of that which is according to right reason, but as regards that which is according to common law, which is the object of legal justice: yet on account of some particular consideration, it mitigates the punishment, deciding, as it were, that a man is not to be punished any further.

Hence Seneca says (*De Clementia* ii.): *Clemency grants this, in the first place, that those whom she sets free are declared immune from all further punishment; and remission of punishment due amounts to a pardon.* Wherefore it is clear that clemency is related to severity as equity (*epikeia*)* to legal justice, whereof severity is a part, as regards the infliction of punishment in accordance with the law. Yet clemency differs from equity, as we shall state further on (A. 3, *ad* 1).

Reply Obj. 3. The beatitudes are acts of virtue: while the fruits are delights in virtuous acts. Wherefore nothing hinders meekness being reckoned both virtue, and beatitude and fruit.

Third Article.

WHETHER THE AFORESAID VIRTUES ARE PARTS OF TEMPERANCE?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the aforesaid virtues are not parts of temperance. For clemency mitigates punishment, as stated above (A. 2). But the Philosopher (*Ethic.* v. 10) ascribes this to equity, which pertains to justice, as stated above (Q. CXX., A. 2). Therefore seemingly clemency is not a part of temperance.

Obj. 2. Further, Temperance is concerned with concupiscences; whereas meekness and clemency regard, not concupiscences, but anger and vengeance. Therefore they should not be reckoned parts of temperance.

Obj. 3. Further, Seneca says (*De Clementia* ii. 4): *A man may be said to be of unsound mind when he takes pleasure in cruelty.* Now this is opposed to clemency and meekness. Since then an unsound mind is opposed to prudence, it seems that clemency and meekness are parts of prudence rather than of temperance.

On the contrary, Seneca says (*De Clementia* ii. 3) that *clemency is temperance of the soul in exercising the power of*

* Cf. Q. CXX.

taking revenge. Tully also (*De Inv. Rhet.* ii.) reckons clemency a part of temperance.

I answer that, Parts are assigned to the principal virtues, in so far as they imitate them in some secondary matter as to the mode whence the virtue derives its praise and likewise its name. Thus the mode and name of justice consist in a certain equality, those of fortitude in a certain strength of mind, those of temperance in a certain restraint, inasmuch as it restrains the most vehement concupiscences of the pleasures of touch. Now clemency and meekness likewise consist in a certain restraint, since clemency mitigates punishment, while meekness represses anger, as stated above (AA. 1, 2). Therefore both clemency and meekness are annexed to temperance as principal virtue, and accordingly are reckoned to be parts of temperance.

Reply Obj. 1. Two points must be considered in the mitigation of punishment. One is that punishment should be mitigated in accordance with the lawgiver's intention, although not according to the letter of the law; and in this respect it pertains to equity. The other point is a certain moderation of a man's inward disposition, so that he does not exercise his power of inflicting punishment; and this belongs properly to clemency. Hence Seneca says (*De Clementia* ii. 3) that *clemency is temperance of the soul in exercising the power of taking revenge.* This moderation of soul comes from a certain sweetness of disposition, whereby a man recoils from anything that may be painful to another. Wherefore Seneca says (*ibid.*) that *clemency is a certain smoothness of the soul;* for, on the other hand, there would seem to be a certain roughness of soul in one who fears not to pain others.

Reply Obj. 2. The annexation of secondary to principal virtues depends on the mode of virtue, which is, so to speak, a kind of form of the virtue, rather than on the matter. Now meekness and clemency agree with temperance in mode, as stated in the *Article,* though they agree not in matter.

Reply Obj. 3. The mind is said to be unsound through

corruption of its soundness. Now just as soundness of body is corrupted by the body lapsing from the condition due to the human species, so unsoundness of mind is due to the mind lapsing from the disposition due to the human species. This occurs both in respect of the reason, as when a man loses the use of reason, and in respect of the appetitive power, as when a man loses that humane feeling whereby every man is naturally friendly towards all other men, as stated in *Ethic.* viii. 1. The unsoundness of mind that excludes the use of reason is opposed to prudence. But that a man who takes pleasure in the punishment of others is said to be of unsound mind, is because he seems on this account to be devoid of the humane feeling which gives rise to clemency.

Fourth Article.

WHETHER CLEMENCY AND MEEKNESS ARE THE GREATEST VIRTUES?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that clemency and meekness are the greatest virtues. For virtue is deserving of praise chiefly because it directs man to happiness that consists in the knowledge of God. Now meekness above all directs man to the knowledge of God: for it is written (James i. 21): *With meekness receive the ingrafted word,* and (Ecclus. v. 13): *Be meek to hear the word* of God. Again, Dionysius says (*Ep. ad Demophil.*) that *Moses was deemed worthy of the Divine apparition on account of his great meekness.* Therefore meekness is the greatest of virtues.

Obj. 2. Further, Seemingly a virtue is all the greater according as it is more acceptable to God and men. Now meekness would appear to be most acceptable to God. For it is written (Ecclus. i. 34, 35): *That which is agreeable* to God *is faith and meekness;* wherefore Christ expressly invites us to be meek like unto Himself (Matth. xi. 29), where He says: *Learn of Me, because I am meek and humble of heart;* and Hilary declares (*Can.* iv. *in Matth.*) that *Christ dwells in us by our meekness of soul.* Again, it is

most acceptable to men; wherefore it is written (Ecclus. iii. 19): *My son, do thy works in meekness, and thou shalt be beloved above the glory of men :* for which reason it is also declared (Prov. xx. 28) that the King's *throne is strengthened by clemency.* Therefore meekness and clemency are the greatest of virtues.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (*De Serm. Dom. in Monte* i. 2) that *the meek are they who yield to reproaches, and resist not evil, but overcome evil by good.* Now this seems to pertain to mercy or piety which would seem to be the greatest of virtues: because a gloss of Ambrose on 1 Tim. iv. 8, *Piety* (Douay,—*Godliness*) *is profitable to all things,* observes that *piety is the sum total of the Christian religion.* Therefore meekness and clemency are the greatest virtues.

On the contrary, They are not reckoned as principal virtues, but are annexed to another, as to a principal, virtue.

I answer that, Nothing prevents certain virtues from being greatest, not indeed simply, nor in every respect, but in a particular genus. It is impossible for clemency or meekness to be absolutely the greatest virtues, since they owe their praise to the fact that they withdraw a man from evil, by mitigating anger or punishment. Now it is more perfect to obtain good than to lack evil. Wherefore those virtues like faith, hope, charity, and likewise prudence and justice, which direct one to good simply, are absolutely greater virtues than clemency and meekness.

Yet nothing prevents clemency and meekness from having a certain restricted excellence among the virtues which resist evil inclinations. For anger, which is mitigated by meekness, is, on account of its impetuousness, a very great obstacle to man's free judgment of truth: wherefore meekness above all makes a man self-possessed. Hence it is written (Ecclus. x. 31): *My son, keep thy soul in meekness.* Yet the concupiscences of the pleasures of touch are more shameful, and harass more incessantly, for which reason temperance is more rightly reckoned as a principal virtue, as stated above (Q. CXLI., A. 7, *ad* 2).

As to clemency, inasmuch as it mitigates punishment, it would seem to approach nearest to charity, the greatest of the virtues, since thereby we do good towards our neighbour, and hinder his evil.

Reply Obj. 1. Meekness disposes man to the knowledge of God, by removing an obstacle; and this in two ways. First, because it makes man self-possessed by mitigating his anger, as stated in the *Article;* secondly, because it pertains to meekness that a man does not contradict the words of truth, which many do through being disturbed by anger. Wherefore Augustine says (*De Doct. Christ.* ii. 7): *To be meek is not to contradict Holy Writ, whether we understand it, if it condemn our evil ways, or understand it not, as though we might know better and have a clearer insight of the truth.*

Reply Obj. 2. Meekness and clemency make us acceptable to God and men, in so far as they concur with charity, the greatest of the virtues, towards the same effect, namely the mitigation of our neighbour's evils.

Reply Obj. 3. Mercy and piety agree indeed with meekness and clemency by concurring towards the same effect, namely the mitigation of our neighbour's evils. Nevertheless they differ as to motive. For piety relieves a neighbour's evil through reverence for a superior, for instance God or one's parents: mercy relieves a neighbour's evil, because this evil is displeasing to one, in so far as one looks upon it as affecting oneself, as stated above (Q. XXX., A. 2): and this results from friendship which makes friends rejoice and grieve for the same things: meekness does this, by removing anger that urges to vengeance, and clemency does this through leniency of soul, in so far as it judges equitable that a person be no further punished.

QUESTION CLVIII.

OF ANGER.

(In Eight Articles.)

We must next consider the contrary vices: (1) Anger that is opposed to meekness; (2) Cruelty that is opposed to clemency.

Concerning anger there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is lawful to be angry? (2) Whether anger is a sin? (3) Whether it is a mortal sin? (4) Whether it is the most grievous of sins? (5) Of its species. (6) Whether anger is a capital vice? (7) Of its daughters. (8) Whether it has a contrary vice?

First Article.

WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL TO BE ANGRY?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that it is unlawful to be angry. For Jerome in his exposition on Matth. v. 22, *Whosoever is angry with his brother*, etc., says: *Some codices add 'without cause.' However, in the genuine codices the sentence is unqualified, and anger is forbidden altogether.* Therefore it is nowise lawful to be angry.

Obj. 2. Further, According to Dionysius (*Div. Nom.* iv., p. 4, lect. 22) *The soul's evil is to be without reason.* Now anger is always without reason: for the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* vii. 6) that *anger does not listen perfectly to reason;* and Gregory says (*Moral.* v. 30) that *when anger beats the tranquil surface of the soul, it mangles and rends it by its*

riot; and Cassian says (*De Inst. Cœnob.* viii. 6): *From whatever cause it arises the angry passion boils over and blinds the eye of the mind.* Therefore it is always evil to be angry.

Obj. 3. Further, *Anger is the desire for vengeance* according to a gloss* on Lev. xix. 17, *Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart.* Now it would seem unlawful to desire vengeance, since this should be left to God, according to Deut. xxxii. 35, *Revenge is Mine.* Therefore it would seem that to be angry is always an evil.

Obj. 4. Further, All that makes us depart from likeness to God is evil. Now anger always makes us depart from likeness to God, since God judges with tranquillity according to Wis. xii. 18. Therefore to be angry is always an evil.

On the contrary, Chrysostom† says: *He that is angry without cause, shall be in danger; but he that is angry with cause, shall not be in danger: for without anger, teaching will be useless, judgments unstable, crimes unchecked.* Therefore to be angry is not always an evil.

I answer that, Properly speaking anger is a passion of the sensitive appetite, and gives its name to the irascible power, as stated above (I.-II., Q. XLVI., A. 1) when we were treating of the passions. Now with regard to the passions of the soul, it is to be observed that evil may be found in them in two ways. First by reason of the passion's very species, which is derived from the passion's object. Thus envy, in respect of its species, denotes an evil, since it is displeasure at another's good, and such displeasure is in itself contrary to reason: wherefore, as the Philosopher remarks (*Ethic.* ii. 6), the very mention of envy denotes something evil. Now this does not apply to anger, which is the desire for revenge, since revenge may be desired both well and ill. Secondly, evil is found in a passion in respect of the passion's quantity, that is in respect of its excess or deficiency; and thus evil may be found in anger, when, to wit, one is angry, more or less than right reason

* S. Augustine (*QQ. in Lev., qu.* lxx.).

† *Hom.* xi. in the *Opus Imperfectum,* falsely ascribed to S. John Chrysostom.

demands. But if one is angry in accordance with right reason, one's anger is deserving of praise.

Reply Obj. 1. The Stoics designated anger and all the other passions as emotions opposed to the order of reason; and accordingly they deemed anger and all other passions to be evil, as stated above (I.-II., Q. XXIV., A. 2) when we were treating of the passions. It is in this sense that Jerome considers anger; for he speaks of the anger whereby one is angry with one's neighbour, with the intent of doing him a wrong. But, according to the Peripatetics, to whose opinion Augustine inclines (*De Civ. Dei*, ix. 9), anger and the other passions of the soul are movements of the sensitive appetite, whether they be moderated or not, according to reason: and in this sense anger is not always evil.

Reply Obj. 2. Anger may stand in a twofold relation to reason. First, antecedently; in this way it withdraws reason from its rectitude, and has therefore the character of evil. Secondly, consequently, inasmuch as the movement of the sensitive appetite is directed against vice and in accordance with reason, this anger is good, and is called *zealous anger*. Wherefore Gregory says (*Moral.* v. 30): *We must beware lest, when we use anger as an instrument of virtue, it overrule the mind, and go before it as its mistress, instead of following in reason's train, ever ready, as its handmaid, to obey.* This latter anger, although it hinder somewhat the judgment of reason in the execution of the act, does not destroy the rectitude of reason. Hence Gregory says (*ibid.*) that *zealous anger troubles the eye of reason, whereas sinful anger blinds it.* Nor is it incompatible with virtue that the deliberation of reason be interrupted in the execution of what reason has deliberated: since art also would be hindered in its act, if it were to deliberate about what has to be done, while having to act.

Reply Obj. 3. It is unlawful to desire vengeance considered as evil to the man who is to be punished, but it is praiseworthy to desire vengeance as a corrective of vice and for the good of justice; and to this the sensitive appetite can tend, in so far as it is moved thereto by the reason:

and when revenge is taken in accordance with the order of judgment, it is God's work, since he who has power to punish *is God's minister*, as stated in Rom. xiii. 4.

Reply Obj. 4. We can and ought to be like to God in the desire for good; but we cannot be altogether likened to Him in the mode of our desire, since in God there is no sensitive appetite, as in us, the movement of which has to obey reason. Wherefore Gregory says (*Moral.* v. 30) that *anger is more firmly erect in withstanding vice, when it bows to the command of reason.*

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER ANGER IS A SIN?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that anger is not a sin. For we demerit by sinning. But we do not demerit by the passions, even as neither do we incur blame thereby, as stated in *Ethic.* ii. 5. Consequently no passion is a sin. Now anger is a passion as stated above (I.-II., Q. XLVI., A. 1) in the treatise on the passions. Therefore anger is not a sin.

Obj. 2. Further, In every sin there is conversion to some mutable good. But in anger there is conversion not to a mutable good, but to a person's evil. Therefore anger is not a sin.

Obj. 3. Further, *No man sins in what he cannot avoid*, as Augustine asserts (*De Lib. Arb.* iii. 19). But man cannot avoid anger, for a gloss on Ps. iv. 5, *Be ye angry and sin not*, says: *The movement of anger is not in our power.* Again, the Philosopher asserts (*Ethic.* vii. 6) that *the angry man acts with displeasure.* Now displeasure is contrary to the will. Therefore anger is not a sin.

Obj. 4. Further, Sin is contrary to nature, according to Damascene (*De Fide Orthod.* ii. 4, 30). But it is not contrary to man's nature to be angry, and it is the natural act of a power, namely the irascible; wherefore Jerome says in a letter (*Ep.* ix., *ad Salvin.*) that *to be angry is the property of man.* Therefore it is not a sin to be angry.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. iv. 31): *Let all indignation and anger* . . . be put away from you.*

I answer that, Anger, as stated above (A. 1: I.-II., Q. XLVI., A. 1), is properly the name of a passion. A passion of the sensitive appetite is good in so far as it is regulated by reason, whereas it is evil if it set the order of reason aside. Now the order of reason, in regard to anger, may be considered in relation to two things. First, in relation to the appetible object to which anger tends, and that is revenge. Wherefore if one desire revenge to be taken in accordance with the order of reason, the desire of anger is praiseworthy, and is called *zealous anger.* On the other hand, if one desire the taking of vengeance in any way whatever contrary to the order of reason, for instance if he desire the punishment of one who has not deserved it, or beyond his deserts, or again contrary to the order prescribed by law, or not for the due end, namely the maintaining of justice and the correction of defaults, then the desire of anger will be sinful, and this is called *sinful anger.* Secondly, the order of reason in regard to anger may be considered in relation to the mode of being angry, namely that the movement of anger should not be immoderately fierce, neither internally nor externally; and if this condition be disregarded, anger will not lack sin, even though just vengeance be desired.

Reply Obj. 1. Since passion may be either regulated or not regulated by reason, it follows that a passion considered absolutely does not include the notion of merit or demerit, of praise or blame. But as regulated by reason, it may be something meritorious and deserving of praise; while on the other hand, as not regulated by reason, it may be demeritorious and blameworthy. Wherefore the Philosopher says (*ibid.*) that *it is he who is angry in a certain way, that is praised or blamed.*

Reply Obj. 2. The angry man desires the evil of another, not for its own sake but for the sake of revenge, towards which his appetite turns as to a mutable good.

* Vulg.,—*Anger and indignation.*

Reply Obj. 3. Man is master of his actions through the judgment of his reason, wherefore as to the movements that forestall that judgment, it is not in man's power to prevent them as a whole, i.e. so that none of them arise, although his reason is able to check each one, if it arise. Accordingly it is stated that the movement of anger is not in man's power, to the extent namely that no such movement arise. Yet since this movement is somewhat in his power, it is not entirely sinless if it be inordinate. The statement of the Philosopher that the angry man acts with displeasure, means that he is displeased, not with his being angry, but with the injury which he deems done to himself: and through this displeasure he is moved to seek vengeance.

Reply Obj. 4. The irascible power in man is naturally subject to his reason, wherefore its act is natural to man, in so far as it is in accord with reason, and in so far as it is against reason, it is contrary to man's nature.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER ALL ANGER IS A MORTAL SIN?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that all anger is a mortal sin. For it is written (Job v. 2): *Anger killeth the foolish man,** and he speaks of the spiritual killing, whence mortal sin takes its name. Therefore all anger is a mortal sin.

Obj. 2. Further, Nothing save mortal sin is deserving of eternal condemnation. Now anger deserves eternal condemnation; for our Lord said (Matth. v. 22): *Whosoever is angry with his brother, shall be in danger of the judgment:* and a gloss on this passage says that *the three things mentioned there, namely judgment, council, and hell-fire, signify in a pointed manner different abodes in the state of eternal damnation corresponding to various sins.* Therefore anger is a mortal sin.

Obj. 3. Further, Whatsoever is contrary to charity is a mortal sin. Now anger is of itself contrary to charity,

* Vulg.,—*Anger indeed killeth the foolish.*

as Jerome declares in his commentary on Matth. v. 22, *Whosoever is angry with his brother*, etc., where he says that this is *contrary to the love of your neighbour*. Therefore anger is a mortal sin.

On the contrary, A gloss on Ps. iv. 5, *Be ye angry and sin not*, says: *Anger is venial if it does not proceed to action.*

I answer that, The movement of anger may be inordinate and sinful in two ways, as stated above (A. 2). First, on the part of the appetible object, as when one desires unjust revenge; and thus anger is a mortal sin in the point of its genus, because it is contrary to charity and justice. Nevertheless suchlike anger may happen to be a venial sin by reason of the imperfection of the act. This imperfection is considered either in relation to the subject desirous of vengeance, as when the movement of anger forestalls the judgment of his reason; or in relation to the desired object, as when one desires to be avenged in a trifling matter, which should be deemed of no account, so that even if one proceeded to action, it would not be a mortal sin, for instance by pulling a child slightly by the hair, or by some other like action. Secondly, the movement of anger may be inordinate in the mode of being angry, for instance, if one be too fiercely angry inwardly, or if one exceed in the outward signs of anger. In this way anger is not a mortal sin in the point of its genus; yet it may happen to be a mortal sin, for instance if through the fierceness of his anger a man fall away from the love of God and his neighbour.

Reply Obj. 1. It does not follow from the passage quoted that all anger is a mortal sin, but that the foolish are killed spiritually by anger, because, through not checking the movement of anger by their reason, they fall into mortal sins, for instance by blaspheming God or by doing injury to their neighbour.

Reply Obj. 2. Our Lord said this of anger, by way of addition to the words of the Law: *Whosoever shall kill shall be in danger of the judgment* (verse 21). Consequently our Lord is speaking here of the movement of anger wherein

a man desires the killing or any grave injury of his neighbour: and should the consent of reason be given to this desire, without doubt it will be a mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 3. In the case where anger is contrary to charity, it is a mortal sin, but it is not always so, as appears from what we have said in the *Article.*

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ANGER IS THE MOST GRIEVOUS SIN?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that anger is the most grievous sin. For Chrysostom says (*Hom.* xlvii. *in Joan.*) that *nothing is more repulsive than the look of an angry man, and nothing uglier than a ruthless face, and most of all than a cruel soul.* Therefore anger is the most grievous sin.

Obj. 2. Further, The more hurtful a sin is, the worse it would seem to be; since, according to Augustine (*Enchir.* xii.), *a thing is said to be evil because it hurts.* Now anger is most hurtful, because it deprives man of his reason, whereby he is master of himself; for Chrysostom says (*loc. cit.*) that *anger differs in no way from madness; it is a demon while it lasts, indeed more troublesome than one harassed by a demon.* Therefore anger is the most grievous sin.

Obj. 3. Further, Inward movements are judged according to their outward effects. Now the effect of anger is murder, which is a most grievous sin. Therefore anger is a most grievous sin.

On the contrary, Anger is compared to hatred as the mote to the beam; for Augustine says in his Rule (*Ep.* ccxi.): *Lest anger grow into hatred and a mote become a beam.* Therefore anger is not the most grievous sin.

I answer that, As stated above (AA. 1, 2), the inordinateness of anger is considered in a twofold respect, namely with regard to an undue object, and with regard to an undue mode of being angry. As to the appetible object which it desires, anger would seem to be the least of sins, for

anger desires the evil of punishment for some person, under the aspect of a good that is vengeance. Hence on the part of the evil which it desires the sin of anger agrees with those sins which desire the evil of our neighbour, such as envy and hatred; but while hatred desires absolutely another's evil as such, and the envious man desires another's evil through desire of his own glory, the angry man desires another's evil under the aspect of just revenge. Wherefore it is evident that hatred is more grievous than envy, and envy than anger: since it is worse to desire evil as an evil, than as a good; and to desire evil as an external good such as honour or glory, than under the aspect of the rectitude of justice. On the part of the good, under the aspect of which the angry man desires an evil, anger concurs with the sin of concupiscence that tends to a good. In this respect again, absolutely speaking, the sin of anger is apparently less grievous than that of concupiscence, according as the good of justice, which the angry man desires, is better than the pleasurable or useful good which is desired by the subject of concupiscence. Wherefore the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* vii. 4) that *the incontinent in concupiscence is more disgraceful than the incontinent in anger.*

On the other hand, as to the inordinateness which regards the mode of being angry, anger would seem to have a certain pre-eminence on account of the strength and quickness of its movement, according to Prov. xxvii. 4, *Anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh forth: and who can bear the violence of one provoked?* Hence Gregory says (*Moral.* v. 3): *The heart goaded by the pricks of anger is convulsed, the body trembles, the tongue entangles itself, the face is inflamed, the eyes are enraged and fail utterly to recognize those whom we know: the tongue makes sounds indeed, but there is no sense in its utterance.*

Reply Obj. 1. Chrysostom is alluding to the repulsiveness of the outward gestures which result from the impetuousness of anger.

Reply Obj. 2. This argument considers the inordinate

movement of anger, that results from its impetuousness, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 3. Murder results from hatred and envy no less than from anger: yet anger is less grievous, inasmuch as it considers the aspect of justice, as stated in the *Article*.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE PHILOSOPHER SUITABLY ASSIGNS THE SPECIES OF ANGER, WHEN HE SAYS THAT SOME ANGRY PERSONS ARE CHOLERIC, SOME SULLEN, SOME ILL-TEMPERED?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the species of anger are unsuitably assigned by the Philosopher (*Ethic.* iv. 5) where he says that *some angry persons are choleric, some sullen, and some ill-tempered or stern.* Because, according to him, a person is said to be *sullen* whose anger is quenched with difficulty, and endures a long time. But this apparently pertains to the circumstance of time. Therefore it seems that anger can be differentiated specifically in respect also of the other circumstances.

Obj. 2. Further, He says (*ibid.*) that *ill-tempered* or *stern* persons *are those whose anger is not put aside without revenge or punishment.* Now this also pertains to the unquenchableness of anger. Therefore seemingly the ill-tempered is the same as bitterness.

Obj. 3. Further, Our Lord mentions three degrees of anger, when He says (Matth. v. 22): *Whosoever is angry with his brother, shall be in danger of the judgment: and whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca, shall be in danger of the council, and whosoever shall say* to his brother, *Thou fool.* But these degrees are not referable to the aforesaid species. Therefore it seems that the above division of anger is not fitting.

On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, *De Nat. Hom.* xxi.) says there are three species of irascibility; namely, the anger which is called *wrath,** and *ill-will* which

* *Fellea, i.e.* like gall. But in I.-II., Q. XLVI., A. 8, S. Thomas quoting the same authority has χόλος which we have rendered *wrath.*

is a disease of the mind, and *rancour*. Now these three seem to coincide with the three aforesaid. For *wrath* he describes as having beginning and movement, and the Philosopher (*loc. cit.*) ascribes this to choleric persons: *ill-will* he describes as an anger that endures, and grows old, and this the Philosopher ascribes to sullenness; while he describes *rancour* as reckoning the time for vengeance, which tallies with the Philosopher's description of the ill-tempered. The same division is given by Damascene (*De Fid. Orth.* ii. 16). Therefore the aforesaid division assigned by the Philosopher is not unfitting.

I answer that, The aforesaid distinction may be referred either to the passion, or to the sin itself of anger. We have already stated when treating of the passions (I.-II., Q. XLVI., A. 8) how it is to be applied to the passion of anger. And it would seem that this is chiefly what Gregory of Nyssa and Damascene had in view. Here, however, we have to take the distinction of these species in its application to the sin of anger, and as set down by the Philosopher.

Now the inordinateness of anger may be considered in relation to two things. First, in relation to the origin of anger, and this regards *choleric* persons, who are angry too quickly and for any slight cause. Secondly, in relation to the duration of anger, for that anger endures too long; and this may happen in two ways. In one way, because the cause of anger, to wit, the inflicted injury, remains too long in a man's memory, the result being that it gives rise to a lasting displeasure, wherefore he is *grievous* and *sullen* to himself. In another way, it happens on the part of vengeance, which a man seeks with a stubborn desire: this applies to *ill-tempered* or *stern* people, who do not put aside their anger until they have inflicted punishment.

Reply Obj. 1. It is not time, but a man's propensity to anger, or his pertinacity in anger, that is the chief point of consideration in the aforesaid species.

Reply Obj. 2. Both bitter and ill-tempered people have a long-lasting anger, but for different reasons. For a bitter person has an abiding anger on account of an abiding

displeasure, which he holds locked in his breast; and as he does not break forth into the outward signs of anger, others cannot reason him out of it, nor does he of his own accord lay aside his anger, except his displeasure wear away with time and thus his anger cease. On the other hand, the anger of ill-tempered persons is long-lasting on account of their intense desire for revenge, so that it does not wear out with time, and can be quelled only by revenge.

Reply Obj. 3. The degrees of anger mentioned by our Lord do not refer to the different species of anger, but correspond to the course of the human act.* For the first degree is an inward conception, and in reference to this He says: *Whosoever is angry with his brother.* The second degree is when the anger is manifested by outward signs, even before it breaks out into effect; and in reference to this He says: *Whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca!* which is an angry exclamation. The third degree is when the sin conceived inwardly breaks out into effect. Now the effect of anger is another's hurt under the aspect of revenge; and the least of hurts is that which is done by a mere word; wherefore in reference to this He says: *Whosoever shall say* to his brother *Thou fool!* Consequently it is clear that the second adds to the first, and the third to both the others; so that, if the first is a mortal sin, in the case referred to by our Lord, as stated above (A. 3, *ad* 2), much more so are the others. Wherefore some kind of condemnation is assigned as corresponding to each one of them. In the first case judgment is assigned, and this is the least severe, for as Augustine says (*Serm. Dom. in Monte* i. 9), *where judgment is to be delivered, there is an opportunity for defence:* in the second case council is assigned, whereby the judges deliberate together on the punishment to be inflicted: to the third case is assigned hell-fire, i.e. decisive condemnation.

* Cf. I.-II., Q. XLVI., A. 8, *Obj.* 3.

Sixth Article.

whether anger should be reckoned among the capital vices?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that anger should not be reckoned among the capital sins. For anger is born of sorrow which is a capital vice known by the name of sloth. Therefore anger should not be reckoned a capital vice.

Obj. 2. Further, Hatred is a graver sin than anger. Therefore it should be reckoned a capital vice rather than anger.

Obj. 3. Further, A gloss on Prov. xxix. 22, *An angry* (Douay,—*passionate*) *man provoketh quarrels,* says: *Anger is the door to all vices : if it be closed, peace is ensured within to all the virtues ; if it be opened, the soul is armed for every crime.* Now no capital vice is the origin of all sins, but only of certain definite ones. Therefore anger should not be reckoned among the capital vices.

On the contrary, Gregory (*Moral.* xxxi.) places anger among the capital vices.

I answer that, As stated above (I.-II., Q. LXXXIV., AA. 3, 4), a capital vice is defined as one from which many vices arise. Now there are two reasons for which many vices can arise from anger. The first is on the part of its object which has much of the aspect of desirability, in so far as revenge is desired under the aspect of just or honest,* which is attractive by its excellence, as stated above (A. 4). The second is on the part of its impetuosity, whereby it precipitates the mind into all kinds of inordinate action. Therefore it is evident that anger is a capital vice.

Reply Obj. 1. The sorrow whence anger arises is not, for the most part, the vice of sloth, but the passion of sorrow, which results from an injury inflicted.

Reply Obj. 2. As stated above (I.-II., Q. LXXXIV., AA. 3, 4) it belongs to the notion of a capital vice to have

* Cf. Q. CXLI., A. 3, footnote.

a most desirable end, so that many sins are committed through the desire thereof. Now anger, which desires evil under the aspect of good, has a more desirable end than hatred has, since the latter desires evil under the aspect of evil: wherefore anger is more a capital vice than hatred is.

Reply Obj. 3. Anger is stated to be the door to the vices accidentally, that is by removing obstacles, to wit by hindering the judgment of reason, whereby man is withdrawn from evil. It is, however, directly the cause of certain special sins, which are called its daughters.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER SIX DAUGHTERS ARE FITTINGLY ASSIGNED TO ANGER, NAMELY QUARRELLING, SWELLING OF THE MIND, CONTUMELY, CLAMOUR, INDIGNATION AND BLASPHEMY?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that six daughters are unfittingly assigned to anger, namely *quarrelling, swelling of the mind, contumely, clamour, indignation and blasphemy.* For blasphemy is reckoned by Isidore (*Comment. in Deut.* xvi.) to be a daughter of pride. Therefore it should not be accounted a daughter of anger.

Obj. 2. Further, Hatred is born of anger, as Augustine says in his Rule (*Ep.* ccxi.). Therefore it should be placed among the daughters of anger.

Obj. 3. Further, A swollen mind would seem to be the same as pride. Now pride is not the daughter of a vice, but the mother of all vices, as Gregory states (*Moral.* xxxi.). Therefore swelling of the mind should not be reckoned among the daughters of anger.

On the contrary, Gregory (*Moral.* xxxi. 17) assigns these daughters to anger.

I answer that, Anger may be considered in three ways. First, as consisting in thought, and thus two vices arise from anger. One is on the part of the person with whom a man is angry, and whom he deems unworthy (*indignum*)

of acting thus towards him, and this is called *indignation*. The other vice is on the part of the man himself, in so far as he devises various means of vengeance, and with such-like thoughts fills his mind, according to Job xv. 2, *Will a wise man . . . fill his stomach with burning heat?* And thus we have *swelling of the mind*.

Secondly, anger may be considered, as expressed in words: and thus a twofold disorder arises from anger. One is when a man manifests his anger in his manner of speech, as stated above (A. 5, *ad* 3) of the man who says to his brother, *Raca:* and this refers to *clamour*, which denotes disorderly and confused speech. The other disorder is when a man breaks out into injurious words, and if these be against God, it is *blasphemy*, if against one's neighbour, it is *contumely*.

Thirdly, anger may be considered as proceeding to deeds: and thus anger gives rise to *quarrels*, by which we are to understand all manner of injuries inflicted on one's neighbour through anger.

Reply Obj. 1. The blasphemy into which a man breaks out deliberately proceeds from pride, whereby a man lifts himself up against God: since, according to Ecclus. x. 14, *the beginning of the pride of man is to fall off from God*, i.e. to fall away from reverence for Him is the first part of pride;* and this gives rise to blasphemy. But the blasphemy into which a man breaks out through a disturbance of the mind, proceeds from anger.

Reply Obj. 2. Although hatred sometimes arises from anger, it has a previous cause, from which it arises more directly, namely displeasure, even as, on the other hand, love is born of pleasure. Now through displeasure, a man is moved sometimes to anger, sometimes to hatred. Wherefore it was fitting to reckon that hatred arises from sloth rather than from anger.

Reply Obj. 3. Swelling of the mind is not taken here as identical with pride, but for a certain effort or daring attempt to take vengeance; and daring is a vice opposed to fortitude.

* Cf. Q. CLXII., A. 7, *ad* 2.

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE IS A VICE OPPOSED TO ANGER RESULTING FROM LACK OF ANGER?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that there is not a vice opposed to anger, resulting from lack of anger. For no vice makes us like to God. Now by being entirely without anger, a man becomes like to God, Who judges *with tranquillity* (Wis. xii. 18). Therefore seemingly it is not a vice to be altogether without anger.

Obj. 2. Further, It is not a vice to lack what is altogether useless. But the movement of anger is useful for no purpose, as Seneca proves in the book he wrote on anger (*De Ira* i. 12). Therefore it seems that lack of anger is not a vice.

Obj. 3. Further, According to Dionysius (*Div. Nom.* iv., p. 4, lect. 22), *man's evil is to be without reason.* Now the judgment of reason remains unimpaired, if all movement of anger be done away. Therefore no lack of anger amounts to a vice.

On the contrary, Chrysostom* says: *He who is not angry, whereas he has cause to be, sins. For unreasonable patience is the hot-bed of many vices, it fosters negligence, and incites not only the wicked but even the good to do wrong.*

I answer that, Anger may be understood in two ways. In one way, as a simple movement of the will, whereby one inflicts punishment, not through passion, but in virtue of a judgment of the reason: and thus without doubt lack of anger is a sin. This is the sense in which anger is taken in the saying of Chrysostom, for he says (*ibid.*): *Anger, when it has a cause, is not anger but judgment. For anger, properly speaking, denotes a movement of passion :* and when a man is angry with reason, his anger is no longer from passion: wherefore he is said to judge, not to be angry.

* Hom. xi. *in Matth.* in the *Opus Imperfectum,* falsely ascribed to S. John Chrysostom.

In another way anger is taken for a movement of the sensitive appetite, which is with passion resulting from a bodily transmutation. This movement is a necessary sequel, in man, to the movement of his will, since the lower appetite necessarily follows the movement of the higher appetite, unless there be an obstacle. Hence the movement of anger in the sensitive appetite cannot be lacking altogether, unless the movement of the will be altogether lacking or weak. Consequently lack of the passion of anger is also a vice, even as the lack of movement in the will directed to punishment by the judgment of reason.

Reply Obj. 1. He that is entirely without anger when he ought to be angry, imitates God as to lack of passion, but not as to God's punishing by judgment.

Reply Obj. 2. The passion of anger, like all other movements of the sensitive appetite, is useful, as being conducive to the more prompt execution* of reason's dictate: else, the sensitive appetite in man would be to no purpose, whereas nature does nothing without purpose.

Reply Obj. 3. When a man acts inordinately, the judgment of his reason is cause not only of the simple movement of the will, but also of the passion in the sensitive appetite, as stated above. Wherefore just as the removal of the effect is a sign that the cause is removed, so the lack of anger is a sign that the judgment of reason is lacking.

* Cf. I.-II., Q. XXIV., A. 3.

QUESTION CLIX.

OF CRUELTY.

(*In Two Articles.*)

We must now consider cruelty, under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether cruelty is opposed to clemency? (2) Of its comparison with savagery or brutality.

First Article.

WHETHER CRUELTY IS OPPOSED TO CLEMENCY?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that cruelty is not opposed to clemency. For Seneca says (*De Clementia* ii. 4) that *those are said to be cruel who exceed in punishing,* which is contrary to justice. Now clemency is reckoned a part, not of justice but of temperance. Therefore apparently cruelty is not opposed to clemency.

Obj. 2. Further, It is written (Jer. vi. 23): *They are cruel, and will have no mercy ;* so that cruelty would seem opposed to mercy. Now mercy is not the same as clemency, as stated above (Q. CLVII., A. 4, *ad* 3). Therefore cruelty is not opposed to clemency.

Obj. 3. Further, Clemency is concerned with the infliction of punishment, as stated above (Q. CLVII., A. 1): whereas cruelty applies to the withdrawal of beneficence, according to Prov. xi. 17, *But he that is cruel casteth off even his own kindred.* Therefore cruelty is not opposed to clemency.

On the contrary, Seneca says (*De Clementia* ii. 4) that *the opposite of clemency is cruelty, which is nothing else but hardness of heart in exacting punishment.*

I answer that, Cruelty apparently takes its name from *cruditas* (*rawness*). Now just as things when cooked and prepared are wont to have an agreeable and sweet savour, so when raw they have a disagreeable and bitter taste. Now it has been stated above (Q. CLVII., A. 3, *ad* 1; A. 4, *ad* 3) that clemency denotes a certain smoothness or sweetness of soul, whereby one is inclined to mitigate punishment. Hence cruelty is directly opposed to clemency.

Reply Obj. 1. Just as it belongs to equity to mitigate punishment according to reason, while the sweetness of soul which inclines one to this belongs to clemency: so too, excess in punishing, as regards the external action, belongs to injustice; but as regards the hardness of heart, which makes one ready to increase punishment, belongs to cruelty.

Reply Obj. 2. Mercy and clemency concur in this, that both shun and recoil from another's unhappiness, but in different ways. For it belongs to mercy* to relieve another's unhappiness by a beneficent action, while it belongs to clemency to mitigate another's unhappiness by the cessation of punishment. And since cruelty denotes excess in exacting punishment, it is more directly opposed to clemency than to mercy; yet on account of the mutual likeness of these virtues, cruelty is sometimes taken for mercilessness.

Reply Obj. 3. Cruelty is there taken for mercilessness, which is lack of beneficence. We may also reply that withdrawal of beneficence is in itself a punishment.

Second Article.

whether cruelty differs from savagery or brutality?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that cruelty differs not from savagery or brutality. For seemingly one vice is opposed in one way to one virtue. Now both savagery and cruelty are opposed to clemency by way of excess. Therefore it would seem that savagery and cruelty are the same.

* Cf. Q. XXX., A. 1.

Obj. 2. Further, Isidore says (*Etym.* x.) that *severity is as it were savagery with verity, because it holds to justice without attending to piety:* so that savagery would seem to exclude that mitigation of punishment in delivering judgment which is demanded by piety. Now this has been stated to belong to cruelty (A. 1, *ad* 1). Therefore cruelty is the same as savagery.

Obj. 3. Further, Just as there is a vice opposed to a virtue by way of excess, so is there a vice opposed to it by way of deficiency, which latter is opposed both to the virtue which is the mean, and to the vice which is in excess. Now the same vice pertaining to deficiency is opposed to both cruelty and savagery, namely remission or laxity. For Gregory says (*Moral.* xx. 8): *Let there be love, but not that which enervates, let there be severity, but without fury, let there be zeal without unseemly savagery, let there be piety without undue clemency.* Therefore savagery is the same as cruelty.

On the contrary, Seneca says (*De Clementia,* ii. 4) that *a man who is angry without being hurt, or with one who has not offended him, is not said to be cruel, but to be brutal or savage.*

I answer that, Savagery and brutality take their names from a likeness to wild beasts which are also described as savage. For animals of this kind attack man that they may feed on his body, and not for some motive of justice the consideration of which belongs to reason alone. Wherefore, properly speaking, brutality or savagery applies to those who in inflicting punishment have not in view a default of the person punished, but merely the pleasure they derive from a man's torture. Consequently it is evident that it is comprised under bestiality: for suchlike pleasure is not human but bestial, and resulting as it does either from evil custom, or from a corrupt nature, as do other bestial emotions. On the other hand, cruelty not only regards the default of the person punished, but exceeds in the mode of punishing: wherefore cruelty differs from savagery or brutality, as human wickedness differs from bestiality, as stated in *Ethic.* vii. 5.

Reply Obj. 1. Clemency is a human virtue; wherefore directly opposed to it is cruelty which is a form of human wickedness. But savagery or brutality is comprised under bestiality, wherefore it is directly opposed not to clemency, but to a more excellent virtue, which the Philosopher (*Ethic.* vii. 5) calls heroic or god-like, which according to us, would seem to pertain to the gifts of the Holy Ghost. Consequently we may say that savagery is directly opposed to the gift of piety.

Reply Obj. 2. A severe man is not said to be simply savage, because this implies a vice; but he is said to be savage as regards the truth, on account of some likeness to savagery which is not inclined to mitigate punishment.

Reply Obj. 3. Remission of punishment is not a vice, except it disregard the order of justice, which requires a man to be punished on account of his offence, and which cruelty exceeds. On the other hand, cruelty disregards this order altogether. Wherefore remission of punishment is opposed to cruelty, but not to savagery.

QUESTION CLX.

OF MODESTY.

(In Two Articles.)

We must now consider modesty: and (1) Modesty in general; (2) Each of its species. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether modesty is a part of temperance? (2) What is the matter of modesty?

First Article.

WHETHER MODESTY IS A PART OF TEMPERANCE?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that modesty is not a part of temperance. For modesty is denominated from mode. Now mode is requisite in every virtue: since virtue is directed to good; and *good*, according to Augustine (*De Nat. Boni*, 3), *consists in mode, species, and order.* Therefore modesty is a general virtue, and consequently should not be reckoned a part of temperance.

Obj. 2. Further, Temperance would seem to be deserving of praise chiefly on account of its moderation. Now this gives modesty its name. Therefore modesty is the same as temperance, and not one of its parts.

Obj. 3. Further, Modesty would seem to regard the correction of our neighbour, according to 2 Tim. ii. 24, 25, *The servant of the Lord must not wrangle, but be mild towards all men . . . with modesty admonishing them that resist the truth.* Now admonishing wrongdoers is an act of justice or of charity, as stated above (Q. XXXIII., AA. 1, 2). Therefore seemingly modesty is a part of justice rather than of temperance.

On the contrary, Tully (*De Invent.* ii.) reckons modesty as a part of temperance.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CXLI., A. 4; Q. CLVII., A. 3), temperance brings moderation into those things wherein it is most difficult to be moderate, namely the concupiscences of pleasures of touch. Now whenever there is a special virtue about some matter of very great moment, there must needs be another virtue about matters of lesser import: because the life of man requires to be regulated by virtue with regard to everything: thus it was stated above (Q. CXXXIV., A. 3, *ad* 1) that while magnificence is about great expenditure, there is need in addition for liberality, which is concerned with ordinary expenditure. Hence there is need for a virtue to moderate other lesser matters where moderation is not so difficult. This virtue is called modesty, and is annexed to temperance as its principal.

Reply Obj. 1. When a name is common to many it is sometimes appropriated to those of the lowest rank; thus the common name of angel is appropriated to the lowest order of angels. In the same way mode which is observed by all virtues in common, is specially appropriated to the virtue which prescribes the mode in the slightest things.

Reply Obj. 2. Some things need tempering on account of their strength, thus we temper strong wine. But moderation is necessary in all things: wherefore temperance is more concerned with strong passions, and modesty about weaker passions.

Reply Obj. 3. Modesty is to be taken there in the general sense, as necessary in all virtues.

Second Article.

whether modesty is only about outward actions?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that modesty is only about outward actions. For the inward movements of the passions cannot be known to other persons. Yet the Apostle enjoins

(Philip. iv. 5): *Let your modesty be known to all men.* Therefore modesty is only about outward actions.

Obj. 2. Further, The virtues that are about the passions are distinguished from justice which is about operations. Now modesty is seemingly one virtue. Therefore, if it be about outward works, it will not be concerned with inward passions.

Obj. 3. Further, No one same virtue is both about things pertaining to the appetite,—which is proper to the moral virtues,—and about things pertaining to knowledge,—which is proper to the intellectual virtues,—and again about things pertaining to the irascible and concupiscible faculties. Therefore, if modesty be one virtue, it cannot be about all these things.

On the contrary, In all these things it is necessary to observe the mode whence modesty takes its name. Therefore modesty is about all of them.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), modesty differs from temperance, in that temperance moderates those matters where restraint is most difficult, while modesty moderates those that present less difficulty. Authorities seem to have had various opinions about modesty. For wherever they found a special kind of good or a special difficulty of moderation, they withdrew it from the province of modesty, which they confined to lesser matters. Now it is clear to all that the restraint of pleasures of touch presents a special difficulty: wherefore all distinguished temperance from modesty.

In addition to this, moreover, Tully (*De Inv.* ii.) considered that there was a special kind of good in the moderation of punishment; wherefore he severed clemency also from modesty, and held modesty to be about the remaining ordinary matters that require moderation. These seemingly are of four kinds. One is the movement of the mind towards some excellence, and this is moderated by *humility*. The second is the desire of things pertaining to knowledge, and this is moderated by *studiousness* which is opposed to curiosity. The third regards bodily movements and

actions, which require to be done becomingly and honestly,* whether we act seriously or in play. The fourth regards outward show, for instance in dress and the like.

To some of these matters, however, other authorities appointed certain special virtues: thus Andronicus mentions meekness, simplicity, humility, and other kindred virtues, of which we have spoken above (Q. CXLIII.); while Aristotle (*Ethic.* iv. 8) assigned εὐτραπελία to pleasures in games, as stated above (I.-II., Q. LX., A. 5). All these are comprised under modesty as understood by Tully; and in this way modesty regards not only outward but also inward actions.

Reply Obj. 1. The Apostle speaks of modesty as regarding externals. Nevertheless the moderation of the inner man may be shown by certain outward signs.

Reply Obj. 2. Various virtues assigned by various authorities are comprised under modesty. Wherefore nothing prevents modesty from regarding matters which require different virtues. Yet there is not so great a difference between the various parts of modesty, as there is between justice, which is about operations, and temperance, which is about passions, because in actions and passions that present no great difficulty on the part of the matter, but only on the part of moderation, there is but one virtue, one namely for each kind of moderation.

Wherefore the *Reply* to the *Third Objection* also is clear.

* Cf. Q. CXLV., A. 1.

QUESTION CLXI.

OF THE SPECIES OF MODESTY AND, IN THE FIRST PLACE, OF HUMILITY.

(*In Six Articles.*)

We must consider next the species of modesty: (1) Humility, and pride which is opposed to it; (2) Studiousness, and its opposite, Curiosity: (3) Modesty as affecting words or deeds: (4) Modesty as affecting outward attire.

Concerning humility there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether humility is a virtue? (2) Whether it resides in the appetite, or in the judgment of reason? (3) Whether by humility one ought to subject oneself to all men? (4) Whether it is a part of modesty or temperance? (5) Of its comparison with the other virtues: (6) Of the degrees of humility.

First Article.

WHETHER HUMILITY IS A VIRTUE?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that humility is not a virtue. For virtue conveys the idea of a good. But humility conveys the notion of a penal evil, according to Ps. civ. 18, *They humbled his feet in fetters.* Therefore humility is not a virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, Virtue and vice are mutually opposed. Now humility sometimes denotes a vice, for it is written (Ecclus. xix. 23): *There is one that humbleth himself wickedly.* Therefore humility is not a virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, No virtue is opposed to another virtue. But humility is apparently opposed to the virtue of

magnanimity, which aims at great things, whereas humility shuns them. Therefore it would seem that humility is not a virtue.

Obj. 4. Further, Virtue is *the disposition of that which is perfect,* as stated in *Phys.* vii. But humility seemingly belongs to the imperfect: wherefore it becomes not God to be humble, since He can be subject to none. Therefore it seems that humility is not a virtue.

Obj. 5. Further, Every moral virtue is about actions and passions, according to *Ethic.* ii. 3. But humility is not reckoned by the Philosopher among the virtues that are about passions, nor is it comprised under justice which is about actions. Therefore it would seem not to be a virtue.

On the contrary, Origen commenting on Luke i. 48, *He hath regarded the humility of His handmaid,* says (*Hom.* viii. *in Luc.*): *One of the virtues, humility, is particularly commended in Holy Writ; for our Saviour said: 'Learn of Me, because I am meek, and humble of heart.'*

I answer that, As stated above (I.-II., Q. XXIII., A. 2) when we were treating of the passions, the difficult good has something attractive to the appetite, namely the aspect of good, and likewise something repulsive to the appetite, namely the difficulty of obtaining it. In respect of the former there arises the movement of hope, and in respect of the latter, the movement of despair. Now it has been stated above (I.-II., Q. LX., A. 4) that for those appetitive movements which are a kind of impulse towards an object, there is need of a moderating and restraining moral virtue, while for those which are a kind of withdrawal or recoil, there is need, on the part of the appetite, of a moral virtue to strengthen it and urge it on. Wherefore a twofold virtue is necessary with regard to the difficult good: one, to temper and restrain the mind, lest it tend to high things immoderately; and this belongs to the virtue of humility: and another to strengthen the mind against despair, and urge it on to the pursuit of great things according to right reason; and this is magnanimity. Therefore it is evident that humility is a virtue.

Reply Obj. 1. As Isidore observes (*Etym.* x.), *a humble man is so called because he is, as it were,* '*humo acclinis,*'* i.e. inclined to the lowest place. This may happen in two ways. First, through an extrinsic principle, for instance when one is cast down by another, and thus humility is a punishment. Secondly, through an intrinsic principle: and this may be done sometimes well, for instance when a man, considering his own failings, assumes the lowest place according to his mode: thus Abraham said to the Lord (Gen. xviii. 27), *I will speak to my Lord, whereas I am dust and ashes.* In this way humility is a virtue. Sometimes, however, this may be ill-done, for instance when man, not understanding his honour, compares himself to senseless beasts, and becomes like to them.

Reply Obj. 2. As stated (*ad* 1), humility, in so far as it is a virtue, conveys the notion of a praiseworthy self-abasement to the lowest place. Now this is sometimes done merely as to outward signs and pretence: wherefore this is false humility, of which Augustine says in a letter (*Ep.* cxlix.) that it is grievous pride, since to wit, it would seem to aim at excellence of glory. Sometimes, however, this is done by an inward movement of the soul, and in this way, properly speaking, humility is reckoned a virtue, because virtue does not consist in externals, but chiefly in the inward choice of the mind, as the Philosopher states (*Ethic.* ii. 5).

Reply Obj. 3. Humility restrains the appetite from aiming at great things against right reason: while magnanimity urges the mind to great things in accord with right reason. Hence it is clear that magnanimity is not opposed to humility: indeed they concur in this, that each is according to right reason.

Reply Obj. 4. A thing is said to be perfect in two ways. First absolutely; such a thing contains no defect, neither in its nature nor in respect of anything else, and thus God alone is perfect. To Him humility is fitting, not as regards His Divine nature, but only as regards His assumed nature.

* Literally *bent to the ground.*

Secondly, a thing may be said to be perfect in a restricted sense, for instance in respect of its nature or state or time. Thus a virtuous man is perfect: although in comparison with God his perfection is found wanting, according to the word of Isaias (xl. 17), *All nations are before Him as if they had no being at all.* In this way humility may be competent to every man.

Reply Obj. 5. The Philosopher intended to treat of virtues as directed to civic life, wherein the subjection of one man to another is defined according to the ordinance of the law, and consequently is a matter of legal justice. But humility, considered as a special virtue, regards chiefly the subjection of man to God, for Whose sake he humbles himself by subjecting himself to others.

DOMINICAN

Second Article.

Whether humility has to do with the appetite or with the judgment of reason?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that humility concerns, not the appetite but the judgment of reason. Because humility is opposed to pride. Now pride concerns things pertaining to knowledge: for Gregory says (*Moral.* xxxiv. 18) that *pride, when it extends outwardly to the body, is first of all shown in the eyes :* wherefore it is written (Ps. cxxx. 1), *Lord, my heart is not exalted, nor are my eyes lofty.* Now eyes are the chief aids to knowledge. Therefore it would seem that humility is chiefly concerned with knowledge, whereby one thinks little of oneself.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (*De Virginit.* 31) that *almost the whole of Christian teaching is humility.* Consequently nothing contained in Christian teaching is incompatible with humility. Now Christian teaching admonishes us to seek the better things, according to 1 Cor. xii. 31, *Be zealous for the better gifts.* Therefore it belongs to humility to restrain not the desire of difficult things but the estimate thereof.

Obj. 3. Further, It belongs to the same virtue both to restrain excessive movement, and to strengthen the soul against excessive withdrawal: thus fortitude both curbs daring and fortifies the soul against fear. Now it is magnanimity that strengthens the soul against the difficulties that occur in the pursuit of great things. Therefore if humility were to curb the desire of great things, it would follow that humility is not a distinct virtue from magnanimity, which is evidently false. Therefore humility is concerned, not with the desire but with the estimate of great things.

Obj. 4. Further, Andronicus assigns humility to outward show; for he says that humility is *the habit of avoiding excessive expenditure and parade.* Therefore it is not concerned with the movement of the appetite.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Pœnit.,—Hom. ult. inter L.*) that *the humble man is one who chooses to be an abject in the house of the Lord, rather than to dwell in the tents of sinners.* But choice concerns the appetite. Therefore humility has to do with the appetite rather than with the estimative power.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), it belongs properly to humility, that a man restrain himself from being borne towards that which is above him. For this purpose he must know his disproportion to that which surpasses his capacity. Hence knowledge of one's own deficiency belongs to humility, as a rule guiding the appetite. Nevertheless humility is essentially in the appetite itself: and consequently it must be said that humility, properly speaking, directs and moderates the movement of the appetite.

Reply Obj. 1. Lofty eyes are a sign of pride, inasmuch as it excludes respect and fear: for fearing and respectful persons are especially wont to lower the eyes, as though not daring to compare themselves with others. But it does not follow from this that humility is essentially concerned with knowledge.

Reply Obj. 2. It is contrary to humility to aim at greater things through confiding in one's own powers: but to aim at

greater things through confidence in God's help, is not contrary to humility; especially since the more one subjects oneself to God, the more is one exalted in God's sight. Hence Augustine says (*loc. cit.*): *It is one thing to raise oneself to God, and another to raise oneself up against God. He that abases himself before Him, him He raiseth up; he that raises himself up against Him, him He casteth down.*

Reply Obj. 3. In fortitude there is the same reason for restraining daring and for strengthening the soul against fear: since the reason in both cases is that man should set the good of reason before dangers of death. But the reason for restraining presumptuous hope which pertains to humility is not the same as the reason for strengthening the soul against despair. Because the reason for strengthening the soul against despair is the acquisition of one's proper good lest man, by despair, render himself unworthy of a good which was competent to him; while the chief reason for suppressing presumptuous hope is based on Divine Revelation, which shows that man ought not to ascribe to himself more than is competent to him according to the position in which God has placed him. Wherefore humility would seem to denote in the first place man's subjection to God; and for this reason Augustine (*De Serm. Dom. in Monte*, i. 4) ascribes humility, which he understands by poverty of spirit, to the gift of fear whereby man reveres God. Hence it follows that the relation of fortitude to daring differs from that of humility to hope. Because fortitude uses daring more than it suppresses it: so that excess of daring is more like fortitude than lack of daring is. On the other hand, humility suppresses hope or confidence in self more than it uses it; wherefore excessive self-confidence is more opposed to humility than lack of confidence is.

Reply Obj. 4. Excess in outward expenditure and parade is wont to be done with a view of boasting, which is suppressed by humility. Accordingly humility has to do, in a secondary way, with externals, as signs of the inward movement of the appetite.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER ONE OUGHT, BY HUMILITY, TO SUBJECT ONESELF TO ALL MEN?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that one ought not, by humility, to subject oneself to all men. For, as stated above (A. 2, *ad* 3), humility consists chiefly in man's subjection to God. Now one ought not to offer to a man that which is due to God, as is the case with all acts of religious worship. Therefore, by humility, one ought not to subject oneself to man.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (*De Nat. et Gratia*, 34): *Humility should take the part of truth, not of falsehood.* Now some men are of the highest rank, who cannot, without falsehood, subject themselves to their inferiors. Therefore one ought not, by humility, to subject oneself to all men.

Obj. 3. Further, No one ought to do that which conduces to the detriment of another's spiritual welfare. But if a man were to subject himself to another by humility, this would be detrimental to the person to whom he subjects himself; for the latter might wax proud, or despise the other. Hence Augustine says in his Rule (*Ep.* ccxxi.): *Lest through excessive humility the ruler lose his authority.* Therefore a man ought not, by humility, to subject himself to all.

On the contrary, It is written (Philip. ii. 3): *In humility, let each esteem others better than themselves.*

I answer that, We may consider two things in man, namely that which is God's, and that which is man's. Whatever pertains to defect is man's: but whatever pertains to man's welfare and perfection is God's, according to the saying of Osee (xiii. 9), *Destruction is thy own, O Israel; thy help is only in Me.* Now humility, as stated above (A. 1, *ad* 5; A. 2, *ad* 3), properly regards the reverence whereby man is subject to God. Wherefore every man, in respect of that which is his own, ought to subject himself to every neighbour, in respect of that which the latter has of God's: but humility

does not require a man to subject what he has of God's to that which may seem to be God's in another. For those who have a share of God's gifts know that they have them, according to 1 Cor. ii. 12: *That we may know the things that are given us from God.* Wherefore without prejudice to humility they may set the gifts they have received from God above those that others appear to have received from Him; thus the Apostle says (Eph. iii. 5): (*The mystery of Christ*) *was not known to the sons of men as it is now revealed to His holy apostles.* In like manner, humility does not require a man to subject that which he has of his own to that which his neighbour has of man's: otherwise each one would have to esteem himself a greater sinner than any one else: whereas the Apostle says without prejudice to humility (Gal. ii. 15): *We by nature are Jews, and not of the Gentiles, sinners.* Nevertheless a man may esteem his neighbour to have some good which he lacks himself, or himself to have some evil which another has not: by reason of which, he may subject himself to him with humility.

Reply Obj. 1. We must not only revere God in Himself, but also that which is His in each one, although not with the same measure of reverence as we revere God. Wherefore we should subject ourselves with humility to all our neighbours for God's sake, according to 1 Pet. ii. 13, *Be ye subject . . . to every human creature for God's sake;* but to God alone do we owe the worship of latria.

Reply Obj. 2. If we set what our neighbour has of God's above that which we have of our own, we cannot incur falsehood. Wherefore a gloss* on Philip. ii. 3, *Esteem others better than themselves,* says: *We must not esteem by pretending to esteem; but we should in truth think it possible for another person to have something that is hidden to us and whereby he is better than we are, although our own good whereby we are apparently better than he, be not hidden.*

Reply Obj. 3. Humility, like other virtues, resides chiefly inwardly in the soul. Consequently a man, by an inward act of the soul, may subject himself to another, without

* S. Augustine, *QQ.* LXXXIII., 71.

giving the other man an occasion of detriment to his spiritual welfare. This is what Augustine means in his Rule (*Ep.* ccxxi.): *With fear, the superior should prostrate himself at your feet in the sight of God.* On the other hand, due moderation must be observed in the outward acts of humility even as of other virtues, lest they conduce to the detriment of others. If, however, a man does as he ought, and others take therefrom an occasion of sin, this is not imputed to the man who acts with humility; since he does not give scandal, although others take it.

Fourth Article.

Whether humility is a part of modesty or temperance?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that humility is not a part of modesty or temperance. For humility regards chiefly the reverence whereby one is subject to God, as stated above (A. 3). Now it belongs to a theological virtue to have God for its object. Therefore humility should be reckoned a theological virtue rather than a part of temperance or modesty.

Obj. 2. Further, Temperance is in the concupiscible, whereas humility would seem to be in the irascible, just as pride which is opposed to it, and whose object is something difficult. Therefore apparently humility is not a part of temperance or modesty.

Obj. 3. Further, Humility and magnanimity are about the same object, as stated above (A. 1, *ad* 3: Q. CXXIX., A. 3, *ad* 4). But magnanimity is reckoned a part, not of temperance but of fortitude, as stated above (Q. CXXIX., A. 5). Therefore it would seem that humility is not a part of temperance or modesty.

On the contrary, Origen says (*Hom.* viii. *super Luc.*): *If thou wilt hear the name of this virtue, and what it was called by the philosophers, know that humility which God regards, is the same as what they called* μετριότης, *i.e. measure or moderation.* Now this evidently pertains to modesty

or temperance. Therefore humility is a part of modesty or temperance.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CXXVIII.; Q. CXXIX., A. 5; Q. CLVII., A. 3), in assigning parts to a virtue we consider chiefly the likeness that results from the mode of the virtue. Now the mode of temperance, whence it chiefly derives its praise, is the restraint or suppression of the impetuosity of a passion. Hence whatever virtues restrain or suppress, and the actions which moderate the impetuosity of the emotions, are reckoned parts of temperance. Now just as meekness suppresses the movement of anger, so does humility suppress the movement of hope, which is the movement of a spirit aiming at great things. Wherefore, like meekness, humility is accounted a part of temperance. For this reason the Philosopher (*Ethic.* iv. 3) says that a man who aims at small things in proportion to his mode is not magnanimous but temperate, and such a man we may call humble. Moreover, for the reason given above (Q. CLX., A. 1), among the various parts of temperance, the one under which humility is comprised is modesty as understood by Tully (*De Invent.* ii.), inasmuch as humility is nothing else than a moderation of spirit: wherefore it is written (1 Pet. iii. 4): *In the incorruptibility of a quiet and meek spirit.*

Reply Obj. 1. The theological virtues, whose object is our last end, which is the first principle in matters of appetite, are the causes of all the other virtues. Hence the fact that humility is caused by reverence for God does not prevent it from being a part of modesty or temperance.

Reply Obj. 2. Parts are assigned to a principal virtue by reason of a sameness, not of subject or matter, but of formal mode, as stated above (Q. CXXXVII., A. 2, *ad* 1; Q. CLVII., A. 3, *ad* 2). Consequently, although humility is in the irascible as its subject, it is assigned as a part of modesty or temperance by reason of its mode.

Reply Obj. 3. Although humility and magnanimity agree as to matter, they differ as to mode, by reason of which magnanimity is reckoned a part of fortitude, and humility a part of temperance.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER HUMILITY IS THE GREATEST OF THE VIRTUES?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that humility is the greatest of the virtues. For Chrysostom, expounding the story of the Pharisee and the publican (Luke xviii.), says (*Hom.* v. *on the incomprehensible nature of God*) that *if humility is such a fleet runner when hampered by sin that it overtakes the justice that is the companion of pride, whither will it not reach if you couple it with justice? It will stand among the angels by the judgment seat of God.* Hence it is clear that humility is set above justice. Now justice is the most exalted of all the virtues, and includes all virtues, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* v. 1). Therefore humility is the greatest of the virtues.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (*De Verb. Dom., serm.* x. 1): *Are you thinking of raising the great fabric of spirituality? Attend first of all to the foundation of humility.* Now this would seem to imply that humility is the foundation of all virtue. Therefore apparently it is greater than the other virtues.

Obj. 3. Further, The greater virtue deserves the greater reward. Now the greatest reward is due to humility, since *he that humbleth himself shall be exalted* (Luke iv. 2). Therefore humility is the greatest of virtues.

Obj. 4. Further, According to Augustine (*De Vera Relig.* 16), *Christ's whole life on earth was a lesson in moral conduct through the human nature which He assumed.* Now He especially proposed His humility for our example, saying (Matth. xi. 29): *Learn of Me, because I am meek and humble of heart.* Moreover, Gregory says (*Pastor.* iii. 1) that the *lesson proposed to us in the mystery of our redemption is the humility of God.* Therefore humility would seem to be the greatest of virtues.

On the contrary, Charity is set above all the virtues, according to Coloss. iii. 14, *Above all . . . things have charity.* Therefore humility is not the greatest of virtues.

I answer that, The good of human virtue pertains to the order of reason: which order is considered chiefly in reference to the end: wherefore the theological virtues are the greatest, because they have the last end for their object. Secondarily, however, it is considered in reference to the ordering of the means to the end. This ordinance, as to its essence, is in the reason itself from which it issues, but by participation it is in the appetite ordered by the reason; and this ordinance is the effect of justice, especially of legal justice. Now humility makes a man a good subject to ordinance of all kinds and in all matters; while every other virtue has this effect in some special matter. Therefore after the theological virtues, after the intellectual virtues which regard the reason itself, and after justice, especially legal justice, humility stands before all others.

Reply Obj. 1. Humility is not set before justice, but before that justice which is coupled with pride, and is no longer a virtue; even so, on the other hand, sin is pardoned through humility: for it is said of the publican (Luke xviii. 14) that through the merit of his humility *he went down into his house justified.* Hence Chrysostom says (*loc. cit.*): *Bring me a pair of two-horse chariots: in the one harness pride with justice, in the other sin and humility: and you will see that sin outrunning justice wins not by its own strength, but by that of humility: while you will see the other pair beaten, not by the weakness of justice, but by the weight and size of pride.*

Reply Obj. 2. Just as the orderly assembly of virtues is, by reason of a certain likeness, compared to a building, so again that which is the first step in the acquisition of virtue is likened to the foundation, which is first laid before the rest of the building. Now the virtues are in truth infused by God. Wherefore the first step in the acquisition of virtue may be understood in two ways. First by way of removing obstacles: and thus humility holds the first place, inasmuch as it expels pride, which *God resisteth,* and makes man open to receive the influx of Divine grace. Hence it is written (James iv. 6): *God resisteth the proud,*

and giveth grace to the humble. In this sense humility is said to be the foundation of the spiritual edifice. Secondly, a thing is first among virtues directly, because it is the first step towards God. Now the first step towards God is by faith, according to Heb. xi. 6, *He that cometh to God must believe.* In this sense faith is the foundation in a more excellent way than humility.

Reply Obj. 3. To him that despises earthly things, heavenly things are promised: thus heavenly treasures are promised to those who despise earthly riches, according to Matth. vi. 19, 20, *Lay not up to yourselves treasures on earth . . . but lay up to yourselves treasures in heaven.* Likewise heavenly consolations are promised to those who despise worldly joys, according to Matth. v. 5, *Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted.* In the same way spiritual uplifting is promised to humility, not that humility alone merits it, but because it is proper to it to despise earthly uplifting. Wherefore Augustine says in his book on repentance (*Hom.* L. *inter* L.): *Think not that he who humbles himself is always abased, for it is written: 'He shall be exalted.' And do not imagine that his exaltation in men's eyes is effected by bodily uplifting.*

Reply Obj. 4. The reason why Christ chiefly proposed humility to us, was because it especially removes the obstacle to man's spiritual welfare consisting in man's aiming at heavenly and spiritual things, in which he is hindered by striving to become great in earthly things. Hence our Lord, in order to remove an obstacle to our spiritual welfare, showed by giving an example of humility, that outward exaltation is to be despised. Thus humility is, as it were, a disposition to man's untrammelled access to spiritual and divine goods. Accordingly as perfection is greater than disposition, so charity, and other virtues whereby man approaches God directly, are greater than humility.

Sixth Article.

WHETHER TWELVE DEGREES OF HUMILITY ARE FITTINGLY DISTINGUISHED ACCORDING TO THE BLESSED BENEDICT, NAMELY, TO SHOW HUMILITY OF THOUGHT AND DEED, WITH ONE'S GAZE LOWERED TO THE GROUND, ETC. ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the twelve degrees of humility that are set down in the Rule of the Blessed Benedict* are unfittingly distinguished. The first is to be *humble not only in heart, but also to show it in one's very person, one's eyes fixed on the ground ;* the second is *to speak few and sensible words, and not to be loud of voice ;* the third is *not to be easily moved, and disposed to laughter ;* the fourth is *to maintain silence until one is asked ;* the fifth is *to do nothing but to what one is exhorted by the common rule of the monastery ;* the sixth is *to believe and acknowledge oneself viler than all ;* the seventh is *to think oneself worthless and unprofitable for all purposes ;* the eighth is *to confess one's sin ;* the ninth is *to embrace patience by obeying under difficult and contrary circumstances ;* the tenth is *to subject oneself to a superior ;* the eleventh is *not to delight in fulfilling one's own desires ;* the twelfth is *to fear God and to be always mindful of everything that God has commanded.* For among these there are some things pertaining to the other virtues, such as obedience and patience. Again there are some that seem to involve a false opinion,—and this is inconsistent with any virtue,—namely to declare oneself more despicable than all men, and to confess and believe oneself to be in all ways worthless and unprofitable. Therefore these are unfittingly placed among the degrees of humility.

Obj. 2. Further, Humility proceeds from within to externals, as do other virtues. Therefore in the aforesaid degrees, those which concern outward actions are unfittingly placed before those which pertain to inward actions.

* S. Thomas gives these degrees in the reverse order to that followed by S. Benedict.

Obj. 3. Further, Anselm (*De Simil.* 99-108) gives seven degrees of humility, the first of which is *to acknowledge oneself contemptible;* the second, *to grieve for this;* the third, *to confess it;* the fourth, *to convince others of this, that is to wish them to believe it;* the fifth, *to bear patiently that this be said of us;* the sixth, *to suffer oneself to be treated with contempt;* the seventh, *to love being thus treated.* Therefore the aforesaid degrees would seem to be too numerous.

Obj. 4. Further, A gloss on Matth. iii. 15 says: *Perfect humility has three degrees. The first is to be subject ourselves to those who are above us, and not to set ourselves above our equals: this is sufficient. The second is to submit to our equals, and not to set ourselves before our inferiors; this is called abundant humility. The third degree is to subject ourselves to inferiors, and in this is perfect righteousness.* Therefore the aforesaid degrees would seem to be too numerous.

Obj. 5. Further, Augustine says (*De Virginit.* 31): *The measure of humility is apportioned to each one according to his rank. It is imperilled by pride, for the greater a man is the more liable is he to be entrapped.* Now the measure of a man's greatness cannot be fixed according to a definite number of degrees. Therefore it would seem that it is not possible to assign the aforesaid degrees to humility.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 2) humility has essentially to do with the appetite, in so far as a man restrains the impetuosity of his soul, from tending inordinately to great things: yet its rule is in the cognitive faculty, in that we should not deem ourselves to be above what we are. Also, the principle and origin of both these things is the reverence we bear to God. Now the inward disposition of humility leads to certain outward signs in words, deeds, and gestures, which manifest that which is hidden within, as happens also with the other virtues. For *a man is known by his look, and a wise man, when thou meetest him, by his countenance* (Ecclus. xix. 26). Wherefore the aforesaid degrees of humility include something regarding the root of humility, namely the twelfth degree, *that a man fear God and bear all His commandments in mind.* Again,

they include certain things which regard the appetite, lest one aim inordinately at one's own excellence. This is done in three ways. First, by not following one's own will, and this pertains to the eleventh degree; secondly, by regulating it according to one's superior's judgment, and this applies to the tenth degree; thirdly, by not being deterred from this on account of the difficulties and hardships that come in our way, and this belongs to the ninth degree.

Certain things also are included referring to the estimate a man forms in acknowledging his own deficiency, and this in three ways. First, by acknowledging and avowing his own shortcomings; this belongs to the eighth degree: secondly, by deeming oneself incapable of great things, and this pertains to the seventh degree: thirdly, that in this respect one should put others before oneself, and this belongs to the sixth degree. Again, some things are included that refer to outward signs. One of these regards deeds, namely that in one's work one should not depart from the ordinary way; this applies to the fifth degree. Two others have reference to words, namely that one should not be in a hurry to speak, which pertains to the fourth degree, and that one be not immoderate in speech, which refers to the second. The others have to do with outward gestures, for instance in restraining haughty looks, which regards the first, and in outwardly checking laughter and other signs of senseless mirth, and this belongs to the third degree.

Reply Obj. 1. It is possible, without falsehood, to deem and avow oneself the most despicable of men, as regards the hidden faults which we acknowledge in ourselves, and the hidden gifts of God which others have. Hence Augustine says (*De Virginit.* 52): *Bethink you that some persons are in some hidden way better than you, although outwardly you are better than they.* Again, without falsehood one may avow and believe oneself in all ways unprofitable and useless in respect of one's own capability, so as to refer all one's sufficiency to God, according to 2 Cor. iii. 5, *Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves as of ourselves; but our sufficiency is from God.* And there is nothing un-

becoming in ascribing to humility those things that pertain to other virtues, since, just as one vice arises from another, so, by a natural sequence, the act of one virtue proceeds from the act of another.

Reply Obj. 2. Man arrives at humility in two ways. First and chiefly by a gift of grace, and in this way the inner man precedes the outward man. The other way is by human effort, whereby he first of all restrains the outward man, and afterwards succeeds in plucking out the inward root. It is according to this order that the degrees of humility are here enumerated.

Reply Obj. 3. All the degrees mentioned by Anselm are reducible to knowledge, avowal, and desire of one's own abasement. For the first degree belongs to the knowledge of one's own deficiency; but since it would be wrong for one to love one's own failings, this is excluded by the second degree. The third and fourth degrees regard the avowal of one's own deficiency; namely, that not merely one simply assert one's failing, but that one convince another of it. The other three degrees have to do with the appetite, which seeks, not outward excellence, but outward abasement, or bears it with equanimity, whether it consist of words or deeds. For as Gregory says (*Regist.* ii. 10, *Ep.* 24), *there is nothing great in being humble towards those who treat us with regard, for even worldly people do this: but we should especially be humble towards those who make us suffer*, and this belongs to the fifth and sixth degrees: or the appetite may even go so far as lovingly to embrace external abasement, and this pertains to the seventh degree; so that all these degrees are comprised under the sixth and seventh mentioned above.

Reply Obj. 4. These degrees refer, not to the thing itself, namely the nature of humility, but to the degrees among men, who are either of higher or of lower or of equal degree.

Reply Obj. 5. This argument also considers the degrees of humility not according to the nature of the thing, in respect of which the aforesaid degrees are assigned, but according to the various conditions of men.

QUESTION CLXII.

OF PRIDE.

(In Eight Articles.)

We must next consider pride, and (1) pride in general; (2) the first man's sin, which we hold to have been pride.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether pride is a sin? (2) Whether it is a special vice? (3) Wherein does it reside as in its subject? (4) Of its species. (5) Whether it is a mortal sin? (6) Whether it is the most grievous of all sins? (7) Of its relation to other sins. (8) Whether it should be reckoned a capital vice?

First Article.

WHETHER PRIDE IS A SIN?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that pride is not a sin. For no sin is the object of God's promise. For God's promises refer to what He will do; and He is not the author of sin. Now pride is numbered among the Divine promises: for it is written (Isa. lx. 15): *I will make thee to be an everlasting pride* (Douay,—*glory*), *a joy unto generation and generation.* Therefore pride is not a sin.

Obj. 2. Further, It is not a sin to wish to be like unto God: for every creature has a natural desire for this; and especially does this become the rational creature which is made to God's image and likeness. Now according to *Lib. Sent. Prosperi* 292, *pride is love of one's own excellence, whereby one is likened to God who is supremely excellent.*

Hence Augustine says (*Conf.* ii.): *Pride imitates exaltedness; whereas Thou alone art God exalted over all.* Therefore pride is not a sin.

Obj. 3. Further, A sin is opposed not only to a virtue but also to a contrary vice, as the Philosopher states (*Ethic.* ii. 8). But no vice is found to be opposed to pride. Therefore pride is not a sin.

On the contrary, It is written (Tob. iv. 14): *Never suffer pride to reign in thy mind or in thy words.*

I answer that, Pride (*superbia*) is so called because a man thereby aims higher (*supra*) than he is; wherefore Isidore says (*Etym.* x.): *A man is said to be proud, because he wishes to appear above* (*super*) *what he really is;* for he who wishes to overstep beyond what he is, is proud. Now right reason requires that every man's will should tend to that which is proportionate to him. Therefore it is evident that pride denotes something opposed to right reason, and this shows it to have the character of sin, because according to Dionysius (*Div. Nom.* iv. 4), *the soul's evil is to be opposed to reason.* Therefore it is evident that pride is a sin.

Reply Obj. 1. Pride may be understood in two ways. First, as transgressing the rule of reason, and in this sense we say that it is a sin. Secondly, it may simply denominate super-excellence; in which sense any super-excellent thing may be called pride: and it is thus that God promises pride as significant of super-excelling good. Hence a gloss of Jerome on the same passage (Isa. lxi. 6) says that *there is a good and an evil pride;* or *a sinful pride which God resists, and a pride that denotes the glory which He bestows.*

It may also be replied that pride there signifies abundance of those things in which men may take pride.

Reply Obj. 2. Reason has the direction of those things for which man has a natural appetite; so that if the appetite wander from the rule of reason, whether by excess or by default, it will be sinful, as is the case with the appetite for food which man desires naturally. Now pride is the appetite for excellence in excess of right reason. Wherefore

Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei*, xiv.) that pride is the *desire for inordinate exaltation:* and hence it is that, as he asserts (*ibid.*, xix.), *pride imitates God inordinately: for it hath equality of fellowship under Him, and wishes to usurp His dominion over our fellow-creatures.*

Reply Obj. 3. Pride is directly opposed to the virtue of humility, which, in a way, is concerned about the same matter as magnanimity, as stated above (Q. CLXI., A. 1, *ad* 3). Hence the vice opposed to pride by default is akin to the vice of pusillanimity, which is opposed by default to magnanimity. For just as it belongs to magnanimity to urge the mind to great things against despair, so it belongs to humility to withdraw the mind from the inordinate desire of great things against presumption. Now pusillanimity, if we take it for a deficiency in pursuing great things, is properly opposed to magnanimity by default; but if we take it for the mind's attachment to things beneath what is becoming to a man, it is opposed to humility by default; since each proceeds from a smallness of mind. In the same way, on the other hand, pride may be opposed by excess, both to magnanimity and humility, from different points of view: to humility, inasmuch as it scorns subjection, to magnanimity, inasmuch as it tends to great things inordinately. Since, however, pride implies a certain elation, it is more directly opposed to humility, even as pusillanimity, which denotes littleness of soul in tending towards great things, is more directly opposed to magnanimity.

Second Article.

whether pride is a special sin?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that pride is not a special sin. For Augustine says (*De Nat. et Grat.* 29) that *you will find no sin that is not labelled pride;* and Prosper says (*De Vita Contempl.* iii. 2) that *without pride no sin is, or was, or ever will be possible.* Therefore pride is a general sin.

Obj. 2. Further, A gloss on Job xxxiii. 17, *That He may*

*withdraw man from wickedness,** says that *a man prides himself when he transgresses His commandments by sin.* Now, according to Ambrose (*De Parad.* 8), *every sin is a transgression of the Divine law, and a disobedience of the heavenly commandments.* Therefore every sin is pride.

Obj. 3. Further, Every special sin is opposed to a special virtue. But pride is opposed to all the virtues, for Gregory says (*Moral.* xxxiv. 17): *Pride is by no means content with the destruction of one virtue; it raises itself up against all the powers of the soul, and like an all-pervading and poisonous disease corrupts the whole body;* and Isidore says (*De Summo Bono* ii. 38) that it is *the downfall of all virtues.* Therefore pride is not a special sin.

Obj. 4. Further, Every special sin has a special matter. Now pride has a general matter, for Gregory says (*Moral.* xxxiv. 18) that *one man is proud of his gold, another of his eloquence: one is elated by mean and earthly things, another by sublime and heavenly virtues.* Therefore pride is not a special but a general sin.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Nat. et Grat.* 29): *If he look into the question carefully, he will find that, according to God's law, pride is a very different sin from other vices.* Now the genus is not different from its species. Therefore pride is not a general but a special sin.

I answer that, The sin of pride may be considered in two ways. First with regard to its proper species, which it has under the aspect of its proper object. In this way pride is a special sin, because it has a special object: for it is inordinate desire of one's own excellence, as stated in the foregoing *Article.* Secondly, it may be considered as having a certain influence towards other sins. In this way it has somewhat of a generic character, inasmuch as all sins may arise from pride, in two ways. First directly, through other sins being directed to the end of pride which is one's own excellence, to which may be directed anything that is inordinately desired. Secondly, indirectly and acci-

* Vulg.,—*From the things that he is doing, and may deliver him from pride.*

dentally as it were, that is by removing an obstacle, since pride makes a man despise the Divine law which hinders him from sinning, according to Jerem. ii. 20, *Thou hast broken My yoke, thou hast burst My bands, and thou saidst: I will not serve.*

It must, however, be observed that this generic character of pride admits of the possibility of all vices arising from pride sometimes, but it does not imply that all vices originate from pride always. For though one may break the commandments of the Law by any kind of sin, through contempt which pertains to pride, yet one does not always break the Divine commandments through contempt, but sometimes through ignorance, and sometimes through weakness: and for this reason Augustine says (*De Nat. et Grat.* 29) that *many things are done amiss which are not done through pride.*

Reply Obj. 1. These words are introduced by Augustine into his book *On Nature and Grace,* not as being his own, but as those of someone with whom he is arguing. Hence he subsequently disproves the assertion, and shows that not all sins are committed through pride. We might, however, reply that these authorities must be understood as referring to the outward effect of pride, namely the breaking of the commandments, which applies to every sin, and not to the inward act of pride, namely contempt of the commandment. For sin is committed, not always through contempt, but sometimes through ignorance, sometimes through weakness, as stated in the *Article.*

Reply Obj. 2. A man may sometimes commit a sin effectively, but not affectively; thus he who, in ignorance, slays his father, is a parricide effectively, but not affectively, since he did not intend it. Accordingly he who breaks God's commandment is said to pride himself against God, effectively always, but not always affectively.

Reply Obj. 3. A sin may destroy a virtue in two ways. In one way by direct contrariety to a virtue, and thus pride does not corrupt every virtue, but only humility; even as every special sin destroys the special virtue opposed

to it, by acting counter thereto. In another way a sin destroys a virtue, by making ill use of that virtue: and thus pride destroys every virtue, in so far as it finds an occasion of pride in every virtue, just as in everything else pertaining to excellence. Hence it does not follow that it is a general sin.

Reply Obj. 4. Pride regards a special aspect in its object, which aspect may be found in various matters: for it is inordinate love of one's excellence, and excellence may be found in various things.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SUBJECT OF PRIDE IS THE IRASCIBLE FACULTY?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the subject of pride is not the irascible faculty. For Gregory says (*Moral.* xxiii. 10): *A swollen mind is an obstacle to truth, for the swelling shuts out the light.* Now the knowledge of truth pertains, not to the irascible but to the rational faculty. Therefore pride is not in the irascible.

Obj. 2. Further, Gregory says (*Moral.* xxiv.) that *the proud observe other people's conduct not so as to set themselves beneath them with humility, but so as to set themselves above them with pride :* wherefore it would seem that pride originates in undue observation. Now observation pertains not to the irascible but to the rational faculty.

Obj. 3. Further, Pride seeks pre-eminence not only in sensible things, but also in spiritual and intelligible things: while it consists essentially in the contempt of God, according to Ecclus. x. 14, *The beginning of the pride of man is to fall off from God.* Now the irascible, since it is a part of the sensitive appetite, cannot extend to God and things intelligible. Therefore pride cannot be in the irascible.

Obj. 4. Further, *Pride is love of one's own excellence* (*Liber. Sent. Prosp.* 292). But love is not in the irascible, but in the concupiscible. Therefore pride is not in the irascible.

On the contrary, Gregory (*Moral.* ii. 26) opposes pride to the gift of fear. Now fear belongs to the irascible. Therefore pride is in the irascible.

I answer that, The subject of any virtue or vice is to be ascertained from its proper object: for the object of a habit or act cannot be other than the object of the power, which is the subject of both. Now the proper object of pride is something difficult, for pride is the desire of one's own excellence, as stated above (AA. 1, 2). Wherefore pride must needs pertain in some way to the irascible faculty. Now the irascible may be taken in two ways. First in a strict sense, and thus it is a part of the sensitive appetite, even as anger, strictly speaking, is a passion of the sensitive appetite. Secondly, the irascible may be taken in a broader sense, so as to belong also to the intellective appetite, to which also anger is sometimes ascribed. It is thus that we attribute anger to God and the angels, not as a passion, but as denoting the sentence of justice pronouncing judgment. Nevertheless the irascible understood in this broad sense is not distinct from the concupiscible power, as stated above in the First Part (Q. LIX., A. 4; Q. LXXXII., A. 5, *ad* 1 and 2). Consequently if the difficult thing which is the object of pride, were merely some sensible object, whereto the sensitive appetite might tend, pride would have to be in the irascible which is part of the sensitive appetite. But since the difficult thing which pride has in view is common both to sensible and to spiritual things, we must needs say that the subject of pride is the irascible not only strictly so called, as a part of the sensitive appetite, but also in its wider acceptation, as applicable to the intellective appetite. Wherefore pride is ascribed also to the demons.

Reply Obj. 1. Knowledge of truth is twofold. One is purely speculative, and pride hinders this indirectly by removing its cause. For the proud man subjects not his intellect to God, that he may receive the knowledge of truth from Him, according to Matth. xi. 25, *Thou hast hid these things from the wise and the prudent,* i.e. from the

proud, who are wise and prudent in their own eyes, *and hast revealed them to little ones*, i.e. to the humble: nor does he deign to learn anything from man, whereas it is written (Ecclus. vi. 34): *If thou wilt incline thy ear, thou shalt receive instruction.* The other knowledge of truth is affective, and this is directly hindered by pride, because the proud, through delighting in their own excellence, disdain the excellence of truth; thus Gregory says (*Moral.* xxiii. 10) that *the proud, although certain hidden truths be conveyed to their understanding, cannot realize their sweetness: and if they know of them they cannot relish them.* Hence it is written (Prov. xi. 2): *Where humility is there also is wisdom.*

Reply Obj. 2. As stated above (Q. CLXI., AA. 1, 2), humility observes the rule of right reason whereby a man has true self-esteem. Now pride does not observe this rule of right reason, for he esteems himself greater than he is: and this is the outcome of an inordinate desire for his own excellence, since a man is ready to believe what he desires very much, the result being that his appetite is borne towards things higher than what become him. Consequently whatsoever things lead a man to inordinate self-esteem lead him to pride: and one of those is the observing of other people's failings, just as, on the other hand, in the words of Gregory (*ibid.*), *holy men, by a like observation of other people's virtues, set others above themselves.* Accordingly the conclusion is, not that pride is in the rational faculty, but that one of its causes is in the reason.

Reply Obj. 3. Pride is in the irascible, not only as a part of the sensitive appetite, but also as having a more general signification, as stated in the *Article.*

Reply Obj. 4. According to Augustine (*De Civ. Dei* xiv. 7, 9), *love precedes all other emotions of the soul, and is their cause,* wherefore it may be employed to denote any of the other emotions. It is in this sense that pride is said to be *love of one's own excellence,* inasmuch as love makes a man presume inordinately on his superiority over others, and this belongs properly to pride.

Fourth Article.

WHETHER THE FOUR SPECIES OF PRIDE ARE FITTINGLY ASSIGNED BY GREGORY, NAMELY, TO THINK THAT ONE'S GOOD IS FROM ONESELF, TO PRESUME THAT WHAT IS GIVEN FROM ABOVE IS OWING TO OUR OWN MERITS, TO BOAST OF HAVING WHAT ONE HAS NOT, TO DESPISE OTHERS AND WISH TO APPEAR THE EXCLUSIVE POSSESSORS OF WHAT WE HAVE?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the four species of pride are unfittingly assigned by Gregory, who says (*Moral.* xxiii. 4): *There are four marks by which every kind of pride of the arrogant betrays itself; either when they think that their good is from themselves, or if they believe it to be from above, yet they think that it is due to their own merits; or when they boast of having what they have not, or despise others and wish to appear the exclusive possessors of what they have.* For pride is a vice distinct from unbelief, just as humility is a distinct virtue from faith. Now it pertains to unbelief, if a man deem that he has not received his good from God, or that he has the good of grace through his own merits. Therefore this should not be reckoned a species of pride.

Obj. 2. Further, The same thing should not be reckoned a species of different genera. Now boasting is reckoned a species of lying, as stated above (Q. CX., A. 2; Q. CXII.). Therefore it should not be accounted a species of pride.

Obj. 3. Further, Some other things apparently pertain to pride, which are not mentioned here. For Jerome says that *nothing is so indicative of pride as to show oneself ungrateful:* and Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xiv. 14) that *it belongs to pride to excuse oneself of a sin one has committed.* Again, presumption whereby one aims at having what is above one, would seem to have much to do with pride. Therefore the aforesaid division does not sufficiently account for the different species of pride.

Obj. 4. Further, We find other divisions of pride. For

Anselm divides the uplifting of pride (*De Simil.* 22), saying that there is *pride of will, pride of speech, and pride of deed.* Bernard also (*De Grad. Humil.* 10) reckons twelve degrees of pride, namely *curiosity, frivolity of mind, senseless mirth, boasting, singularity, arrogance, presumption, defence of one's sins, deceitful confession, rebelliousness, licence, sinful habit.* Now these apparently are not comprised under the species mentioned by Gregory. Therefore the latter would seem to be assigned unfittingly.

On the contrary, The authority of Gregory suffices.

I answer that, As stated above (AA. 1, 3), pride denotes immoderate desire of one's own excellence, a desire, to wit, that is not in accord with right reason. Now it must be observed that all excellence results from a good possessed. Such a good may be considered in three ways. First, in itself. For it is evident that the greater the good that one has, the greater the excellence that one derives from it. Hence when a man ascribes to himself a good greater than what he has, it follows that his appetite tends to his own excellence in a measure exceeding his competency: and thus we have the third species of pride, namely boasting of having what one has not. Secondly, it may be considered with regard to its cause, in so far as to have a thing of oneself is more excellent than to have it of another. Hence when a man esteems the good he has received of another as though he had it of himself, the result is that his appetite is borne towards his own excellence immoderately. Now one is cause of one's own good in two ways, efficiently and meritoriously: and thus we have the first two species of pride, namely when a man thinks he has from himself that which he has from God, or when he believes that which he has received from above to be due to his own merits. Thirdly, it may be considered with regard to the manner of having it, in so far as a man obtains greater excellence through possessing some good more excellently than other men; the result again being that his appetite is borne inordinately towards his own excellence: and thus we have the fourth species of pride, which is when

a man despises others and wishes to be singularly conspicuous.

Reply Obj. 1. A true judgment may be destroyed in two ways. First, universally: and thus in matters of faith, a true judgment is destroyed by unbelief. Secondly, in some particular matter of choice, and unbelief does not do this. Thus a man who commits fornication, judges that for the time being it is good for him to commit fornication; yet he is not an unbeliever, as he would be, were he to say that universally fornication is good. It is thus in the question in point: for it pertains to unbelief to assert universally that there is a good which is not from God, or that grace is given to men for their merits, whereas, properly speaking, it belongs to pride and not to unbelief, through inordinate desire of one's own excellence, to boast of one's goods as though one had them of oneself, or of one's own merits.

Reply Obj. 2. Boasting is reckoned a species of lying, as regards the outward act whereby a man falsely ascribes to himself what he has not: but as regards the inward arrogance of the heart it is reckoned by Gregory to be a species of pride.

Reply Obj. 3. The ungrateful man ascribes to himself what he has from another: wherefore the first two species of pride pertain to ingratitude. To excuse oneself of a sin one has committed, belongs to the third species, since by so doing a man ascribes to himself the good of innocence which he has not. To aim presumptuously at what is above one, would seem to belong chiefly to the fourth species, which consists in wishing to be preferred to others.

Reply Obj. 4. The three mentioned by Anselm correspond to the progress of any particular sin: for it begins by being conceived in thought, then is uttered in word, and thirdly is accomplished in deed.

The twelve degrees mentioned by Bernard are reckoned by way of opposition to the twelve degrees of humility, of which we have spoken above (Q. CLXI., A. 6). For the first degree of humility is to *be humble in heart, and to show*

it in one's very person, one's eyes fixed on the ground : and to this is opposed *curiosity*, which consists in looking around in all directions curiously and inordinately. The second degree of humility is *to speak few and sensible words, and not to be loud of voice :* to this is opposed *frivolity of mind*, by which a man is proud of speech. The third degree of humility is *not to be easily moved and disposed to laughter*, to which is opposed *senseless mirth*. The fourth degree of humility is *to maintain silence until one is asked*, to which is opposed *boasting*. The fifth degree of humility is *to do nothing but to what one is exhorted by the common rule of the monastery*, to which is opposed *singularity*, whereby a man wishes to seem more holy than others. The sixth degree of humility is *to believe and acknowledge oneself viler than all*, to which is opposed *arrogance*, whereby a man sets himself above others. The seventh degree of humility is *to think oneself worthless and unprofitable for all purposes*, to which is opposed *presumption*, whereby a man thinks himself capable of things that are above him. The eighth degree of humility is *to confess one's sins*, to which is opposed *defence of the same*. The ninth degree of humility is *to embrace patience by obeying under difficult and contrary circumstances*, to which is opposed *deceitful confession*, whereby a man being unwilling to be punished for his sins confesses them deceitfully. The tenth degree of humility is *obedience*, to which is opposed *rebelliousness*. The eleventh degree of humility is *not to delight in fulfilling one's own desires ;* to this is opposed *licence*, whereby a man delights in doing freely whatever he will. The last degree of humility is *fear of God :* to this is opposed *the habit of sinning*, which implies contempt of God.

In these twelve degrees not only are the species of pride indicated, but also certain things that precede and follow them, as we have stated above with regard to humility (Q. CLXI., A. 6).

Fifth Article.

whether pride is a mortal sin?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that pride is not a mortal sin. For a gloss on Ps. vii. 4, *O Lord my God, if I have done this thing,* says: *Namely, the universal sin which is pride.* Therefore if pride were a mortal sin, so would every sin be.

Obj. 2. Further, Every mortal sin is contrary to charity. But pride is apparently not contrary to charity, neither as to the love of God, nor as to the love of one's neighbour, because the excellence which, by pride, one desires inordinately, is not always opposed to God's honour, or our neighbour's good. Therefore pride is not a mortal sin.

Obj. 3. Further, Every mortal sin is opposed to virtue. But pride is not opposed to virtue; on the contrary, it arises therefrom, for as Gregory says (*Moral.* xxxiv. 18), *sometimes a man is elated by sublime and heavenly virtues.* Therefore pride is not a mortal sin.

On the contrary, Gregory says (*ibid.*) that *pride is a most evident sign of the reprobate, and contrariwise, humility of the elect.* But men do not become reprobate on account of venial sins. Therefore pride is not a venial but a mortal sin.

I answer that, Pride is opposed to humility. Now humility properly regards the subjection of man to God, as stated above (Q. CLXI., A. 1, *ad* 5). Hence pride properly regards lack of this subjection, in so far as a man raises himself above that which is appointed to him according to the Divine rule or measure, against the saying of the Apostle (2 Cor. x. 13), *But we will not glory beyond our measure; but according to the measure of the rule which God hath measured to us.* Wherefore it is written (Ecclus. x. 14): *The beginning of the pride of man is to fall off from God* because, to wit, the root of pride is found to consist in man not being, in some way, subject to God and His rule. Now it is evident that not to be subject to God

is of its very nature a mortal sin, for this consists in turning away from God: and consequently pride is, of its genus, a mortal sin. Nevertheless just as in other sins which are mortal by their genus (for instance fornication and adultery) there are certain motions that are venial by reason of their imperfection (through forestalling the judgment of reason, and being without its consent), so too in the matter of pride it happens that certain motions of pride are venial sins, when reason does not consent to them.

Reply Obj. 1. As stated above (A. 2) pride is a general sin, not by its essence but by a kind of influence, in so far as all sins may have their origin in pride. Hence it does not follow that all sins are mortal, but only such as arise from perfect pride, which we have stated to be a mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 2. Pride is always contrary to the love of God, inasmuch as the proud man does not subject himself to the Divine rule as he ought. Sometimes it is also contrary to the love of our neighbour; when, namely, a man sets himself inordinately above his neighbour: and this again is a transgression of the Divine rule, which has established order among men, so that one ought to be subject to another.

Reply Obj. 3. Pride arises from virtue, not as from its direct cause, but as from an accidental cause, in so far as a man makes a virtue an occasion for pride. And nothing prevents one contrary from being the accidental cause of another, as stated in *Phys.* viii. Hence some are even proud of their humility.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER PRIDE IS THE MOST GRIEVOUS OF SINS?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that pride is not the most grievous of sins. For the more difficult a sin is to avoid, the less grievous it would seem to be. Now pride is most difficult to avoid; for Augustine says in his Rule (*Ep.* ccxi.), *Other*

sins find their vent in the accomplishment of evil deeds, whereas pride lies in wait for good deeds to destroy them. Therefore pride is not the most grievous of sins.

Obj. 2. Further, The greater evil is opposed to the greater good, as the Philosopher asserts (*Ethic.* viii. 10). Now humility to which pride is opposed is not the greatest of virtues, as stated above (Q. LXI., A. 5). Therefore the vices that are opposed to greater virtues, such as unbelief, despair, hatred of God, murder, and so forth, are more grievous sins than pride.

Obj. 3. Further, The greater evil is not punished by a lesser evil. But pride is sometimes punished by other sins, according to Rom. i. 28, where it is stated that on account of their pride of heart men of science were delivered *to a reprobate sense, to do those things which are not convenient.* Therefore pride is not the most grievous of sins.

On the contrary, A gloss on Ps. cxviii. 51, *The proud did iniquitously,* says: *The greatest sin in man is pride.*

I answer that, Two things are to be observed in sin, conversion to a mutable good, and this is the material part of sin; and aversion from the immutable good, and this gives sin its formal aspect and complement. Now on the part of the conversion, there is no reason for pride being the greatest of sins, because uplifting which pride covets inordinately is not essentially most incompatible with the good of virtue. But on the part of the aversion, pride has extreme gravity, because in other sins man turns away from God, either through ignorance or through weakness, or through desire for any other good whatever; whereas pride denotes aversion from God simply through being unwilling to be subject to God and His rule. Hence Boethius* says that *while all vices flee from God, pride alone withstands God;* for which reason it is specially stated (James iv. 6) that *God resisteth the proud.* Wherefore aversion from God and His commandments, which is a consequence as it were in other sins, belongs to pride by its very nature, for its act is the contempt of God. And

* Cf. Cassian, *de Cœnob. Inst.* xii. 7.

since that which belongs to a thing by its nature is always of greater weight than that which belongs to it through something else, it follows that pride is the most grievous of sins by its genus, because it exceeds in aversion which is the formal complement of sin.

Reply Obj. 1. A sin is difficult to avoid in two ways. First, on account of the violence of its onslaught: thus anger is violent in its onslaught on account of its impetuosity; and still more difficult is it to resist concupiscence, on account of its connaturality, as stated in *Ethic.* ii. 9. A difficulty of this kind in avoiding sin diminishes the gravity of the sin; because a man sins the more grievously, according as he yields to a less impetuous temptation, as Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xiv. 12, 15). Secondly, it is difficult to avoid a sin, on account of its being hidden. In this way it is difficult to avoid pride, since it takes occasion even from good deeds, as stated (A. 5, *ad* 3). Hence Augustine says pointedly that it *lies in wait for good deeds*; and it is written (Ps. cxli. 4): *In the way wherein I walked, the proud** (Vulg.,—*they*) *have hidden a snare for me.* Hence no very great gravity attaches to the movement of pride while creeping in secretly, and before it is discovered by the judgment of reason: but once discovered by reason, it is easily avoided, both by considering one's own infirmity, according to Ecclus. x. 9, *Why is earth and ashes proud?* and by considering God's greatness, according to Job xv. 13, *Why doth thy spirit swell against God?* as well as by considering the imperfection of the goods on which man prides himself, according to Isa. xl. 6, *All flesh is grass, and all the glory thereof as the flower of the field*; and farther on (lxiv. 6), *all our justices* are become *like the rag of a menstruous woman.*

Reply Obj. 2. Opposition between a vice and a virtue is inferred from the object, which is considered on the part of conversion. In this way pride has no claim to be the greatest of sins, as neither has humility to be the greatest of virtues. But it is the greatest on the part of aversion,

* Cf. Ps. cxxxix. 6, *The proud have hidden a net for me.*

since it brings greatness upon other sins: for unbelief, by the fact of its arising out of proud contempt, is rendered more grievous than if it be the outcome of ignorance or weakness. The same applies to despair and the like.

Reply Obj. 3. Just as in syllogisms that lead to an impossible conclusion one is sometimes convinced by being faced with a more evident absurdity, so too, in order to overcome their pride, God punishes certain men by allowing them to fall into sins of the flesh, which though they be less grievous are more evidently shameful. Hence Isidore says (*De Summo Bono* ii.) that *pride is the worst of all vices; whether because it is appropriate to those who are of highest and foremost rank, or because it originates from just and virtuous deeds, so that its guilt is less perceptible. On the other hand, carnal lust is apparent to all, because from the outset it is of a shameful nature: and yet, under God's dispensation, it is less grievous than pride. For he who is in the clutches of pride and feels it not, falls into the lusts of the flesh, that being thus humbled he may rise from his abasement.*

From this indeed the gravity of pride is made manifest. For just as a wise physician, in order to cure a worse disease, allows the patient to contract one that is less dangerous, so the sin of pride is shown to be more grievous by the very fact that, as a remedy, God allows men to fall into other sins.

Seventh Article.

whether pride is the first sin of all?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that pride is not the first sin of all. For the first is maintained in all that follows. Now pride does not accompany all sins, nor is it the origin of all: for Augustine says (*De Nat. et Grat.* 29) that many things are done *amiss which are not done with pride.* Therefore pride is not the first sin of all.

Obj. 2. Further, It is written (Ecclus. x. 14) that the *beginning of . . . pride is to fall off from God.* Therefore falling away from God precedes pride.

Obj. 3. Further, The order of sins would seem to be according to the order of virtues. Now, not humility but faith is the first of all virtues. Therefore pride is not the first sin of all.

Obj. 4. Further, It is written (2 Tim. iii. 13): *Evil men and seducers shall grow worse and worse;* so that apparently man's beginning of wickedness is not the greatest of sins. But pride is the greatest of sins as stated in the foregoing *Article.* Therefore pride is not the first sin.

Obj. 5. Further, Resemblance and pretence come after the reality. Now the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iii. 7) that *pride apes fortitude and daring.* Therefore the vice of daring precedes the vice of pride.

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. x. 15): *Pride is the beginning of all sin.*

I answer that, The first thing in every genus is that which is essential. Now it has been stated above (A. 6) that aversion from God, which is the formal complement of sin, belongs to pride essentially, and to other sins, consequently. Hence it is that pride has the aspect of the first sin, and is the beginning of all sins, as stated above (I.-II., Q. LXXXIV., A. 2), when we were treating of the causes of sin on the part of the aversion which is the chief part of sin.

Reply Obj. 1. Pride is said to be the beginning of every sin, not as though every sin originated from pride, but because any kind of sin is naturally liable to arise from pride.

Reply Obj. 2. To fall off from God is said to be the beginning of pride, not as though it were a distinct sin from pride, but as being the first part of pride. For it has been said above (A. 5) that pride regards chiefly subjection to God which it scorns, and in consequence it scorns to be subject to a creature for God's sake.

Reply Obj. 3. There is no need for the order of virtues to be the same as that of vices. For vice is corruptive of virtue. Now that which is first to be generated is the last to be corrupted. Wherefore as faith is the first of

virtues, so unbelief is the last of sins, to which sometimes man is led by other sins. Hence a gloss on Ps. cxxxvi. 7, *Rase it, rase it, even to the foundation thereof*, says that *by heaping vice upon vice a man will lapse into unbelief*, and the Apostle says (1 Tim. i. 19) that *some rejecting a good conscience have made shipwreck concerning the faith.*

Reply Obj. 4. Pride is said to be the most grievous of sins because that which gives sin its gravity is essential to pride. Hence pride is the cause of gravity in other sins. Accordingly previous to pride there may be certain less grievous sins that are committed through ignorance or weakness. But among the more grievous sins the first is pride, as the cause whereby other sins are rendered more grievous. And as that which is the first in causing sins is the last in the withdrawal from sin, a gloss on Ps. xviii. 13, *I shall be cleansed from the greatest sin*, says: *Namely from the sin of pride, which is the last in those who return to God, and the first in those who withdraw from God.*

Reply Obj. 5. The Philosopher associates pride with feigned fortitude, not that it consists precisely in this, but because man thinks he is more likely to be uplifted before men, if he seem to be daring or brave.

Eighth Article.

whether pride should be reckoned a capital vice?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that pride should be reckoned a capital vice, since Isidore (*Comment. in Deut.* xvi.) and Cassian (*De Inst. Cænob.* i.) number pride among the capital vices.

Obj. 2. Further, Pride is apparently the same as vainglory, since both covet excellence. Now vainglory is reckoned a capital vice. Therefore pride also should be reckoned a capital vice.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (*De Virginit.* 31) that *pride begets envy, nor is it ever without this companion.* Now envy is reckoned a capital vice, as stated above

(Q. XXXVI., A. 4). Much more therefore is pride a capital vice.

On the contrary, Gregory (*Moral.* xxxi. 17) does not include pride among the capital vices.

I answer that, As stated above (AA. 2, 5, *ad* 1) pride may be considered in two ways; first in itself, as being a special sin; secondly, as having a general influence towards all sins. Now the capital vices are said to be certain special sins from which many kinds of sin arise. Wherefore some considering pride in the light of a special sin, numbered it together with the other capital vices. But Gregory, taking into consideration its general influence towards all vices, as explained above (A. 2), did not place it among the capital vices, but held it to be the queen and mother of all the vices. Hence he says (*loc. cit.*): *Pride, the queen of vices, when it has vanquished and captured the heart, forthwith delivers it into the hands of its lieutenants the seven principal vices, that they may despoil it and produce vices of all kinds.*

This suffices for the *Reply* to the *First Objection.*

Reply Obj. 2. Pride is not the same as vainglory, but is the cause thereof: for pride covets excellence inordinately: while vainglory covets the outward show of excellence.

Reply Obj. 3. The fact that envy, which is a capital vice, arises from pride, does not prove that pride is a capital vice, but that it is still more principal than the capital vices themselves.

QUESTION CLXIII.

OF THE FIRST MAN'S SIN.

(*In Four Articles.*)

We must now consider the first man's sin which was pride: and (1) his sin; (2) its punishment; (3) the temptation whereby he was led to sin.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether pride was the first man's first sin? (2) What the first man coveted by sinning? (3) Whether his sin was more grievous than all other sins? (4) Which sinned more grievously, the man or the woman?

First Article.

WHETHER PRIDE WAS THE FIRST MAN'S FIRST SIN?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that pride was not the first man's first sin. For the Apostle says (Rom. v. 19) that *by the disobedience of one man many were made sinners.* Now the first man's first sin is the one by which all men were made sinners in the point of original sin. Therefore disobedience, and not pride, was the first man's first sin.

Obj. 2. Further, Ambrose says, commenting on Luke v. 3, *And the devil said to Him,* that the devil in tempting Christ observed the same order as in overcoming the first man. Now Christ was first tempted to gluttony, as appears from Matth. iv. 3, where it was said to Him: *If thou be the Son of God, command that these stones be made bread.* Therefore the first man's first sin was not pride but gluttony.

Obj. 3. Further, Man sinned at the devil's suggestion.

Now the devil in tempting man promised him knowledge (Gen. iii. 5). Therefore inordinateness in man was through the desire of knowledge, which pertains to curiosity. Therefore curiosity, and not pride, was the first sin.

Obj. 4. Further, A gloss* on 1 Tim. ii. 14, *The woman being seduced was in the transgression*, says: *The Apostle rightly calls this seduction, for they were persuaded to accept a falsehood as being true; namely that God had forbidden them to touch that tree, because He knew that if they touched it, they would be like gods, as though He who made them men, begrudged them the godhead.* . . . Now it pertains to unbelief to believe such a thing. Therefore man's first sin was unbelief and not pride.

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. x. 15): *Pride is the beginning of all sin.* Now man's first sin is the beginning of all sin, according to Rom. v. 12, *By one man sin entered into this world.* Therefore man's first sin was pride.

I answer that, Many movements may concur towards one sin, and the character of sin attaches to that one in which inordinateness is first found. Now it is evident that inordinateness is in the inward movement of the soul before being in the outward act of the body; since, as Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* i. 18), *the sanctity of the body is not forfeited so long as the sanctity of the soul remains.* Now among the inward movements, the appetite is moved towards the end before being moved towards that which is desired for the sake of the end; and consequently man's first sin was where it was possible for his appetite to be directed to an inordinate end. Now man was so appointed in the state of innocence, that there was no rebellion of the flesh against the spirit. Wherefore it was not possible for the first inordinateness in the human appetite to result from his coveting a sensible good, to which the concupiscence of the flesh tends against the order of reason. It remains therefore that the first inordinateness of the human appetite resulted from his coveting inordinately some spiritual good. Now he would not have coveted it inordinately,

* S. Augustine (*Gen. ad Lit.* xi.).

by desiring it according to his measure as established by the Divine rule. Hence it follows that man's first sin consisted in his coveting some spiritual good above his measure: and this pertains to pride. Therefore it is evident that the first man's first sin was pride.

Reply Obj. 1. Man's disobedience to the Divine command was not willed by man for its own sake, for this could not happen unless one presuppose inordinateness in his will. It remains therefore that he willed it for the sake of something else. Now the first thing he coveted inordinately was his own excellence; and consequently his disobedience was the result of his pride. This agrees with the statement of Augustine, who says to Orosius (*Dial. Qq.* lxv. 4) that *man puffed up with his pride obeyed the serpent's prompting, and scorned God's commands.*

Reply Obj. 2. Gluttony also had a place in the sin of our first parents. For it is written (Gen. iii. 6): *The woman saw that the tree was good to eat, and fair to the eyes, and delightful to behold, and she took of the fruit thereof, and did eat.* Yet the very goodness and beauty of the fruit was not their first motive for sinning, but the persuasive words of the serpent, who said (*verse* 5): *Your eyes shall be opened and you shall be as Gods :* and it was by coveting this that the woman fell into pride. Hence the sin of gluttony resulted from the sin of pride.

Reply Obj. 3. The desire for knowledge resulted in our first parents from their inordinate desire for excellence. Hence the serpent began by saying: *You shall be as Gods,* and added: *Knowing good and evil.*

Reply Obj. 4. According to Augustine (*Gen. ad Lit.* xi.), *the woman had not believed the serpent's statement that they were debarred by God from a good and useful thing, were her mind not already filled with the love of her own power, and a certain proud self-presumption.* This does not mean that pride preceded the promptings of the serpent, but that as soon as the serpent had spoken his words of persuasion, her mind was puffed up, the result being that she believed the demon to have spoken truly.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE FIRST MAN'S PRIDE CONSISTED IN HIS COVETING GOD'S LIKENESS?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the first man's pride did not consist in his coveting the Divine likeness. For no one sins by coveting that which is competent to him according to his nature. Now God's likeness is competent to man according to his nature: for it is written (Gen. i. 26): *Let Us make man to Our image and likeness.* Therefore he did not sin by coveting God's likeness.

Obj. 2. Further, It would seem that man coveted God's likeness in order that he might obtain knowledge of good and evil: for this was the serpent's suggestion: *You shall be as Gods, knowing good and evil.* Now the desire of knowledge is natural to man, according to the saying of the Philosopher at the beginning of his *Metaphysics : All men naturally desire knowledge.* Therefore he did not sin by coveting God's likeness.

Obj. 3. Further, no wise man chooses the impossible. Now the first man was endowed with wisdom, according to Ecclus. xvii. 5, *He filled them with the knowledge of understanding.* Since then every sin consists in a deliberate act of the appetite, namely choice, it would seem that the first man did not sin by coveting something impossible. But it is impossible for man to be like God, according to the saying of Exod. xv. 11, *Who is like to Thee among the strong, O Lord?* Therefore the first man did not sin by coveting God's likeness.

On the contrary, Augustine commenting on Ps. lxviii. 5, *Then did I restore* (Douay,—*pay*) *that which I took not away,* says: *Adam and Eve wished to rob the Godhead and they lost happiness.*

I answer that, Likeness is twofold. One is a likeness of absolute equality:* and such a likeness to God our first

* Cf. P. I., Q. XCIII., A. 1.

parents did not covet, since such a likeness to God is not conceivable to the mind, especially of a wise man.

The other is a likeness of imitation, such as is possible for a creature in reference to God, in so far as the creature participates somewhat of God's likeness according to its measure. For Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* ix.): *The same things are like and unlike to God; like, according as they imitate Him, as far as He can be imitated; unlike, according as an effect falls short of its cause.* Now every good existing in a creature is a participated likeness of the first good.

Wherefore from the very fact that man coveted a spiritual good above his measure, as stated in the foregoing *Article*, it follows that he coveted God's likeness inordinately.

It must, however, be observed that the proper object of the appetite is a thing not possessed. Now spiritual good, in so far as the rational creature participates in the Divine likeness, may be considered in reference to three things. First, as to natural being: and this likeness was imprinted from the very outset of their creation, both on man,—of whom it is written (Gen. i. 26) that God made man *to His image and likeness*,—and on the angel, of whom it is written (Ezech. xxviii. 12): *Thou wast the seal of resemblance.* Secondly, as to knowledge: and this likeness was bestowed on the angel at his creation, wherefore immediately after the words just quoted, *Thou wast the seal of resemblance*, we read: *Full of wisdom.* But the first man, at his creation, had not yet received this likeness actually but only in potentiality. Thirdly, as to the power of operation: and neither angel nor man received this likeness actually at the very outset of his creation, because to each there remained something to be done whereby to obtain happiness.

Accordingly, while both (namely the devil and the first man) coveted God's likeness inordinately, neither of them sinned by coveting a likeness of nature. But the first man sinned chiefly by coveting God's likeness, as regards knowledge of good and evil, according to the serpent's instigation, namely that by his own natural power he might decide what was good, and what was evil for him to do; or again

that he should of himself foreknow what good and what evil would befall him. Secondarily he sinned by coveting God's likeness as regards his own power of operation, namely that by his own natural power he might act so as to obtain happiness. Hence Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit.* xi. 30) that *the woman's mind was filled with love of her own power*. On the other hand, the devil sinned by coveting God's likeness, as regards power. Wherefore Augustine says (*De Vera Relig.* 13) that *he wished to enjoy his own power rather than God's*. Nevertheless both coveted somewhat to be equal to God, in so far as each wished to rely on himself in contempt of the order of the Divine rule.

Reply Obj. 1. This argument considers the likeness of nature: and man did not sin by coveting this, as stated.

Reply Obj. 2. It is not a sin to covet God's likeness as to knowledge, absolutely; but to covet this likeness inordinately, that is, above one's measure, this is a sin. Hence Augustine commenting on Ps. lxx. 18, *O God, who is like Thee?* says: *He who desires to be of himself, even as God is of no one, wishes wickedly to be like God. Thus did the devil, who was unwilling to be subject to Him, and man who refused to be, as a servant, bound by His command.*

Reply Obj. 3. This argument considers the likeness of equality.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SIN OF OUR FIRST PARENTS WAS MORE GRIEVOUS THAN OTHER SINS?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the sin of our first parents was more grievous than other sins. For Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xiv. 15): *Great was the wickedness in sinning, when it was so easy to avoid sin.* Now it was very easy for our first parents to avoid sin, because they had nothing within them urging them to sin. Therefore the sin of our first parents was more grievous than other sins.

Obj. 2. Further, Punishment is proportionate to guilt. Now the sin of our first parents was most severely punished,

since by it *death entered into this world*, as the Apostle says (Rom. v. 12). Therefore that sin was more grievous than other sins.

Obj. 3. Further, The first in every genus is seemingly the greatest (*Metaph.* ii. 4). Now the sin of our first parents was the first among sins of men. Therefore it was the greatest.

On the contrary, Origen says (*Peri Archon.* iii.): *I think that a man who stands on the highest step of perfection cannot fail or fall suddenly: this can happen only by degrees and little by little.* Now our first parents were established on the highest and perfect grade. Therefore their first sin was not the greatest of all sins.

I answer that, There is a twofold gravity to be observed in sin. One results from the very species of the sin: thus we say that adultery is a graver sin than simple fornication. The other gravity of sin results from some circumstance of place, person, or time. The former gravity is more essential to sin and is of greater moment: hence a sin is said to be grave in respect of this gravity rather than of the other. Accordingly we must say that the first man's sin was not graver than all other sins of men, as regards the species of the sin. For though pride, of its genus, has a certain pre-eminence over other sins, yet the pride whereby one denies or blasphemes God is greater than the pride whereby one covets God's likeness inordinately, such as the pride of our first parents, as stated in the foregoing *Article*.

But if we consider the circumstances of the persons who sinned, that sin was most grave on account of the perfection of their state. We must accordingly conclude that this sin was most grievous relatively but not simply.

Reply Obj. 1. This argument considers the gravity of sin as resulting from the person of the sinner.

Reply Obj. 2. The severity of the punishment awarded to that first sin corresponds to the magnitude of the sin, not as regards its species but as regards its being the first sin: because it destroyed the innocence of our original state, and by robbing it of innocence brought disorder upon the whole human nature.

Reply Obj. 3. Where things are directly subordinate, the first must needs be the greatest. Such is not the order among sins, for one follows from another accidentally. And thus it does not follow that the first sin is the greatest.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ADAM'S SIN WAS MORE GRIEVOUS THAN EVE'S?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that Adam's sin was more grievous than Eve's. For it is written (1 Tim. ii. 14): *Adam was not seduced, but the woman being seduced was in the transgression :* and so it would seem that the woman sinned through ignorance, but the man through assured knowledge. Now the latter is the graver sin, according to Luke xii. 47, 48, *That servant who knew the will of his lord . . . and did not according to his will, shall be beaten with many stripes : but he that knew not, and did things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes.* Therefore Adam's sin was more grievous than Eve's.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (*De Decem Chordis* 3): *If the man is the head, he should live better, and give an example of good deeds especially to his wife, that she may imitate him.* Now he who ought to do better sins more grievously, if he commit a sin. Therefore Adam sinned more grievously than Eve.

Obj. 3. Further, The sin against the Holy Ghost would seem to be the most grievous. Now Adam, apparently, sinned against the Holy Ghost, because while sinning he relied on God's mercy,* and this pertains to the sin of presumption. Therefore it seems that Adam sinned more grievously than Eve.

On the contrary, Punishment corresponds to guilt. Now the woman was more grievously punished than the man, as appears from Gen. iii. Therefore she sinned more grievously than the man.

* Cf. Q. XXI., A. 2, *Obj.* 3. S. Thomas is evidently alluding to the words of Peter Lombard quoted there.

I answer that, As stated in the foregoing *Article*, the gravity of a sin depends on the species rather than on a circumstance of that sin. Accordingly we must assert that, if we consider the condition attaching to these persons, the man's sin is the more grievous, because he was more perfect than the woman.

As regards the genus itself of the sin, the sin of each is equally described, for each sinned by pride. Hence Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit.* xi. 35): *Eve in excusing herself betrays disparity of sex, though parity of pride.*

But as regards the species of pride, the woman sinned more grievously, for three reasons. First, because she was more puffed up than the man. For the woman believed in the serpent's persuasive words, namely that God had forbidden them to eat of the tree, lest they should become like to Him, so that in wishing to attain to God's likeness by eating of the forbidden fruit, her pride rose to the height of desiring to obtain something against God's will. On the other hand, the man did not believe this to be true; wherefore he did not wish to attain to God's likeness against God's will: but his pride consisted in wishing to attain thereto by his own power. Secondly, the woman not only herself sinned, but suggested sin to the man; wherefore she sinned against both God and her neighbour. Thirdly, the man's sin was diminished by the fact that, as Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit.* xi.), *he consented to the sin out of a certain friendly good-will, on account of which a man sometimes will offend God rather than make an enemy of his friend. That he ought not to have done so is shown by the just issue of the Divine sentence.*

It is therefore evident that the woman's sin was more grievous than the man's.

Reply Obj. 1. The woman was deceived because she was first of all puffed up with pride. Wherefore her ignorance did not excuse, but aggravated her sin, in so far as it was the cause of her being puffed up with still greater pride.

Reply Obj. 2. This argument considers the circumstance

of personal condition, on account of which the man's sin was more grievous than the woman's.

Reply Obj. 3. The man's reliance on God's mercy did not reach to contempt of God's justice, wherein consists the sin against the Holy Ghost, but as Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xiv. 11), it was due to the fact that, *having had no experience of God's severity, he thought the sin to be venial,* i.e. easily forgiven.*

* Cf. I.-II., Q. LXXXIX., A. 3, *ad* 1.

QUESTION CLXIV.

OF THE PUNISHMENTS OF THE FIRST MAN'S SIN.

(*In Two Articles.*)

WE must now consider the punishments of the first sin; and under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Death, which is the common punishment; (2) the other particular punishments mentioned in Genesis.

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER DEATH IS THE PUNISHMENT OF OUR FIRST PARENTS' SIN?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that death is not the punishment of our first parents' sin. For that which is natural to man cannot be called a punishment of sin, because sin does not perfect nature but vitiates it. Now death is natural to man: and this is evident both from the fact that his body is composed of contraries, and because *mortal* is included in the definition of man. Therefore death is not a punishment of our first parents' sin.

Obj. 2. Further, Death and other bodily defects are similarly found in man as well as in other animals, according to Eccles. iii. 19, *The death of man and of beasts is one, and the condition of them both is equal.* But in dumb animals death is not a punishment of sin. Therefore neither is it so in men.

Obj. 3. Further, The sin of our first parents was the sin of particular individuals: whereas death affects the entire human nature. Therefore it would seem that it is not a punishment of our first parents' sin.

Obj. 4. Further, All are equally descended from our first parents. Therefore if death were the punishment of our first parents' sin, it would follow that all men would suffer death in equal measure. But this is clearly untrue, since some die sooner, and some more painfully, than others. Therefore death is not the punishment of the first sin.

Obj. 5. Further, The evil of punishment is from God, as stated above (P. I., Q. XLIX., A. 2). But death, apparently, is not from God: for it is written (Wis. i. 13): *God made not death.* Therefore death is not the punishment of the first sin.

Obj. 6. Further, Seemingly, punishments are not meritorious, since merit is comprised under good, and punishment under evil. Now death is sometimes meritorious, as in the case of a martyr's death. Therefore it would seem that death is not a punishment.

Obj. 7. Further, Punishment would seem to be painful. But death apparently cannot be painful, since man does not feel it when he dies, and he cannot feel it when he is not dying. Therefore death is not a punishment of sin.

Obj. 8. Further, If death were a punishment of sin, it would have followed sin immediately. But this is not true, for our first parents lived a long time after their sin (Gen. v. 5). Therefore, seemingly, death is not a punishment of sin.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. v. 12): *By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death.*

I answer that, If any one, on account of his fault, be deprived of a favour bestowed on him, the privation of that favour is a punishment of that fault. Now as we stated in the First Part (Q. XCV., A. 1; Q. XCVII., A. 1), God bestowed this favour on man, in his primitive state, that as long as his mind was subject to God, the lower powers of his soul would be subject to his rational mind, and his body to his soul. But inasmuch as through sin man's mind withdrew from subjection to God, the result was that neither were his lower powers wholly subject to his reason: and from this there followed so great a rebellion of the

carnal appetite against the reason, that neither was the body wholly subject to the soul: whence arose death and other bodily defects. For life and soundness of body depend on the body being subject to the soul, as the perfectible is subject to its perfection. Consequently, on the other hand, death, sickness, and all defects of the body are due to the lack of the body's subjection to the soul.

It is therefore evident that as the rebellion of the carnal appetite against the spirit is a punishment of our first parents' sin, so also are death and all defects of the body.

Reply Obj. 1. A thing is said to be natural if it proceeds from the principles of nature. Now the essential principles of nature are form and matter. The form of man is his rational soul, which is, of itself, immortal: wherefore death is not natural to man on the part of his form. The matter of man is a body such as is composed of contraries, of which corruptibility is a necessary consequence, and in this respect death is natural to man. Now this condition attached to the nature of the human body results from a natural necessity, since it was necessary for the human body to be the organ of touch, and consequently a mean between objects of touch: and this was impossible, were it not composed of contraries, as the Philosopher states (*De Anima* ii. 3). On the other hand, this condition is not attached to the adaptability of matter to form because, if it were possible, since the form is incorruptible, its matter should rather be incorruptible. In the same way a saw needs to be of iron, this being suitable to its form and action, so that its hardness may make it fit for cutting. But that it be liable to rust is a necessary result of such a matter and is not according to the agent's choice; for, if the craftsman were able, of the iron he would make a saw that would not rust. Now God Who is the author of man is all-powerful, wherefore when He first made man, He conferred on him the favour of being exempt from the necessity resulting from such a matter: which favour, however, was withdrawn through the sin of our first parents. Accordingly death is both natural on account of a condition

attaching to matter, and penal on account of the loss of the Divine favour preserving man from death.*

Reply Obj. 2. This likeness of man to other animals regards a condition attaching to matter, namely the body being composed of contraries. But it does not regard the form, for man's soul is immortal, whereas the souls of dumb animals are mortal.

Reply Obj. 3. Our first parents were made by God not only as particular individuals, but also as principles of the whole human nature to be transmitted by them to their posterity, together with the Divine favour preserving them from death. Hence through their sin the entire human nature, being deprived of that favour in their posterity, incurred death.

Reply Obj. 4. A twofold defect arises from sin. One is by way of a punishment appointed by a judge: and such a defect should be equal in those to whom the sin pertains equally. The other defect is that which results accidentally from this punishment; for instance, that one who has been deprived of his sight for a sin he has committed, should fall down in the road. Such a defect is not proportionate to the sin, nor does a human judge take it into account, since he cannot foresee chance happenings. Accordingly, the punishment appointed for the first sin and proportionately corresponding thereto, was the withdrawal of the Divine favour whereby the rectitude and integrity of human nature was maintained. But the defects resulting from this withdrawal are death and other penalties of the present life. Wherefore these punishments need not be equal in those to whom the first sin equally appertains. Nevertheless, since God foreknows all future events, the Divine foreknowledge and providence has so disposed that these penalties are apportioned in different ways to various people. This is not on account of any merits or demerits previous to this life, as Origen held (*Peri Archon.* ii. 9):—for this is contrary to the words of Rom. ix. 11, *When they . . . had not done any good or evil;* and also contrary to

* Cf. I.-II., Q. LXXXV., A. 6.

statements made in the First Part (Q. XLVII., A. 2; Q. LXXV., A. 7; Q. XC., A. 4), namely that the soul is not created before the body: but either in punishment of their parents' sins, inasmuch as the child is something belonging to the father, wherefore parents are often punished in their children; or again it is for a remedy intended for the spiritual welfare of the person who suffers these penalties, to wit that he may thus be turned away from his sins, or lest he take pride in his virtues, and that he may be crowned for his patience.

Reply Obj. 5. Death may be considered in two ways. First, as an evil of human nature, and thus it is not of God, but is a defect befalling man through his fault. Secondly, as having an aspect of good, namely as being a just punishment, and thus it is from God. Wherefore Augustine says (*Retract.* i.) that God is not the author of death, except in so far as death is a punishment.

Reply Obj. 6. As Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xiii. 5), *just as the wicked abuse not only evil but also good things, so do the righteous make good use not only of good but also of evil things. Hence it is that both evil men make evil use of the law, though the law is good, while good men die well, although death is an evil.* Wherefore inasmuch as holy men make good use of death, their death is to them meritorious.

Reply Obj. 7. Death may be considered in two ways. First, as the privation of life, and thus death cannot be felt, since it is the privation of sense and life. In this way it involves not pain of sense but pain of loss. Secondly, it may be considered as denoting the corruption which ends in the aforesaid privation. Now we may speak of corruption even as of generation in two ways: in one way as being the term of alteration, and thus in the first instant in which life departs, death is said to be present. In this way also death has no pain of sense. In another way corruption may be taken as including the previous alteration: thus a person is said to die, when he is in motion towards death; just as a thing is said to be engendered,

while in motion towards the state of having been engendered: and thus death may be painful.

Reply Obj. 8. According to Augustine (*Gen. ad lit.* ii. 32), *this death occurred on the day when that was done which God forbade, because from thenceforth our first parents contracted in their body the deadly and death-bearing quality.* Or, as he says again (*De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss.* i. 16), *although our first parents lived thereafter many years, they began to die on the day when they heard the death-decree, condemning them to decline to old age.*

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE PARTICULAR PUNISHMENTS OF OUR FIRST PARENTS ARE SUITABLY APPOINTED IN SCRIPTURE?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the particular punishments of our first parents are unsuitably appointed in Scripture. For that which would have occurred even without sin should not be described as a punishment for sin. Now seemingly there would have been pain in child-bearing, even had there been no sin: for the disposition of the female sex is such that offspring cannot be born without pain to the bearer. Likewise the subjection of woman to man results from the perfection of the male, and the imperfection of the female sex. Again it belongs to the nature of the earth to bring forth thorns and thistles, and this would have occurred even had there been no sin. Therefore these are unsuitable punishments of the first sin.

Obj. 2. Further, That which pertains to a person's dignity does not, seemingly, pertain to his punishment. But the multiplying of conceptions pertains to a woman's dignity. Therefore it should not be described as the woman's punishment.

Obj. 3. Further, The punishment of our first parents' sin is transmitted to all, as we have stated with regard to death (A. 1). But all women's conceptions are not multiplied, nor does every man eat bread in the sweat of his face.

Therefore these are not suitable punishments of the first sin.

Obj. 4. Further, The place of paradise was made for man. Now nothing in the order of things should be without purpose. Therefore it would seem that the exclusion of man from paradise was not a suitable punishment of man.

Obj. 5. Further, This place of the earthly paradise is said to be naturally inaccessible. Therefore it was useless to put other obstacles in the way lest man should return thither, to wit the cherubim, and the *flaming sword turning every way.*

Obj. 6. Further, Immediately after his sin man was subject to the necessity of dying, so that he could not be restored to immortality by the beneficial tree of life. Therefore it was useless to forbid him to eat of the tree of life, as instanced by the words of Gen. iii. 22: See, *lest perhaps he . . . take . . . of the tree of life . . . and live for ever.*

Obj. 7. Further, To mock the unhappy seems inconsistent with mercy and clemency, which are most of all ascribed to God in Scripture, according to Ps. cxliv. 9, *His tender mercies are over all His works.* Therefore God is unbecomingly described as mocking our first parents, already reduced through sin to unhappy straits, in the words of Gen. iii. 22, *Behold Adam is become as one of Us, knowing good and evil.*

Obj. 8. Further, Clothes are necessary to man, like food, according to 1 Tim. vi. 8, *Having food, and wherewith to be covered, with these we are content.* Therefore just as food was appointed to our first parents before their sin, so also should clothing have been ascribed to them. Therefore after their sin it was unsuitable to say that God made for them garments of skin.

Obj. 9. Further, The punishment inflicted for a sin should outweigh in evil the gain realized through the sin: else the punishment would not deter one from sinning. Now through sin our first parents gained in this, that their eyes were opened, according to Gen. iii. 7. But this out-

weighs in good all the penal evils which are stated to have resulted from sin. Therefore the punishments resulting from our first parents' sin are unsuitably described.

On the contrary, These punishments were appointed by God, Who does all things, *in number, weight, and measure** (Wis. xi. 21).

I answer that, As stated in the foregoing *Article,* on account of their sin, our first parents were deprived of the Divine favour, whereby the integrity of human nature was maintained in them, and by the withdrawal of this favour human nature incurred penal defects. Hence they were punished in two ways. In the first place by being deprived of that which was befitting the state of integrity, namely the place of the earthly paradise: and this is indicated (Gen. iii. 23) where it is stated that *God sent him out of the paradise of pleasure.* And since he was unable, of himself, to return to that state of original innocence, it was fitting that obstacles should be placed against his recovering those things that were befitting his original state, namely food (lest he should take of the tree of life) and place; for *God placed before . . . paradise . . . Cherubim, and a flaming sword.* Secondly, they were punished by having appointed to them things befitting a nature bereft of the aforesaid favour: and this as regards both the body and the soul. With regard to the body, to which pertains the distinction of sex, one punishment was appointed to the woman and another to the man. To the woman punishment was appointed in respect of two things on account of which she is united to the man; and these are the begetting of children, and community of works pertaining to family life. As regards the begetting of children, she was punished in two ways: first in the weariness to which she is subject while carrying the child after conception, and this is indicated in the words (Gen. iii. 16), *I will multiply thy sorrows, and thy conceptions;* secondly, in the pain which she suffers in giving birth, and this is

* Vulg.,—*Thou hast ordered all things in measure, and number, and weight.*

indicated by the words (*ibid.*), *In sorrow shalt thou bring forth.* As regards family life she was punished by being subjected to her husband's authority, and this is conveyed in the words (*ibid.*), *Thou shalt be under thy husband's power.*

Now, just as it belongs to the woman to be subject to her husband in matters relating to the family life, so it belongs to the husband to provide the necessaries of that life. In this respect he was punished in three ways. First, by the barrenness of the earth, in the words (*verse* 17), *Cursed is the earth in thy work.* Secondly, by the cares of his toil, without which he does not win the fruits of the earth; hence the words (*ibid.*), *With labour and toil shalt thou eat thereof all the days of thy life.* Thirdly, by the obstacles encountered by the tillers of the soil, wherefore it is written (*verse* 18), *Thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to thee.*

Likewise a triple punishment is ascribed to them on the part of the soul. First, by reason of the confusion they experienced at the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit; hence it is written (*verse* 7): *The eyes of them both were opened; and . . . they perceived themselves to be naked.* Secondly, by the reproach for their sin, indicated by the words (*verse* 22), *Behold Adam is become as one of Us.* Thirdly, by the reminder of their coming death, when it was said to him (*verse* 19): *Dust thou art and into dust thou shalt return.* To this also pertains that God made them garments of skin, as a sign of their mortality.

Reply Obj. 1. In the state of innocence child-bearing would have been painless: for Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xiv. 26): *Just as, in giving birth, the mother was then relieved not by groans of pain, but by the instigations of maturity, so in bearing and conceiving the union of both sexes was one not of lustful desire but of deliberate action.**

The subjection of the woman to her husband is to be understood as inflicted in punishment of the woman, not as to his head-ship (since even before sin the man was the

* Cf. P. I., Q. XCVIII., A. 2.

head and governor of the woman), but as to her having now to obey her husband's will even against her own.

If man had not sinned, the earth would have brought forth thorns and thistles to be the food of animals, but not to punish man, because their growth would bring no labour or punishment for the tiller of the soil, as Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit.* iii. 18). Alcuin,* however, holds that, before sin, the earth brought forth no thorns and thistles whatever: but the former opinion is the better.

Reply Obj. 2. The multiplying of her conceptions was appointed as a punishment to the woman, not on account of the begetting of children, for this would have been the same even before sin, but on account of the numerous sufferings to which the woman is subject, through carrying her offspring after conception. Hence it is expressly stated: *I will multiply thy sorrows, and thy conceptions.*

Reply Obj. 3. These punishments affect all somewhat. For any woman who conceives must needs suffer sorrows and bring forth her child with pain: except the Blessed Virgin, who conceived without corruption, and bore without pain, because her conceiving was not according to the law of nature, transmitted from our first parents. And if a woman neither conceives nor bears, she suffers from the defect of barrenness, which outweighs the aforesaid punishments. Likewise whoever tills the soil must needs eat his bread in the sweat of his brow: while those who do not themselves work on the land, are busied with other labours, for *man is born to labour* (Job v. 7); and thus they eat the bread for which others have laboured in the sweat of their brow.

Reply Obj. 4. Although the place of the earthly paradise avails not man for his use, it avails him for a lesson; because he knows himself deprived of that place on account of sin, and because by the things that have a bodily existence in that paradise, he is instructed in things pertaining to the heavenly paradise, the way to which is prepared for man by Christ.

* *Interrog. et Resp. in Gen.* 17.

Reply Obj. 5. Apart from the mysteries of the spiritual interpretation, this place would seem to be inaccessible, chiefly on account of the extreme heat in the middle zone by reason of the nighness of the sun. This is denoted by the flaming sword, which is described as *turning every way*, as being appropriate to the circular movement that causes this heat. And since the movements of corporal creatures are set in order through the ministry of the angels, according to Augustine (*De Trin.* iii. 4), it was fitting that, besides the sword turning every way, there should be cherubim *to keep the way of the tree of life.* Hence Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit.* xi. 40): *It is to be believed that even in the visible paradise this was done by heavenly powers indeed, so that there was a fiery guard set there by the ministry of angels.*

Reply Obj. 6. After sin, if man had ate of the tree of life, he would not thereby have recovered immortality, but by means of that beneficial food he might have prolonged his life. Hence in the words, *And live for ever, 'for ever'* signifies *for a long time.* For it was not expedient for man to remain longer in the unhappiness of this life.

Reply Obj. 7. According to Augustine (*Gen. ad lit.* xi. 39), *these words of God are not so much a mockery of our first parents as a deterrent to others, for whose benefit these things are written, lest they be proud likewise,* because *Adam not only failed to become that which he coveted to be, but did not keep that to which he was made.*

Reply Obj. 8. Clothing is necessary to man in his present state of unhappiness for two reasons. First, to supply a deficiency in respect of external harm caused by, for instance, extreme heat or cold. Secondly, to hide his ignominy and to cover the shame of those members wherein the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit is most manifest. Now these two motives do not apply to the primitive state; because then man's body could not be hurt by any outward thing, as stated in the First Part (Q. XCVII., A. 2), nor was there in man's body anything shameful that would bring confusion on him. Hence it is written (Gen. ii. 23): *And they were both naked, to wit Adam and his wife, and were not*

ashamed. The same cannot be said of food, which is necessary to entertain the natural heat, and to sustain the body.

Reply Obj. 9. As Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit.* xi. 31), *We must not imagine that our first parents were created with their eyes closed, especially since it is stated that the woman saw that the tree was fair, and good to eat. Accordingly the eyes of both were opened so that they saw and thought on things which had not occurred to their minds before; this was a mutual concupiscence such as they had not hitherto.*

QUESTION CLXV.

OF OUR FIRST PARENTS' TEMPTATION.

(*In Two Articles.*)

We must now consider our first parents' temptation, concerning which there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether it was fitting for man to be tempted by the devil? (2) Of the manner and order of that temptation.

First Article.

WHETHER IT WAS FITTING FOR MAN TO BE TEMPTED BY THE DEVIL?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that it was not fitting for man to be tempted by the devil. For the same final punishment is appointed to the angel's sin and to man's, according to Matth. xxv. 41, *Go* (Vulg.,—*Depart from Me*) *you cursed into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the devil and his angels.* Now the angel's first sin did not follow a temptation from without. Therefore neither should man's first sin have resulted from an outward temptation.

Obj. 2. Further, God, Who foreknows the future, knew that through the demon's temptation man would fall into sin, and thus He knew full well that it was not expedient for man to be tempted. Therefore it would seem unfitting for God to allow him to be tempted.

Obj. 3. Further, It seems to savour of punishment that anyone should have an assailant, just as on the other hand the cessation of an assault is akin to a reward. Now punishment should not precede fault. Therefore it was unfitting for man to be tempted before he sinned.

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. xxxiv. 11): *He that hath not been tempted* (Douay,—*tried*), *what manner of things doth he know?*

I answer that, God's wisdom *orders all things sweetly* (Wis. viii. 1) inasmuch as His providence appoints to each one that which is befitting it according to its nature. For as Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* iv. 23), *it belongs to providence not to destroy, but to maintain, nature.* Now it is a condition attaching to human nature that one creature can be helped or impeded by another. Wherefore it was fitting that God should both allow man in the state of innocence to be tempted by evil angels, and should cause him to be helped by good angels. For by a special favour of grace, it was granted him that no creature outside himself could harm him against his own will, whereby he was able even to resist the temptation of the demon.

Reply Obj. 1. Above the human nature there is another that admits of the possibility of the evil of fault: but there is not above the angelic nature. Now only one that is already become evil through sin can tempt by leading another into evil. Hence it was fitting that by an evil angel man should be tempted to sin, even as according to the order of nature he is moved forward to perfection by means of a good angel. An angel could be perfected in good by something above him, namely by God, but he could not thus be led into sin, because according to Jas. i. 13, *God is not a tempter of evils.*

Reply Obj. 2. Just as God knew that man, through being tempted, would fall into sin, so too He knew that man was able, by his free will, to resist the tempter. Now the condition attaching to man's nature required that he should be left to his own will, according to Ecclus. xv. 14, *God left* man *in the hand of his own counsel.* Hence Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit.* xi. 4): *It seems to me that man would have had no prospect of any special praise, if he were able to lead a good life simply because there was none to persuade him to lead an evil life; since both by nature he had the power, and in his power he had the will, not to consent to the persuader.*

Reply Obj. 3. An assault is penal if it be difficult to resist it: but, in the state of innocence, man was able, without any difficulty, to resist temptation. Consequently the tempter's assault was not a punishment to man.

Second Article.

WHETHER THE MANNER AND ORDER OF THE FIRST TEMPTATION WAS FITTING?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the manner and order of the first temptation was not fitting. For just as in the order of nature the angel was above man, so was the man above the woman. Now sin came upon man through an angel: therefore in like manner it should have come upon the woman through the man; in other words the woman should have been tempted by the man, and not the other way about.

Obj. 2. Further, The temptation of our first parents was by suggestion. Now the devil is able to make suggestions to man without making use of an outward sensible creature. Since then our first parents were endowed with a spiritual mind, and adhered less to sensible than to intelligible things, it would have been more fitting for man to be tempted with a merely spiritual, instead of an outward, temptation.

Obj. 3. Further, One cannot fittingly suggest an evil except through some apparent good. But many other animals have a greater appearance of good than the serpent has. Therefore man was unfittingly tempted by the devil through a serpent.

Obj. 4. Further, The serpent is an irrational animal. Now wisdom, speech, and punishment are not befitting an irrational animal. Therefore the serpent is unfittingly described (Gen. iii. 1) as *more subtle than any of the beasts of the earth*, or as *the most prudent of all beasts* according to another version:* and likewise is unfittingly stated to have spoken to the woman, and to have been punished by God.

* The Septuagint.

On the contrary, That which is first in any genus should be proportionate to all that follow it in that genus. Now in every kind of sin we find the same order as in the first temptation. For, according to Augustine (*De Trin.* xii. 12), it begins with the concupiscence of sin in the sensuality, signified by the serpent; extends to the lower reason, by pleasure, signified by the woman; and reaches to the higher reason by consent in the sin, signified by the man. Therefore the order of the first temptation was fitting.

I answer that, Man is composed of a twofold nature, intellective and sensitive. Hence the devil, in tempting man, made use of a twofold incentive to sin: one on the part of the intellect, by promising the Divine likeness through the acquisition of knowledge which man naturally desires to have; the other on the part of sense. This he did by having recourse to those sensible things, which are most akin to man, partly by tempting the man through the woman who was akin to him in the same species; partly by tempting the woman through the serpent, who was akin to them in the same genus; partly by suggesting to them to eat of the forbidden fruit, which was akin to them in the proximate genus.

Reply Obj. 1. In the act of tempting the devil was by way of principal agent; whereas the woman was employed as an instrument of temptation in bringing about the downfall of the man, both because the woman was weaker than the man, and consequently more liable to be deceived, and because, on account of her union with man, the devil was able to deceive the man especially through her. Now there is no parity between principal agent and instrument, because the principal agent must exceed in power, which is not requisite in the instrumental agent.

Reply Obj. 2. A suggestion whereby the devil suggests something to man spiritually, shows the devil to have more power against man than outward suggestion has, since by an inward suggestion, at least, man's imagination is changed by the devil;* whereas by an outward suggestion, a change

* Cf. P. I., Q. XCI., A. 3.

is wrought merely on an outward creature. Now the devil had a minimum of power against man before sin, wherefore he was unable to tempt him by inward suggestion, but only by outward suggestion.

Reply Obj. 3. According to Augustine (*Gen. ad lit.* xi. 3), *we are not to suppose that the devil chose the serpent as his means of temptation; but as he was possessed of the lust of deceit, he could only do so by the animal he was allowed to use for that purpose.*

Reply Obj. 4. According to Augustine (*Gen. ad lit.* xi. 28, 29), *the serpent is described as most prudent or subtle, on account of the cunning of the devil, who wrought his wiles in it: thus, we speak of a prudent or cunning tongue, because it is the instrument of a prudent or cunning man in advising something prudently or cunningly. Nor indeed did the serpent understand the sounds which were conveyed through it to the woman; nor again are we to believe that its soul was changed into a rational nature, since not even men, who are rational by nature, know what they say when a demon speaks in them. Accordingly the serpent spoke to man, even as the ass on which Balaam sat spoke to him, except that the former was the work of a devil, whereas the latter was the work of an angel.* Again (*ibid.*, 36) he says: *Hence the serpent was not asked why it had done this, because it had not done this in its own nature, but the devil in it, who was already condemned to everlasting fire on account of his sin: and the words addressed to the serpent were directed to him who wrought through the serpent.* Moreover, as again Augustine says (*Super Gen. contra Manich.* ii. 17, 18), *his, that is, the devil's, punishment mentioned here is that for which we must be on our guard against him, not that which is reserved till the last judgment. For when it was said to him: "Thou art cursed among all cattle and beasts of the earth," the cattle are set above him, not in power, but in the preservation of their nature, since the cattle lost no heavenly bliss, seeing that they never had it, but they continue to live in the nature which they received. It is also said to him: "Upon thy breast and belly shalt thou creep," according to another version*

(the Septuagint). *Here the breast signifies pride, because it is there that the impulse of the soul dominates, while the belly denotes carnal desire, because this part of the body is softest to the touch : and on these he creeps to those whom he wishes to deceive. The words, "Earth shalt thou eat all the days of thy life" may be understood in two ways. Either "Those shall belong to thee, whom thou shalt deceive by earthly lust," namely sinners who are signified under the name of earth, or a third kind of temptation, namely curiosity, is signified by these words : for to eat earth is to look into things deep and dark. The putting of enmities between him and the woman means that we cannot be tempted by the devil, except through that part of the soul which bears or reflects the likeness of a woman. The seed of the devil is the temptation to evil, the seed of the woman is the fruit of good works, whereby the temptation to evil is resisted. Wherefore the serpent lies in wait for the woman's heel, that if at any time she fall away towards what is unlawful, pleasure may seize hold of her : and she watches his head that she may shut him out at the very outset of the evil temptation.*

QUESTION CLXVI.

OF STUDIOUSNESS.

(In Two Articles.)

We must next consider studiousness and its opposite, curiosity. Concerning studiousness there are two points of inquiry: (1) What is the matter of studiousness? (2) Whether it is a part of temperance?

First Article.

WHETHER THE PROPER MATTER OF STUDIOUSNESS IS KNOWLEDGE?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that knowledge is not the proper matter of studiousness. For a person is said to be studious because he applies study to certain things. Now a man ought to apply study to every matter, in order to do aright what has to be done. Therefore seemingly knowledge is not the special matter of studiousness.

Obj. 2. Further, Studiousness is opposed to curiosity. Now curiosity, which is derived from *cura* (*care*), may also refer to elegance of apparel and other such things, which regard the body; wherefore the Apostle says (Rom. xiii. 14): *Make not provision* (*curam*) *for the flesh in its concupiscences.*

Obj. 3. Further, It is written (Jerem. vi. 13): *From the least of them even to the greatest, all study* (Douay,—*are given to*) *covetousness.* Now covetousness is not properly about knowledge, but rather about the possession of wealth, as stated above (Q. CXVIII., A. 2). Therefore studiousness, which is derived from *study*, is not properly about knowledge.

On the contrary, It is written (Prov. xxvii. 11): *Study wisdom, my son, and make my heart joyful, that thou mayest give an answer to him that reproacheth.* Now study, which is commended as a virtue, is the same as that to which the Law urges. Therefore studiousness is properly about knowledge.

I answer that, Properly speaking, study denotes keen application of the mind to something. Now the mind is not applied to a thing except by knowing that thing. Wherefore the mind's application to knowledge precedes its application to those things to which man is directed by his knowledge. Hence study regards knowledge in the first place, and as a result it regards any other things the working of which requires to be directed by knowledge. Now the virtues lay claim to that matter about which they are first and foremost; thus fortitude is concerned about dangers of death, and temperance about pleasures of touch. Therefore studiousness is properly ascribed to knowledge.

Reply Obj. 1. Nothing can be done aright as regards other matters, except in so far as is previously directed by the knowing reason. Hence studiousness, to whatever matter it be applied, has a prior regard for knowledge.

Reply Obj. 2. Man's mind is drawn, on account of his affections, towards the things for which he has an affection, according to Matth. vi. 21, *Where thy treasure is, there is thy heart also.* And since man has special affection for those things which foster the flesh, it follows that man's knowledge is concerned about things that foster his flesh, so that man seeks to know how he may best sustain his body. Accordingly curiosity is accounted to be about things pertaining to the body by reason of things pertaining to knowledge.

Reply Obj. 3. Covetousness craves the acquisition of gain, and for this it is very necessary to be skilled in earthly things. Accordingly studiousness is ascribed to things pertaining to covetousness.

Second Article.

whether studiousness is a part of temperance?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that studiousness is not a part of temperance. For a man is said to be studious by reason of his studiousness. Now all virtuous persons without exception are called studious according to the Philosopher, who frequently employs the term *studious* (σπουδαίος) in this sense (*Ethic.* ix. 4, 8, 9).* Therefore studiousness is a general virtue, and not a part of temperance.

Obj. 2. Further, Studiousness, as stated in the foregoing *Article*, pertains to knowledge. But knowledge has no connexion with the moral virtues which are in the appetitive part of the soul, and pertains rather to the intellectual virtues which are in the cognitive part: wherefore solicitude is an act of prudence, as stated above (Q. XLVII., A. 9). Therefore studiousness is not a part of temperance.

Obj. 3. Further, A virtue that is ascribed as part of a principal virtue resembles the latter as to mode. Now studiousness does not resemble temperance as to mode, because temperance takes its name from being a kind of restraint, wherefore it is more opposed to the vice that is in excess: whereas studiousness is denominated from being the application of the mind to something, so that it would seem to be opposed to the vice that is in default, namely neglect of study, rather than to the vice which is in excess, namely curiosity; wherefore, on account of its resemblance to the latter, Isidore says (*Etym.* x.) that *a studious man is one who is curious to study.* Therefore studiousness is not a part of temperance.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Morib. Eccl.* 21): *We are forbidden to be curious : and this is a great gift that temperance bestows.* Now curiosity is prevented by moderate studiousness. Therefore studiousness is a part of temperance.

* In the same sense Aristotle says (*Ethic.* iii. 2) that *every vicious person is ignorant of what he ought to do.*

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CXLI., AA. 1, 2, 3), it belongs to temperance to moderate the movement of the appetite, lest it tend excessively to that which is desired naturally. Now just as in respect of his corporeal nature man naturally desires the pleasures of food and sex, so, in respect of his soul, he naturally desires to know something; thus the Philosopher observes at the beginning of his *Metaphysics : All men have a natural desire for knowledge.*

The moderation of this desire pertains to the virtue of studiousness; wherefore it follows that studiousness is a potential part of temperance, as a subordinate virtue annexed to a principal virtue. Moreover, it is comprised under modesty for the reason given above (Q. CLX., A. 2).

Reply Obj. 1. Prudence is the complement of all the moral virtues, as stated in *Ethic.* vi. 13. Consequently, in so far as the knowledge of prudence pertains to all the virtues, the term *studiousness*, which properly regards knowledge, is applied to all the virtues.

Reply Obj. 2. The act of a cognitive power is commanded by the appetitive power, which moves all the powers, as stated above (I.-II., Q. IX., A. 1). Wherefore knowledge regards a twofold good. One is connected with the act of knowledge itself; and this good pertains to the intellectual virtues, and consists in man having a true estimate about each thing. The other good pertains to the act of the appetitive power, and consists in man's appetite being directed aright in applying the cognitive power in this or that way to this or that thing. And this belongs to the virtue of studiousness. Wherefore it is reckoned among the moral virtues.

Reply Obj. 3. As the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* ii. 9) in order to be virtuous we must avoid those things to which we are most naturally inclined. Hence it is that, since nature inclines us chiefly to fear dangers of death, and to seek pleasures of the flesh, fortitude is chiefly commended for a certain steadfast perseverance against such dangers, and temperance for a certain restraint from pleasures of the flesh. But as regards knowledge, man has contrary

inclinations. For on the part of the soul, he is inclined to desire knowledge of things; and so it behoves him to exercise a praiseworthy restraint on this desire, lest he seek knowledge immoderately: whereas on the part of his bodily nature, man is inclined to avoid the trouble of seeking knowledge. Accordingly, as regards the first inclination, studiousness is a kind of restraint, and it is in this sense that it is reckoned a part of temperance. But as to the second inclination, this virtue derives its praise from a certain keenness of interest in seeking knowledge of things; and from this it takes its name. The former is more essential to this virtue than the latter: since the desire to know directly regards knowledge, to which studiousness is directed, whereas the trouble of learning is an obstacle to knowledge, wherefore it is regarded by this virtue indirectly, as by that which removes an obstacle.

QUESTION CLXVII.

OF CURIOSITY.

(*In Two Articles.*)

WE must next consider curiosity, under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether the vice of curiosity can regard intellective knowledge? (2) Whether it is about sensitive knowledge?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER CURIOSITY CAN BE ABOUT INTELLECTIVE KNOWLEDGE?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that curiosity cannot be about intellective knowledge. Because, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* ii. 6), there can be no mean and extremes in things which are essentially good. Now intellective knowledge is essentially good: because man's perfection would seem to consist in his intellect being reduced from potentiality to act, and this is done by the knowledge of truth. For Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* iv. 4) that *the good of the human soul is to be in accordance with reason,* whose perfection consists in knowing the truth. Therefore the vice of curiosity cannot be about intellective knowledge.

Obj. 2. Further, That which makes man like to God, and which he receives from God, cannot be an evil. Now all abundance of knowledge is from God, according to Ecclus. i. 1, *All wisdom is from the Lord God,* and Wis. vii. 17, *He hath given me the true knowledge of things that are, to know the disposition of the whole world, and the virtues of the*

elements, etc. Again, by knowing the truth man is likened to God, since *all things are naked and open to His eyes* (Heb. iv. 13), and *the Lord is a God of all knowledge* (1 Kings ii. 3). Therefore however abundant knowledge of truth may be, it is not evil but good. Now the desire of good is not sinful. Therefore the vice of curiosity cannot be about the intellective knowledge of truth.

Obj. 3. Further, If the vice of curiosity can be about any kind of intellective knowledge, it would be chiefly about the philosophical sciences. But, seemingly, there is no sin in being intent on them: for Jerome says (*Super Daniel.* i. 8): *Those who refused to partake of the king's meat and wine, lest they should be defiled, if they had considered the wisdom and teaching of the Babylonians to be sinful, would never have consented to learn that which was unlawful:* and Augustine says (*De Doctr. Christ.* ii. 40) that *if the philosophers made any true statements, we must claim them for our own use, as from unjust possessors.* Therefore curiosity about intellective knowledge cannot be sinful.

On the contrary, Jerome, commenting on Eph. iv. 17, *That you walk not . . . in vanity*, says: *Is it not evident that a man who day and night wrestles with the dialectic art, the student of natural science whose gaze pierces the heavens, walks in vanity of understanding and darkness of mind?* Now vanity of understanding and darkness of mind are sinful. Therefore curiosity about intellective sciences may be sinful.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CLXVI., A. 1) studiousness is directly, not about knowledge itself, but about the desire and study in the pursuit of knowledge. Now we must judge differently of the knowledge itself of truth, and of the desire and study in the pursuit of the knowledge of truth. For the knowledge of truth, strictly speaking, is good, but it may be evil accidentally, by reason of some result, either because one takes pride in knowing the truth, according to 1 Cor. viii. 1, *Knowledge puffeth up*, or because one uses the knowledge of truth in order to sin.

On the other hand, the desire or study in pursuing the

knowledge of truth may be right or wrong. First, when one tends by his study to the knowledge of truth as having evil accidentally annexed to it, for instance those who study to know the truth that they may take pride in their knowledge. Hence Augustine says (*De Morib. Eccl.* 21): *Some there are who forsaking virtue, and ignorant of what God is, and of the majesty of that nature which ever remains the same, imagine they are doing something great, if with surpassing curiosity and keenness they explore the whole mass of this body which we call the world. So great a pride is thus begotten, that one would think they dwelt in the very heavens about which they argue.* In like manner, those who study to learn something in order to sin are engaged in a sinful study, according to the saying of Jeremias (ix. 5), *They have taught their tongue to speak lies, they have laboured to commit iniquity.* Secondly, there may be sin by reason of the appetite or study directed to the learning of truth being itself inordinate; and this in four ways. First, when a man is withdrawn by a less profitable study from a study that is an obligation incumbent on him; hence Jerome says in a letter (cxlvi.) on the prodigal son: *We see priests forsaking the gospels and the prophets, reading stage-plays, and singing the love songs of pastoral idyls.* Secondly, when a man studies to learn of one, by whom it is unlawful to be taught, as in the case of those who seek to know the future through the demons. This is superstitious curiosity: wherefore Augustine says (*De Vera Relig.* 4): *Maybe, the philosophers were debarred from the faith by their sinful curiosity in seeking knowledge from the demons.* Thirdly, when a man desires to know the truth about creatures, without referring his knowledge to its due end, namely the knowledge of God. Hence Augustine says (*ibid.* 29) that *in studying creatures, we must not be moved by empty and perishable curiosity; but we should ever mount towards immortal and abiding things.* Fourthly, when a man studies to know the truth above the capacity of his own intelligence, since by so doing men easily fall into error: wherefore it is written (Ecclus. iii. 22): *Seek not the things that are too*

high for thee, and search not into things above thy ability . . . and in many of His works be not curious, and further on (*verse* 26), *For . . . the suspicion of them hath deceived many, and hath detained their minds in vanity.*

Reply Obj. 1. Man's good consists in the knowledge of truth; yet man's sovereign good consists, not in the knowledge of any truth, but in the perfect knowledge of the sovereign truth, as the Philosopher states (*Ethic.* x. 7, 8). Hence there may be sin in the knowledge of certain truths, in so far as the desire of such knowledge is not directed in due manner to the knowledge of the sovereign truth, wherein supreme happiness consists.

Reply Obj. 2. Although this argument shows that the knowledge of truth is good in itself, this does not prevent a man from misusing the knowledge of truth for an evil purpose, or from desiring the knowledge of truth inordinately, since even the desire for good should be regulated in due manner.

Reply Obj. 3. The study of philosophy is in itself lawful and commendable, on account of the truth which the philosophers acquired through God revealing it to them, as stated in Rom. i. 19. Since, however, certain philosophers misuse the truth in order to assail the faith, the Apostle says (Coloss. ii. 8): *Beware lest any man cheat you by philosophy and vain deceit, according to the tradition of men . . . and not according to Christ:* and Dionysius says (*Ep. ad Poly.*) of certain philosophers that *they make an unholy use of divine things against that which is divine, and by divine wisdom strive to destroy the worship of God.*

Second Article.

whether the vice of curiosity is about sensitive knowledge?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the vice of curiosity is not about sensitive knowledge. For just as some things are known by the sense of sight, so too are some things known

by the senses of touch and taste. Now the vice concerned about objects of touch and taste is not curiosity but lust or gluttony. Therefore seemingly neither is the vice of curiosity about things known by the sight.

Obj. 2. Further, Curiosity would seem to refer to watching games; wherefore Augustine says (*Conf.* vi. 8) that when *a fall occurred in the fight a mighty cry of the whole people struck him strongly, and overcome by curiosity Alypius opened his eyes.* But it does not seem to be sinful to watch games, because it gives pleasure on account of the representation, wherein man takes a natural delight, as the Philosopher states (*Poet.* ii.). Therefore the vice of curiosity is not about the knowledge of sensible objects.

Obj. 3. Further, It would seem to pertain to curiosity to inquire into our neighbours' actions, as Bede observes on 1 Jo. ii. 16, *Concupiscence of the flesh*, etc. Now, seemingly, it is not a sin to inquire into the actions of others, because according to Ecclus. xvii. 12, God *gave to every one of them commandment concerning his neighbour.* Therefore the vice of curiosity does not regard the knowledge of suchlike particular sensible objects.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Vera Relig.* 38) that *concupiscence of the eyes makes men curious.* Now according to Bede (*loc. cit.*) *concupiscence of the eyes refers not only to the learning of magic arts, but also to sight-seeing, and to the discovery and dispraise of our neighbours' faults*, and all these are particular objects of sense. Therefore since concupiscence of the eyes is a sin, even as concupiscence of the flesh and pride of life, which are members of the same division (1 Jo. ii. 16), it seems that the vice of curiosity is about the knowledge of sensible things.

I answer that, The knowledge of sensible things is directed to two things. For, in the first place, both in man and in other animals, it is directed to the upkeep of the body, because by knowledge of this kind, man and other animals avoid what is harmful to them, and seek those things that are necessary for the body's sustenance. In the second place, it is directed in a manner special to man, to intellective

knowledge, whether speculative or practical. Accordingly to employ study for the purpose of knowing sensible things may be sinful in two ways. First, when the sensitive knowledge is not directed to something useful, but turns man away from some useful consideration. Hence Augustine says (*Conf.* x. 35), *I go no more to see a dog coursing a hare in the circus: but in the open country, if I happen to be passing, that coursing haply will distract me from some weighty thought, and draw me after it . . . and unless Thou, having made me see my weakness, didst speedily admonish me either through the sight itself by some contemplation to rise towards Thee, or altogether to despise it and pass it by, I become foolishly dull.* Secondly, when the knowledge of sensible things is directed to something harmful, as looking on a woman is directed to lust: even so the busy inquiry into other people's actions is directed to detraction. On the other hand, if one be ordinately intent on the knowledge of sensible things by reason of the necessity of sustaining nature, or for the sake of the study of intelligible truth, this studiousness about the knowledge of sensible things is virtuous.

Reply Obj. 1. Lust and gluttony are about pleasures arising from the use of objects of touch, whereas curiosity is about pleasures arising from the knowledge acquired through all the senses. According to Augustine (*Conf.* x. 35) *it is called concupiscence of the eyes* because *the sight is the sense chiefly used for obtaining knowledge, so that all sensible things are said to be seen,* and as he says further on: *By this it may more evidently be discerned wherein pleasure and wherein curiosity is the object of the senses; for pleasure seeketh objects beautiful, melodious, fragrant, savoury, soft; but curiosity, for trial's sake, seeketh even the contraries of these, not for the sake of suffering annoyance, but out of the lust of experiment and knowledge.*

Reply Obj. 2. Sight-seeing becomes sinful, when it renders a man prone to the vices of lust and cruelty on account of things he sees represented. Hence Chrysostom says (*Hom.* vi. *in Matth.*) that such sights make men adulterers and shameless.

Reply Obj. 3. One may watch other people's actions or inquire into them, with a good intent, either for one's own good,—that is in order to be encouraged to better deeds by the deeds of our neighbour,—or for our neighbour's good, —that is in order to correct him, if he do anything wrong, according to the rule of charity and the duty of one's position. This is praiseworthy, according to Heb. x. 24, *Consider one another to provoke unto charity and to good works.* But to observe our neighbours' faults with the intention of looking down upon them, or of detracting them, or even with no purpose at all, is sinful: hence it is written (Prov. xxiv. 15), *Lie not in wait, nor seek after wickedness in the house of the just, nor spoil his rest.*

QUESTION CLXVIII.

OF MODESTY AS CONSISTING IN THE OUTWARD MOVEMENTS OF THE BODY.

(*In Four Articles.*)

We must next consider modesty as consisting in the outward movements of the body, and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether there can be virtue and vice in the outward movements of the body that are done seriously? (2) Whether there can be a virtue about playful actions? (3) Of the sin consisting in excess of play. (4) Of the sin consisting in lack of play.

First Article.

WHETHER ANY VIRTUE REGARDS THE OUTWARD MOVEMENTS OF THE BODY?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that no virtue regards the outward movements of the body. For every virtue pertains to the spiritual beauty of the soul, according to Ps. xliv. 14, *All the glory of the king's daughter is within,* and a gloss adds, *namely, in the conscience.* Now the movements of the body are not within, but without. Therefore there can be no virtue about them.

Obj. 2. Further, Virtues are not in us by nature, as the Philosopher states (*Ethic.* ii. 1). But outward bodily movements are in man by nature, since it is by nature that some are quick, and some slow of movement, and the same applies to other differences of outward movements. Therefore there is no virtue about movements of this kind.

Obj. 3. Further, Every moral virtue is either about actions directed to another person, as justice, or about passions, as temperance and fortitude. Now outward bodily movements are not directed to another person, nor are they passions. Therefore no virtue is connected with them.

Obj. 4. Further, Study should be applied to all works of virtue, as stated above (Q. CLXVI., A. 1, *Obj.* 1; A. 2, *ad* 1). Now it is censurable to apply study to the ordering of one's outward movements: for Ambrose says (*De Offic.* i. 18): *A becoming gait is one that reflects the carriage of authority, has the tread of gravity, and the foot-print of tranquillity : yet so that there be neither study nor affectation, but natural and artless movement.* Therefore seemingly there is no virtue about the style of outward movements.

On the contrary, The beauty of honesty* pertains to virtue. Now the style of outward movements pertains to the beauty of honesty. For Ambrose says (*De Offic.* i. 19): *The sound of the voice and the gesture of the body are distasteful to me, whether they be unduly soft and nerveless, or coarse and boorish. Let nature be our model ; her reflection is gracefulness of conduct and beauty of honesty.* Therefore there is a virtue about the style of outward movement.

I answer that, Moral virtue consists in the things pertaining to man being directed by his reason. Now it is manifest that the outward movements of man are dirigible by reason, since the outward members are set in motion at the command of reason. Hence it is evident that there is a moral virtue concerned with the direction of these movements.

Now the direction of these movements may be considered from a twofold standpoint. First, in respect of fittingness to the person; secondly, in respect of fittingness to externals, whether persons, business, or place. Hence Ambrose says (*ibid.*): *Beauty of conduct consists in becoming behaviour towards others, according to their sex and person,* and this regards the first. As to the second, he adds: *This is the*

* Cf. Q. CXLV., A. 1.

best way to order our behaviour, this is the polish becoming to every action.

Hence Andronicus ascribes two things to these outward movements: namely *taste* (*ornatus*) which regards what is becoming to the person, wherefore he says that it is the knowledge of what is becoming in movement and behaviour; and *methodicalness* (*bona ordinatio*) which regards what is becoming to the business in hand, and to one's surroundings, wherefore he calls it *the practical knowledge of separation, i.e.*, of the distinction of *acts*.

Reply Obj. 1. Outward movements are signs of the inward disposition, according to Ecclus. xix. 27, *The attire of the body, and the laughter of the teeth, and the gait of the man, show what he is;* and Ambrose says (*loc. cit.*) that *the habit of mind is seen in the gesture of the body,* and that *the body's movement is an index of the soul.*

Reply Obj. 2. Although it is from natural disposition that a man is inclined to this or that style of outward movement, nevertheless what is lacking to nature can be supplied by the efforts of reason. Hence Ambrose says (*ibid.*): *Let nature guide the movement: and if nature fail in any respect, surely effort will supply the defect.*

Reply Obj. 3. As stated (*ad* 1) outward movements are indications of the inward disposition, and this regards chiefly the passions of the soul. Wherefore Ambrose says (*De Offic.* i. 18) that *from these things, i.e.* the outward movements, *the man that lies hidden in our hearts is esteemed to be either frivolous, or boastful, or impure, or on the other hand sedate, steady, pure, and free from blemish.* It is moreover from our outward movements that other men form their judgment about us, according to Ecclus. xix. 26, *A man is known by his look, and a wise man, when thou meetest him, is known by his countenance.* Hence moderation of outward movements is directed somewhat to other persons, according to the saying of Augustine in his Rule (*Ep.* ccxi.), *In all your movements, let nothing be done to offend the eye of another, but only that which is becoming to the holiness of your state.* Wherefore the moderation of

outward movements may be reduced to two virtues, which the Philosopher mentions in *Ethic.* iv. 6, 7. For, in so far as by outward movements we are directed to other persons, the moderation of our outward movements belongs to *friendliness or affability.** This regards pleasure or pain which may arise from words or deeds in reference to others with whom a man comes in contact. And, in so far as outward movements are signs of our inward disposition, their moderation belongs to the virtue of truthfulness,† whereby a man, by word and deed, shows himself to be such as he is inwardly.

Reply Obj. 4. It is censurable to study the style of one's outward movements, by having recourse to pretence in them, so that they do not agree with one's inward disposition. Nevertheless it behoves one to study them, so that if they be in any way inordinate, this may be corrected. Hence Ambrose says (*loc. cit.*): *Let them be without artifice, but not without correction.*

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE CAN BE A VIRTUE ABOUT GAMES?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that there cannot be a virtue about games. For Ambrose says (*De Offic.* i. 21): *Our Lord said : "Woe to you who laugh, for you shall weep." Wherefore I consider that all, and not only excessive, games should be avoided.* Now that which can be done virtuously is not to be avoided altogether. Therefore there cannot be a virtue about games.

Obj. 2. Further, *Virtue is that which God forms in us, without us,* as stated above (I.-II., Q. LV., A. 4). Now Chrysostom says (*Hom.* vi. *in Matth.*): *It is not God, but the devil, that is the author of fun. Listen to what happened to those who played : "The people sat down to eat and drink, and they rose up to play."*‡ Therefore there can be no virtue about games.

* Cf. Q. CXIV., A. 1. † Cf. Q. CIX.

‡ Exod. xxxii. 6.

Obj. 3. Further, The Philosopher says (*Ethic.* x. 6), that playful actions are not directed to something else. But it is a requisite of virtue that the agent in choosing should direct his action to something else, as the Philosopher states (*Ethic.* ii. 4). Therefore there can be no virtue about games.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*Music.* ii.): *I pray thee, spare thyself at times: for it becomes a wise man sometimes to relax the high pressure of his attention to work.* Now this relaxation of the mind from work consists in playful words or deeds. Therefore it becomes a wise and virtuous man to have recourse to such things at times. Moreover the Philosopher (*Ethic.* iv. 8) assigns to games the virtue of εὐτραπελία, which we may call wittiness.

I answer that, Just as man needs bodily rest for the body's refreshment, because he cannot always be at work, since his power is finite and equal to a certain fixed amount of labour, so too is it with his soul, whose power is also finite and equal to a fixed amount of work. Consequently when he goes beyond his measure in a certain work, he is oppressed and becomes weary, and all the more since when the soul works the body is at work likewise, in so far as the intellective soul employs forces that operate through bodily organs. Now sensible goods are connatural to man, and therefore, when the soul arises above sensibles, through being intent on the operations of reason, there results in consequence a certain weariness of soul, whether the operations with which it is occupied be those of the practical or of the speculative reason. Yet this weariness is greater if the soul be occupied with the work of contemplation, since thereby it is raised higher above sensible things; although perhaps certain outward works of the practical reason entail a greater bodily labour. In either case, however, one man is more wearied than another, according as he is more intensely occupied with works of reason. Now just as weariness of the body is dispelled by resting the body, so weariness of the soul must needs be remedied by resting the soul: and the soul's rest is pleasure, as stated above (I.-II., Q. XXV., A. 2; Q. XXXI., A. 1, *ad* 2). Con-

sequently, the remedy for weariness of soul must needs consist in the application of some pleasure, by slackening the tension of the reason's study. Thus in the *Conferences of the Fathers* (xxiv. 21) it is related of Blessed John the Evangelist, that when some people were scandalized on finding him playing together with his disciples, he is said to have told one of them who carried a bow to shoot an arrow. And when the latter had done this several times, he asked him whether he could do it indefinitely, and the man answered that if he continued doing it, the bow would break. Whence the Blessed John drew the inference that in like manner man's mind would break if its tension were never relaxed. Now suchlike words or deeds wherein nothing further is sought than the soul's delight, are called playful or humorous. Hence it is necessary at times to make use of them, in order to give rest, as it were, to the soul.

This is in agreement with the statement of the Philosopher (*Ethic.* iv. 8) that *in the intercourse of this life there is a kind of rest that is associated with games:* and consequently it is sometimes necessary to make use of such things. Nevertheless it would seem that in this matter there are three points which require especial caution. The first and chief is that the pleasure in question should not be sought in indecent or injurious deeds or words. Wherefore Tully says (*De Offic.* i.) under the heading *Concerning scurrility and jokes,* that *one kind of joke is discourteous, insolent, scandalous, obscene.* Another thing to be observed is that one lose not the balance of one's mind altogether. Hence Ambrose says (*De Offic.* i. 20): *We should beware lest, when we seek relaxation of mind, we destroy all that harmony which is the concord of good works:* and Tully says (*De Offic.* i.), immediately before the chapter *On scurrility,* that, *just as we do not allow children to enjoy absolute freedom in their games, but only that which is consistent with good behaviour, so our very fun should reflect something of an upright mind.* Thirdly, we must be careful, as in all other human actions, to conform ourselves to persons, time, and place, and take

due account of other circumstances, so that our fun *befit the hour and the man,* as Tully says (*ibid.*, tit. *De Scurril.*). Now these things are directed according to the rule of reason: and a habit that operates according to reason is a virtue.

Therefore there can be a virtue about games. The Philosopher gives it the name of wittiness (εὐτραπελία), and a man is said to be witty through having a happy turn* of mind, whereby he gives his words and deeds a cheerful turn: and inasmuch as this virtue restrains a man from immoderate fun, it is comprised under modesty.

Reply Obj. 1. As stated in the *Article,* fun should fit with business and persons; wherefore Tully says (*Rhet.* i.) that *when the audience is weary, it will be useful for the speaker to try something novel or amusing, provided that joking be not incompatible with the gravity of the subject.* Now the sacred doctrine is concerned with things of the greatest moment, according to Prov. viii. 6, *Hear, for I will speak of great things.* Wherefore Ambrose does not altogether exclude fun from human speech, but from the sacred doctrine; hence he begins by saying: *Although jokes are at times fitting and pleasant, nevertheless they are incompatible with the ecclesiastical rule; since how can we have recourse to things which are not to be found in Holy Writ?*

Reply Obj. 2. This saying of Chrysostom refers to the inordinate use of fun, especially by those who make the pleasure of games their end; of whom it is written (Wis. xv. 12): *They have accounted our life a pastime.* Against these Tully says (*De Offic.* i.) under the title, *The source of modesty is the appetite's obedience to reason: We are so begotten by nature that we appear to be made not for play and fun, but rather for hardships, and for occupations of greater gravity and moment.*

Reply. Obj. 3. Playful actions themselves considered in their species are not directed to an end: but the pleasure derived from such actions is directed to the recreation and rest of the soul, and accordingly if this be done with

* Εὐτραπελία is derived from τρέπειν = *to turn.*

moderation, it is lawful to make use of fun. Hence Tully says (*loc. cit.*) : *It is indeed lawful to make use of play and fun, but in the same way as we have recourse to sleep and other kinds of rest, then only when we have done our duty by grave and serious matters.*

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE CAN BE SIN IN THE EXCESS OF PLAY?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that there cannot be sin in the excess of play. For that which is an excuse for sin is not held to be sinful. Now play is sometimes an excuse for sin, for many things would be grave sins if they were done seriously, whereas if they be done in fun, are either no sin or but slightly sinful. Therefore it seems that there is no sin in excessive play.

Obj. 2. Further, All other vices are reducible to the seven capital vices, as Gregory states (*Moral.* xxxi. 17). But excess of play does not seem reducible to any of the capital vices. Therefore it would seem not to be a sin.

Obj. 3. Further, Comedians especially would seem to exceed in play, since they direct their whole life to playing. Therefore if excess of play were a sin, all actors would be in a state of sin; moreover all those who employ them, as well as those who make them any payment, would sin as accomplices of their sin. But this would seem untrue; for it is related in the Lives of the Fathers (ii. 16; viii. 63) that it was revealed to the Blessed Paphnutius that a certain jester would be with him in the life to come.

On the contrary, A gloss on Prov. xiv. 13, *Laughter shall be mingled with sorrow, and mourning taketh hold of the end of joy,* remarks: *A mourning that will last for ever.* Now there is inordinate laughter and inordinate joy in excessive play. Therefore there is mortal sin therein, since mortal sin alone is deserving of everlasting mourning.

I answer that, In all things dirigible according to reason, the excessive is that which goes beyond, and the deficient is that which falls short of the rule of reason. Now it

has been stated (A. 2) that playful or jesting words or deeds are dirigible according to reason. Wherefore excessive play is that which goes beyond the rule of reason: and this happens in two ways. First, on account of the very species of the acts employed for the purpose of fun, and this kind of jesting, according to Tully (*loc. cit.*), is stated to be *discourteous, insolent, scandalous, and obscene*, when to wit a man, for the purpose of jesting, employs indecent words or deeds, or such as are injurious to his neighbour, these being of themselves mortal sins. And thus it is evident that excessive play is a mortal sin.

Secondly, there may be excess in play, through lack of due circumstances: for instance when people make use of fun at undue times or places, or out of keeping with the matter in hand, or persons. This may be sometimes a mortal sin on account of the strong attachment to play, when a man prefers the pleasure he derives therefrom to the love of God, so as to be willing to disobey a commandment of God or of the Church rather than forgo suchlike amusements. Sometimes, however, it is a venial sin, for instance where a man is not so attached to amusement as to be willing for its sake to do anything in disobedience to God.

Reply Obj. 1. Certain things are sinful on account of the intention alone, because they are done in order to injure someone. Such an intention is excluded by their being done in fun, the intention of which is to please, not to injure: in these cases fun excuses from sin, or diminishes it. Other things, however, are sins according to their species, such as murder, fornication, and the like: and fun is no excuse for these, in fact they make fun scandalous and obscene.

Reply Obj. 2. Excessive play pertains to senseless mirth, which Gregory (*loc. cit.*) calls a daughter of gluttony. Wherefore it is written (Exod. xxxii. 6): *The people sat down to eat and drink, and they rose up to play.*

Reply. Obj. 3. As stated in the foregoing *Article*, play is necessary for the intercourse of human life. Now what-

ever is useful to human intercourse may have a lawful employment ascribed to it. Wherefore the occupation of play-actors, the object of which is to cheer the heart of man, is not unlawful in itself; nor are they in a state of sin provided that their playing be moderated, namely that they use no unlawful words or deeds in order to amuse, and that they do not introduce play into undue matters and seasons. And although in human affairs, they have no other occupation in reference to other men, nevertheless in reference to themselves, and to God, they perform other actions both serious and virtuous, such as prayer and the moderation of their own passions and operations, while sometimes they give alms to the poor. Wherefore those who maintain them in moderation do not sin but act justly, by rewarding them for their services. On the other hand, if a man spends too much on such persons, or maintains those comedians who practise unlawful mirth, he sins as encouraging them in their sin. Hence Augustine says (*Tract* C. *in Joan.*) that *to give one's property to comedians is a great sin, not a virtue;* unless by chance some play-actor were in extreme need, in which case one would have to assist him, for Ambrose says (*De Offic.*)* *: Feed him that dies of hunger; for whenever thou canst save a man by feeding him, if thou hast not fed him, thou hast slain him.*

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE IS A SIN IN LACK OF MIRTH?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that there is no sin in lack of mirth. For no sin is prescribed to a penitent. But Augustine speaking of a penitent says (*De Vera et Falsa Pœnit.* 15): *Let him refrain from games and the sights of the world, if he wishes to obtain the grace of a full pardon.* Therefore there is no sin in lack of mirth.

Obj. 2. Further, No sin is included in the praise given to holy men, But some persons are praised for having

* Quoted in Canon *Pasce, dist.* 86.

refrained from mirth; for it is written (Jerem. xv. 17): *I sat not in the assembly of jesters,* and (Tob. iii. 17): *Never have I joined myself with them that play ; neither have I made myself partaker with them that walk in lightness.* Therefore there can be no sin in the lack of mirth.

Obj. 3. Further, Andronicus counts austerity to be one of the virtues, and he describes it as a habit whereby a man neither gives nor receives the pleasures of conversation. Now this pertains to the lack of mirth. Therefore the lack of mirth is virtuous rather than sinful.

On the contrary, The Philosopher (*Ethic* ii. 7; iv. 8) reckons the lack of mirth to be a vice.

I answer that, In human affairs whatever is against reason is a sin. Now it is against reason for a man to be burdensome to others, by offering no pleasure to others, and by hindering their enjoyment. Wherefore Seneca says (*De Quat. Virt.,* cap. *De Continentia*) *: Let your conduct be guided by wisdom so that no one will think you rude, or despise you as a cad.* Now a man who is without mirth, not only is lacking in playful speech, but is also burdensome to others, since he is deaf to the moderate mirth of others. Consequently they are vicious, and are said to be boorish or rude, as the Philosopher states (*Ethic.* iv. 8).

Since, however, mirth is useful for the sake of the rest and pleasures it affords; and since, in human life, pleasure and rest are not in quest for their own sake, but for the sake of operation, as stated in *Ethic.* x. 6, it follows that *lack of mirth is less sinful than excess thereof.* Hence the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* ix. 10): *We should make few friends for the sake of pleasure, since but little sweetness suffices to season life, just as little salt suffices for our meat.*

Reply Obj. 1. Mirth is forbidden the penitent because he is called upon to mourn for his sins. Nor does this imply a vice in default, because this very diminishment of mirth in them is in accordance with reason.

Reply Obj. 2. Jeremias speaks there in accordance with the times, the state of which required that man should mourn; wherefore he adds: *I sat alone, because Thou*

hast filled me with threats. The words of Tobias iii. refer to excessive mirth; and this is evident from his adding: *Neither have I made myself partaker with them that walk in lightness.*

Reply Obj. 3. Austerity, as a virtue, does not exclude all pleasures, but only such as are excessive and inordinate: wherefore it would seem to pertain to affability, which the Philosopher (*Ethic.* iv. 6) calls *friendliness*, or εὐτραπελία, otherwise wittiness. Nevertheless he names and defines it thus in respect of its agreement with temperance, to which it belongs to restrain pleasure.

QUESTION CLXIX.

OF MODESTY IN THE OUTWARD APPAREL.

(In Two Articles.)

We must now consider modesty as connected with the outward apparel, and under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether there can be virtue and vice in connexion with outward apparel? (2) Whether women sin mortally by excessive adornment?

First Article.

WHETHER THERE CAN BE VIRTUE AND VICE IN CONNEXION WITH OUTWARD APPAREL?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that there cannot be virtue and vice in connexion with outward apparel. For outward adornment does not belong to us by nature, wherefore it varies according to different times and places. Hence Augustine says (*De Doctr. Christ.* iii. 12) that *among the ancient Romans it was scandalous for one to wear a cloak with sleeves and reaching to the ankles, whereas now it is scandalous for anyone hailing from a reputable place to be without them.* Now according to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* ii. 1) there is in us a natural aptitude for the virtues. Therefore there is no virtue or vice about such things.

Obj. 2. Further, If there were virtue and vice in connexion with outward attire, excess in this matter would be sinful. Now excess in outward attire is not apparently sinful, since even the ministers of the altar use most precious vestments in the sacred ministry. Likewise it would seem

not to be sinful to be lacking in this, for it is said in praise of certain people (Heb. xi. 37): *They wandered about in sheep-skins and in goat-skins.* Therefore it seems that there cannot be virtue and vice in this matter.

Obj. 3. Further, Every virtue is either theological, or moral, or intellectual. Now this matter is not the concern of an intellectual virtue, since the latter consists in some knowledge of truth. Nor is there a theological virtue connected therewith, since that has God for its object; nor are any of the moral virtues enumerated by the Philosopher (*Ethic.* ii. 7), connected with it. Therefore it seems that there cannot be virtue and vice in connexion with this kind of attire.

On the contrary, Honesty* pertains to virtue. Now a certain honesty is observed in the outward apparel; for Ambrose says (*De Offic.* i. 19): *The body should be bedecked naturally and without affectation, with simplicity, with negligence rather than nicety, not with costly and dazzling apparel, but with ordinary clothes, so that nothing be lacking to honesty and necessity, yet nothing be added to increase its beauty.* Therefore there can be virtue and vice in the outward attire.

I answer that, It is not in the outward things themselves which man uses, that there is vice, but on the part of man who uses them immoderately. This lack of moderation occurs in two ways. First, in comparison with the customs of those among whom one lives; wherefore Augustine says (*Conf.* iii. 8): *Those offences which are contrary to the customs of men, are to be avoided according to the customs generally prevailing; so that a thing agreed upon and confirmed by custom or law of any city or nation may not be violated at the lawless pleasure of any, whether citizen or foreigner. For any part, which harmonizeth not with its whole, is offensive.* Secondly, the lack of moderation in the use of these things may arise from the inordinate attachment of the user, the result being that a man sometimes takes too much pleasure in using them, either in accordance with the

* Cf. Q. CXLV.

custom of those among whom he dwells, or contrary to such custom. Hence Augustine says (*De Doctr. Christ.* iii. 12): *We must avoid excessive pleasure in the use of things, for it leads not only wickedly to abuse the customs of those among whom we dwell, but frequently to exceed their bounds, so that, whereas it lay hidden, while under the restraint of established morality, it displays its deformity in a most lawless outbreak.*

In point of excess, this inordinate attachment occurs in three ways. First, when a man seeks glory from excessive attention to dress; in so far as dress and suchlike things are a kind of ornament. Hence Gregory says (*Hom.* xl. *in Ev.*): *There are some who think that attention to finery and costly dress is no sin. Surely, if this were no fault, the word of God would not say so expressly that the rich man who was tortured in hell had been clothed in purple and fine linen. No one, forsooth, seeks costly apparel* (such, namely, as exceeds his estate) *save for vainglory.* Secondly, when a man seeks sensuous pleasure from excessive attention to dress, in so far as dress is directed to the body's comfort. Thirdly, when a man is too solicitous* in his attention to outward apparel.

Accordingly Andronicus reckons three virtues in connexion with outward attire; namely *humility,* which excludes the seeking of glory, wherefore he says that humility is *the habit of avoiding excessive expenditure and parade;* and *contentedness,* which excludes the seeking of sensuous pleasure, wherefore he says that contentedness is the habit that makes a man satisfied with what he ought to be, *and enables him to determine what is becoming in his manner of life,* according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Tim. vi. 8): *Having food and wherewith to be covered, with these let us be content;* and *simplicity,* which excludes excessive solicitude only, wherefore he says that simplicity is a habit that makes a man contented with what he has.

In the point of deficiency there may be inordinate attachment in two ways. First, through a man's neglect to give the requisite study or trouble to the use of outward apparel.

* Cf. Q. LV., A. 6.

Wherefore the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* vii. 7) that *it is a mark of effeminacy to let one's cloak trail on the ground to avoid the trouble of lifting it up*. Secondly, by seeking glory from the very lack of attention to outward attire. Hence Augustine says (*De. Serm. Dom. in Monte* ii.) that *not only the glare and pomp of outward things, but even the weeds of mourning may be a subject of ostentation, all the more dangerous as being a decoy under the guise of God's service;* and the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iv. 7) that *both excess and inordinate deficiency are a subject of ostentation.*

Reply Obj. 1. Although outward attire does not come from nature, it belongs to natural reason to moderate it; so that we are naturally inclined to be the recipients of the virtue that moderates outward raiment.

Reply Obj. 2. Those who are placed in a position of dignity, or again the ministers of the altar, are attired in more costly apparel than others, not for the sake of their own glory, but to indicate the excellence of their office or of the Divine worship: wherefore this is not sinful in them. Hence Augustine says (*De Doctr. Christ.* iii. 12): *Whoever uses outward things in such a way as to exceed the bounds observed by the good people among whom he dwells, either signifies something by so doing, or is guilty of sin, inasmuch as he uses these things for sensual pleasure or ostentation.* Likewise there may be sin on the part of deficiency: although it is not always a sin to wear coarser clothes than other people. For, if this be done through ostentation or pride, in order to set oneself above others, it is a sin of superstition; whereas, if this be done to tame the flesh, or to humble the spirit, it belongs to the virtue of temperance. Hence Augustine says (*ibid.*): *Whoever uses transitory things with greater restraint than is customary with those among whom he dwells, is either temperate or superstitious.* Especially, however, is the use of coarse raiment befitting to those who by word and example urge others to repentance, as did the prophets of whom the Apostle is speaking in the passage quoted. Wherefore a gloss on Matth. iii. 4 says: *He who preaches penance, wears the garb of penance.*

Reply Obj. 3. This outward apparel is an indication of man's estate, wherefore excess, deficiency, and mean therein, are referable to the virtue of truthfulness, which the Philosopher (*loc. cit.*) assigns to deeds and words, which are indications of something connected with man's estate.

Second Article.

whether the adornment of women is devoid of mortal sin?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the adornment of women is not devoid of mortal sin. For whatever is contrary to a precept of the Divine law is a mortal sin. Now the adornment of women is contrary to a precept of the Divine law; for it is written (1 Pet. iii. 3): *Whose,* namely women's, *adorning, let it not be the outward plaiting of the hair, or the wearing of gold, or the putting on of apparel.* Wherefore a gloss of Cyprian says: *Those who are clothed in silk and purple cannot sincerely put on Christ: those who are bedecked with gold and pearls and trinkets have forfeited the adornments of mind and body.* Now this is not done without a mortal sin. Therefore the adornment of women cannot be devoid of mortal sin.

Obj. 2. Further, Cyprian says (*De Habit. Virg.*): *I hold that not only virgins and widows, but also wives and all women without exception, should be admonished that nowise should they deface God's work and fabric, the clay that He has fashioned, with the aid of yellow pigments, black powders or rouge, or by applying any dye that alters the natural features.* And afterwards he adds: *They lay hands on God, when they strive to reform what He has formed. This is an assault on the Divine handiwork, a distortion of the truth. Thou shalt not be able to see God, having no longer the eyes that God made, but those the devil has unmade; with him shalt thou burn on whose account thou art bedecked.* But this is not due except to mortal sin. Therefore the adornment of women is not devoid of mortal sin.

Obj. 3. Further, Just as it is unbecoming for a woman to wear man's clothes, so is it unbecoming for her to adorn herself inordinately. Now the former is a sin, for it is written (Deut. xxii. 5): *A woman shall not be clothed with man's apparel, neither shall a man use woman's apparel.* Therefore it seems that also the excessive adornment of women is a mortal sin.

Obj. 4. *On the contrary,* If this were true it would seem that the makers of these means of adornment sin mortally.

I answer that, As regards the adornment of women, we must bear in mind the general statements made above (A. 1) concerning outward apparel, and also something special, namely that a woman's apparel may incite men to lust, according to Prov. vii. 10, *Behold a woman meeteth him in harlot's attire, prepared to deceive souls.*

Nevertheless a woman may use means to please her husband, lest through despising her he fall into adultery. Hence it is written (1 Cor. vii. 34) that the woman *that is married thinketh on the things of the world, how she may please her husband.* Wherefore if a married woman adorn herself in order to please her husband she can do this without sin.

But those women who have no husband nor wish to have one, or who are in a state of life inconsistent with marriage, cannot without sin desire to give lustful pleasure to those men who see them, because this is to incite them to sin. And if indeed they adorn themselves with this intention of provoking others to lust, they sin mortally; whereas if they do so from frivolity, or from vanity for the sake of ostentation, it is not always mortal, but sometimes venial. And the same applies to men in this respect. Hence Augustine says (*Ep.* ccxlv.) in a letter to Possidius: *I do not wish you to be hasty in forbidding the wearing of gold or costly attire except in the case of those who being neither married nor wishful to marry, should think how they may please God: whereas the others think on the things of the world, either husbands how they may please their wives, or wives how they may please their husbands, except that it is*

unbecoming for women though married to uncover their hair, since the Apostle commands them to cover the head. Yet in this case some might be excused from sin, when they do this not through vanity but on account of some contrary custom: although such a custom is not to be commended.

Reply Obj. 1. As a gloss says on this passage, *The wives of those who were in distress despised their husbands, and decked themselves that they might please other men :* and the Apostle forbids this. Cyprian is speaking in the same sense; yet he does not forbid married women to adorn themselves in order to please their husbands, lest the latter be afforded an occasion of sin with other women. Hence the Apostle says (1 Tim. ii. 9): *Women . . . in ornate* (Douay—*decent*) *apparel, adorning themselves with modesty and sobriety, not with plaited hair, or gold, or pearls, or costly attire :* whence we are given to understand that women are not forbidden to adorn themselves soberly and moderately, but to do so excessively, shamelessly, and immodestly.

Reply Obj. 2. Cyprian is speaking of women painting themselves: this is a kind of falsification, which cannot be devoid of sin. Wherefore Augustine says in a letter to Possidius (*Ep.* ccxlv.): *To dye oneself with paints in order to have a rosier or a paler complexion is a lying counterfeit. I doubt whether even their husbands are willing to be deceived by it, by whom alone* (i.e. the husbands) *are they to be permitted, but not ordered, to adorn themselves.* However, such painting does not always involve a mortal sin, but only when it is done for the sake of sensuous pleasure or in contempt of God, and it is to like cases that Cyprian refers.

It must, however, be observed that it is one thing to counterfeit a beauty one has not, and another to hide a disfigurement arising from some cause such as sickness or the like. For this is lawful, since according to the Apostle (1 Cor. xii. 23), *such as we think to be the less honourable members of the body, about these we put more abundant honour.*

Reply Obj. 3. As stated in the foregoing *Article*, outward apparel should be consistent with the estate of the person, according to the general custom. Hence it is in itself

sinful for a woman to wear man's clothes, or *vice versa*; especially since this may be a cause of sensuous pleasure; and it is expressly forbidden in the Law (Deut. xxii.) because the Gentiles used to practise this change of attire for the purpose of idolatrous superstition. Nevertheless this may be done sometimes without sin on account of some necessity, either in order to hide oneself from enemies, or through lack of other clothes, or for some similar motive.

Reply Obj. 4. In the case of an art directed to the production of goods which men cannot use without sin, it follows that the workmen sin in making such things, as directly affording others an occasion of sin: for instance, if a man were to make idols or anything pertaining to idolatrous worship. But in the case of an art the products of which may be employed by man either for a good or for an evil use, such as swords, arrows, and the like, the practice of such an art is not sinful. These alone should be called arts; wherefore Chrysostom says (*Hom.* 1. *super Matth.*): *The name of art should be applied to those only which contribute towards and produce necessaries and mainstays of life.* In the case of an art that produces things which for the most part some people put to an evil use, although such arts are not unlawful in themselves, nevertheless, according to the teaching of Plato, they should be extirpated from the State by the governing authority. Accordingly, since women may lawfully adorn themselves, whether to maintain the fitness of their estate, or even by adding something thereto, in order to please their husbands, it follows that those who make such means of adornment do not sin in the practice of their art, except perhaps by inventing means that are superfluous and fantastic. Hence Chrysostom says on Matthew (*loc. cit.*) that *even the shoemakers' and clothiers' arts stand in need of restraint, for they have lent their art to lust, by abusing its needs, and debasing art by art.*

QUESTION CLXX.

OF THE PRECEPTS OF TEMPERANCE.

(*In Two Articles.*)

We must next consider the precepts of temperance: (1) The precepts of temperance itself; (2) the precepts of its parts.

First Article.

WHETHER THE PRECEPTS OF TEMPERANCE ARE SUITABLY GIVEN IN THE DIVINE LAW?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the precepts of temperance are unsuitably given in the Divine law. Because fortitude is a greater virtue than temperance, as stated above (Q. CXLI., A. 8; I.-II., Q. LXI., A. 4). Now there is no precept of fortitude among the precepts of the decalogue, which are the most important among the precepts of the Law. Therefore it was unfitting to include among the precepts of the decalogue the prohibition of adultery, which is contrary to temperance, as stated above (Q. CLIV., A. 8).

Obj. 2. Further, Temperance is not only about venereal matters, but also about pleasures of meat and drink. Now the precepts of the decalogue include no prohibition of a vice pertaining to pleasures of meat and drink, or to any other species of lust. Neither, therefore, should they include a precept prohibiting adultery, which pertains to venereal pleasure.

Obj. 3. Further, In the lawgiver's intention inducement to virtue precedes the prohibition of vice, since vices are forbidden in order that obstacles to virtue may be removed.

Now the precepts of the decalogue are the most important in the Divine law. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue should have included an affirmative precept directly prescribing the virtue of temperance, rather than a negative precept forbidding adultery which is directly opposed thereto.

On the contrary stands the authority of Scripture in the decalogue (Exod. xx. 14, 17).

I answer that, As the Apostle says (1 Tim. i. 5), *the end of the commandment is charity*, which is enjoined upon us in the two precepts concerning the love of God and of our neighbour. Wherefore the decalogue contains those precepts which tend more directly to the love of God and of our neighbour. Now among the vices opposed to temperance, adultery would seem most of all opposed to the love of our neighbour, since thereby a man lays hold of another's property for his own use, by abusing his neighbour's wife. Wherefore the precepts of the decalogue include a special prohibition of adultery, not only as committed in deed, but also as desired in thought.

Reply Obj. 1. Among the species of vices opposed to fortitude there is not one that is so directly opposed to the love of our neighbour as adultery, which is a species of lust that is opposed to temperance: and yet the vice of daring, which is opposed to fortitude, is wont to be sometimes the cause of murder, which is forbidden by one of the precepts of the decalogue: for it is written (Ecclus. viii. 18): *Go not on the way with a bold man lest he burden thee with his evils.*

Reply Obj. 2. Gluttony is not directly opposed to the love of our neighbour, as adultery is. Nor indeed is any other species of lust, for a father is not so wronged by the seduction of the virgin over whom he has no connubial right, as is the husband by the adultery of his wife, for he, not the wife herself, has power over her body.

Reply Obj. 3. As stated above (Q. CXXII., A. 1) the precepts of the decalogue are universal principles of the Divine law; hence they need to be common precepts.

Now it was not possible to give any common affirmative precepts of temperance, because the practice of temperance varies according to different times, as Augustine remarks (*De Bono Conjug.* 5), and according to different human laws and customs.

Second Article.

Whether the precepts of the virtues annexed to temperance are suitably given in the Divine law?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the precepts of the virtues annexed to temperance are unsuitably given in the Divine law. For the precepts of the decalogue, as stated above (A. 1, *ad* 3), are certain universal principles of the whole Divine law. Now *pride is the beginning of all sin*, according to Ecclus. x. 15. Therefore among the precepts of the decalogue there should have been one forbidding pride.

Obj. 2. Further, A place before all should have been given in the decalogue to those precepts by which men are especially induced to fulfil the Law, because these would seem to be the most important. Now since humility subjects man to God, it would seem most of all to dispose man to the fulfilment of the Divine law; wherefore obedience is accounted one of the degrees of humility, as stated above (Q. CLXI., A. 6); and the same apparently applies to meekness, the effect of which is that a man does not contradict the Divine Scriptures, as Augustine observes (*De Doctr. Christ.* ii. 7). Therefore it seems that the decalogue should have contained precepts of humility and meekness.

Obj. 3. Further, It was stated in the foregoing *Article* that adultery is forbidden in the decalogue, because it is contrary to the love of our neighbour. But inordinateness of outward movements, which is contrary to modesty, is opposed to neighbourly love: wherefore Augustine says in his Rule (*Ep.* ccxii.): *In all your movements let nothing be done to offend the eye of any person whatever.* Therefore it seems that this kind of inordinateness should also have been forbidden by a precept of the decalogue.

On the contrary suffices the authority of Scripture.

I answer that, The virtues annexed to temperance may be considered in two ways: first, in themselves; secondly, in their effects. Considered in themselves they have no direct connexion with the love of God or of our neighbour; rather do they regard a certain moderation of things pertaining to man himself. But considered in their effects, they may regard the love of God or of our neighbour: and in this respect the decalogue contains precepts that relate to the prohibition of the effects of the vices opposed to the parts of temperance. Thus the effect of anger, which is opposed to meekness, is sometimes that a man goes on to commit murder (and this is forbidden in the decalogue), and sometimes that he refuses due honour to his parents, which may also be the result of pride, which leads many to transgress the precepts of the first table.

Reply Obj. 1. Pride is the beginning of sin, but it lies hidden in the heart; and its inordinateness is not perceived by all in common. Hence there was no place for its prohibition among the precepts of the decalogue, which are first self-evident principles.

Reply Obj. 2. Those precepts which are essentially an inducement to the observance of the Law presuppose the Law to be already given, wherefore they cannot be first precepts of the Law so as to have a place in the decalogue.

Reply Obj. 3. Inordinate outward movement is not injurious to one's neighbour, if we consider the species of the act, as are murder, adultery, and theft, which are forbidden in the decalogue; but only as being signs of an inward inordinateness, as stated above (Q. CLXVIII., A. 1, *ad* 1).

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